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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the decline of the Labour party in two constituencies in north- 
west Wales (Caernarfonshire and Merioneth) from the mid 1960s onwards, a decline 
which culminated in the party's defeat at the hands of the Welsh Nationalist Party - 
Plaid Cymru - in the general election of February 1974. Whilst the study is essentially 
local, it places political change in the region within much broader experiences and 
circumstances. National as well as local forces for political change are examined. 
Social, economic and cultural factors underpinning those changes are also considered. 
The structure of the thesis is broadly chronological and is divided into six chapters. 
The first chapter examines Labour's attempt to embed itself within these unfamiliar, 
rural, traditionally Welsh speaking communities before and after the Second World 
War. It shows that after 1945, Labour's (overwhelming) electoral successes were 
based on a combination of local and national, cultural and linguistic as well as 
economic appeals. The second chapter examines social and economic change from 
1960-74, and shows the socio-economic challenges faced by Labour in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. These changes were the result of numerous factors, both long term and 
short term. It shows how national trends such as `affluence' combined with local 
concerns such as depopulation and the decline of the Welsh language to present 
powerful political challenges. The third chapter examines Labour's response to these 
challenges. It shows that whilst Labour was still successful, its commitment and plans 
to deliver social and economic reforms were undermined by the economic problems 
of the mid to late 1960s. Chapter Four shows how a viable political challenger to 
Labour - Plaid Cymru - emerged in the 1960s. Chapter Five focuses on Plaid's efforts 
to undermine Labour's credibility in the 1960s and on Labour's response to the 
emerging nationalist challenge. Chapter Six focuses on the general elections of 
February and October 1974, on the problems facing Labour in developing `new' 
solutions to the regions problems and on the popularity of Plaid Cymru's appeal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I 
The history of the Labour party in Wales has been dominated by two broad concerns. 
On the one hand, the majority of the literature has concentrated on the period up to 
1945. On the other, most of that material has focussed on the history of the party in 
south Wales. Labour's history is (largely) a tale of overwhelming dominance, 
powerful trade unions, formidable Labour figures and a bristling and hostile 
radicalism. ' Although that electoral domination - if not the union domination and 
hostile radicalism - is now more apparent than ever at parliamentary level, 
weaknesses have emerged across the last thirty years that have only recently been 
highlighted. 2 Whilst the `rise of Labour' in Wales has produced a huge literature, the 
`decline of Labour' in some parts of Wales and its fragility elsewhere, remains to be 
fully investigated. 
The literature that deals with the post 1945 period is comparatively sparse. Leading 
Labour figures have captured most of the attention. There have been adulatory and 
romantic studies of leading figures such as Nye Bevan and Jim Griffiths. 3 In recent 
years, Jim Callaghan has been the subject of a major biography and Neil Kinnock 
(who still lacks a biographical study of the same depth) has also attracted attention. 
4 
These studies of national Labour leaders with seats in south Wales draw important 
attention to one of the ways in which Wales influenced British politics, but their direct 
examination of specifically Welsh events is necessarily muted. Moreover, none of 
these figures `led' Welsh Labour, in part because of their role in British Labour 
politics. 
As fewer leading figures have emerged from north `'ales -with no Labour politicians 
of the mythical, heroic, stature of Bevan or Hardie or the importance of Griffiths, 
Callaghan or Kinnock - there is no biographical basis for historians to develop. 
Despite this, a number of figures from the north were formative and influential figures 
in the shaping of Welsh Labour politics both before and after 1945. Despite his 
significant contribution to the implantation and development of the party in the north, 
David Thomas has only recently been the subject of a biography. Other leading north 
Wales figures from the post 1945 period such as Cledwyn Hughes, Goronwy Roberts, 
Huw T. Edwards and T. W. Jones have received little attention. ' When they do 
appear, it is largely as devolutionists alone. 
The literature on north Wales politics is very good, but not without its weaknesses. 
Cyril Parry's work on the origins of Labour's success in north Wales up to 1918 was 
published in the early 1970s. There has been nothing since. Other historians have 
touched on the institutional history of the party in the north, Merfyn Jones in a study 
of the north Wales quarrymen and David Pretty on farm workers' trade unions in 
Wales. 6 Both these works focussed on the period before the Second World War, and 
reflected the south Wales historians' emphasis on class and trade unions. 
' Whilst 
evidently recognising unique local circumstances, their explanations of events 
reflected conceptual emphasis that was more suitable to south Wales. The period after 
1945 is virtually virgin territory. 
I 
Most studies of post war events focus on devolution - and most also assume that this 
issue was detached from other aspects of Labour policy. It is regularly treated either 
as a recent event or as part of a history of struggles by `good' Welshmen against 'bad' 
political forces. 8 Only K. O. Morgan has tried to combine studies of Labour with 
studies of `Welshness', supporting both with archival research of prodigious depth 
and quality. Moreover, Morgan's work set an important, but subsequently neglected, 
lead in looking beyond class and trade unionism to explain Labour's success, and in 
looking at north and south, devolution and other aspects of politics, the `Welsh 
influence' and the British dimension as forces moulding the pattern of opinion. 9 
Understanding Labour's power in the south tells only half a story - one of massive 
majorities, popular messages, powerful individuals and institutions, trade union unrest 
and allegations of corruption. In the other half of Wales, Labour cultivated 
unprofitable terrain through advocating unusual and distinctively `Welsh' messages in 
areas where it lacked either institutional or individual power. This story remains 
untold. 10 Understanding Labour in the south has, in part at least, been motivated by a 
desire to understand the basis of Labour's early success and growth. This thesis - on 
the north - is motivated, in part at least, by a desire to understand the basis of 
Labour's increasingly challenged power - in the area where that challenge was first 
felt. The thesis is thus an attempt to engage with a challenge posed by Chris Williams 
to move away from `labour with a capital `L', palais de danse and fish and chip shops 
and cup finals' and understand also `the more exotic strains of British socialism' - in 
this case, the `peculiar form of socialism' evident in north Wales. " 
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II 
If studying the Labour politics of north Wales and the circumstances of the party's 
collapse is a step away from `normal' Labour history, it is also a step towards a 
`newer' history, building on Morgan's initiatives which accepts -identity' and 
`economics' as influences on electoral change, and which sees the collapse of Labour 
in Wales as part of broader changes in political alignments across Britain and indeed 
much of Europe. Labour's problems in north-west Wales in the 1960s and 1970s were 
not unique. The party was being challenged by nationalists across Wales and Scotland 
and by Liberals across England. In Europe, parties were also emerging which 
challenged the conventional political establishment, some representing the nationalist 
aspirations of areas within States, others delivering protests at political complacency, 
stagnation or corruption. As contemporary voting analysis recognised, there was no 
longer a blind allegiance to social class. Other forms of identity were of growing 
importance. Political changes apparently followed in their wake. 
These changes are generally examined only at national level, and largely by political 
scientists. Even pioneering regional studies of Labour's history have concentrated, to 
a large extent, on local issues, politics, policies and personalities and the period before 
1939.12 The relationship between `national' politics and appeals and `local' demands 
and concerns is often passed over in post-war studies, which assume that politics had 
become `nationalised' by 1945. This thesis shows how national (UK) concerns 
meshed with `local' issues to create support for electoral changes. It shows that 
politics did not become entirely `national', and that allegiances could be challenged 
when 'national' approaches had no `local' appeal. 
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It took some time for historians to recognise that Labour's post-war success could not 
be taken for granted and that the way it held power needed to be explained. A number 
of scholars challenged traditional assumptions about class and voting behaviour in 
doing this. It took even longer for scholars to address the way that the party held 
power - and eventually lost it - both in Wales and elsewhere. 
'' Recent work on Wales 
has in some respects set a new agenda for research on Labour's collapse in other parts 
of the UK, since it has attempted to understand the `one party States' that Labour 
created in the 1950s and 1960s, and the challenges it faced thereafter. '` However, if 
there are innumerable local case studies of Labour's rise to power, there are very few 
which throw light on the challenges of the 1960s and after. This thesis thus fills a gap, 
both in Welsh history and in British history. It doing so, it draws attention to a 
neglected part of Wales and to themes other than class and trade unionism. It looks at 
`Welsh' and `British' influences on political attitudes, and at both devolution and 
other aspects of Labour politics. In doing so, it suggests a Labour `ascendancy' which 
was much weaker that is often assumed, and more contingent on the capacity to 
deliver something valued by ordinary people. 
III 
To understand political change we need to look not just at a dominant party, but at its 
rivals. For most of the century, Labour lacked a credible political rival in many of its 
heartland constituencies. Massive majorities (in south Wales and elsewhere in the 
UK) were the norm rather than an exception. When the party experienced problems in 
such areas they were - more often than not - self created. 
Political rivals capitalised 
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on these deficiencies in by-elections, but these were generally temporary aberrations 
by Labour voters who usually returned to the fold in -general elections. Labour 
experienced a realistic and sustained challenge in very few industrial constituencies - 
at least not until the early 1970s. 
It is seldom recognised that this challenge did not emerge from nothing, and that 
`warnings' sounded in by-elections could become a sustained assault on weakened 
allegiances. From the mid 1960s onwards, Labour experienced a sustained challenge 
to its dominance from the emerging political voice of Plaid Cymru. The challenge was 
eventually successful in north-west Wales. It has not been reversed. It has not been a 
`protest' vote, but a gradual erosion of a position and the building of a new alignment. 
The thesis examines the challenge to Labour as well as Labour's politics, and explains 
why the challenge succeeded. It is presented as more than a `local' study. It is a study 
of an electoral competition now common in Wales. It is also a case study of how 
nationalist politics of the kind that have become increasingly common since the 1960s 
can challenge the establishment. And it is a study of how `apparently' class based 
allegiances could in fact prove much weaker than one might suspect -a conclusion 
that reinforces works which challenge its assured role in twentieth century politics. In 
order to do this it is necessary to examine the role and development of Plaid Cymru. 
The literature on Plaid Cymru is also sparse, although more has been written than on 
Labour in north Wales. No detailed history of Plaid Cymru has been published. 
Recent work by Laura McAllister spans the party's history from its inception in 1925 
to 2000, and provides a `broad sweep' analysis of influential figures and events in the 
party's history. 15 A. Butt Phillip's more detailed study of the party is useful only for 
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the period up to 1970.16 D. H. Davies's acclaimed study of the party is similarly onl\ 
useful up to 1945.17 Other accounts of the party's history have been confined to much 
shorter narrative articles. '8 For the latter period, we have discussions largely by 
sociologists or political scientists, focussing on events but without the aid of archival 
research. 19 Biographical studies of the party's leading figures for the period after 1945 
are virtually non-existent. Autobiographical material is more useful. Dafydd `Viglev's 
autobiographies have now reached three volumes. 20 Gwynfor Evans's autobiography 
has appeared in both Welsh and English. 21 Other autobiographies have also 
emerged. 22 All of these are useful, but naturally do not see the broader picture. 
Apart from Butt-Phillip's work, little attention has been paid to Plaid's development 
at local level, and virtually none to Plaid's rise in north-west Wales from the 1960s 
onwards. This is surprising given the party's successes in Gwynedd from the mid 
1970s to the present day. Nor have historians recognised the importance of studying 
the party's activities as a challenge to Labour, rather than as part of a distinctively 
Welsh set of linguistic and cultural themes. This thesis extends the understanding of 
Plaid Cymru's development by focussing on the expansion and reorientation of the 
party's organisation, policies and propaganda campaigns, and by placing Plaid's 
development within the context of wider (UK) social and political change in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. Instead of looking back with hindsight and stressing the significance 
of issues that are now of primary importance (as in some autobiographies), it relocates 
the challenge to Labour within the concerns and sentiments of the time. 
The thesis also places contemporary Welsh political debates in a historical setting. 
The arrival of the Welsh Assembly in 1997 re-invigorated the interest of Welsh 
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historians and political scientists in devolution, leading to the publication of a number 
of studies which offer differing perspectives on its recent history. 23 This thesis adds to 
the growing literature on the subject by showing that - in the heart of Welsh speaking 
Wales - support for devolution grew from economic and social, as well as cultural 
and linguistic appeals. Whilst it highlights historic tensions within the Labour party 
over devolution, demonstrating the internal problems which led to the party's crisis 
during the 1979 referendum campaign, it also demonstrates that Labour support for 
devolution was growing across the period (albeit hesitantly) - and that there -vv-as in 
fact no huge public demand for devolution that the party ignored. 
In developing these arguments, the thesis challenges a series of myths which parties 
and those with deep commitments have perpetuated and turned into popular 
understandings of the past. It shows that Labour was far more attentive to Welsh 
cultural and linguistic concerns than has often been chronicled. It was less Labour's 
`failure' on these issues than on its own economic and social agenda that sealed its 
fate - even if such failures were interpreted through the rhetoric of nationalism. 
Ironically, widespread popular support for linguistic and cultural preservation and for 
Welsh nationhood was constructed after Plaid's success - it did not cause the party's 
breakthrough. 
Iv 
Whilst this thesis develops and builds on some new approaches to Welsh Labour 
history, it also rests on archival research of an unusual kind. Despite the scarcity of 
primary documentation for the Labour party in north Wales after 1945, seldom used 
archives and some un-deposited sources have produced a wealth of material. Un- 
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deposited material includes the papers of the Merioneth Labour party covering the 
period from 1948 to 1967, which offer a valuable and important insight into the 
organisation and politics of an untypical Labour constituency., 4 The papers of the late 
Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Labour's MP for Caemarfonshire from 1945 to 1974. were 
kindly made available by the family towards the end of the project. These offer a 
valuable insight into the political career of this important and influential Welsh 
Labour MP. 25 Interviews with Labour activists in north-west Wales have shed new 
and surprising light on the party's local machinery and ideology. The research derives 
much from the vast Plaid Cymru archive at the National Library of Wales -a 
surprisingly under-used and important source of material on modern Welsh political 
history - and from little used Welsh and British Labour party records. Manuscript 
collections of activists and politicians, alongside some untouched local sources for 
Caernarfonshire, have produced frank observations on local political concerns. 
Statements in the contemporary press reflected attitudes which many may now wish 
to forget. These have helped to recreate a picture of the debates and concerns which is 
vivid and powerful. Extensive use has also been made of Welsh language sources - in 
particular newspapers and journals. These offer fresh perspectives and views on 
Welsh politics which were available to local observers, and which highlighted 
different themes to `national' party propaganda. They thus help to unpick the attitudes 
of some influential local commentators, and to see politics as it was seen by a section 
of the local electorate. 
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V 
The structure of the thesis is broadly chronological. Chapter One argues that Labour's 
success after 1945 was the result of the party's long process of implantation within 
local society. By 1945 Labour had finally overcome the stubborn resistance from the 
Liberal party, which had hampered its progress up to the Second World War. 
Labour's success in north-west Wales was testament to the party's ability to adapt its 
message and appeal to fit in with the needs and expectations of a distinctive Welsh 
speaking society, whilst at the same time depending on the party's much wider 
`British' appeal as the party of modernisation. The party's emphasis combined a 
promise to deliver much needed economic prosperity with a concern for Welsh 
society, culture and the language. A central aspect of the party's appeal was the 
selection of local candidates who were not only aware that the future of local 
communities depended on developing a sound economic footing, but who were also 
prepared to put. the needs of those communities above more dogmatic partisan 
concerns. Success was thus fairly recent, and involved developing values and policies 
often associated - rightly or wrongly - with other parties. 
Labour's dominance in north-west Wales during the 1950s was also aided by the fact 
that it lacked a credible or powerful political rival. The chapter thus examines why the 
Liberal challenge faltered in the post-war decades and why neither the Conservative 
party or Plaid Cymru was in a position to challenge Labour's dominance. Whilst these 
factors ensured Labour's success in the short term, they raise questions over the scale 
and depth of Labour implantation and the roots of the party's support. These were to 
be crucial factors when a challenge to the party's dominance emerged in the 1960s. 
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Chapter Two examines the impact of social and economic change from 1959 to 1974. 
focussing on the period of Labour's decline and Plaid Cymru's rise as a political force 
in north-west Wales. Rather than argue that Labour's decline was 'caused' by socio- 
economic changes, the chapter shows the socio-economic challenges that politicians 
had to face. These were the result of numerous factors both long term and short term. 
These mounting concerns were more `real' than appeals to class loyalty. They 
threatened the very basics of life within north Wales. They were capable of 
conflicting interpretation. They were both emotional and material. The chapter 
examines such vital interests as employment and housing, and notes a series of 
broader challenges - from depopulation to the decline of the Welsh language - which 
may have contributed to a feeling of unease and insecurity. 
Chapter Two also assesses the scale of the problems facing policy makers in north- 
west Wales. In the 1950s the pronounced affluence that had spread across many 
regions of the UK had largely escaped Wales - particularly the north-west - as it did 
other regions of the UK. As in those other regions, the decline of `old' industries was 
not matched by the arrival of `new' industries of the type that had ensured prosperity 
for `booming' areas such as the midlands and south-east England. The problems that 
this created - unemployment and depopulation being the most notable - were not 
`unique'. However, they assumed a uniqueness when added to a number of 
distinctively local social and cultural factors and controversies, most notably the 
decline of local communities and the Welsh language, together with the impact of 
'second homes' and in-migrants, on the small towns where most people lived. 
Labour was not oblivious to the socio-economic changes and challenges taking place 
from the 1950s onwards. Chapter Three focuses on its response. It argues that Labour 
was still an attractive force in the 1960s because of its local and national appeal. By 
the mid 1960s, the party's personnel were still attentive to distinctive local needs and 
aspirations, whilst the party also developed policies which recognised and offered 
solutions to the economic problems faced in the region. In the period up to 1964 the 
party was frustrated by its inability to implement change, and to build on some of the 
foundations laid by the 1945-51 Labour governments. Labour's return to power in 
1964 therefore met with a huge burden of expectation. The party's commitment to 
`regional development' - specifically targeted at the stagnating and decaying areas of 
the UK - meant that north-west Wales stood to gain much from Labour's innovative 
and dynamic approach and the `white heat of technological change' promised by 
Wilson. Moreover, there was also an enlightened Labour approach to distinctively 
Welsh issues. The promise of a Welsh Office and Secretary of State for Wales (a 
long-standing and controversial topic in the Welsh Labour party) was finally delivered 
in 1964. 
Yet much depended on economic success. As it transpired, many of Labour's 
economic and industrial policies were built on sand. Labour inherited a much worse 
economic situation than it had anticipated. These problems, bad in 1964, worsened 
after Labour's convincing electoral success in 1966. As a result, the government 
lacked the resources necessary to successfully implement many of its programmes. 
Cuts in expenditure led to growing discontent within the party across the UK, a 
fact 
which the party's by-election performances (including those in Wales) regularly 
highlighted. Neither did the party's representation of `Welshness' prosper 
in the way 
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that some had hoped. As the thesis will show, the Welsh Office and Secretary of State 
for Wales both came in for sustained criticism throughout the period to 19-4. 
Moreover, policies intended to stimulate a Welsh economic, social and cultural 
revival proved disappointing. Labour's by-election defeat by Plaid Cymru at 
Carmarthen in 1966, followed by poor performances in the Rhondda 'West and 
Caerphilly by-elections, were symptoms of a much deeper malaise afflicting the party 
in Wales. These results affected confidence and damaged morale. By the end of the 
1960s, the Welsh Office became a symbol of Labour's ineffectiveness and failure, 
whilst Plaid Cymru's emergence in the late 1960s called into question Labour's status 
as `the party of Wales'. Ultimately this set back the cause of devolution within the 
party and undermined its traditional and `radical' appeal in north-west Wales. 
Nonetheless, throughout the 1960s Labour remained a powerful political force in 
north-west Wales. Whilst comfortable electoral majorities were a reflection of 
Labour's local relevance, they were undoubtedly accentuated by the lack of a credible 
political alternative to challenge the party at the polls. In the 1950s, the dramatic 
decline of the Liberal party, the traditional unpopularity of the Tories and the political 
immaturity of Plaid Cymru ensured growing Labour dominance. However, changing 
socio-economic forces, together with Labour `failure' in the 1960s, created favourable 
conditions for Plaid's development as a political force. 
Chapter Four examines the development of Plaid Cymru as a credible political party. 
In the 1950s several factors had marginalized Plaid Cymru's potential as a political 
rival to Labour. Its image was that of an exclusive society, vying for the support of a 
Welsh speaking, intellectual, middle class, eisteddfod attending elite. The party's lack 
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of discernible or credible economic policies and its concentration on linguistic and 
cultural concerns (notably the Welsh language), together with its romantic quest for a 
utopian `independent' Wales, explained meagre electoral returns. 
However, and as Chapter Four shows, in the 1960s Plaid began to address those 
problems by attempting to construct a new image. By developing both organisation 
and policies, Plaid moulded itself into a `proper' political party, undertaking the 
groundwork that would enable it to challenge Labour, not only in Welsh speaking 
north and west Wales, but also in Labour's industrial heartlands. Immediate successes 
followed in the south, especially in the by-elections of the late 1960s, but these were 
temporary achievements. More permanent foundations for electoral success were laid 
in the north-west, where the party successfully combined an appeal to those 
sympathetic to traditional nationalist aspirations with a newer concern for economic 
problems, in particular the need to attract new industry and jobs to the region. 
The thesis will argue that Plaid's electoral credibility depended on its ability to 
construct a range of credible economic policies. At the same time, organisation was 
vital in building up support for the party at grass roots level, particularly as it 
attempted to shed its out-dated, old-fashioned image. Chapter Five shows how this 
was developed through the local press. The nationalist critique of Labour policy not 
only sought to highlight deficiencies in the Labour government's record and policies, 
but also an imbalance in Labour's ranks which ensured that distinctively Welsh issues 
- particularly devolution - were not properly addressed. Despite the support 
for a 
nationalist agenda in north-west, Welsh speaking Wales, Plaid Cymru argued that 
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Labour was still dominated by its southern wing and strong support for UK wide 
economic initiatives, backed by regional aid for `Welsh problems. 
Moreover, Plaid's by-election successes in the 1960s and the hostile nature of its anti- 
Labour, anti-government, propaganda exacerbated divisions in the Labour party over 
devolution and `the challenge of nationalism'. Some members of the Labour party 
sought a positive response. They demanded that Labour undermine Plaid's challenge 
by re-developing Labour's image as a party sympathetic to both an economic and 
socio-cultural nationalist agenda. Others, unfavourable to this approach, attempted to 
undermine the nationalist challenge through hostile counter-propaganda and the 
development of policies that did not `encourage' the further escalation of nationalist 
demands. They believed a robust challenge and denial would block Plaid Cymru's 
electoral ambitions. 
Ultimately, neither of these approaches dampened the growing appeal of Plaid Cymru 
in north-west Wales. As Chapter Six notes, the general election of 1970 had provided 
evidence of Plaid Cymru's emergence as a credible political alternative to Labour. In 
both Caernarfonshire and Merioneth, the party amassed a sizeable vote, slashing 
Labour's majority in the former, and turning the latter into a `three-way marginal'. 
Out of power in the period from 1970-74, Labour was in no position to rectify some 
of the problems that had besieged the party and tarnished its reputation in the 1960s. 
Labour's success had been built on the party's image as an appealing alternative 
government to the Tories, and on the party's promise to deliver economic salvation to 
north-west Wales when it was returned to power. Now it was out of power 
it had to 
rebuild that appeal. 
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The voters' frustration with the dominance of British politics by the Conservative and 
Labour parties and (in part at least) their ineffectiveness in dealing with fundamental 
and eventually long-standing problems, led to the collapse of that unchallenged 
dominance by 1974. In many regions of the UK, the 1974 general elections witnessed 
a Liberal renaissance, although in both Scotland and Wales there was also a strong 
nationalist challenge. In Wales, Plaid Cymru's re-invention as a credible political 
force provided voters with another `third party' option. The political successes of 
Plaid Cymru in north-west Wales is thus viewed within a much wider social, 
economic and political context. However, it is not seen as part of a single (reflex) 
reaction, but one in which local political and socio-economic circumstances have to 
be examined in order to explain the pattern of events. 
In the early 1970s Labour's promises no longer seemed as credible in areas like north- 
west Wales. Labour had failed to deliver in the 1960s, even with its comfortable 
electoral majority after 1966. Economic problems in the early 1970s did not appear to 
provide the conditions for a more favourable Labour response than in the past. 
Moreover, Plaid Cymru's campaigns highlighted the fact that political failure in 
north-west Wales was less to do with the `ins-and-outs' of the two main parties or the 
failings of individual Labour MPs, and much more to do with the fact that the 
system' - Westminster governance - did not provide conditions favourable for 
developments of `regions' such as Wales. As a result, Plaid Cymru's socio-economic 
appeal was increasingly combined with support for system changes. 
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However, support for greater independence was only one strand in Plaid Cvnru's 
electoral assault. As Chapter Six highlights, the general elections of 1974 saw the 
culmination of the socio-economic changes that had taken place since the late 1950s. 
Plaid's electoral breakthrough in north-west Wales was not the result of a local protest 
vote against the Labour party, or against Tory governance, but the result of a much 
longer process of political change and a much deeper erosion of loyalties to the main 
parties. Plaid's electoral success in 1974 was mirrored by successes for the Liberal 
party (mainly in England) and the SNP in Scotland. If not all these lasted, mans' 
`breakthroughs' were not fully overturned thereafter. 
Plaid's `success' - like Labour's earlier - depended on weak opposition. Given the 
long traditions of the Liberal party in north-west Wales, and what was happening 
elsewhere, Chapter Six briefly examines why the party was unable to mount a serious 
challenge in north-west Wales. The organisational and financial problems which 
helped destroy the party's challenge to Labour in the 1950s had not diminished by the 
early 1970s. Neither had the party's ability to develop distinctive and dynamic 
policies. The chapter also shows that these problems were shared by Plaid's other 
`rival' in north-west Wales, the Conservative party. 
But problems of organisation and finance were not confined to these parties. Labour 
success in north-west Wales from the 1950s did not mean that the party had 
developed a powerful local `machine'. On the contrary, the party's comfortable 
electoral successes had rendered organisation a secondary consideration, particularly 
in Caernarfonshire. Under pressure organisationally, and lacking `new' dynamic 
policies to captivate the local electorate, the party was not in a position to compete 
17 
with the vigorous, youthful and ambitious challenge posed by Plaid Cymru by 1974. 
Thus in February 1974, Labour's twenty years of electoral success came to an end. 
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Chapter One 
The origins of Labour's electoral success in north west Wales 
1951-1959 
This country (Wales) has shown very definitely that there is no longer any room for the Liberal parts 
in its political life. Liberalism can lead us no further. It won for us the battles of the last century, the 
political freedom of which we are now the benefactors.. . (but). . . Liberalism is finished. The Labour 
party has grasped its finest attributes and is striding forwards in search of a bigger and brighter 
future for its new supporters. 
Ithel Davies, F Cynnro, 23 No%ember 1935 
During a period described as 'disastrous' for the party in Britain as a whole, the Labour 
party improved its position in Wales in the 1950s. This was a clear indication of the depth 
of anti-Conservatism among the majority of the Welsh population and the extent to which 
Labour's appeal transcended social and cultural divisions. It meant - in particular - that 
Labour gained support in north Wales. However until recently the north Wales dimension 
of `Labour Wales' has either been neglected, or it has been assumed that what made the 
Labour party popular in south Wales also applied to the north. An index of Welsh Labour 
history may typically have read `for north Wales, see south Wales'. 
Only recently has the other half of `Labour Wales' begun to receive attention. As Duncan 
Tanner has recently argued, there was more to the Labour party in Wales during the 
twentieth century than the politics of the coalfield, and there is a neglected historiography 
of Labour's moderate Welsh tradition that deals with it, at least for the 1920s and 1930s. 
Beyond this period only Andrew Walling has developed the case. His work has identified 
the neglected efforts of the Labour party's Welsh officials in Cardiff to extend Labour's 
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position in the north. Yet there is much still to be done in applying, theories to new 
circumstances, and in broadening out the groundbreaking, but necessarily restricted, work 
on the area. 
This chapter adds to this literature. It will argue that Labour's success after 1945 was a 
product in part of a long term programme of developing its root within local society. 
Labour after 1945 was the inheritor of a long standing campaign by local socialists and 
Labour activists from early in the century to install the party as the natural heir to the 
Liberal party, to become the defender of the social institutions and traditions represented 
by the Liberals. This had been partially successful in the 1920's and 1930's, but Labour 
had not overcome all its problems or disposed of its rivals. It needed the credibility that it 
developed during the war, as well as a material appeal which stressed what Labour led 
economic modernisation could do for north Wales. Nevertheless, such issues did not 
translate 'naturally' into electoral support in these semi-rural, and oddly urbanised, seats. 
Labour's proposals did not have quite the same resonance as in other Welsh 
constituencies. It worked only when economic modernisation went hand in hand with 
Labour's defence of local interests and values - when it became the party of `gwerin'. ' Its 
emphasis incorporated an ability to deliver economic prosperity, combined with an ability 
to defend Welsh cultural, social and linguistic aspirations - arguing that the first could 
only help the second. Labour would support and sustain the best aspects of local values 
and culture. The politics of Labour's candidates and MP's after 1945 were a crucial 
component in this process. Significantly Labour were not averse to placing the needs of 
the local community above party loyalty in order to create the right `blend' of appeals. 
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Yet the strength of this should not be overstated. Labour's success during the period was 
accentuated by the lack of a credible political alternative. If Labour politics in north 
Wales is little discussed, Liberal and Conservative politics is virgin ground. The chapter 
examines how the Liberal party declined during the 1950s. Whilst this was accentuated 
by organisational failures, it also reflected a political drift to the right and the lack of a 
political programme to call its own. It will be argued that the Liberal party's failure, 
combined with the existence of weak third and fourth parties, enabled Labour to achieve 
significant electoral majorities during the 1950s. Some attempt will be made to explain 
why the Conservatives - so powerful even in parts of south Wales and certainly in many 
British seats - made no headway in north Wales. Whilst this process ensured Labour's 
success in the short term, the chapter hence raises questions regarding the depth of 
Labour's implantation, and the strength of the party's support. It thus adds to Walling's 
recognition of Labour's attempt to broaden its appeal, but goes further by questioning its 
success and strength. It thus prepares for an explanation of how these Labour weaknesses 
could lead to problems once its rivals gained in strength. 
The pattern of electoral politics. 
Prior to the Second World War the Labour party had already become the largest party in 
Welsh politics, but its domination was geographically limited to the areas of the south 
Wales coalfields and the industrial north-east. By the 1950s the Labour party could 
justifiably claim to be the party of Wales. Labour gained Welsh seats in the General 
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Election of 1951, against the trend, and held them throughout the 1950s. As Table I 
shows, in Wales as a whole, first Labour and then the Tories gained from Liberal decline. 
Table 1: Welsh General Election results, 1945-59. 
Election Seats LABOUR CONSERVATIVE LIBERAL PC 
1945 36 25 3 8 0 
1950 36 27 3 6 0 
1951 36 27 5 4 0 
1955 36 27 5 4 0 
1959 36 27 6 3 0 
Source: B. Jones, Etholiadau'r Ganrif/Welsh Elections 1885-1997 (TaIN'bont, 1999). 
In 1945 the Labour party won Caernarvonshire. By 1951 it had also captured the 
neighbouring constituencies of Merioneth and Anglesey, all staunch Liberal seats since 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Labour won in 1945 because of its wartime 
image and the attractiveness of its practical policies. ' Despite the party's electoral defeat 
in 1951, many aspects of the party's programme remained popular. ' However, as Walling 
has argued, because Labour did not win a general election in the period 1951-64, and 
because Bevan and the left have captured most of the attention, historians have not 
recognised the way that Labour attempted to build up its appeal during the 1950s. These 
attempts were surprisingly successful in Wales, bearing in mind Labour's poor general 
election performances and the distraction of in-fighting within the party. 
The value of this approach was especially apparent in north Wales. Labour's role 
in the 
wartime coalition brought it prestige, but there were also tangible 
benefits for north 
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Wales from that participation. The impact of the war on the economy of north-west Wales 
was a 'gift of God'. ' The increased state powers necessitated by war, coupled with 
geographic and logistical good fortune, ensured that north Wales benefited immensely 
from the relocation of wartime industry. The benefits offered from an interventionist. 
`socialist' wartime government were made clear to north Walians, even before Labour 
had been elected in 1945. To a large extent the history of north Wales has been a matter 
of trying to retain the gains made as result of war. ' 
There were several consequences for the local economy. First, war helped to alleviate the 
burden of unemployment which existed in the 1930s. During the height of the war effort 
60,000 were employed in war industries in Gwynedd, 40,000 in new factories. Second, 
the war witnessed a huge influx of government and military personnel. An Admiralty 
training camp operated near Pwllheli. A prisoner of war camp was built in Bangor. The 
RAF base at Valley on Anglesey became one of the largest RAF/USAF bases in the UK. 
An artillery range was developed in Trawsfynydd on the site of the former First World 
War training camp, a firing range was developed at Tywyn and an airfield was built at 
Llanbedr. Coleg Harlech was taken over by the Royal Army Education Corps and an 
officer training unit was established in Barmouth. Third, and of greater significance in the 
longer term were the changes in manufacturing industry. Four major factories were set up 
by the Ministry for Aircraft Production. ' Smaller enterprises also moved into the area. In 
Caernarfon alone 657 new jobs were created by five new firms that arrived during the 
war. The arrival of these new industries, large and small, relieved the emphasis on the 
old' basic industries of north Wales (most notably agriculture and slate) which were 
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already in decline before the war. The wartime industries were seen as the cornerstone of 
the economic resurgence of the north-west. Labour activists hoped that the industries 
brought in for war purposes could be adapted to meet post-war markets, serving` alongside 
other local industries, such as tourism, to stimulate a buoyant employment market. 
The dangers were clear. Wartime jobs could vanish once the war came to an end. %lanv of 
the new firms experienced considerable difficulty in effecting a smooth changeover. It 
was not always easy to find peacetime products which these firms were technically 
equipped to produce at a reasonable price. Raw material shortages added to these 
difficulties. ' Moreover the changes did not alleviate the position in rural areas or the 
quarrying towns. In the former, agriculture was threatened by new international 
competition, whilst rural industries could easily get squashed by Labour's industrial 
plans. Furthermore, whilst the economic benefits were tangible, the social effect of 
wartime industry presented a bag of mixed blessings. Several factors are worthy of note. 
First, the closing of munitions factories after the war resulted in an exodus of industrial 
workers from west Wales to the Midlands. Towns such as Caernarfon experienced the 
same phenomenon. Secondly, the new firms which had settled in the north-west during 
the war often suffered from a shortage of skilled workers. Whilst non-skilled jobs could 
therefore be filled by locals, skilled workers continued to be imported. The lack of local 
technical colleges accentuated the problem. As one industrial development report argued 
in 1947: 
It cannot be stressed too strongly that technical education facilities in rural Wales 
are quite inadequate to meet the needs of industry already settled there and unless 
improvement takes place further development will be hindered10 
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Thirdly, wartime industries had also produced a partial re-organisation of the local labour 
market. The new industries had attracted labour from surrounding rural areas as well as 
the towns. In the aftermath of war, many of these workers were reluctant to return to 
agriculture after having enjoyed the benefits of assisted travel schemes, welfare facilities. 
regular hours and relatively high wages in the industrial sector. '' These were not the only 
factors. As the Beacham survey pointed out, `the most disturbing feature in their attitude 
was the feeling that to go back to the land involved a drop in social status. This, whether 
justified or not, was deeply felt and merits more serious consideration than it has yet 
received'. " Of little consequence was the fact that 'few realised that they had in many 
cases experienced industrial employment at its best, i. e. in wartime establishments . here 
welfare arrangements were excellent, wages high, and work assured'. 13 
However, Labour did not rest on its laurels, as an examination of the party's 1950 
election manifesto Labour is Building a New Wales indicates. Labour was trying to come 
to terms with its responsibility for rural as well as industrial Wales. The manifesto is 
significant for its references to north as well as south Wales, and rural as well as 
industrial economic needs. As the party argued, there was a `fresh spirit of enterprise in 
Welsh industry in both north and south Wales, and there is a ne«w prosperity in the 
farming community of the countryside'. The party also claimed credit for the fact that 
`practically the whole of south Wales and the Wrexham area in the north' 
had been 
scheduled as development areas under the Distribution of Industry Act. Indeed, 
local 
parties in Swansea and Wrexham, at opposite ends of the country, had pushed 
for and 
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obtained new industrial estates. Labour claimed credit for attracting public money to 
bring new industries to `some of the smaller towns and villages with special employment 
needs'. Both Caernarvonshire and Merioneth were benefactors, funds having been made 
available through the Development Committee to build new factories in the Nantlle 
Valley and at Blaenau Ffestiniog, areas which hitherto had been almost entirely 
dependent on slate quarrying as a source of employment. ' A section of the manifesto 
was devoted entirely to that industry. In 1946 the Labour government had established the 
Rees Committee to consider and make recommendations on the future of slate. In 
response to these recommendations, Labour claimed `good progress' had been made, in 
particular with regard to recruitment and training, welfare facilities and marketing, 
research on slate by-products, experiments on slate waste and lung disease (the tackling 
of the dust problem). Crucially, Labour argued that the demand for Welsh slate is 
expected to exceed supplies for some time to come', the industry now being `free to sell 
all it can produce, where it wills and at its own price'. Labour's house building 
programme ensured that demand for slate remained (temporarily) buoyant. Between 1945 
and 1950 30,000 Welsh families settled into new homes built by Labour - 1,000 of these 
especially designated for agricultural workers. The building of a `new town' in Cwmbran 
in south Wales, and discussions over the possible building of another in mid Wales 
offered the potentiality of even greater demand. Furthermore, industrial relations within 
the slate industry fitted in with the image which Labour hoped other industries would 
follmti'. The commitment to promote the well being of this `essentially Welsh industry 
was simplified by good industrial relations and its status as an industry `remarkably free 
of disputes'. 15 
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Neither did Labour ignore the other weakening industries of north-west Wales. The social 
and economic importance of Welsh agriculture was paid a significant amount of attention 
after 1945. The Hill Farming Act of 1946 and the Agriculture Act of 1947 had for the 
first time `enabled Welsh farmers to plan with certainty' and provided `fair prospects of 
steady employment to farm workers'. Subsidies to Welsh farmers were a significant 
feature of Labour's programme. Between 1947 and 1949 more than two and a half 
million pounds was paid to Welsh farmers in sheep, cattle and calf-rearing subsidies, this 
in addition to other grants for land drainage, ploughing and lime application. 
Furthermore, and of particular relevance in the mountainous areas of the north-west, the 
Hill Farming Act saw the investment of a further one and a quarter million pounds in 
improvements to farm buildings, houses, roads and services on more than 1600 
holdings. " Labour's social policy, which placed an important emphasis on milk for 
mothers and children, contributed to a seventy per cent rise in milk production between 
1939 and 1955. National wage agreements, combined with smallholding legislation, 
appeared to make employment in agriculture attractive, whilst the long standing problem 
of tied cottages was to be addressed. " 
Labour's attack on agricultural areas was meant to have direct electoral benefits. Labour 
had been targeting the rural seats since the 1920's, believing that it could not win a UK 
majority without them. 'R This provided the stimulus for a series of rural campaigns in the 
1920s and 1930s. After 1945, the party launched a direct attack on the Tories rural 
neglect. As the Welsh Council of Labour argued, `Never have Welsh farmers had such 
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opportunities for improving not only their land but their own and their workers living 
conditions. The Tories claim a kind of divine right to speak for landed interests. They 
have never done so much for the land as the Labour government'. 19 This could equally be 
applied to the Liberal party, the party of the farming community in rural north Wales. 
Neither did Labour neglect the problem of the social and economic infrastructure of 
Wales. North Wales featured prominently in Labour's plans for improved 
communications. The north-south trunk road (an item which had featured on Labour's 
agenda since the 1930s) was part of the party's plan to help `unify the Principality 
culturally as well as commercially'. Other transport schemes assumed a high priority. 
Furthermore, Welsh rural areas had also benefited from the `urgent need' for introduction 
of water and sewerage schemes `cheap electricity' as well as from the building of thirty 
thousand new houses across Wales. Nationalised electricity extended power to many 
farms and small villages for the first time. Moreover, electricity was not the only utility 
receiving Labour's attention. The proposed nationalisation of water promised a 'benefit to 
housewives, farmer and farm workers alike'. The National Farm survey, published in 
1943, reported that only 30% of Welsh farms enjoyed the benefit of piped water. Another 
60% still had well water as the only source of supply whilst 8% had no water supply at 
all. As the WRCL argued, this was both unacceptable and nonsensical in a `land of more 
than ample rainfall'. 
Labour's success after 1945 was achieved through economic centralisation. In its 1955 
election manifesto, Forward with Labour, the party promised to `respect and safeguard 
the distinctive national cultures' of Scotland and Wales. Devolved power received less 
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attention. The party's policy statement, Labour's Policy for IT ales (1954), was almost 
entirely a rationale for centralisation and a challenge to calls for a Welsh parliament from 
elements within the party. Whilst it clearly stated that the party was `not unsympathetic to 
the spirit which animates the proposals for a Welsh parliament' it argued that 'it is a 
serious error in political thinking to trace the causes of past and present Welsh problems 
to the constitutional arrangements which exist between Wales and the rest of the United 
Kingdom'. 2° The party argued that `the prosperity of Wales is bound up with the 
prosperity of the United Kingdom as a whole'. Full employment in the rest of the UK 
meant full employment in Wales. Unemployment in the rest of the UK meant 
unemployment in Wales. It was therefore `quite impossible for the UK to cut itself off 
from Wales of for Wales to cut itself off from the UK'. The measures the party had taken 
to combat unemployment in Wales after 1945 served to highlight the damage that 
devolution could do to the re-development of Wales. For example, the Distribution of 
Industry Act had enabled Labour to move industries into the Welsh development areas, 
through a combination of public and private enterprises. However, 'a Welsh parliament 
would not be able to exert any statutory powers over British industry ... 
it would have to 
rely on its own resources to attract new private investments or to build factories itself . 
21 
Nationalisation and universal social services provided further examples of the ways in 
which Wales benefited from remaining within the UK. 22 
Labour's policy statement also addressed the political implications of a Parliament for 
Wales. It argued that a Parliament for Wales would actually worsen, not improve, high 
levels of government bureaucracy. The financial cost of establishing a Welsh parliament 
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would be considerable. Instead of improving the political and economic infrastructure of 
Wales it could erode positive work that had already been done. It would mean the 
enlistment of many `leading people living in Wales', whose services may be more 
usefully employed in other ways' into the unnecessary thrashing out of detailed 
legislation. Crucially, instead of uniting Wales, a Parliament could destroy, what unity 
already existed. This was an important and perceptive point. Supporters of the Parliament 
for Wales campaign had shown that a united Wales would have to be achieved before 
devolution could become a reality. A Welsh parliament could not be expected to unite 
Wales (see below). As Labour argued, a parliament `might in fact aggravate existing 
differences'. Two-thirds of its members would inevitably come from the industrial south. 
This would cause resentment in mid and north Wales. `Weighting' regions, which some 
supporters of the campaign had proposed, was also unacceptable. It would cause 
resentment in the south and was in any case undemocratic. 
This still left a vacuum in Labour's appeal to Welsh speaking areas. Despite the success 
of policy, the need to address a sense `Welshness' was still profound. Despite its 
opposition to a Welsh parliament, Labour moved forward with means of addressing 
distinctively Welsh issues which concerned rural and Welsh speaking areas through 
administrative and structural decentralisation. Labour's Policy for Wales supported an 
extension of powers to the Welsh Department of Agriculture and called for the Welsh 
Department of Education to be moved from London to Wales. It supported calls for a 
'Minister of Welsh Affairs, with a seat in the Cabinet', called for more parliamentary 
time to be allocated to Welsh affairs and committed the party to an overhaul of the 
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Council for Wales and Monmouthshire `with the purpose of making it a more 
representative and effective' organ of Welsh opinion. 
Labour's Policy for Wales typified Labour's attempts to become the party of Wales'. 
When it had the power Labour had taken steps to 'support the Welsh people in their 
attempts to safeguard their distinctive heritage'. The influence of the party's new MP's in 
Welsh speaking areas was also evident. Heightened interest was shown in the cultural 
interests of Wales. Labour promised to strengthen the cultural life of the nation 'so 
renowned for its literary, musical and religious activities'. However, north-west and 
`rural' Wales continued to pose `very intricate' and 'difficult' problems for the Welsh 
Regional Council of Labour. These problems were undoubtedly accentuated by Labour's 
failure to gain ground in the 1955 general election. A `Tripartite Committee' was set up 
in the mid fifties, a direct response to the fact that post-war re-development in Wales had 
been uneven. Despite Labour's achievements between 1945 and 1951, the WRCL 
acknowledged that whereas the south and north-east were recovering from the problems 
of the depression, rural Wales lagged behind in the programme of rehabilitation. Several 
factors needed to be addressed and recognised. Depopulation was a key concern. This was 
not a matter which could be ignored or swept under the carpet. The WRCL linked 
depopulation to the social and economic decay of rural areas. The council was frustrated 
and alarmed by the fact that depopulation was undermining calls for industrial and 
economic investment in north-west Wales. Not only the Conservative party, but members 
of Labour's Tripartite Committee were confused or ignorant of the fact that low 
unemployment figures were the result of depopulation, a `positive' consequence of a 
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sound economy. Peter Shore, the chair of the committee was especially confused. " There 
were also confused political motives. The council saw its attempts to tackle rural Welsh 
problems on the one hand as `an answer to the Welsh nationalist problem... not a 
negligible force in Welsh politics and a menace to our party and its MP's' and as an 
answer to the Parliament for Wales movement. 24 
The WRCL encouraged research on rural problems. This was carried out by Caradog 
Jones, Labour's parliamentary candidate in Montgomery during the 1950s, and one of 
several `rural experts'. Jones' recommendations, most of which were adopted by the 
WRCL in its `twelve year programme', were based on the premise that the economic 
development of rural areas should involve utilising the natural resources of those areas. 
Jones believed that the problems of rural areas stemmed from the economic imbalance 
between agriculture and industry. Jones credited Labour with returning prosperity to 
many farming and rural areas for the first time since 1918. But much work remained to be 
done. Despite Labour's house building programme, road improvements, electrification 
and improved water and sewerage supplies, young people were still leaving the land. 
Labour could not afford to be complacent. In the mid Wales counties (which included 
Merioneth) afforestation projects had been expanded and some industrial development 
had already begun. But these industries had not adequately replaced the vanished 
leadmining and woollen textile industries, which, alongside slate and agriculture, had 
been the staple employers. For Jones, the principles of modernisation should be applied to 
rural areas. This meant reorganisation of holdings, land reclamation and a change of 
emphasis in production techniques. However, the tendency would still be for more 
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production, more machines and fewer jobs. The `strong and growing desire among the 
younger generation' to have land of their own had to be addressed to keep areas alive. An 
increase in the number of smallholdings was particularly controversial when economic 
prudence and the changing shape of markets tended to suggest that larger units were 
much more economically viable. But even if this could be addressed, only half the 
problem would be solved. `Rural industry' had to be established to exploit local 
production of its raw materials. 
Jones argued that existing activity was too simplistic and crude. The days of sawing tree 
trunks into different lengths, slaughtering animals or `putting milk into churns to be 
collected and taken to the big towns or cities' had to end. Instead local industries should 
be established to use the products. Modern, scientific, techniques had to be applied to 
defunct industries such as lead-mining, as modern methods of extraction `might make the 
revival of the lead-mining industry possible'. Modernisation would also ensure that there 
was no repetition of the dangerous working practices which had characterised many 
extractive industries in the past, a situation which meant that some of us never saw our 
grandfathers who died of tuberculosis before reaching the prime of life'. Neither did it 
mean that rural areas should progressively be destroyed by the forces of industry, turning 
them into a `wilderness of bricks and mortar'. On the contrary, proper planning and the 
application of new techniques would ensure that this was not necessary. 
Nevertheless, Jones appreciated that simply addressing material problems would not be 
enough to alleviate the problems of rural areas or address the problem of depopulation. A 
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decade after the second world war, attitudes and expectations had changed. No long=er 
could the traditional appeals of rural life satisfy the demands of a young generation, who 
wanted to enjoy the same quality of life as those living in the towns. An increase in 
leisure time added to the predicament. Some rural areas enjoyed the benefits of vý-ell- 
equipped village halls and community centres. Others did not. Similarly, a more 
ambitious populace meant that library provisions had to be substantially improved 'and 
more opportunities given to people living in rural areas to express and develop their 
talent'. Children in rural areas had to be given the same educational privileges as those 
living in the urban centres. Only through strategic planning could the problems of rural 
areas be addressed, 'Better amenities in the countryside have become necessities. So have 
opportunities for more varied employment. But these things don't just happen; they must 
be planned and provided'. 
The WRCL's interim report on Development of Rural Areas in Wales, published in 1957, 
incorporated many of the ideas which Jones had expressed. 'The Future of Agriculture', 
'Research and Development' and 'Development of the Primary Products' were the 
cornerstones of Labour's programme. 25 Farming was again the report's primary target. In 
addition to extra capital for farm buildings, drainage and water, Labour would encourage 
more co-operatives and enable the majority of small 'family farms' to operate on a 
larger, 
more competitive scale. Derelict and marginal land would be reclaimed and 
let as 
smallholdings. In addition, 'County Colleges in Rural Areas' providing day release and 
evening classes would be provided, along with the establishment of an 'Agricultural 
College'. These would provide two to three year diplomas in agriculture, 
dairying, 
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poultry, horticulture, forestry and estate management. In addition, Labour's road building 
programme would be extended to include a scheme for the improvement of unclassified 
roads and roads to remote farms `since reasonable modern transport facilities are a 
necessity in these areas as they are in industrial areas'. 26 
The need to diversify and attract new industries into rural areas was still deemed 
essential. As Caradog Jones had argued, the primary products of rural areas were raw 
materials for industries located long distances away. Whilst re-location would not 
necessarily create more jobs (they would simply be moved from the towns to the rural 
areas) it would address the problem of depopulation. Among the schemes which Labour 
hoped would address this problem were the opening of medium sized abattoirs. Again 
this necessitated (and promised) the improvement of rail and road links for rural areas. 
The hides and skins of the animals could be dealt with in `fell-mongering' units, with the 
pelts and hides being cured and tanned in the local area and used to produce leather goods 
such as boots and shoes. These light industries would be specifically directed toward rural 
villages as well as towns. In addition, more creameries would be established. Butter and 
cheese making, as well as the pasteurising of milk, would be expanded, whilst egg 
packing would provide another suitable village industry. Another Jones brainchild - the 
development of forestry industries - would be addressed by Labour. Steps would 
be taken 
to establish saw mills and turneries. Again, this would lead to the development of village 
industries in furniture making, whilst a more ambitious scheme for the production of 
wood-pulp would be explored as a `long-term possibility'. 
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The WRCL were also alive to the challenge of declining industries. The slate industry 
provided a particularly difficult challenge. Mechanisation stripped jobs from the industry 
whilst alternative (and cheaper) roofing methods increased competition. New uses for 
slate were to be researched, notably on the use of slate waste for road building. Moreover, 
through modernisation, research and development the north Wales slate industry could 
compete with alternative and cheaper roofing methods. Initial investigations by the 
WRCL had discovered that slate waste, ground to powder, could itself be used to 
manufacture roofing tiles and for other purposes. Marketing improvements , giere 
necessary. Slates should be produced in a variety of colours, shapes and sizes'. Similarly, 
in the development of `slate wool' for insulation against fire and weathering, the WRCL 
would `expect a Labour government to back and encourage such research, and the 
establishment of manufacturing, if that should prove to be an economic proposition'. 27 
Of course many towns relied on industries which bore no relation to the resources of rural 
Wales. Here Labour was less emphatic in its commitments. Light engineering industries 
that existed in some towns `were to be welcomed', providing that `it is kept within 
bounds' and `the greater the variety the better'. However, the development of light 
industries would not be allowed to interfere with the strategy for rural areas which the 
report had outlined, otherwise it will result in an unhealthy concentration of the 
population in the towns at the expense of the depopulated countryside'. Instead, 
encouragement would be given to other industries which would stimulate rural life. 
Tourism, fishing and ship-building were therefore considered better long term and 
strategic bets. Alongside the commitments to rural industries were promises to address 
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the problems, highlighted by Caradog Jones, into the quality of life enjoyed in rural 
villages. However, this was something of a `chicken and the egg situation', for as the 
WRCL argued, `the provision of amenities will not itself bring prosperity to the rural 
areas'. 
Problems remained and began to affect communities. By 1958 Labour's education service 
was warning of the adverse effects caused to local communities by the halving of jobs in 
agriculture - largely through the modernisation which was a central Labour aim. At the 
same time, the decline of slate damaged the `vigorous democratic communities' which it 
had sustained in the Nantlle valley, Blaenau Ffestiniog and Bethesda. In 1938 these 
quarries had employed 38,000 men. Two decades later they provided employment for 
only a third of this figure. 
The depopulation of rural areas was of paramount concern to Labour, both at local and 
national (Wales) level. For an older generation of Welsh socialists, depopulation served 
as a timely reminder of capitalist savagery. They pointed out that depopulation was not a 
new phenomenon. Rural areas (which included large sections of Wales) had always been 
a `recruiting ground for industry' -a tradition which stretched back to the Industrial 
Revolution. For others, depopulation became not only a symbol of an economically 
unbalanced Britain (where jobs were increasingly generated in the midlands and south- 
east) but of the inadequacy of Westminster to properly recognise the distinctive needs of 
Wales. For Labour's new MPs in north-west Wales, the question of depopulation became 
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inseparable from the need for devolution and the need to defend and preserve an 
endangered local community. 
Candidates, devolution and the appeal to `Gwerin'. 
The second side of Labour's appeal in north-west Wales after 1945 was its role as 
guardian of local interests and of Welshness, and of the values and social institutions 
which had previously been safeguarded by the Liberal party. Labour is typically portrayed 
as a party of the working class, as the party of trade unions, but its appeal in north Wales 
was also based on attracting the support of a local society where the Welsh language, 
Welsh culture and the local chapels formed the backbone of local communities. The 
protection of the `Gwerin' was far removed from the proletarian, industrial politics of the 
south Wales valleys. This had been an important, but not entirely successful, feature of 
the strategy adopted by some Labour figures in Wales since the turn of the century. For 
Labour pioneers such as David Thomas in the period from 1900 to 1939, adapting the 
party's message to fit in with and express an established view of local society had been as 
important as converting the local electorate to the gospel of socialism. They established a 
tradition that was kept alive and extended after 1945. 
Much of the (limited) work that has been undertaken on the Labour party in north Wales 
after 1918 has focussed on the impact of the first world war on local politics. Such work 
argues that after 1918 Labour became much more `typically' the party of the local 
working class as the importance of old social institutions and values were eroded. 
HoNvever, because historians focussed on how 'typical' local Labour politics were after 
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1918 they have neglected an important feature of the party's history - the continuation Of 
the process by which Labour's Welshness and its status as the party of local ' gwerin' 
continued to be cultivated. In the period before and after the first world war, David 
Thomas played an important role in this process, aided by the establishment of a local, 
Welsh language, and socialist newspaper, Y Dinesydd Cymreig. Both are v, -orthy of brief 
comment as they demonstrate the origins of political approaches which Labour in north- 
west Wales successfully developed after 1945. 
David Thomas is primarily known for his work Y Werin a'i Theyrnas (19 10) which stated 
the principles of socialism in the Welsh language. This work was deemed necessary more 
to help establish the Labour party in an area where ninety percent of the population in 
1910 was Welsh speaking. But an equally important and often neglected feature of 
Thomas's work was to state those principles within a context that was both acceptable 
and relevant to the close-knit Welsh community for which it was intended. Central to the 
image which Thomas attempted to convey was a party in touch with, and alive to the 
needs of a local society where shared interests, values, culture and language outweighed 
or rivalled class based solidarities. For Thomas, as with a later generation of Welsh 
speaking Labour activists, it was essential that socialism 'adapted itself to fit the spirit of 
the individual nation, and before it has any real impact in Wales it must make itself an 
important element of Welsh national awakening'. " This meant establishing both local 4: ) 
socialist principles and the Labour party within a communitarian spirit of 'gwenn' - an 
attachment which was previously associated only with Liberalism and the Liberal party. Y 
Dinesydd, like David Thomas, wished to promote an image of a socialist but classless 
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Labour party which was attentive to Welsh social, political and linguistic concems and 
which respected local political traditions. 
For Thomas, labounsm, socialism and patriotism were natural bedfellows. In an article 
'Socialism and the Welsh People', he spoke of socialism as an intemational mo, ýement 
which adapted itself to fit the 'national spirit' of indi-vidual nations. 2' Like other 'foreign 
movements', including Thristianity from Palestine, Protestantism from Germaw", Non- 
Conformity from England and Calvinism from Geneva', socialism had begun to earn the 
respect and trust of the Welsh people. Not only did socialism follow on from other 
'creeds' held dear by the Welsh, but it embodied the values and spirit of Welshness and 
'gwenn'. However, and like Goronwy Roberts later on, Thomas argued that the g 
relationship between socialism and Welshness was a reciprocal one. On the one hand 
Labour (and socialism) was becoming the political force which would ensure the future 
prosperity of the Welsh people. On the other, Welshness and in particular the spirit of 
'gwerin', had a positive impact on Labour, a softenlng approach, ensuring the party was 
attentive to the needs of Welsh speaking society and culture. It also had a de- 
proletarianising effect on Labour policy. The latter was crucial. Thomas wished to gently 
\vean traditional Liberal supporters away from their party and into the Labour fold. 
Labour's inevitable rise had been depicted as an 'organic growth'. Evolution not 
revolution was the watchword. As a result, Labour was not opposed to any of the 
fundamental principles of Liberalism, but, on the contrary, was appealing to the same 
cross-class community values which had inspired its support. These were fundamental 
\Velsh values. The Welsh were inherently socialist (an idea which was later promoted by 
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other Labourites such as Jim Griffiths). Radical policies - notably nationalisation - ýý ere 
more likely to be accepted by the Welsh because 'the Welsh mind is already npe for 
nationalising the land and mines and other things of the kind because the 'Welsh people 
are democratic almost without knowing it'. 
The same approach was adopted by Y Dinesydd (to which Thomas v, -as a rqPlar 
contributor). " After the First World War the newspaper devoted most of its editorial 
space to Labour's attempts at rooting itself in the local community. The community (as 
opposed to the political) bias of the paper is only one indication of this approach. The 
major issues which dominated news columns were community news, chapel news and 
Welsh culture (particularly news of local and national 'eisteddfodau'). The call for 
Labour support remained a rational one in that 'you have to be blind not to see that 
Labour has the wan-nest heart, strongest mind and most reasonable approach of all the 
parties'; it was inevitable that 'Labour must rule'. Support for Labour candidates standing 
at general elections was based on the grounds that 'those who love their religion, who 
love their nation, care about the workers and care about the 'werindod" should support 
Labour candidates. Like Thomas, YDinesydd argued that to see the local Labour only as a 
class party missed one of its Mtrinsic strengths. The Labour party was a 'party of those 
who use their heads as much as of those who use their hands. It is the party of all who 
contribute to the good of society. It is the party of all people of all classes who earn their 
living through honest and worthwhile labour'. Furthermore, community interest was 4all 0 
important. Not person, not class, not trade union. Labour is totally opposIte to a class 
party - that is exactly what Labour is opposed to'. " 
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Given the status of other parliamentary candidates, and the -weakness of Labour 
organisation, to have any chance of success Labour candidates had to fill certain criteria. 
The personal popularity of candidates was an important feature of politics in north-west 
Wales, a tradition which spread upwards from roots in 'independent' local politics where 
reputations were often considered more important than political doctrines. Welsh 
speaking non-confonnists who understood the values of 'gwerin' could fit the bill 
perfectly - candidates who 'love their religion, who love their nation, care about the 
workers and care about the werindod' (Labour's candidates after 1945 could confidently 
tick all these boxes). The selection of 'outsiders' by the Liberal party added welAt to 
these arguments. As Y Dinesydd argued of one Liberal candidate standing in 1918, 'he 
does not speak Welsh and is not a non-conformist ... you cannot represent Wales unless 
you fulfil these criteria'. The only option was for locals to vote for *one of us', 'one of the 
werin bobol' who was 'in touch with the workers and also the werindod'. 32 
The new generation of Labour candidates in north-west Wales after the Second World 
War shared these values and could represent them with conviction. They were generally 
'sympathetic to Welsh, 'nationalist' issues. But unlike many of their counterparts in Plaid 
Cymru they did not want to fossilise Wales, to safeguard the past and preserve it for a 
cultured elite. On the contrary, they sought to preserve Wales through modemlsatlon, by Z: ý 
allowing it to retain its people and gain the employment and opportunities that were 
essemial to preserving Welsh life, as well as preserving the language and culture. All Z-- I C, 
three Labour MPs in north-west from 1945-59, Goronwy Roberts, T. W. Jones and 
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Cledwyn Hughes were local, Welsh speaking, patriots. All three supported the Parliament 
for Wales campaign in the early 1950's and were strong advocates of a Secretary of State 
for Wales as a pre-requisite to some form of Welsh devolution. These were candidates 
who a generation earlier may conceivably have been Liberals. Cledv, -yn Hughes, 
Anglesey's Labour MP from 195 1, was a Welsh speaking radical from the professional 
classes. Hughes' father had been a prominent and respected Holyhead Liberal. Such were 
Hughes' 'Liberal' credentials that when he defeated the Liberal Megan Lloyd George in 
the 1951 General Election, the victory was described by one Welsh newspaper as a 
'swing to the right'. His status as a Welsh radical and his ability to arouse support for the 
Labour party in working class Holyhead -a town which had posed problems for the 
Labour party in the 1920s - were crucial to his success. Hughes' personal papers include 
letters from Madoc Jones, Secretary of the Welsh Liberal Party, affectionately addressed 
to 'the virtually Liberal member for my native county of Anglesey'. " Jones was 
attempting to convince Hughes of the political benefits to be gained from creating a new 
'Radical' party in north Wales, a fusion of the radically minded elements from Labour, 
the Liberals and Plaid Cymru. Even by 1967, when Secretary of State for Wales, Hughes 
was still treated with some suspicion within Labour circles, where he was seen as one of 
select band of Labour MPs who were 'nationalists first and socialist second'. 34 Even for 
some of those actively involved in Labour politics in the north, Hughes was dabbed with 
a 'little too much green paint' to be trusted completely. " 
In Merioneth, Labour's MP from 1951 to 1966 was T. W. Jones. Despite emerging from a 
more typically Labour background, he nevertheless emanated from the same radical, 
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Welsh speaking roots as both Hughes and Roberts. Jones was a patnot, a lover of all 
things Welsh. A chapel minister and an active worker on vanous eisteddfod committees. 
he was also well known and respected for having been jailed as a conscienscious objector 
during the First World War. This had led him into the local ILP in his native 
Mosilanerchgrugog near Wrexham immediately after the war. Like Hughes and Roberts, tl 
he used his status as a local preacher to warm chapel audiences to the appeal of the 
Labour party during a crucial period in its implantation. He was a shrewd and skilled 
electioneer. Through the chapels and through a network of friends he studied attitudes 
towards the Labour party in north-west Wales, even going as far as conducting his own 
unofficial opinion polls to assess progress. Part of his network included other chapel 
ministers, who were especially useful in gauging opinion in areas of Menoneth where 
support for the party was weak and/or could not be taken for granted. Once elected, Jones 
was proud of the fact that he spoke more Welsh at Westminster than any other MP in 
history. " He was devoutly proud of Labour's success in Merioneth, and pointed to the 
fact that a majority of two thousand, which the party had ground out by 1959, was 
especially good for one of the smallest seats in the UK. 
In Caemarvonshire, Labour's MP from 1945 to 1974 was Goronwy Roberts. Durinc, the týl 
1930s Roberts had helped found the 'Grwp Gwerin' movement at the University Collezl-_Ie 
of North Wales in Bangor. A left-wing, patriotic group, it was firmly committed to 
establishing the Labour party as the 'national' party of Wales and espousing a truly 
balanced and legitimate view of 'national socialism' or 'Labour nationalism'. '- The 
movement's strong support for a Welsh parliament reflected Roberts's own views. 
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Roberts' status as a patnot was unquestionable. As an aspinng Labour %IP in the run up 
to the 1945 election, he campaigned on two fronts, 'as a Labour candidate, but also as a 
Welsh candidate'. At the heart of this vision was the belief that Labour 'was out to 
protect and extend the cultural and industrial well being of the nation'. " 
After 1945 such candidates claimed that Labour was the party most likely to deliver some 
form of political autonomy for Wales. In their eagerness to install this vision of the 
Labour party, both Roberts and Hughes were led into a principled but ultimately III- 
disciplined campaign in support of a Secretary of State for Wales In 1945, when this 
commitment did not form part of Labour's programme. In addition to re-affirming calls 
for a Welsh Secretary, concerns over the preservation of Welsh language and culture xere 
expressed in a renegade Labour newspaper, Vais Dafur. Although 'generally speaking' 
supportive of official Labour policy, the paper was overly 'enthusiastic' about 
'nationalist' issues for some Labour stalwarts from the south. " In the run up to the 
election, senior Labour figures had been concerned that 'Welsh candidates' were making L- 
irresponsible promises which were 'outside the party line'. In a speech at Llandudno in 
June 1945, Herbert MoMson re-iterated the party's rejection of calls to appoint a 
Secretary of State for Wales, arguing that it would 'lower the quality of administration in 
Welsh affairs'. Morrison favoured 'organisations within every government department 
staffed with Welsh officers and whose business it would be to understand Wales'. He 
repeated the warning to 'local Labour candidates' who were in the habit of making 
'unorthodox promises' . 
4' The local press claimed the speech was 'sufficient in itself to 
make the Labour party lose every seat in north Wales'. 41 Despite the Nvarning, Roberts 
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continued to campaign up to the election for *Welsh control of things that are her own' 
and 'parity with Scotland' (an enduring feature of the campaign for a Secretary of State). 
Furthen-nore, Labour's image of a distinctly 'Welsh' party was aided by party 
propaganda, published in Welsh. Veteran local acti%ists such as David Thomas were 
extremely valuable, not only in advising Labour HQ on the 'cultural side' of policy for 
the north, but also in the preparation of 'some of the most attractive posters ever 
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published by the Labour party'. Thus, the campaign for a Welsh parliament and support 
for 'Welshness' (in many guises) was an intrinsic element of Labour's mandate in north- 
west Wales. 
The confrontation between Morrison and Labour's prospective MPs in north-west Wales 
was symbolic of the problems encountered by pro-devolutionists in the Labour party 
during an era when the belief in centralism, and centralist cures for social and economic 
problems, was at its most profound. However, the rejection of calls for a Secretary of 
State did not signify that Labour was disinterested in Welsh matters. Opposition to a 
Secretary of State was in part based on concerns that this office would lead to less 
efficient government for both Wales and Britain. The experience of Scotland, where 
during the war the existence of a Secretary of State was believed to have delayed decision 
making processes, actually served to reinforce British arguments against devolution. " It 
also reflected a tendency to see nationalism as the cause of the world's problems in the 
1930s. 
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if Morrison's speech had attacked unorthodoxy amongst Labour's candidates, his 
campaign speech in support of the party in north Wales -, vas in itself somewhat 
unorthodox. Morrison stressed that Labour was the inheritor of local radical and Liberal 
traditions. He claimed that even at the party's higher levels there was an appreciation of I= 
the local party's attempt to identify itself with long standing political and communitanan 
traditions. The iron hand of party discipline on devolution was thus mixed with a much 
more subtle approach. In MoMson's judgement, it was important that: 
The Labour party in north Wales should and does inherit the true traditions of 
Lloyd George. Critics may argue that Lloyd George was no socialist. He certainly 
never claimed to be one, but he was not afraid of economic change, as are the 
members of the present government. 
It was Morrison's view that the Labour party had absorbed 'all that was highest and best 
in the Liberal faith'. North Wales could not perpetuate the Lloyd George tradition by 
voting Conservative, nor could the tradition effectively be carried on by voting Liberal. 
The choice of north Wales, as in the rest of Wales was now between a Tory government 
representing reaction and privilege and a Labour govemment representing progress and 
the public interest. " 
During the period after 1951 - when the Labour party underwent an understudied process 
of modemisation - Goronwy Roberts identified himself with the ideological currents 
within the party who favoured change, notably the Gaitskellites, but also with an 
emerging centre-left group of technocrats. In the 1930s he had been a radical. No", he 
was perceived as being on the 'right'. Such shifts were not unusual within the Labour 
party. The radicals of the 1930s had been motivated by issues of economic policy, by a 
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concern to attack poverty and to modernise the economy, and by issues of foreign polic%. 
By the 1950s this was hardly incompatible with support for Gaitskell; and many English 
radicals of the 1930s were Gaitskellites by the 1950s. '-' At the same time, however, 
Roberts was a firm believer in the notion that In order for the part-y to sur-O, e It had to 
keep alive the enthusiasm of the old pioneers. Along with many other Welsh radicals, one 
of his political icons was Keir Hardie. Another was the devout nationalist O. M. 
Edwards. " Hardie's position in Labour folklore was important in linking the Labour 
movement in the north with that of the South. For Roberts, Hardie represented the 
cherished ideal of Christian socialism and a society based on freedom, compassion and 
understanding. These were all fundamental aspects of his personal and political beliefs. 
Equally, Hardie symbolised the spirit of radicalism which triumphed over adversity. 
Hardie's reputation as a supporter of Home Rule was equally inspirational. Roberts felt 
he followed the same 'moral' pioneering spirit in the 1950s as he had in the 1930s, and 
that Hardie had proclaimed before 1914. Support for the Parliament for Wales campaign 
was thus an extension of the radical spirit which had inspired Roberts to fonn the 'Grwp 
Gwenn' in the 1930s - it was the spirit too of the party's most famous and internally 
respected pioneer. 
In supporting calls for devolution, Roberts's was not motivated by a desire to be a 'rebel' 
(unlike some south Wales MP's this was not a position he cherished). He felt that 
devolution did not necessarily have to damage the Labour party in Wales. On the 
Contrary, devolution could improve the standards of living enjoyed by the Welsh people 
whilst at the same time establishing the Labour party as the genuine 'party of Wales'. 
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Despite his status as a rebel within the Labour party at the time of the Parliament for 
Wales campaign, Roberts believed that devolution for Wales could only be achie-ý ed by a 
united Labour party and within a united Wales, a fact which the failure of the campaign 
confirmed. Within the Welsh Labour party, he formed close friendships , N-ith those like 
Jim Griffiths who were opposed to the Parliament for Wales campaign during the 1950,,. 
Roberts appreciated that despite his unfavourable attitude to a Parliament for 'Wales, 
Griffiths was still a patriot and that 'on every other issue his support Is always on the 
Welsh side'. " More importantly he recognised that Griffiths, despite emanating from the 
industrial south, understood the values and life of the north. Griffiths' support ký-, as crucial 
in ensuring that the needs of north Wales were given a sympathetic hearing within the 
party, especially after he became deputy leader. When others criticised Griffiths for his 
increasingly moderate stance and the fact that he had become an establishment figure 
within the party, Roberts believed that having someone who understood the problems of 
I gwerin' in a position of influence was no bad thing. Griffiths assurance that Labour's 
Welsh rural policy would 'get fair consideration at NEC level' was an example of the 
important influence which Roberts recognised. " Griffiths was respected by all 'sides' of 
the Labour party in Wales. As a result he was one of only a few people who could unite 
the party around an acceptable Welsh policy, i. e. one which addressed the needs of the 
south and the north simultaneously. 
Griffiths appreciated that many of his fellow party members in the south did not share his 
love for the notion of the 'gwerin', indeed 'they dislike the life and language which are 
characteristic of these areas'. However, in order for Labour's commitment to devolution 
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to advance, it was essential that those who believed in devolution and in the concept of 
6gwenn' should win over the sceptics. Despite his passionate support for NA"elshness, 
Roberts was also aware that Welsh language culture excluded the majority of Wales. For 
example, he was concerned that the cornerstone of Welsh culture - the National 
Eisteddfod - excluded a large percentage of the Welsh population from participating, 
The answer was not to 'betray' Welshness. On the contrary, the 'no English' rule, he 
agreed, 'was essential to the purpose of the Eisteddfod'. What Roberts objected to was 
the betrayal - the rejection - of those in Wales who had not been bom into the Welsh 
language. fristead of wanning people to the Welsh language, the eisteddfod presented a 
'cold and contemptuous attitude' to English speakers. It was Important that the eisteddfod 
explain the reasons for the rule. They had been lazy in failing to do so. Similarly, it was 
important for those who supported a Welsh parliament to understand the views of those 
Welshmen who did not. 
Despite the failure of the Parliament for Wales campaign Roberts was pleased that it had 
opened up debate within his own party. It had even convinced some sceptics of the need 
for greater Welsh recognition. Roberts welcomed the publication of Ness Edwards's 
pamphlet Is This the Road? (1956) because it had been written by someone who had not 
supported the campaign and for whom the values of 'gwerin' were alien. Edwards should 
not be condemned for his indifferent attitude to devolution (he was attacked by 
nationalists), for he emanated from a part of Wales where issues of class, poverty and the 
struggle for daily existence were the issues which had traditionally united communities. 
His comments should be welcomed because an awakening was occurring even among 
54 
those who were not naturally pre-disposed to 'nationalistic' beliefs. It was a *thoughtful 
contribution' . 
4' He continued: 
A country can reach self-government through revolution or through development. 
Does anyone in Wales believe that revolution is the means to this end? Is that ho%v 
it should come? Is it not true that development is the only We have to 
develop opinion and feelings (this is the crucial aspect) among people whose lives 
are as alien as among those who live in the south or live in the north. We must 
develop our national identity. If your companion comes with you one mile when 
you wanted him to come two, don't send him back'. 'o 
As Roberts pointed out, there was more 'togetherness' on Welsh issues within his party 
than many outsiders believed. Even though Roberts condemned the Labour party's 
refusal to back the Parliament for Wales campaign, he welcomed the almost unanimous 
opposition of Labour members to Liverpool's plans for a reservoir in Tryweryn in 
Merioneth, because it would 'drown' a Welsh village, Capel Celyn, in the process. There 
is insufficient space here to elaborate on the Tryweryn controversy. Labour's role in the 
controversy was met with some derision both at the time and in subsequent Welsh 
language accounts. It has become a part of nationalist mythology, designed to castigate 
the party. " Much of this criticism rests on the fact that Plaid Cymru and not the Labour 
party was instrumental in initiating the organised opposition to the scheme, and on the 
assumption that Labour generally and T. W. Jones in particular, actively conspired with the 
Labour controlled Liverpool council in allowing the scheme to progress. 52 
Undoubtedly the Tryweryn. affair was a difficult political issue for the Labour party - and 
especially so for both Roberts and Jones. it was an issue where 'socialism and 
ying people -nationalism' came into direct conflict. Roberts the modemiser argued 'suppl i 
Nvith water is as essential as supplying them with houses, schools and hospitals'. 
5' 
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However, Roberts and Jones the Welshmen bemoaned the affront to %Velsh life and 
independence. This was a classic 'Welsh' community drowned - 'murdered' - because of 
English needs. Both Jones and Roberts feared the damage caused to rural Welsh life b-v 4-- 1 I 
schemes like Tryweryn. Given their backgrounds it was nonsense to suggest otherwise. 
Unlike many Welsh nationalists, Roberts' opposition to Tryweryn. was not inspired by 
racism or xenophobia. On the contrary he attempted to diffuse the anti-English sentiments 
which the affair had stimulated amongst some fellow nationalists. He was anxious to 
point to the fact that feelings between Liverpudlians and north Wallans had 'always been 
wann'. 54 It was 'not an anti-Liverpool or an anti-English spirit' which motivated 
objections over Tryweryn'. " On the contrary, Liverpool's need for water was the same as 
anyone else, including those of his own country. The controversy merely indicated the 
lack of long term planning by previous governments. As a result, Roberts argued that the 
solution was not the destruction of a viable Welsh community but greater understanding 
of the growing need for water supplies and the education of the public in the best ways to 
conserve water. In the long term this was the only way which schemes such as Tryweryn 
could be avoided. To this end Roberts supported calls for a Welsh Water Board. " 
Nevertheless there were concerns over the functions which such a Board would adopt. 
Welsh Water Board did not necessarily mean that schemes like Tryweryn would be 
prevented in the future. Such guarantees could only be achieved through the creation of a 
Welsh parliament. 
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Despite this, Labour's support for the establishment of a Welsh Water Board did receive 
widespread support, even from Plaid Cymru. This did not mean that attacks on Labour 
relented. T. W. Jones became a particular target for nationalist accusations. Among many 
concerns was Jones' involvement in discussions with Liverpool over *agcgeed schemes'. 5' 
Plaid Cymru and the Welsh language press condemned Labour for 'Circulating the 
advantages of the scheme to drown Tryweryn'. " Both Roberts and Jones were attacked by 
nationalists for accepting the scheme and airing some of the more positive outcomes for 
the local community. Yet this was not a betrayal of Welshness nor of their approach. It 
was modernisation and cold rationalism at work. Jones argued that many of the houses 
which would be 'drowned' were in fact out-dated and lacking in modem utilities. It vvas 
his duty - and responsibility - to ensure that all the options on offer to the residents of 
Capel Celyn were aired. Jones argued that the offer of a modem, well-equipped house for 
an old house and a chapel for a chapel (by the local Bala council), was an attractive 
package for the residents of Capel Celyn. In other words, he emphasised there were 
important side issues which had to be made clear to the local people. As Jones knew, 
some village residents were more opposed to the scheme than others. The objection to 
Tryweryn, he said, was actually a 'minority protest', many locals in fact being indifferent 
to the ongoing debate. " Instead, opposition to Tryweryn was fuelled by a Plaid Cymru 
propaganda campaign. More importantly both Jones and Roberts were aware of the fact 
that a reservoir in Tryweryn would help attract desperately needed industry and jobs. The 
proposed building of nuclear power stations at Edem and Trawsfynydd was a significant 
factor in their response. It was part of a series of proposals to use Welsh water as a 
resource. ' Plaid Cymru itself encouraged Liverpool County Council to 'repay the debt' to 
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Tryweryn by seeking assurances from the council that they would support the 
development of industry in that area. Although meetings between Alderman Sefton 
(Labour leader of the council) and Plaid Cymru had initially been 'frosty'. Gxvynfor 
Evans (the President of Plaid Cymru) found that Sefton had some sympathy xvith Plaid', 
cause and shared many of Plaid's alms. Sefton himself favoured devolution for the north- 
west of England, and after waming to Plaid's protestations over Trv%, ý-eryn began 
describing himself as a 'scouse nationalist'. " This clearly caused some annoyance within 
the Labour party, as a letter from the Welsh Regional Office of the party to the North 
West Regional Office in Manchester suggested: 
We have enough trouble from Plaid Cymru as it is without Alderman Sefton 
giving them additional ammunition. I was wandering whether Alderman Sefton 
was a member of the Labour party and whether you know him personally. If so I 
wonder whether it would be possible for you to have a word with him and point 
out the political implications of his actions to the Labour party in Wales. " 
For Goronwy Roberts, if nuclear power stations and other industries came to Gwynedd, 
Tryweryn could be 'sacrificed'. If the loss of one small Welsh community prevented the 
long term destruction of a much larger Welsh community in Gwynedd, it was worthwhile. 
As Roberts noted, Trawsfynydd and Edem were already being eannarked as possible sites 
for new nuclear power stations. 
There was still a need to attract other industnes. Roberts had little time for those "ho 
objected to new industry on the grounds that it would ruin the scenic landscape. Most of 
these people who objected, he claimed were exiled Welshmen living in Manchester or 
Binningham, who saw rural Wales as nothing more than a 'nice' weekend playground. 
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Their attitude to Wales could be summed up in one word; 'selfish' . 
63 *These people' cared 
little for the economic problems of rural areas, or the fact that if neýw industry ýý as not 
attracted the 'gwenn' would be destroyed. In 1958, Roberts launched a scathinu attack on 
those from outside Wales who sought to influence economic policy in a Commons speech 
on unemployment in rural areas: 
Much of the area to which I have referred lies within the boundaries of the 
Snowdonia National Park. There will always be objectors to the introduction of 
any kind of industry to the area, but I would advise the Ministers concerned that 
no more than a few dozen of these objectors live in the area. They take jolly good 
care to live somewhere else. They think that because they spend a fortnight's 
holiday in Snowdonia they own the place and can drive its people out of the area 
so that they can enjoy it seasonally without being disturbed. They tend to regard 
Snowdonia as a kind of Red Indian reservation, set aside for tired Manchester 
stockbrokers. We deserve a better fate than that, and we shall insist upon it. Our 
duty is to see that human nature as well as nature has a chance of survival in this 
area. 64 
Roberts had not insisted that Gwynedd should be turned into another R-hondda. or 
Sheffield. On the contrary, there was no need for this. New industry would have to adapt 
to its surroundings. It should 'blend in' to the local enviromnent. " But the need for jobs 
had to be addressed. Unemployment in Gwynedd was double the national average. The 
-old' industries (most notably slate) which had sustained the local communities for 
several generations were in decline. Fall in demand and mechanisation meant that even 
with economic planning and capital investment (which would help) these industries were 
spent forces as mass employers. The infrastructure of 'old' industry therefore had to be 
adapted and 'new' industry attracted. The central purpose of industrial planning was to 
end the process of depopulation in the area. As he argued in 1957: 
At the moment the situation is awful. Every week, and almost every day I hear 
about people leaving Arfon, many for Wrexham, the south, England and some to 
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the far comers of the World. Hunger drives them out of Wales, but it is a physical 
hunger. The other hunger- the hunger to return once more to their ", %verin' g 
deepens with very passing moment that they have to survive in their new alien 66 
environment. 
it was not only the loss of one generation which troubled Roberts. A large percentage of 
those who were leaving local areas were young, depriving the local 'gwenn' of further 
generations of its community. But there was another side to the problem, 'As the native 
Welsh leave their cottages the English immediately buy them. But these are middle a0red 
people. Professionals or those who have retired. They have no children or their children 
have grown up'. He argued that these new residents - without children - would not 
readily integrate into the Welsh community. Children would pick up the language at 
school and would make friends with Welsh speakers. It was more difficult for those who 
were set in their ways. If traditional values and culture were to survive, Wales had to live 
in the present, not the past, and alter the pattern of migration. 
Roberts took this so seriously that he even countenanced protest actions. He supported 
marches by the local unemployed (such as the one from Penygoes to Caemarfon in 1957) 
which highlighted their plight, and argued that the long term effects of unemployment 
affected the whole of the community, not only those who were unemployed. Whilst he 
acknowledged that in one sense the local 'gwenn' had flourished almost because of the 
harsh realities of life in these areas, long term unemployment was a different matter. It 
was 'contagious'. Sooner or later there would not be a member of the community who 
remained unaffected, 'In every direction, economically, culturally and spiritually the 
fabric of all our lives will decline'. 
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For Roberts, economic policy was cr-ucial to the future of the local community. There was 
little point in worrying too much about cultural issues if there was no longer a Welsh 
community left to sustain that culture. As the WRCL also argued, there was little point in 
Labour building community centres if there were no communities left to use them. It vvas 
therefore important for new industry to employ local labour. Roberts argued that the 
proposed power stations would collectively lead to the creation of around 800 jobs, which 
would 'break the back of the unemployment problem from Caernarfon to Aberdaron'. " 
However, the government's 'Report on Industrial Development in Caemarfonshire', 
published in June 1956, assumed that skilled workers would come from outside the area. 
As the report argued. 'the possibility of living in the country rather than in an industrial 
area may be expected to offer considerable attraction to skilled workers and scientific 
employees'. " This did not address Roberts' concern over the fact that 'intelligence is 
being drained away from these areas at an alarming rate'. " 
Building nuclear power stations and chemical works promised to create local jobs during 
the construction phase, but in the long tenn the very antithesis of what Roberts hoped was 
likely to occur. The new industries would not nourish the needs of the local community, 
but would actually serve to undennine it. They would not provide high paid jobs for 
locals, but lead to in-migration and the decline of Welsh communities. The remedy for 
this predicament, Roberts insisted, would be the establishing of local technical colleges, 
Miching the skills which the new industnes would demand. If this was achieved, new 
employers would not have to look outside the local area for their skilled labour. There 
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ývas also still the problem of attracting more industries to the area, xhich would also 
increase demand for skilled labour. 
The answer was to provide facilities for an influx of small to medium sized factories. 
This work had begun dunng Attlee's administration. Trading Estates were believed to 
have proved their worth 'socially and economically'. " Goronwy Roberts ývas 
'disappointed' that Harold Wilson's 1950 initiative for the development of Trading 
Estates, which had included provision for Gwynedd (in particular Penygroes") had not 
materialised. There were other disappointments. Despite being a member of the WRCL's 
Tripartite Committee on rural areas, Roberts did not agree wholeheartedly vvith the 
party's policy for rural Wales. For example, he was concemed that the schemes which 
Caradog Jones and the WRCL had in mind did not seem to be schemes of mass 
employment, which areas like Gwynedd needed. Rather, they focussed on skilled 
employment in small units. In this respect, as Roberts was to suggest, the Conservative 
government's schemes for the economic development of 'depressed' areas such as 
Gwynedd were as radical as the schemes which Labour had in mind. " He was even more 
concerned at Labour's enthusiasm for developing tourism in Gwynedd. There were 
evident disadvantages so far as this 'industry' was concerned. As Roberts argued: 
There are two ways of looking at this industry. On the one hand it is the largest 
industry that we have in north Wales. On the other hand it is the least satisfactory, 
since it is busy for a couple of months in the summer but then Increases leý'els of 
unemployment in the winter months. I will say it once again ... no good will come from this industry in north Wales. Indeed, the sporadic nature of the industry only 
ýý, eakens our argument for new, permanent and regular industry and work. " 
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Roberts was nonetheless encouraged by the government's attempts to bring work to I-- 
Wales in the late 1950s. It was, he argued, a sign that a process of modernisation was also 
occurrIng in the Conservative party as well as his own. " Never before had a Conservative 
govenunent 'gone as close to accepting the socialist assertion that it is only through 
purposeful and careful planning that work can be found in the depressed areas of Wales. 
in gradients only do the parties differ in principle'. " The Tories had accepted that it was a 
government's duty to create work for the nation's unemployed. They accepted *that those 
without work should no longer have to go and look for it'. " This was a positi-,., e feature 
for counties like Gwynedd who had lost the 'cream' of its people. 
The government planned to use Treasury money to create new industries and thus new 
jobs in 'depressed' areas. 'New Development Areas' were to emerge. Anglesey and large 
areas of Gwynedd qualified for help under the scheme. Nevertheless, as the scheme was 
for the whole of Britain, it did not include separate or special budgets for Wales. It wasted 
an opportunity to grant Wales the responsibility for economic planning which Roberts 
and others within the Labour party, such as Tudor Watkins, had been campaigning for 
since the early 1950s. " However, whilst there was cnticism over the fact that the 
government did not intend to develop their own industries under the reconstruction 
programme, Roberts perhaps surprisingly argued that state owned industrial development 
was not necessarily a good thing. His arguments here explain his support for the 
ideological changes (especially moves towards the repeal of Clause Four) which were 
taking place within the Labour party. For Roberts, many government factories which had 
been built in Gwynedd had ended in 'shambles'. " Industry therefore had a greater chance 
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of succeeding when 'industrialists themselves ask for assistance in building them' -a 
fundamental feature of the Conservative's policy on regional development (see below). "' 
The construction of government owned factories often involved false economies which 
were a menace to re-employment programmes. 
Roberts was not the only sceptic in relation to nationalised industries in Wales. The 'on- 
off' process of government control of steel was not good propaganda. The Welsh 
language press stressed that nationalisation and then cle-nationalisation of industry had 
done harrn to Welsh industry. For example Y Faner pointed to the case of 'Cvvmni Dlir 
Vansawel' (Briton Ferry Steel Company) which had established close and fond links 
with the local community. However, having been nationalised and then de-nationalised 
by the Tones, ownership passed out of local hands and into the control of the Duport 
Company. This was 'another example of old Welsh ownership maintained in a co- 
operative and kindred spirit having been destroyed. A system which had lasted for two 
generations before the government interfered with it' had now disappeared. " 
Criticism of Tory governance was, however, constructive. Where credit was due, Roberts 
was willing to give it. He praised Henry Brooke (Minister of State for Wales) for his 
more positive attitude to Welsh affairs. Brooke's own credibility in rural Wales had been 
mortally injured by the Tryweryn controversy. But Roberts was eager to show that the 
office of 'Minister for Welsh Affairs' could prove beneficial to the interests of Wales, 
even if it was held by a nonentity and a Tory. How many nationalists, Roberts argued, 
I would say no to the suggestion that an Economic and Industrial Board be set up for the 
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purpose of bringing new industry to Wales"" - as Brooke had sugg ested. " in principle, 
the creation of a Board acting without governmental interference, but with its financial 
backing was an appealing notion. However, as Roberts argued, less appealing was the 
thought of yet another 'body' dealing with Welsh affairs. As he was to note, 'We alreadv 
have so many bodies in Wales that I sometimes think that I am living in a cemetery'. 81 
Obtaining - and advocating - economic progress was therefore crucial to the Labour 
party's success in many parts of Welsh speaking rural Wales. This was underlined by 
Roberts's own election campaign in 1959, which was dominated not by cultural 
nationalism but by economic arguments, with a lesser emphasis on constitutional change 
and Labour's policy for peace. He noted that a Labour govenunent, if elected, would re- 
develop and extend the Dalton Industrial Dispersion policy, which had been successful 
under the 1945 Labour government. 84 If this suggested that Labour had no new ideas on 
economic rebuilding, Roberts argued that this would be backed up by a 'radical and 
progressive agricultural policy'(along the lines suggested by the WRCL). He re-iterated 
the WRCL's plans to extend water and electricity supplies to remote rural areas. There 
were promises of radical education packages, technical colleges, and the extension of 
NHS health services. Pensions would be increased. It was only after the presentation of 
economic, social and welfare policies that Roberts presented Labour's case for 
constitutional reform. Here can be noted a marked shift in his own position fOllWA-In=c, the 
lessons of the Parliament for Wales campaign. He defended Labour's record on Wales, 
disagreeing with those who argued that Labour's colonial policy and its Welsh policy 
demonstrated duplicity, on the grounds that 'Wales is not ready for self-government'. 
" 
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The reason for this was the north-south divide and the absence of a single notion of 
nationhood which would unite the Welsh along social and cultural lines. The Parliament 
for Wales campaign had proved this fact. 
Goronwy Roberts success as a representative of the nationalist and radical tradition was 
based quite firmly on the modernising appeal of the Labour party in Welsh speaking Zý 
Wales. It was based on the premise that a Labour government could and would deliver 
economic reforms that would stimulate industry and solve the unemployment problems in 
many of the rural areas (and on his capacity to 'serve' the local community even if Labour 
did not form a govemment). 
Labour's popularity was therefore twofold. In addition to an attractive package of policies 
for rural north Wales, the candidate's support for Welshness (including devolution) and 
an overwhelming desire to preserve and protect the local 'gwenn' was clearly attractive. 
These were all ingredients in Labour's success after 1945. The final ingredient which 
cemented that success was the failure of rival political parties to mount a sustained 
challenge. 
The lack of a credible political alternative. 
Labour's victories in Merioneth and Anglesey in the general election of 1951 confirmed 
the party's new found dominance of north-west Wales. Such was the scale of its 
dominance in Caemarvonshire by 1951 that the seat, won only six years earlier, was 
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being described in the national press as an 'Impregonable' Labour stronchold. " As Table 2 
indicates, this dominance continued throughout the 1950s. 
Table 2: Caernarfonshire General Election Results, 1945-59. 
YEAR LABOUR LIBERAL CONSERV PLAID TL-RNOUT 
1945 22,043 15,637 No 2,152 77.7 
(55.3) (39.3) Candidate (5.4) 
1950 18,369 7,791 6,315 4,882 85.9 
(49.1) (20.9) (16.9) (13.1) 
1951 22,375 No 13,479 No 82.5 
(62.4) Candidate (37.6) Candidate 
1955 17,682 3,277 8,461 5,815 82.4 
(50.2) (9.3) (24.0) (16.5) 
1959 17,506 No 9,564 7,293 83.4 
(51.0) Candidate (27.8) (21.2) 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
Labour's results in Caernarvonshire were now more typical of those expected in south 
Wales. Roberts was proud of the fact that the margin of his victories were all the more 
notable for the fact that this was 'not Rhondda or Llanelli . 
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In Merioneth the picture was less spectacular but no less impressive, for this was an 
unlikely Labour constituency. The popularity of T. W. Jones and of Labour's interest in 
rural, Welsh speaking, areas were important aspects of the party's success. As Table 3 
indicates, Labour's success in Merioneth could not be taken for granted. Yet despite this. 
the partý"s tenure was not seriously challenged in the elections of 1955 and 1959. 
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Table 3: Merioneth General Election Results, 1945-59. 
YEAR LABOUR LIBERAL CONSERV PLAID TURNOUT] 
1945 8,383 8,495 4,474 2,448 82.2 
(35.4) (35.8) (18.5) (10 . 3) 
1950 8,577 9,647 3,846 2,754 88.8 
(34.6) (38.8) (15.5) (11.1) 
1951 10,505 9,457 4,505 No 87.3 
(42.9) (38.7) (18.4) Candidate 
1955 9,056 6,374 3,001 5,243 86.2 
(38.3) (26.9) (12.7) (22.1) 
1959 9,095 8,119 No 5,127 84.5 
(40.8) (36.3) Candidate (22.9) 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
The political parties it faced at General Elections were either politically, financially or 
organisationally incapable of mounting effective, realistic challenges to Labour's 
dominance. 
The Conservative party 
Ironically, Labour's victones in north-west Wales in 1951 occurred against the trend for 
the party's fortunes at UK level. Labour lost the 1951 election to the Conservative party 
despite obtaining its highest vote ever, (fourteen million, or 48.8 per cent). This was the C> 
beginnings of the party's first 'wilderness years', a turbulent period of internal debate and 
disunity. Having won in 195 1, the Conservatives consolidated their position with 
further 
N Ictories in 1955 and 1959. However, the party failed to capitalise on this SLICCCSS. xvith 
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no real improvements in Wales. As Table 4 shows, whilst the Conservatives obtained 2-5- 
30 per cent of the vote in Wales, it did abysmally in north-west Wales. 'ýVith the 
exception of its performance in Caernarfonshire in 1951, when a (rare) two-way contest 
saw the party poll an impressive 37.6 per cent, it performed below the Welsh averagze in 
Caemarfonshire and well below the average in Merioneth for the entire period. 
Table 4: Conservative party electoral performance, 1945-59 (% of vote) 
Year UK Wales Caernarfonshire Merioneth 
1945 36.2 16.5 No candidate 18.5 
1950 40.0 21.0 16.9 15.5 
1951 44.3 27.6 37.6 18.4 
1955 46.6 26.7 24.0 12.7 
1959 46.6 29.6 27.8 No cand. 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
The party's performance in the north-west was at best typical and frequently worse than 
its performance at Welsh level. During the 1950s, the Conservative party won 19 of a 
possible 144 constituency seats in Wales at general elections. It best perfon-nance came in 
1959 when it won 6 seats out a total of 36. The party's core support - and its 
(comparative) failure to build on this in Wales after the Second World War is a crucial 
but much understudied area of Welsh political history. " 
The Conservative's failure to convert its UK popularity into success in Wales was not a 
ne, w phenomenon. These problems dated back to the nmeteenth century, specIfically to 
the extension of the franchise in 1885. Increased democracy was a disaster for the party in 
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Wales. Its dismal showing in the 1950s showed little change from its equally poor 
performance in the period from 1885 to 1910, when it had won only 32 out of a possible 
272 seats. In 1906 the party failed to win a single Welsh seat, a feat x-%, -hich was not 
repeated until 1997. Hostility towards the party was deeply rooted. Dunno, the second half 
of the nineteenth century it developed a reputation as the party of the often despised 
landed elite and of the Anglican church. As a result, Welsh society thus became deepl-v 
divided with several cleavages - class, culture, language and religion - tendin2 to re- 
enforce each other. As a consequence, the Liberals and Radicals came to speak for the 
vast majority - the Welsh non-conformist middle and working class and the peasantry - 
whilst the Tories represented the interests of the Anglican, anglicised, property owning 
minority. This could create (neglected) pockets of strength; but no real domination. 
Neither did the party's position in Wales improve in the inter-war period. In marked 
contrast to Scotland, where fear of socialism consolidated the middle class vote behind 
the Conservatives and a mixture of Protestantism, Orangeism and Unionism, the Tory 
cause in Wales remained enfeebled and marginalized until the 1930s. '9 Electoral 
performances remained poor. In seven general elections between 1918 and 1939, the 
party secured only 37 victories out of a possible 252. " Furthermore, despite the changes 
occurring in Welsh society, the party's strength remained very localised, this strength 
being confined to the coastal strip from Swansea to Newport, Monmouthshire and 
Breconshire, and among voters in north Wales coastal resorts. " Even when the Labour 
Party was in crisis, the Conservative party offered little attraction to Welsh -voters. If any 
eý'ent in the inter-war period signalled the redundant nature of Conservatism among the 
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Welsh, it was the collapse of the Labour government in 193 1. 'Whereas support for the 
Labour party in Bntain as a whole decreased from 37 per cent in 1929 to 30.8 per cent in 
1931, support for the party in Wales actually increased from 43.9 per cent to 44.1 per 
cent. 
When the party enjoyed success, it was in borough constituencies - constituencies which 
typically contained a higher percentage of prosperous, English speaking, voters. There 
were certainly Tory farmers, but seldom enough to provide a strong electoral platform. 
Lack of support for the party in the 1950s was perhaps partly based on traditional 
suspicions. As work by Jones et al has suggested, one of the party's long standing 
problems so far as attracting Welsh voters is concerned, was its status as 'an English 
party in Wales'. " 
Recent research suggests that 'the Conservatives share of middle class support in Wales 
was 15 percentage points lower than in any other region of Britain'. " Not only, therefore, 
could Conservative difficulties be understood by the fact that Wales had a proportionately 
larger working class than the rest of Britain, but also by the fact that the Welsh middle 
class was more strongly anti-Conservative than in the rest of Britain. Jones et al. argue 
that there was a 'specific, deep rooted perception of the Conservatives among the Welsh 
population as being a fundamentally 'English' party. " Indeed, anti-Conservatism may 
now be a part of 'Welshness' and an element in Labour's appeal. However, these 
comments provide an uncertain guide to opinion in the 1950s. The Consen, ative's policy 
statements on Wales during the 1950s did not demonstrate a neglect of Welsh values or 
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interests. In The Conservative Party and Welsh Affairs (195 1) the party argued that it was 
not an anti-Welsh spirit which animated objections to devolution. Rather, it argued that 
those who campaigned for a Welsh parliament were irresponsible, careless and 
impractical. In other words, those who sought a Welsh parliament were raising false 
hopes among the Welsh people. Devolution was not a 'quick-fix' solution to the 
problems of Wales. Only through practical policies could these problems be solved. In 
contrast to official Labour policy, the Conservatives acknowledged that Wales did have 
4special problems' and 'national aspirations' that had to be addressed. The Tories argued 
that Labour's centralism had gone too far in making local authorities the tools of 
Whitehall. But rather than proposing devolution (which would weaken goverranent and 
the union) it favoured strengthened local authorities. In particular it sought to extend local 
control for the humane and effective operation of social services. 
Neither did Conservative candidates neglect local issues. Like Labour and the Liberal 
parties, prospective candidates talked of the need for 'vigorous policies of expansion' in 
north-west Wales. Better roads, water supplies and electricity were high on the party's 
agenda. Depopulation was also a concem. Like Labour, the Conservative party was 
concerned over the loss of 'young people' from Welsh rural areas. In a speech which 
could well have been made by his political opponent, the party's candidate for 
Caemarfonshire 
, J. E. Bryn Davies, argued 
in 195 1: 
Our tradition, our culture and our language are in the hands of the young people. 
We must by all means encourage them to safeguard and improve upon the 
heritage of our forefathers" 
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As Goronwy Roberts conceded, the Conservative party had gone a lontc; vvay in 
recognising the distinctive needs of Wales. For many pragmatists and technocrats %, ý'Ithin 
the Labour party, like Roberts, the Conservative party's plans for balancýng private and 
public initiatives as a means of attracting industry to rural Wales were often more 
attractive than those which placed the entire burden on government. in the party's 1959 
general election manifesto The Next Five Years the party argued that local 
unemployment, brought about by a combination Of 'Markets, methods and machines', 
could only be attacked through positive government intervention. This would involve 
capital grants for building new factories combined with subsidised rents for government 
built factories. Both these policies were designed to be of 'particular help' to Scotland 
and Wales. 
However, as the party's dismal electoral performances indicated, the message was not 
getting through to the local electorate. This was again despite the fact that the party 
selected distinctly 'Welsh' candidates to contest the north-west constituencies. Like its 
political rivals, the Tory party increasingly opted for local and Welsh speaking 
candidates. In 1951 the local press described the party's candidate for Caemarfonshire, a 
Welsh speaking farmer from Pwllheli, as 'the best candidate the Conservative party have 
had for years ... a patriotic Welshman'. Davies increased the party's share of the vote, 
but 
this was largely due to the transferred loyalties of many local Liberals. At times, the 
views held by these candidates on local issues differed little from those held by Labour's 
candidates. In 1955 the local Liberal Association went as far as to present both Labour 
and Conservative candidates with a list of key questions which would enable their own 
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supporters to decide who to support in the general election. This was not conducive to 
retaining the party's 'core' support. 
Social and economic realities were more important as explanations of the Tones' limited 
appeal to middle class voters and farmers at least. Wales still differed from England b,, 
being, on aggregate, poorer and more working class. North-west Wales was one of 
several regions of the UK which did not enjoy the benefits associated with economic 
growth in the 1950s. During the 'affluent years' of the 1950s when many English voters 
had 'never had it so good', voters in north-west Wales had suffered due to the fact that 
many of the factors which ensured support for the party in England, and other parts of 
Wales, either did not apply or did not apply in large enough measures to ensure electoral 
success. 
What undermined the party was its failure to bring 'British' levels of prosperity to north- 
west Wales. This accentuated the voters alienation from a party they already mistrusted. 
The Tryweryn controversy, which had been a burdensome issue to the Labour party, 
added to its problems. The party's installation of a Minister of State for Welsh Affairs 
was no more successful. Affectionately known as 'Dai Bananas', Sir David Maxwell Fyfe 
and Henry Brooke, both unfortunate incumbents of the office in the 1950s, were treated 
with derision by rival Welsh politicians and the Welsh language press. The party's lack of 
interest in the issues surrounding Tryweryn were more a symptom of its failure than a 
cause. The Conservatives' London leaders did not seem able to comment in ways that 
attracted sympathy in north-west Wales. 
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However, despite its many problems, the end of the 1950s saw the emergence of a new 
generation of young Conservative activists (including the party's prospective candidate 
for Caemarfon, Tom Hooson, and the prospective MP for Aberafon, Geoffrey HoAe). 
They pioneered a more enlightened attitude towards Wales in the 1960s and 1970s, This 
new spirit of 'radicalism' is worthy of note because it identified weaknesses in the 
Conservative case during the 1950s, and because the new radicals strengthened It in the 
1970s. 
In 1959 a section of the 'Bow Group', the 'Young Conservatives in Wales' published a 
mammoth 35,000 word pamphlet, Workfor Wales: Gwaith i Gyniru. This was openly I 
critical of the party's policies and record in Wales. Shrewd in its analysis of Tory failure 
in Wales, it argued that the party had failed to address itself purposely to a Welsh 
audience. The party's poor record was symptomatic of its image as an 'English' party. 
However 'quaint' this assertion was - the authors pointing to the fact that 97% of the 
Welsh electorate actually voted for 'English' parties - it was an electoral noose. A 
positive step towards addressing this problem would be the creation of a 'Conservative 
Party of Wales'. " This would not be achieved overnight, but it might create the 'gradual 
groN-,, Ih of the Welsh Conservative vote'. A change in attitudes was required socially and 
politically. The people of Wales had to come to terms with the realities of economic 
change. Tough decisions lay ahead. These decisions could not be made with one eye on 
'the romantic policy of preserving industries', on 'cherish-ing decay', but by coming to 
terms with reality and the ftiture. 
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Diversification of industry should be a vital component of a new Tory strategy. Private 
investment, attracted by 'positive inducements' and combined with 'special in-vestment 
allowances' to encourage industrial investment in areas of high unemployment, would 
help to encourage new industry. However, it was also essential that Wales 'sold' itself in 
an increasingly competitive industrial arena. Industrialists had to be convinced that Welsh 
workers were second to none in terms of loyalty and co-operation. The authors noted that 
'the long traditions of industrial strikes in coal mining and the migration to England of 
militant Welsh trade unionists' had created a 'dismal and unjust' perception of Wales. 
The pamphlet also offered specific proposals for dealing with the problems facing north- 
west Wales. In agriculture, Welsh farmers would have to come to terms with reality. In 
the long term, 'Welsh agriculture will support fewer people at higher standards'. Whilst 
acknowledging the fact that amalgamation aroused strong feelings in Wales, the authors 
fundamentally rejected the conservation of small units, the Welsh hill farm or 'tyddyn', 
on cultural grounds and in defiance of economics: 
This type of argument is frequently advanced by literary Welshmen living 
comfortably in Cardiff, Aberystwyth or London. This is the wrong ground to pitch 
a battle in defence of the Welsh environment. " 
Similarly, new innovative approaches had to be taken in the slate industry. A roofini-, 
service, supplying and fitting slates anywhere in the country, was one option. Another tn 11 
\Nas to promote the sale of slate in terms of quality rather than price. Twenty-five year 
arantees on slate roofs would help the to counter the fact that alternative 
roofing products were cheaper. Tourism was also to be welcomed. 
On the one had. 
0 
76 
tourism was an excellent means of promoting 'a busier Wales', whilst on the other *the 
throb of increased spending' would help to stimulate the Welsh economy. 
The scale of the task facing government was vast. This was no time for sentimentality. 
Ten thousand jobs were needed in the Welsh countryside. Half of these were needed in 
Gwynedd, the other half in mid Wales. To tackle the problem, parts of G"-ynedd should 
be made development areas. However, the onus on development should not be the sole 
responsibility of central government. On the contrary, the authors were highly cntical of 
the fact that local authorities had 'failed to take the elementary steps necessary for the 
establishment of new industry'. Weak local authorities should therefore be abolished, 
with six large counties established to replace the present thirteen. Again, however, these 
were not problems that could be solved ovemight - nor problems with the state could 
solve by trying to 'buck' the market. The slow emergence of a 'Thatcherite' approach - 
identified by historians of the British Conservative party - had its parallels m Wales. " 
If the future for the Conservative party in Wales was potentially more encouraging, its 
short term prospects in north-west Wales continued to look bleak. During the 1950s it had 
failed to dent Labour majorities in north-west Wales. Despite some promising policies 
and commitments, tradition or traditionalism had ensured that the party remained deeply 
unpopular among a large section of the local electorate. Economic and social changes 
(including the perceived growth of the middle class), which had ensured the party's 
success in England, were invisible in most part of Wales - particularly in poor, Welsh 
speaking regions, such as the north-west. Even in the early 1950s, the Conservative party 
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relied heavily on its ability to attract the voted of discontented centre-nght local Liberals 
to mount a serious challenge at election times. Although pol't1cally unsuccessful, this 
strategy had a more profound impact on the ailing Liberal party than on the Tones. 
The Liberal Party 
The decade after 1945 was particularly painful for the Liberal party. A decline which was 
well advanced before 1945 came to fruition after 1945.11 Across Britain the party paid the 
price after the war for mistakes it made in the inter-war period - in particular the 
excessive support it gave to the National Government of 1931 and the Conservati, *,, e 
government thereafter. This association posed both political and organisational 
difficulties for the Liberal party. In many constitudricies, local Liberal associations were 
left to act as little more than auxiliaries of Conservative organisations, and as a result 
were usually defective and in many places rudimentary. "' In the period after 1945 the 
party (in the UK as a whole) was 'squeezed out' in the shires by Conservatism and by 
Labour in Britain's industnal heartlands. In north-west Wales it was also 'squeezed out' 
by Labour's appeal to rural areas and to both Labour and Plaid Cymru's challenge to its 
status as a representative of Welsh 'nationalist' interests. 
The decline of the Liberal party after 1945 has been afforded surprisingly little historical 
attention. There is a limited literature on the party at UK level, but these works pay little 
specific attention to Wales. Literature specifically on the fate of the party in Wales is even 
more sparse. The overwhelming image of the party after 1945 is depressing. John 
Stevenson argues that the 1945 election was a 'disaster' for the Liberal party. The decay 
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of grassroots organisation, well advanced before the war, worsened during the 19', Os as z::! - 
the party 'faced extinction'. "' The party was also in trouble politically. Roy Dou-i, -Ias aptIv 
entitles a chapter on the post 1945 period 'Between the Millstones', and descnbe,, a party 
squeezed-out by a two party antithesis at UK level. "' In Wales the party ýý, -as either dead 
or mortally wounded after the Second World War. David Roberts views the post 1945 
period as 'The Strange Death of Liberal Wales'. 'O' The party was in turinoil, lackin-g), a 
coherent or credible strategy and political message. The 'strength' of the party at Welsh 
(as opposed to UK) level disguised the fact that the party's members were in fact a 
disparate team', divided ideologically to the left and right of the political spectrum. 
Other Welsh historians also view the party's fortunes after 1945 pessimistically. As J. 
Graham Jones has argued, the party failed to become a radical-nationalist alternative to 
Labour. Problematically, the Welsh Liberal party increasingly appeared 'a relatively 
conservative party' and as a result drove 'radical thinkers disillusioned Nvith Labour into 
the arms of Plaid Cymru'. "' 
As Table 5 indicates, support for the party slumped dramatically after 1945, both at UK 
and Wales levels. Despite this, rural Wales remained one of only a handful of Liberal 
strongholds throughout Britain. Only twelve Liberal MP's were returned in the general 
election of 1945, but seven of these represented Welsh constituencies. In 1950, when the 
Party's representation at Westminster fell to nine, five came from Wales. However, these 
P fon Boroughs - fi- res often flattered to deceive. In Wales, the party had lost Caernar 
Lloyd George's seat until his death in 1945 - to the Conservatives in 1945, along with cý 
Caemarfonshire. By 1950 both Anglesey and Merioneth were tantalisingly close to 
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Labour's grasp, Menoneth eluding Labour by only 112 votes. In 195 1. the party* s share 
of seats in Wales fell to three, Labour victories in Merioneth and Anglesey providing the 
latest casualties. 
Table 5: Liberal party's percentage share of the vote in General Elections, 1945-64. 
United Kingdom Wales Caernarvonshire Merioneth 
1945 9.0 15.2 39.3 35.8 
1950 9.1 12.6 20.9 38.8 
1951 2.6 7.7 No Candidate 38.7 
-T9--55 2.7 7.3 9.3 26.9 
1959 5.9 5.3 No Candidate 36.3 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections 
Following its defeat in 1945, the Caemarfonshire Liberal Association fell apart. As in 
Anglesey, bitter in-fighting characterised the 1950s. However, in Menoneth the party 
declared following its defeat in 1951 that 'there would be no question of the abandonment 
of the Liberal cause in Merioneth'. "' This symbolised a dogged, albeit unsuccessful, 
attempt to marshal the forces of Liberalism during the 1950s. 
The 1950s were a stagnant period for the party in north-west Wales. Despite the party's 
slight resurgence following Jo Gnmond's accession to the party leadership in place of 
Clem Davies in 1956, the party remained divided, despondent and defeated. Bitter 
internal fighting, reflecting disagreements over party strategy and Policy. Together with 
4-- * organisational and financial problems, this blighted the party's attempts at rebuilding 
Under six per cent of Welsh voters remained 'loyal' to the party by 1959.106 
Even in 
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constituencies like Merioneth, where support for the party remained strong, it Nvas still 
incapable of winning. By the end of the 1950s, the party in north-west Wales ýý as in a 
sorry state. As a report on party organisation, written in 1960, argued 'the position in 
north Wales is unimproving'. An accompanying list of north Wales constituencies 
confirmed the diagnosis. These ranged from Anglesey - 'dead beat', Caernarfon 'ticking 
over', Conwy, 'no enthusiasm', East Flint 'first executive meeting for two years held this 
month', to Merioneth 'not yet adopted a new candidate'. "' 
Disagreements over the political direction of the party after the war were profound. It was 
not surprising that the Liberal party in Wales lacked a clear strategy after 1945. Divisions 
over aims and values were brought into sharp focus by Labour's increasing dominance 
and the advent of a Labour government with a commanding majority. A major problem 
for the party was its inability to devise policies that were distinctly different from those 
offered by Labour and the Tones. 'New Liberal' ideology was safely housed within 
Labour's philosophy whilst 'Old' Liberal ideology was accommodated by modem 
Conservatism. As the 1945 Nuffield study noted: 
There was a very decisive verdict against the Liberal party, but it might be rash to 
state that there was a verdict against Liberalism, the beliefs and prescriptions of 
which found so large a place in the propaganda of other parties"' 
The party's policies had the potential to please, but they failed to provoke or challenge. 
Lacking distinct economic arguments, and a basis of support which could be used to 
challenge the Labour party in most areas, in Wales the party over-relied upon and o,,,, er- 
estimated the importance of devolution as a political weapon. In 1945 Emrys Roberts. the 
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party's candidate in Merioneth, had been 'seriously concerned' that the part,, ý I should 
include a 'proposal in regard to Wales' in its election manifesto, suggesting that the t: lt: l 
establishment of a Secretary of State and a Welsh National Development Council would 
not be inappropriate. "' In the event, the party's manifesto advocated only 'suitable 
measures of devolution' which would enable both Scotland and Wales *to assume greater 
responsibility in the management of their domestic affairs'. "' In July 1946 six Welsh 
Liberal MP's sponsored a new clause in the National Health Service Bill, which xould 
transfer to Wales the administration of its own hospitals and specialist services. The 
party's leader, Clem Davies, was also a firm supporter of Welsh devolution, consistently 
supporting devolutionary solutions to Welsh social and economic problems. Assured by 
these positive attitudes and support at the highest level, by the late 1940s some sections of 
the party in Wales were pushing hard for a firm commitment to devolution and in 
particular a Parliament for Wales. 
However, Welsh issues - particularly the question of devolution - brought uncertainties 
over Liberal policy into sharp focus. In north-west Wales the party was determined that it 
should continue to carry the beacon of Welsh 'nationalist' aspirations. Support for 
devolution was an intrinsic feature of the party's desire to develop specifically 'Welsh' 
and 'radical' policies. This made nonsense of the party's association with the Tones (see 
below), but it also highlighted differences of opinion over devolution within the Liberal 
party and the extent to which the party was dominated at UK level by conservative 
elements in the decade after 1945. In 1947, the Liberal party's statement of policy on the 
machinery of government had confirmed a firm commitment to devolution for Scotland 
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and Wales, with, in the case of Wales, a separate Secretaný of State. Flo, ývever, an 
amendment by Solihull Liberal Association attempted to water down the pollcy. WhIlst 
agreeing on the need for Welsh control over matters such as housing, education, 4: ) 
electricity, gas and public health, it opposed control of trade, commerce and industry and 
called for the 'strengthening and more effective operation of all Government departments 
in Scotland and Wales' rather than devolved parliaments. There was little doubt amon,, 
some Liberals that the success of the Solihull amendment would deal a fatal blow to the 
party in north-west Wales. Martin Rees, general secretary of the Nferioneth Liberal 
Association, wrote thus to the chairman of the Liberal party in London: 
1. The deletion of the devolution clause by the adoption of the Solihull 
amendment would, without a shadow of a doubt, be a serious blow to Liberalism 
in Wales. Large numbers of us - and I say this very deliberately - would have to 
reconsider our attitude and our allegiance if the party goes back on its election 
manifesto declaration on devolution. 
2. What Solihull propose as Liberal policy in this particular matter is precisely 
what Prime Minister Attlee offered the Welsh Parliamentary Party last year when 
he summarily declined to consider the appointment of a Secretary of State for 
Wales. If the Liberal Assembly endorses Attlee's attitude by passing the Solihull 
amendment, what are we going to tell our people, and what will be our reply to 
the very active Welsh Nationalist Party? You will agree that a big question of 
principle is involved. 
3. The rejection of Clause (i) in favour of the amendment would gravely 
jeopardise the position of the Liberal Federation of Wales in the efforts it is ably 
making in North, and particularly in South Wales, to rally the forces of 
Liberalism, not only against Socialism and Tory infultration but against the 
reactionary Nationalist elements whose strength must not be underestimated. ''' 
With Clem Davies at the helm, the appeal to Liberal HQ did not fall on deaf ears. The 
Solihull amendment was 'overwhelmingly' defeated. However, the incident is crucial in 
understanding the anxieties of the Liberal party in Wales during the period. Even for 
members in south Wales, it was evident that leading the way on devolution was -., -ital in LI 
liolding off the growmg threat posed by Plaid Cymru. As J. Walter Jones from the Neath t, 
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Liberal Association pointed out, in 'at least five constituencies' there was a danger 'that 
the Nationalists might wreck Liberal representation in North 'Wales'. '' , Commitment to 
devolution was therefore both an attempt to retain an intrinsic element of the party's 
traditional radicalism and a political move aimed at staving off political rivals and 
preserving the party's remaining seats in north Wales. The Liberal party's influential role 
in establishing the ill-fated Parliament for Wales campaign in 1950 was another strand in 
the party's effort to 'push the boat into the water' and lead the way on devolution. "' 
However, support for devolution could also be problematic inside Wales. The Parliament 
for Wales campaign highlighted the party's political and organisational difficulties. Two 
factors are particularly worthy of note. The campaign itself had been initiated by the 
Liberal party on New Year's Eve 1949, "' but it lacked the resources and organisational 
infrastructure to capitallse on its involvement. Only Megan Lloyd George generated any 
real interest. Instead, media attention was hijacked by Labour's new generation of MPs 
and candidates, who (successfully) built their own reputations around their Welshness, 
and whose defiance of party in support of the campaign won a number of admirers. 
Moreover, it was not only the Labour party who capitalised on the interest afforded to the 
Parliament for Wales campaign. Plaid Cymru did the same. This caused irritation within 
the Liberal party. As one member of the party in Merioneth wrote to Emrys Roberts, 'It 
Nvill be difficult to get Merioneth's Liberals to wholeheartedly back the campaign, but it 
should be made clear that it is not the 'Blaidd's' campaign, but a Liberal one'. '' 
ý 
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The party Is involvement and role in the Parliament for Wales campaign complicated (and 
dominated) its electoral strategy. The campaign was clearly part of an attempt by the party 
to ward off Plaid's growing popularity in Merioneth and was a tactical move to ensure the 
preservation of the party's seats in Merioneth and Anglesey. The Liberal party suggested 
it would not oppose Labour MP's who supported the Parliament for Wales campaign, if I 
in return Labour would allow Liberals a free run elsewhere. In the north-west this Nvould 
have guaranteed a Labour victory in Caernarfon and Liberal victories in Merioneth and 
Anglesey. However, this suggestion paid little attention to facts often highlighted in the 
local Liberal press: that Labour HQ opposed the campaign; that the two Liberal 
constituencies were high on Labour's list of target seats and that Labour enjoyed a 
commanding majority in Caernarvonshire - Liberal candidate or not. 
This was a complex but ultimately weak strategy. The party's defeat in Merioneth was 
facilitated by Plaid Cymru's decision to withdraw its candidate, Gwynfor Evans, at a late 
stage in the election campaign. Although officially Plaid's decision was justified on the 
grounds that Emrys Roberts was a supporter of the Parliament for Wales campaign, one 
Welsh historian has argued that it was in fact a 'tactical manoeuvre to hasten the demise 
of the Liberal party in Wales'. "' The party's defeat in Menoneth not only confirmed its 
total eclipse in north-west Wales, but also the extent to which 'nationalist' sentiments 
were comfortably contained in the Labour party. As Jo Grimond, writing to Ernrys 
Roberts, regretfully recognised, 'I thought that with no nationalist standing you were safe. 
It seems to have been a most cruel stroke that Labour should have gained the votes'. 
" - 
These sentiments were shared by local Liberals. As one party supporter argued, 'It was 
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the nationalist wolf in sheep's clothing that was responsible for the result. 'We did not 
even consider such a possibility before the election, or even m, 'hen \N e travelled around on 
polling day'. "' The party no longer seemed capable of controlling its own destinv. Cý Instead 
it relied on the participation or non-participation of other parties or on electoral pacts to 
preserve its own position. In this respect, its relationship with the Conservative party ý, vas 
particularly problematic. The image of close association with the Tories, whetlier real or 
imagined, was difficult for the party to escape during the 1950s. 
in the early 1950s the Caemarvonshire Liberal Association resisted persistent Tory 
overtures to reach electoral 'understandings'. "' When the Liberal party's grave 
organisational and financial position meant it failed to field candidates in 1951 and 1959, 
it was difficult to escape rumours that a pact with the Tories had been arranged. Its 
promise that 'not fighting does not mean co-operation with other parties' fell on deaf 
ears. "' More problematic was the fact that when it had no candidate, the party actively 
encouraged local supporters to vote for other parties. In 1951 the party was keen to ensure 
that supporters made the right decisions. It sent a questionnaire to both Labour and 
Conservative candidates in the Caemarfonshire constituency, which the two candidates 
subsequently answered through the local press. 12 ' However, the major concern was the 
damage caused by failing to field Liberal candidates, financial difficulties or not. The 
minonty who opposed the decision not to contest the 1951 election pointed to the huge 
political error' which the party had made. In particular, they argued that in areas where 
the party's roots were strong, the decision would be devastating. An example cited was 
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the Lleyn Peninsula (a highly agricultural area where the party remained strong) where 
'the decision would do nothing for the party'. "' 
Yet the appeal of political association with the Tones was not the only option aired by the 
Liberals in the early 1950s. More 'Welsh' Liberals considered the merits of political pacts 
with Plaid Cymru. Having lost Caernarvonshire in 1945, the subsequent loss of 
Merioneth and Anglesey in 1951 were priceless defeats for the party, eroding even further 
a diminishing radical image. Even without the presence of a Plaid Cymru candidate, the 
party had been unable to sustain its 'Welsh' vote in Merioneth. In Merioneth and 
Anglesey, where Liberal voters deserted to the Conservative party in 195 1, Plaid support 
turned towards Labour. "' This did not augur well for the revival of the Liberal party in 
north-west Wales. As Y Cvmro argued, 'If Liberals can turn their backs on their I 
candidates in Anglesey and Merioneth, why should they not do so in Caemarvonshire, 
and, if so, what is the point of selecting a candidate? "" For some, the answer was to unite 
the forces of liberalism with other 'radical' parties. Prominent local Liberal figures 
encouraged discussion of an 'agreement' with Plaid Cymru. Unlike association with the 
Tories, this would be a much more natural affiliation for local Welsh speaking, non- 
conformist, and radical Liberals. 
Shared support for the Parfiament for Wales campalgn. demonstrated the logic behind the 
move. Rather than divide the forces behind Welsh devolution, such an agreement could 
mean an extra five thousand votes for whichever party carried the banner, v, 'hether it was 
Welsh Liberal Party' or 'Nationalist Liberal Party'. Others took the suggestion a stage 
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further, suggesting a more implausible pact with both Plaid and the Tories. As Y Cvmro 
noted, the idea of a 'Welsh Liberal Conservative Party' was not only bizarre but akin to 
'mixing milk and vinegar'. "' 
Despite the failure of these attempts, the fermentation of 'radical' elements within a 
'Welsh Radical' party (or similar) were a regular feature of attempts to fuse pro- 
devolutionist elements within one party. Several forces were at work. First, as has alread,, 
been argued, many criticised both the Liberal party and Plaid Cyrnru. for opposing local t= 
Labour candidates who supported the Parliament for Wales campaign. Such people 
questioned the logic of often fielding three candidates who supported the principle of 
Welsh devolution (and thus splitting the vote) against Conservative candidates who were 
opposed to devolution. A sensible solution was therefore to fuse pro-devolutionists into 
one camp. These were discussions which extended throughout the 1950s. Senior local 
Liberal figures tried to persuade political rivals in the Labour party to adopt the idea. 
One of the major supporters of a new radical party was Madoc Jones. For Madoc Jones it 
was clear 'that in north Wales the Labour party and the Liberal party have much in 
common, springing from the same parent roots'. He regarded Megan Lloyd George's 
decision to join Labour as odd for a 'professed radical', beanng in mind Labour's Z-- 
. strained attitude' towards devolution. Labour had become 'insensitive to the rights of 
minorities and intent only upon centralisation of executive power In HQ'. Labour 'Instead 
of becoming great had become massive'. He urged Labour MPs not to resign their seats in Z: l : _- 
protest at their party HQ's attitude towards Wales, but encouraged them to work more 
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closely with 'radical elements in the Liberal party', not only on the issue of devolution 
but also on economic reform and welfare. However, Jones' aspirations for a new radical 
party were not well received in the upper-echelons of the Liberal party. As Jones wrote to 
a political friend: 
I have got myself into trouble up here by suggesting consideration of a United 
Radical Party in Wales. It did not go down well in the last Liberal Party %Vales 
executive. 126 
As a result, Jones lost interest in his personal campaign, explaining to another political 
friend that his flirtations were due to him being 'frustrated and bored' with the Liberal 
party. 
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Organisational problems were another reason for the party's decline. In the years of 
success, organisation had not been maintained efficiently or adequately. In the party's 
hour of need it could not be relied upon to stand up to the rigours of political battle. 
Organisation, like support, had been taken for granted when times were good. When 
organisation became a serious problem after 1945, party divisions made them difficult to 
solve. There were fundamental differences over what caused organisational problems and 
how they should be overcome. 
There were two proposed remedies. On the one hand, party loyalists and stalwarts 
ýisserted that 're-organisation from top to bottom' was the only means of stalling z -- -- 
rehabilitation. 128 Others were less prepared to accept the long and painfal process of 
recovery that this entailed. Instead a 'quick-fix' solution was deemed preferable, electoral 
pacts and co-operation being high on this agenda. For the latter, poor organisation was 
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regarded as the result, not the cause of the party's problems. As the Caemar-fon 
Association argued: 
It is no use talking about organisation, and even if you get the best organisation in 
the world we can never win the seat unless we get co-operation with the 
Conservative and perhaps the Welsh Nationalist Party. If these forces combine we 
can easily win. "' 
Political alliances were also a means of shoring up the party's gr-im finances. In the run up 
to the 1950 election, the Caemarfon association admitted that it had 'no funds' to fight 
the coming election. A sum of five hundred pounds was required to contest the election. 
However, at an emergency meeting to address the problem, donations immediately raised 
E340 from those present - proof in itself of the middle class orientation of the party in the 
early fifties. The party's financial situation locally and its lack of organisational planning 
and common sense at national level was, however, a source of great irritation to the 
party's members and activists. An example of this was the national party's tendency to 
fund candidates in hopeless constituencies, whilst at the same time being unable to fund 
campaigns in traditional heartlands. Elwyn Thomas, the party's prospective candidate in 
Caemarvonshire, argued that it was 'disgraceful that the party can put up a candidate in 
Aberafon where it is fighting a 30,000 majority, but not somewhere with deep Liberal 
traditions"" - perhaps missing the point that Caemarfonshire was now just another lost 
cause. 
Even in N/lerioneth, where the party still performed well, organisation was a problem. As 
one party activist argued in the aftermath of defeat in 195 1: 
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It is all very well blaming Plaid Cymiru, but the truth is that we have not kept our 
organisation in order. We did less work than any of the other parties between 
elections and therefore a lot of blame should be placed on the Liberals of 
Merioneth, myself included. "' 
Money mattered because without it there was no local activity and no parliamentary 
contest. By the early 1950s the estimated cost of putting up a candidate (f 800) could no 
longer be justified in many constituencies, including Caemarfonshire. "' No longer was 
the party in a position to compete 'against two wealthy parties'. Lacking the financial 
resources of the Conservatives or the backing of the unions, the party 'was unusually 
dependent upon unpaid, amateur, and often makeshift assistance'. Moreover, as 
contemporary psephologists argued, this was not helped by the very nature and traditions 
of a party that expressed a great aversion to central direction and a limited esteem for the 
benefits of organisation. "' Good intentions were not matched by the drive and 
determination to see change through. Crucial ti-me and ground was lost as the party 
dabbled with different strategies. 
The Caemarfonshire Liberal Association provides a classic example of the inability to 
force through organisational improvements. Following defeat in 1945 and a sorry 
performance in 1950, the local association decided to review and modernise its 
organisation. By 1951 nothing had happened. As a senior member of the local Liberal 
association argued, 'it was surprising that the party had done nothing about organisation 
since the last election'. As he continued, 'the result is that thousands of Liberals in the 
constituency have been left without a voice'. Inactivity between elections was a major 
problem for a party that had to make up ground. As Elwyn Thomas argued: 
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We cannot hope to win an election with only three weeks work. if we are to haý e 
any chance of victory we have to work in the months and years when there is no 
election. The trouble is that the association leaves all the work to a dozen or so 
people. It would be totally unfair to ask any candidate to stand with organisation 
as it i S. 134 
cal. In lg; l Yet when 're-organisation' did eventually take place it bordered on the farci 
the Caemarfon Liberal Association decided to 'spring clean' the local association, with 
the aim of injecting new blood. However, when re-organisation took place, the 
association reported that 'all the former members had been re-elected'. 135 
This was not just a sign of mis-management. Finding new blood was not easy. As Elwyn 
Thomas had pointed out, the party had become increasingly reliant on a small band of 
workers and popular incumbent MPs. Madoc Jones, the North Wales Liberal Federation's 
press and publicity officer and honorary secretary, was a pnme example. Jones ran the 
NWLF virtually single handedly. As the NWLF's papers show, he was the party's eyes 
and ears, judge, jury and executioner, a shoulder to cry on and a referee for the party's 
many quarrels. In 1954, when the party was at a low ebb, Jones launched a series of 
newsletters entitled Liberal Lighthouse, which he described as a 'monthly message of 
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comfort and enthusiasm for a party sorely in need of both'. Neither did Jones' 
commitment to the Liberal cause go unnoticed by the party's leaders. As Clem Davies 
opined, 'I believe that the North Wales Liberalism would die of inaction were it not for 
your enthusiasm, vigour and drive'. "' The party's MPs also carried a huge organIsat, onal 
and motivational burden. Before her defeat in 195 1, Megan Lloyd George had 'carried the 
Anglesey Liberal Association on her back' - support for the local association 
being 
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confined to 'the waving of handkerchiefs' at election times. "" Similarly, Emrys Roberts 
carried a significant personal vote in Merioneth -a major factor in the narrow victories of 
1945 and 1950. 
Following defeat in 1951, Emrys Roberts decided to retire from politics. It was difficult 
for the party to find a candidate who held the same radical, leftist, Liberal beliefs. As one 
party activist claimed during a failed attempt to get Roberts to stand again, 'I am afraid 
that you are the only Liberal who can win the seat for the party without going into 
partnership with the Tories'. "' As the decade progressed, the party came to rely on young, 
inexperienced, candidates who found it hard to cope with the rigours of electoral battles. 
Geraint Williams, the party's candidate in Caernarfonshire in 1955, was one unfortunate 
victim of this trend. As Y Cymro noted, in a meeting at Groesion, Williams discussed 
unions and monopolies with the assembled meeting, but 'failed to get to grips with the 
audience ... and started a 
fire that he could not put out'. Trying to smother the flames, 
Williams succeeded only in 'making matters go from bad to worse'. As Y Cymro noted, 
'in areas like these a parliamentary candidate has to be a political encyclopaedia' - 
something Williams clearly was not. "' 
Confusion within the party reigned supreme. By the mid the 1950s the Liberal party had 
become distinctly middle class and had been stripped of most of its former radicalism. At 
national level the party's appeal was largely limited to the professional middle classes 
who were not attracted by Labour or Tory doctrines. Unlike its political rivals the party 
could not rely on an unquestionably 'loyal' vote. Towards the end of the decade the 
North 
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Wales Liberal Federation found it increasingly difficult to find candidates to contest the 
north-west constituencies. The party had lost its radical elements to the Labour party. 
Others supported pressure groups or left politics altogether. The Liberals' status as the 
party of 'Welshness' withered away at the hands of both Labour and the emerging Plaid -I tý 
Cymru. Unlike elsewhere in the UK, where the party became a useful third force 
following Grimond's rise to the party summit, in Wales it had to fight even for this status 
against the locally significant challenge of Plaid Cymr-u. 
Plaid Cymru 
Despite growing interest in Plaid Cymru, its electoral challenge to Labour has not 
received much attention. Recent work by Laura McAllister describes the period from 
1945-59 as 'the modem party's youth', a period when it increasingly acquired the 
responsibilities and hallmarks of the adult party. "' John Davies views the same years as 
ones of modernisation, a period when the party began to break from its founding fathers 
mould by 'jettisoning' its 'ideological baggage'. "' Yet the extent of this shift, and its 
implications for electoral politics, remains unclear from accounts which focus on the 
party's central leaders and aims. 
In the 1920s, the founding fathers of Plaid Cymru had been ill-prepared to lead a 
conventional political party. A complex aggregate of individuals representing different 
i ing a org-anisat ions, they were united (in theory at least) by the common goal of establishi - 
Welsh government. 143 The dilenima for the party in the inter-war period was to consider 
how this aim could be achieved. The party in the inter-war years embraced a plethora of 
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political, cultural and religious concerns (some of which vvere intertwined). 
Consequently, it party lacked a regular of distinctive platform upon which electoral 
foundations could be built. Of these strains, cultural nationalism dominated. Defence of 
Welsh culture - in particular the Welsh language - became a moulding and motivational 
factor in the construct of the early party and bore the hallmark of the party's pioneer,,. 
notably Saunders Lewis. 
The interest in cultural nationalism had profound political implications for Plaid. It led 
Plaid to adopt a 'pres sure- group' philosophy (which permeated the party's political 
philosophy throughout the twentieth century). In the inter-war years, Plaid was content 
with its own political ineffectiveness - on condition that it was more successful in its 
attempts to place the defence of 'Welshness' on other parties political agendas. The 
importance of pressure-group politics meant that the party's political philosophy and 
ethos was developed very loosely. This was also considered a vital component of the 
party's efforts to attract members of other political parties into its ranks. As Saunders 
Lewis pointed out in 1923: 'Adopting a definite policy would tie us down before we can 
start work'. "' The party's active and competitive participation in the political arena was 
remilarly and inconclusively discussed in the inter-war period. Plaid's indifference to 
NVestininster (which the early party blamed for Welsh economic problems) led to a 
commitment that Plaid MPs would boycott Westminster when elected. Plaid members 
Ný'ere also banned from voting for other political parties when Plaid Cymru candidates 
were not standing. 
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As a result of the party's narrow platform, its size and Its general Indlffer, 2nce to the 
political arena, little progress was made in the period up to the Second 'World War. 
Neither did the party present an electoral threat to the LaboUr party in north-ýý est Wales. 
or anywhere else in Wales, in the period from 1945-59. As Table 5 shows, support for 
Plaid Cymru did not rise above 22 per cent in north-west Wales, or a feeble 3.1 per cent 
in Wales during the period. 
Table 5: Plaid Cymru electoral performance IsNales, Caernarfonshire and 
Merioneth, 1945-59 (% of vote). 
Election Caernarfonshire Merioneth Wales 
1945 5.4 10.3 1.2 
1950 13.1 11.1 1.2 
1951 No candidate No candidate 0.7 
1955 16.5 22.1 3.1 
1959 21.4 16.8 4.8 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
However, as Table 5 also shows, Plaid did make steady progress in north-west Wales 
after 1945. In Caemarfonshire an upward trend in party support was discernible, whilst in 
Merioneth the party began to amass a respectable poll. However, as Table 6 shows, 
ing deposits rather than winning seats was a more realistic objecti-ve for the party 
across Wales as a whole in the 1940s and 50s. 
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Table 6: Number of Plaid Cymru candidates and deposits saved in general elections, 
1945-59. 
Election year No. of candidates NIP's % of the vote Deposits sa-, ed 
1945 7 0 1.2 1 
1950 7 0 1.2 
1951 4 0 0.7 0 
1955 11 0 3.1 4 
1959 20 0 5.2 6 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
Yet there was progress. The number of seats the party was able to contest increased, and 
the average vote for the party also grew. There had always been some potential. In 1945 Y 
Owiro's assessment of Plaid's electoral performance had been pessimistic: 
After twenty years of work and propaganda the harvest has not been fruitful. For 
better of worse one Welsh mystery has been settled - that is the level of support 
which the people of Wales want to give to the Welsh Nationalist Party. 
However, as it intuitively noted, 'It would be a disaster for any Welsh or Englishman to 
assume that the Welsh have no interest in their own problems'. This was a view also 
expressed in the 'Nuffield' study of the 1945 General Election, which argued: 
The ill success of these two parties (Plaid Cymru and the Scottish Nationalist 
Party) may tempt people in England to underestimate the anxiety of so many Scots 
and Welshmen over the state of their nations, more especially as the political 
acumen of Englishmen becomes somewhat obtuse in dealing with this problem of 
nationality within the United Kingdom, a nationality that is inferior 
but not 
subordinate, an inner loyalty that has no counterpart in English regional 
patnoti SM. 146 
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The danger of misinterpreting the levels of support given to Plaid Cymru was not lost on 
political rivals during the 1950s. As has already been argued, both Labour and the Liberal 
parties were well aware of the fact that support for Welsh nationalist issues should not be 
underestimated. There was much potential to be exploited. In 1950, as the Nuffield study 
almost contemptuously noted, its appeal was restricted to the 'idealist and emotional'. 
Crudely it categorised Plaid's voters as coming from five elements in Welsh society, 'the 
Liberal-radical chapel element, some Catholics, old socialists with syndicalist memories, 
young intellectuals and the sporting vote'. This, at least, was progress. However, for the 
authors of the 'Nuffield' election study, this was in part a consequence of an amateur 
approach. Plaid's poor performance was hardly surprising given the fact that its seven 
candidates were made up of 'one farmer, one minister, three schoolmasters and two 
poets'; and the fact that the party had only two full time organisers hardly helped. "' 
Plaid took some steps to develop this potential after the war. First, in the aftermath of the 
1945 election, the party changed its name from the Welsh Nationalist party to Plaid 
Cymru, thus dropping the 'nationalist' tag which had been equated with disastrous 
European events in the period up to 1945. Second, in August 1945 Gwynfor Evans 
replaced Abi Williams, becoming the party's fifth president (a position he would hold for 
thirty six years). Evans' rise to the party summit coincided with some definitive shifts in 
the party's development, notably its internal modernisation, its external reputation and its 
Political direction. "' Despite the fact that Evans admired and was influenced by 
individuals who had such a formative influence on the party's establishment and survival, 
notably Saunders Lewis, his ascendancy allowed Plaid to develop a more modem image, 
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and to break with the imagery of Welsh mtellectualism which had been an burden to the 
party's development in the inter-war period. A young, non-conformist, pacifist and a self- 
confessed radical, Evans vision for the party fitted in more appreciably Nv1th the polIt1cal 
traditions of north-west Wales than the conservative, catholic, reputation which 
surrounded the party under the tenure of previous presidents. 14' However, as John Davies 
has argued, despite the apparent modemisation of party philosophy and the Jettisoning of 
baggage', 'that baggage had been mislaid rather than consciously abandoned. "' The party 
was still dominated by a cultural and linguistic emphasis - by the shadow of Saunders 
Lewis. As Davies rightly notes, the contrast between Evans and Lewis (or even Plaid in 
the 1950s as opposed to the 1930s) was more apparent than real. Like Lewis, Evans 
feared a rootless and cultureless proletariat (or 'gwerin'), and likewise feared the 
concentration of economic power in the hands of the state. "' 
However, there were discernible differences. Under Evans leadership, Plaid began to shift 
notably to the left during the 1950s. Despite being intellectually influenced by Saunders 
Lewis, Evans (a Welsh leamer) was also influenced by English socialists, notably G. D. H. 
Cole and R. H. Tawney. Under Evans leadership, Plaid's electoral strategy changed. The 
party committed itself to fighting elections on a much broader geographic scale. As a Cý 
result, its status as a successful pressure group was developed dunng the 1950s, as Plaid 
began to hound the 'big' political parties, notably Labour, when they failed to deliver, or 
when they dragged their heels on Welsh issues. Plaid's more ambitious electoral strategy 
immediately bore promising rewards. At by-elections in Ogmore and Aberdare in 1946, 
Plaid polled 29.4% and 20.0% of the poll, saving deposits and slashing Labour majonties. 
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In both instances, economic discontent and support for devolution and local issues ivere 
notable factors in Plaid's improved performances. However, despite another reasonable 
performance at another Aberdare by-election, this time in 1954, (vvhen the party polled 
16% of the vote and again saved its deposit), Plaid's performances in other by-elections 
in the 1950s were disappointing. in Wrexham (1955). Newport (1956), Carmarthen 
(1957) and Pontypool (1958) the party was 'wooden spooned' and lost its deposit on each 
occasion. 
Moreover, Plaid's electoral strategies also lacked refinement. Curiously, the party did not 
contest the Ogmore seat, where it had performed so well in 1946, in the 1950 election. It 
failed to even try and capitalise on its earlier investment. The reason for this was 
straightforward. Organisationally, Plaid was severely handicapped at election times. As 
its by-election performances had suggested, it could perform quite well when a 
disillusioned electorate could be mobilised through concentrating financial resources and 
personnel on single seats (factors which were evident again in the 1960s). However, at 
general elections it lacked both the finances and the manpower to compete adequately. 
Even in its strongest constituencies, like Caemarfonshire, organisation was still 
problematic, particularly at election times. In 1955 Y Cymro reported that Plaid were 
guilty of several organisational flaws, which included 'no adverts in the press, no 
loudspeakers going round the houses, and no posters in shop winclows'. Plald meetings 
were amongst the poorest attended, and often descended into farce. Y CvMro reported that I 
one meeting in Talysarn had attracted an audience of only six, which included two 
communists. Even the chairman of the meeting had not been aware of the meeting until 
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earlier in the day. The late arrival of the Plaid candidate ensured that the press -vvere 
treated to impromptu speeches by the communists as they waited for him to arrive. As the 
report noted, 'there is a lot of sympathy locally for Plaid's aims but in this campaign in 
Caernarfon the wheels of the party machine are squeaking'. '-" A party that looked amateur 
and got no publicity was unlikely to convert opinion. 
Lack of finances severely handicapped the party's development in the 1950s. The 
contradictions evident in pursuing pressure groups politics on the one hand, and 
attempting to develop as a political party on the other, was not without its problems. If 
putting all its energies into the Parliament for Wales campaign had brought frustration to 
the Liberal party's political aims, it also caused Plaid some problems. Plaid failed to 
contest the Caemarfonshire and Merioneth constituencies in 195 1. In part this was a 
political move. More importantly it also reflected the party's inability to finance and 
organise support for the Parliament for Wales campaign, and two general elections in 
some twelve months. Overall, the party's emphasis on the Parliament for Wales 
campaign, as opposed to fighting elections, highlighted the tensions between its status as CI 
a pressure group and as an aspinng political party. 
However, unlike the Liberal party, Plaid's performance in 1955 indicated that it had not 
suffered from failing to compete in 195 1. In both Caemarfonshire and Menoneth, the 
party improved on its 1950 showing. In Merioneth it doubled its vote. Plaid's respectable 
performance was also accompanied by a new, more respectable image. In the ten years 
after the Second World War, it had transformed its reputation in north-west Wales. No 
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longer was the party associated with the narrow, extreme nationalism of the inter-vvar 
period. As Y Cymro noted, Plaid's improved performance across Wales, and its presence 
in the industrial south, gave the party a weapon that 'they can and must use to Nvake the 
Labour movement to the scale of Welsh consciousness and nati I-, is oý-as an Thi 
important point. Plaid's strength was seen as a pressure group, not a 'proper' poll I 
party. The dilemma for the party was that when it competed in electoral contests it 
(potentially) jeopardised the things which the party ultimately stood for (in particular 
devolution). As Y Cymro astutely pointed out in a preview of the 1955 general election: 
The greatest mystery and paradoxes are in Anglesey, Merioneth and 
Caernarfonshire where three Labour members who supported the Parliament for 
Wales campaign are fighting for their lives against a party who also support the 
Parliament for Wales campaign and the cause of peace ... as Plaid Cymru ha,,, e no 
chance of coming first or second in these constituencies, the attacks on the Labour 
party and on those particular seats will weaken the cause of both ... Plaid Cymru 
have not made their stand to help the Liberals ... 
it is the Tories that their presence 
helps in Conway and Caernarfonshire. 151 
Moreover, the party's progress was stalled by the fact that its policies still fell short of 
addressing the serious political issues of the period. Materialism, rather than the 'higher' 
political issues which political scientists believe led to 'third-party' surges in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, still dominated local politics. "' As YFaner pointed out in, whilst 
Plaid Cymru was 'popular' on the Lleyn peninsula in Caemarfonshire and whilst it was 
'making ground in the quarrying districts', the fact was that 'cheap medicine, glasses and 
false teeth prevent Labourites from supporting Plaid 
Cymrui. 156 
The ravaging effects of local depopulation and the question of a Welsh parliament 
dominated Plaid Cymru's local election campaigns in the 1950s. The party did not 
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present a well developed economic case, but as Butt-Philip has argued. favoured 
conservative economics for cultural reasons. 157 Preservation of Welsh communities was 
accompanied by a concern for traditional Welsh industries (particularly the preservation 
of the small family farm). Butt Philip views the 'preservationist' streak in Plaid Cý, mru's 
politics as vital in understanding the party's 'furious opposition' to periodic plans to turn 
Welsh fanning valleys into water reservoirs in the 1950s. 
There is insufficient space here to elaborate on the controversy surrounding one such 
scheme - the 'drowning' of the Welsh village, Capel Celyn (see above). This is one of the 
few areas of post 1945 Welsh history to have generated a substantial literature, and a 
great deal of that literature focuses on Plaid's involvement in the controversy. "' As has 
already been argued, Plaid's 'defence' of Capel Celyn and Labour's failure to prevent the 
scheme from developing has become part of nationalist mythology. It is still regarded by 
senior Plaid Cymru figures, such as Dafydd Wigley, as the key to understanding the 
party's later successes in north-west Wales from the 1970s onwards. "' It would be wrong 
to understate the significance of Tryweryn. in boosting Plaid's popularity, especially 
among young voters. The building of the Tryweiyn mythology has also been a crucial 
factor in maintaining and building up local nationalist consciousness. Yet, at the same 
time it is important that Tryweryn is seen in its historical context. What is worthy of note 
here is that Tryweryn did not lead to a 'surge' of support for Plaid Cymru in north-west 
Wales in the early 1960s. On the contrary, support for Plaid Cyrnru in Merioneth (where 
Capel Celyn was situated) actually declined in the 1964 general election. As the party's 
candidate Gwynfor Evans argued, 'the Tryweryn controversy did not significantly 
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strengthen the party in Merioneth', "' a fact collaborated not only by the falling ia vote but 
also declining party membership. As the literature that deals with the subject suggests. 
Tryweryn was important to Plaid's development. But with or %ý,, Ithout TryN, ý-ei-yn, the parv, 
still had to address fundamental problems if it was to make progress. For one thing the 
party still lacked credible and coherent social and economic policies. For another it lacked 
the organisational structures which would allow it to get its message and appeal across to 
ordinary voters. It was not Tryweryn but the pragmatic and systematic attention paid to 
these problems which accounted for Plaid's development in the subsequent decade. 
Despite the achievements of the 1945-51 Labour administration, the 1950s were 
ultimately a frustrating period. North-west Wales had not experienced the warm sun of 
the 'affluent fifties'. Instead it had faced the bleak realities of continued depopulation, 
unemployment, declining industries and a Tory government. This had served to make 
Labour strong. A Tory govenunent perceived to be delivering the goods for Britain as a 
whole, and failing to do so in north-west Wales, made the party as alien and unattractive 4D 
to the local electorate as it ever had been. Labour on the other hand was perceived as the 
only party capable of delivering economic salvation. By the end of the decade, Labour 
had comfortably established its reputation as the inhentor of the Welsh radical polltIcal 
tradition -a fact aided by the local Labour MPs renegade support of the Parliament for 
Wales campaign, support for Welsh language issues and Welsh culture, and its concern 
over the future of the local 'gwerin'. Even in the north-west, where it had been subjected 
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to hostile attacks over its role in the Tryweryn controversy, the party did not suffer an 
electoral backlash. 
Nonetheless, the long period of Tory dominance, along with events like Try"'eryn, had a 
considerable impact on the Labour party in Wales. They made nonsense of Labour's 
dominance at election after election. Not a single Welsh MP had supported the Trvwer-ý, n 
pr ject, yet the same MP's lacked any power to prevent the pr ject from taking place. In 01 Oj L- 
1959 Labour's election manifesto committed the next Labour go-vernment to installing a 
Secretary of State for Wales. However, as the 1950s drew to a close, Labour's chances of 
being in a position to implement this promise, and to put its policies to the test, seemed 
remote. The party's defeat in the 1959 election was a calamity for the party. Yet It also 
provided an opportunity for renewal -a chance for the party to re-group, and to present 
the Tories with a fresh, dynamic challenge, hoping than when it finally achieved power it 
would inherit an economy that would allow these policies to flourish. In the meantime at 
least, its position in north-west Wales was safe. However, the 1960s and early 70s would 
present Labour with even greater challenges, as the economic problems of the 1950s gave 
birth to new, inter-related problems, the development of which were to have an immense 
impact on the social and political climate of north-west Wales. These issues will be 
examined in Chapter Two. 
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Chapter Two 
Problems, Opportunities and Challenges, 1959-74 
one of the latest so-called sciences is one called psephology - flourishing in one of those ne"ý 
Colleges - the study of how people voted last time, how they will vote next time; all apparenth, 
capable of mathematical calculation, irrespectke of the political campaign or the issues at stake. 
This sort of political Calvinism is only redeemed by the recent discovery that their 
predetermined anticipations are generally wrong. The electors do show, from time to time, a 
regrettable outbreak of political free will. 
Harold Macmillan, 19-59 
This chapter focuses on the impact of social and economic change at both UK and 
local levels in the period 1959-74. In so doing it evaluates the social and economic 
climate surrounding the period of Labour's decline as a political force in north-west 
Wales. This period ended with the party's defeat in both the Caemarfonshire and 
Merioneth constituencies in the February 1974 General Election. As a result the 
chapter also focuses on the period of Plaid Cymru's growth as a force in local politics. 
The chapter is not intended to demonstrate that Labour's decline was 'caused' by 
socio-economic change. Rather, the chapter is based on the following perceptions 
which reflect newer approaches to the analysis of electoral change. Political changes 
are the result of a number of factors, some long term, some short tenn, some political, 
some non-political. Social and economic factors can have an impact on political 
fortunes. They present opportunities and challenges to political parties and political 
actors. Social and economic factors do not in themselves cause political change, but 
they set the parameters in which political decisions are made and provide the turf on 
which political battles are fought out. Post-modemist studies that stress the 
constructive role of politics accept that local structures - local ways of seeing politics 
- influence the ways in which national images are received. Those cultures are not 
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structured from nothing. Moreover, for the language of politics to be accepted, it has 
to cater for changing needs and expectations. Wh1lst recent political science does not 
deny the role of the language of politics, it recognises that certain features of changing 
socio-economic landscapes are frequently correlated with the erosion of Labour 
support. Too few historians (and too few post-modernists) recognise this fact. Thus, 
this chapter notes particular social and economic circumstances that have been 
associated with particular political developments, as a preliminary to disco,,, -enng how 
parties coped with these issues. It thus escapes the trap of seeing change as the 
'inevitable' outcome of class changes or shifts in identity, but does not assume that 
voting patterns are purely a consequence of political discourse. 
The chapter deals with social and economic factors at local level. In doing so it 
identifies the key social problems facing policy makers in the period up to 1974. First 
it will attempt to place the changes occurring at UK level within a local perspective. It 
will argue that UK 'affluence' was less apparent in north Wales, where a variety of 
structural changes in the economy were not matched by strong new developments. 
Secondly, it will attempt to show that whilst national social and economic trends 
cannot be neglected, political change at regional level should not ignore often unique 
local social problems and challenges and the failure or inability to tackle these 
problems by local political actors and parties. In particular, it looks at second 
homes 
as an issue which could both have an economic impact (forcing up house prices) and a 
cultural resonance (diluting Welsh language and culture). 
There is certainly something to explain. UK politics in the second 
half of the 
twentieth century can be divided into two major periods. Firstly, the era of two-party 
117 
dominance or alignment from 1945 to 1966 and secondly, the era of de-aligment and 
emergence of a 'moderate multi-party system' from 1970 onwards. Labour's general 
election perfon-nances in the 1950s were poor, but the party's role as one of the UK's 
two main political parties was never in question. Its failures in elections 
underestimated its strength as a political force. Both the Conservative and Labour 
parties dominated UK politics in the 1950s. The zenith of two-party dominance was 
reached in 1955 when the two main parties amassed a combined poll of 96.1 per 
cent. ' The early to mid 1950s witnessed the overwhelming demise of the Liberal 
party as a political force, whilst nationalist parties in both Scotland and 'Wales 
remained at the periphery of parliamentary politics. 
However by 1974 the dominance of the two main political parties had been eroded. In 
the general election of February 1974 only 75% of the UK electorate supported one of 
the two main parties, a decline of over 21% over two decades. First, from the early 
1960s onwards there was a revival in the fortunes of the Liberal party. From 
depressing returns of 2.6% and 2.7% in the general elections of 1951 and 1955, the 
party recovered to record respectable polls of 19.3% and 18.3% in the general 
elections of February and October 1974. Second, the recovery of the Liberal party 
was accompanied by the emergence of both the Scottish National Party (SNP) and 
Plaid Cymru as a political force. By October 1974 support for the SNP had climbed to 
30.4% of the Scottish vote, whilst Plaid Cymru's share of the Welsh vote grew to 
11.4%. The decline in support for the two main political parties in regions such as 
north-west Wales was therefore part of a wider UK trend in the period up to 1974. In 
north-west Wales, though, it was taken further, with Plaid Cymru gaining both the 
Caernarfonshire and Merioneth constituencies in the February 1974 election, and 
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consolidating on these victories in the October election. The decline of two-party 
dominance in the UK in the two decades after 1955 is therefore beyond doubt. The 
explanations remain controversial. In examining a local area and embracing both the 
ideas of the 'new' electoral historians and a concern with the socio-economic 
variables noted by political scientists, this chapter adopts an approach which is still 
unusual in British history. 
Social, Economic and Political Change in the UK, 1959- 74 
That the 1950s and 1960s were a period of profound social and economic change is 
beyond doubt. The standard of living enjoyed by the majority of the British electorate 
was at a level unimaginable in the 1930s and unobtainable in the 1940s. Income levels 
rose substantially dunng the fifties and continued to rise in the sixties. The shift from 
a 'blue collar' to 'white collar' workforce was characterised by a rise in better paid, 
supervisory, skilled, technical and managerial posts. The declining 'old' or 
'traditional' industries were slowly augmented by 'new' light, manufactunng 
industries and a growing service sector. In these industries, substitution of a male for a 
largely female workforce became common in some sectors. As a result, by the mid 
1960s two-income families were a common feature of domestic life. Such was the 
transition in the shape of the workforce that as early as 1962 it was reported that: 
The whole industrial and commercial structure of the UK would be severely 
jolted, perhaps temporarily dislocated if all the working wives gave up their 
jobs and went home. 2 
With higher incomes came higher spending. Consumerism boomed during the fifties 
and sixties. Sales of durable goods rocketed. From washing machines to motor cars, 
conswrier spending reached new heights. In 1959 240,200 cars were regIstered in 
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Wales. By 1974 the figure was 705,200. Between December 1957 and July 1959 hire 
purchase credit for durable goods rose by E294 million. Better pay was accompanied 
by better working hours - and hence more leisure time. Holidays became a feature of 
family life. By the early 1970s, foreign travel had come within the reach of the many. 
Motor cars stimulated the domestic tourist trade (with north Wales one of the largest 
benefactors). Fear of 'debt' was cushioned by a welfare state safety net which 
provided social security at levels unimaginable in the means test years of the 1930s. 
Aided by improved food intake and the NHS, standards of health improved 
considerably by the 1970s. As early as 1960, boys and girls aged fourteen were, on 
average more than half an inch taller and three to four pounds heavier than 
schoolchildren of the same age a decade earlier. 3 In addition to free school milk (and 
meals for the less privileged) home cupboards were stocked with supplies from the 
'supermarket revolution' which began in the mid 1950s. By 1960, spending on food 
had risen by twenty per cent over a decade. Housewives were buying 'more meat, 
bacon, sugar, fruit, vegetables, beverages and manufactured foods' than they had a 
decade earlier. Symptomatic of the affluent shopping trolley was the absence of bread 
and cereals, once an important and cheap dietary supplement of the less privileged. 
Housing conditions were also a contributory factor in improving health. Housing 
became a symbol of affluent post-war Britain. By 1959 around a third of the 
population owned - or was buying - its own home. Owner-occupancy increased 
from 
5 29% in 1950 to 52% in 1973 . For those who could not afford 
to buy, council house 
buildin continued to grow through to the end of the 1970s. Around 18% of the 9 týl 
Population lived in council houses in 1950. By 1973 the figure had risen to 31%. 
Council housing provided quality accommodation at affordable rents. Of the unfit 
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dwellings that remained in the UK in 1971, only 4. -"o were provided by local 
authonty housing, compared to 51.8% for privately rented and 28.5% for oxvner- 
occupied housing. 6 
Educational advancement was also profound. Shifts in the working patterns of the UK 
stimulated both the desire and necessity for learning. With the demise of unskilled, 
manual, 'obs came the demand for better qualificatlons, requIred to meet the needs of 
new, technical and scientific employers. Numbers staying on at school beyond the 
compulsory age of fifteen trebled between 1950 and 1960. At the turn of the decade 
some 600,000 pupils chose to stay on at school. 7 As a result, numbers attending 
further and higher education rose sharply in the 1960s. Comprehensive education - 
pioneered in north Wales - theoretically at least, provided the necessary grounding to 
facilitate post-compulsory education. Higher numbers attending university helped 
towards the emergence of a young social group possessing enlightened liberal 
attitudes towards contemporary events. As a result, the growth in student numbers - 
represented in north Wales by the expansion of the University College of North 
Wales, Bangor - was accompanied by a growth in student activism, evident not only 
in the UK, but across Europe by the late 1960s. 
The quality of family life was also stimulated by the new society of the 1960s. 
Sociologists became intngued at the ways in which the social and economic changes 
impacted on family values. Car ownership, higher disposable incomes and profound 
changes in living arrangements were believed to have had a huge effect on the 
functioning of family life. As a result of these changes a 'home centred' society 
emerged by the early 1960s, signalling a shift in the interests of husbands and wives 
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towards a greater interest in the standards and style of domestic living which thev 
could achieve for themselves and their offspring. Families, it was noted, now 'tended 
to keep themselves to themselves'. 8 Housing was again a central feature of this 'home 
centred' society. Crucially, home ownership and the burdens of mortgages also meant 
that members of the 'home centred' society became much more concerried over issues 
such as job security, and perhaps much less willing to engage In Industrial disputes 
than a previous generation had been. Individuall II ism (as opposed to collectivism) 
became the ethic of the new society. 
Social and Economic change in north-west Wales, 1961- 71 
As was discussed in Chapter One, the social and economic climate of north-west 
Wales was blighted by many problems in the 1950s. In the subsequent decade it 
changed for the worse. Part of Labour's appeal had been its promise and commitment 
to deal with many of these problems. It now had to deliver 'affluence' against the 
trend of market forces. The central issues facing policyrnakers in Wales were the 
decline of key industries, the resultant and continuing trend of depopulation and the 
difficulties of attracting new industries into the local area. All these trends continued 
to be problematic into the 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, the prevalence of these 
problems in turn led to the development of new problems and challenges, the most 
notable of which was the growth of in-migration, 'second homes', and the decline of 
the Welsh language. These were all factors challenging local political policyrnakers in 
the period up to 1974. Population trends in north-west Wales in the period up to 1974 
ývas dominated by one issue - migration. Of major concern to policy makers was the 
continuing trend of outward migration - depopulation which had blighted 
local 
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society since the 1930s. In addition was the accompanying, and by the 19-0s 
increasing, trend of inward migration. 
Of all regional resources, population is fundamental, for it is related to the size of the 
labour force and thus represents the labour force's capacity for expansion. The total 
population of north-west Wales during the period amounted to just over 300,000, 
although the combined populations of Caernarfonshire and Merioneth amounted to 
just over half that figure. Population statistics for the region are an important indicator 
of the problems and challenges facing local political leaders. First, the small size of 
the local population is worthy of note. The total population of north-vvest Wales was 
less than that of an average city such as Nottingham. The size of the poptilation was 
an important consideration when considering the requirements of industrial 
expansion. Large scale industrial plans and projects, designed to suit areas containing 
millions of people within narrow geographical limits, were unworkable in north-west 
Wales. During the 1950s some of the more ambitious proposals for the area paid little 
attention to this question of scale. 9 The sparse population of the area had led the 
Labour party to advocate 'rural' solutions to the problem of depopulation in the 1950s 
(see Chapter One). This 'rural' view of the region was not without substance. North- 
west Wales was devoid of any large, urban settlements capable of offenng a full range 
of social and professional services or of providing substantial reserves of labour 
within easy journey to work distance from the principal towns. The region even 
lacked any towns with a population of more than twenty thousand people. In 
Caernarfonshire and Merioneth, only Caemarfon sustained a population of ten 
thousand. Other towns which had previously sustained populations of ten thousand at 
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the turn of the century witnessed declinincy Populations throughout the M-entleth 
century. 
The larger towns in both constituencies were largely created and sustained by the slate 
industry. With the decline in the slate industry (see below) these towns also declined. 
As Table 1, showing the population of the slate town of Ffestlnlo,,, )r in Menoneth 
demonstrates, the depressed nature of the slate industry had a major impact on the 
local population by the early 1970s. 
Table 1: Population of Ffestiniog, 1901-1971 
-YEAR 1901 1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 
Popuiaition 11,435 8,138 9,078 6,920 6,708 -- , 751 
Source: Taken from J. Williams, Digest of Welsh Statistics (1985) 
By 1971 the population of Ffestiniog was only 48 per cent of its 1901 figure. This ývas 
an extreme, but not uncommon, example of the decline of slate quarrying towns in the 
region. As Table 2 shows, the population of Caemarfon remained stagnant throughout 
the century, despite the growth of the tourist industry and the movement of the 
population towards urban centres. 
Table 2: Population of Caernarfon, 1901-1971 
YEAR 1901 1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 
- Population 9,760 8,307 8,469 9,271 9,055 99260 
Source: Taken from Williams, Digest of Welsh Statistics (1985) 
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The populations of these t,, vo principal towns were indicative of the -, cneral 
population trends evident in the two constituencies. As Table 3 sho-ws. the population 
of Merioneth continued to decline steadily from 19-59 onv., ards-, 
Table 3: Populations of Caernarfonshire and iNlerioneth, 1959-197410 
t959 1964 1969 W-4 
Caernarfonshire 121,200 119,820 t20,620 123,400 
Merioneth 38,600 38,870 37,700 34,400 
Source: Taken from Williams, Digest of Welsh Statistics (1985) 
It fell by just over four thousand (8.9%) in the period from 1959-74. By contrast, the 
population of Caemarfonshire, despite falling consistently in the period up to 1969 
had recovered by 1974, showing an increase of around two thousand (1.8%) on the 
1959 figure. Employment trends were a major reason for outward migration (see 
below). However, the true impact of out-migation is softened by the reverse trend of 
in-migation, which gew steadily in the penod up to 1974. 
As a result of in-migation patterns, populations shifts were not evenly spread across 
either county. In Merioneth, depopulation affected both quarrying and agncultural 
areas alike. The rural (agricultural) districts of Deudraeth, Dolgellau, Perillyn and 
Bala as well as the urban (quarrying) district of Ffestiniog were all victims of 
continuing depopulation trends in the penod up to 1974. However, the urban distncts 
of Tywyn, Dolgellau and Edeyrnion all showed a small amount of population growth 
during the same period. Similarly in Caemarfonshire, the Population of the 
quarrying/farming, district of Gwyrfai and the heavily agricultural Lleyn Peninsula 
125 
both declined, whilst towns such as Caemarfon, P"Ilheli, Cniccieth. Porthmadog. 
Abersoch and Barmouth had increased populations by 19-4. 
Two factors were responsible for this patchwork of population trends. On the one 
hand, the decline of slate and agriculture as staple employers was accompanied by a 
rise in small manufacturing industries located near the larger towns. At the same time, 
there was also a growth in public sector employment and white collar work in the 
larger towns. Many of these towns also doubled-up as tourist centres. As a result, jobs 
in the tourist industry were generally centred around the larger coastal towns. On the 
other hand, many of the towns that witnessed population growth were those which 
had proved attractive to a elderly, retired and largely English group of in-migrants. 
Quite simply, trends in outward migration and in-migration often depended on the 
attractiveness of the area as a retirement retreat. For example, the bleak, damp 
surroundings of industrially decayed Blaenau Ffestiniog held less pulling power than 
the tranquil sands of Barmouth in the same county. Scenic beauty rather than signs of 
industrial decay attracted the retired classes to north-west Wales. II 
In-migration was a contentious social, economic and political issue (see below). 
However, as Table 4 shows, the impact of in-migration went some way to balancing 
sharp declines experienced in natural growth rates. 
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Table 4: Migration statistics for Caernarfonshire, Nlerioneth and Wales, 1951--1 
Total Change Natural Increase Net Micyration 
Caernarfonshire 
1951-61 -2,373 -1.91 -1,925 -1.55 448 -0.36 
1961-71 +1,297 +1.07 -1,284 -1.05 +2,581 +2.12 
Merioneth 
1951-61 -3,155 -7.61 -199 -0.48 -2956 -7.13 
1961-71 -2,980 -7.78 +138 +0.36 -3118 -8.14 
Wales 
1951-61 +45,348 +1.75 +86,960 +3.35 -41,612 -1.60 
1961-71 +87,181 +3.30 +107,782 +4.08 -20,601 -0.78 
Source: Welsh Council, Economic Strategyfor North-West Wales (1974) 
Despite a growth in the population of Caemarfonshire up to 1974, 'natural' 
population increases declined in both the 195 1-61 and 1961-71 periods. The picture 
for Merioneth was more stnking. Net migration, already treble the Welsh average in 
the decade up to 1961 shot to ten times the Welsh average in the following decade. 
This occurred at a time when the Welsh average was itself causing some concern to 
social commentators, economists and politicians (see Chapter Four). The attraction of 
the north Wales coast as a haven for the retired is bome out not only by the fact that 
the population of Caemarfonshire (a depressed industrial region) defied overall Welsh 
trends in the period up to 1971 but also in the changing age structures of the county 
when compared to Welsh and UK averages for the same period. Tables 5a and 5b 
show the effects of depopulation and in-migration on population age trends. 
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Table 5a: Age structure of population 1951 (%) 
Area 0-14 NVorking age Retired 
Caernarfonshire 20.6 61.7 17.7 
Merioneth 19.6 63.9 16.5 
Wales 22.7 63.8 
- 
13.5 
UK 
T 
22.4 F 6-4.0 13--6 
Table 5b: Age structure of population 1966 
Area 0-14 Working age Retired 
Caernarfonshire 20.2 57.6 22.2 
Merioneth 23.2 57.8 19.0 
Wales 23.1 60.8 16.1 
UK 23.3 61.3 15.4 
Source: Welsh Council, Economic Strategyfor north-west Wales (1971). 
As these tables show, the local population already showed sips of 'ageing' as early 
as 1951. Caernarfonshire at some 4% and Merioneth at some 3% above the Welsh 
average. By 1966, Caemarfonshire's retired population was 6-7 per cent higher than 
both UK and Welsh averages, whilst Menoneth's averaged around 4 per cent higher. 
During the 1960s, growth in the urban centres of the region was actively encouraged. 
As part of plans to stimulate the economy, the Welsh Council backed initiatives made 
in the late sixties and early seventies for the development of selected 'growth centres' 
in both Caemarfonshire and Merioneth. 'New Towns' were an integoTal feature of this 
strategy. Among the towns targeted for expansion were Caemarfon and Bala, 
although Bala's inclusion was controversial (see Chapters Three and Five). Attempts 
to stimulate the local economy and the growth centres were not helped by lower than 
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average activity rates (a lower percentage of the population aýýailable for 
employment). Activity rates in north-west "'ales were the lmvest in "'ales throualiout 
the 1951-71 period. Table 6 compares the acti%, it,,,,, rates for north-ýýest 'Walc,, ý, vith 
figures for the whole of Wales from 1951 onwards. 
Table 6: Activity rates for north-west Wales and Wales, 1951-71 
MALES 
1951 1961 1971 
North-West Wales 78.9 76.5 67.1 
(Coast) 77.4 73.9 64.2 
(Remainder) 79.4 77.6 68.5 
Wales 82.9 81.5 73.2 
FEMALES 
1951 1961 1971 
North-West Wales 25.0 24.6 29.4 
(Coast) 27.3 26.4 29.6 
(Remainder) 23.9 23.6 29.3 
WALES 24.2 27.0 33.0 
Source: HMSO, Welsh Economic Trends (1974) 
As the table shows, whilst the trend of economic activitY in north-west Wales 
corresponded with a general decline across Wales during the period, the decline in 
this region was more advanced. The lower level of female activity compared with the 
national average is characteristic of trends in rural areas, although this discrepancy 
was being reduced dramatically as suitable employment opportunities for women in 
appropriate locations were created. 12 As the table shows, north-west NVales also 
contained a substantially smaller active population than both Wales and the UK. 
""orth-west Wales contained a substantially smaller 'young' working age group than I -- 
129 
the Welsh average (71.8% as compared to 78.8%). Rural areas of the region were also 
characterised by a higher proportion of older workers - 19.2% of the labour force was 
over 65 compared to 17% for Wales. This was accounted for by the large than average 
percentage of self-employed persons, normally farmers and small business ow'ners, 
who worked beyond typical retirement age. The lower activity rates in the 15-24 age 
group was due to the proportionately higher tendency to stay on at school and colleie, 
a factor accentuated in the north-west Wales figures by the presence of students in 
Bangor. 
Unemployment figures reflected the depressed nature of the region during the period. 
As Table 7 shows, unemployment levels in the non-coastal areas of the region were 
on average double to one and a half times the Welsh average throughout the period up 
to 1970. This was at a time when the Welsh figures were consistently higher than UK 
averages and caused some concern among policy makers. Moreover, as was discussed 
earlier, unemployment figures for the region distorted economic realities, for they do 
not (obviously) reflect the numbers of persons leaving the area in search of work. 
These statistics are backed up by unemployment figures for the re ion in the period tý 91 
1964-70. 
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Table 7a: June unemployment flgures for Wales, north-west Wales and the L'K. 
1964-70. 
1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 
North-West 
Wales 
2.6 4.3 4.4 5.8 3.7 
(Coast) 1.7 3.2 3.2 4.0 3.6 
(Remainder) 3.3 4.9 5.1 -6.8 5.3 
WALES 2.2 3.6 3.6 4.2 3.3 
UK (Average) 1.3 2.2 2.3 3.2 2.7 
Table 7b: December unemployment figures for Wales, north-west NVales and the 
UK, 1964-70. 
1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 
North-West 
Wales 
4.3 6.0 6.5 8.4 . 5.1 
(Coast) 3.3 5.2 5.8 7.1 4.7 
(Remainder) 4.9 6.4 6.9 9.2 5.3 
WALES 2.9 6.4 6.9 9.2 5.3 
LK (Average) 1.3 2.2 2.3 3.2 2.7 
Source: HMSO, Welsh Economic Trends (1974) 
As Tables 7a and 7b demonstrate, unemployment in north-west Wales was 
consistently higher than both Wales and UK averages throughout the period from tn' 
1965 to 1973. Moreover, the area of north-west Wales encompassing both the 
Caemarfonshire and Merioneth constituencies (the area identified as 'remainder' 
above) had higher average rates than Wales as a whole. Lastly, the real extent of 4ý 
unemployment in this region is clearly highlighted by the much more serious problem 
of unemployment in the winter months. When local seasonal employment in the 
tOurist industry had been terminated, unemployment increased from 5.4 to 8.4 per 
cent in coastal areas during the worst year of 1971. 
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However, unemployment statistics are even more striking 'when disaggregited. In 
en M 'oneth the Blaenau Ffestiniog area was an unemployment blackspot bY 19' 5 
showing high unemployment figures for both sexes. In 1973 the male and female 
unemployment rates for the area stood at 9.4 and 10.4% respectivelý'. Two ý'ears later 
the figures had increased to 12.6 and 11.2%. Blaenau's troubles reflected the aeneral 
shortage of male, unskilled and semi-skilled jobs by the early 1970s. The transition of 
the workforce from a pre-dominantly male to increasingly female workforce Nvas also 
apparent. In the Porthmadog/Pwllheli area where male unemployment stood at 8.4 
and 10.9% in 1973 and 1975, female unemployment amounted to only 2.7 and 49, o. 
The Caemarfon/Bangor/Bethesda/Penygroes area was similarly afflicted by mate 
unemployment of 7.7 and 11.9% respectively, whereas female unemployment 
remained constantly low at 2.1 and 2.6%. 
Employment 
As population trends have demonstrated, a declining industrial base continued to 
blight the economic infrastructure of north-west Wales after 1959. As has already 
been stated, this was largely the result of the decline of the region's two major 
employers - slate and agriculture. 
The decline of the slate industry, well advanced after the Second World War, reached 
epic proportions in the 1959-74 period. In 1938 the quarries of Caemarfonshire 
produced 160 thousand tons of slate, Merioneth 54 thousand tons. By 1946 slate 
production for the whole of Wales had slumped to just 103 thousand tons. By 1962 
this figure had fallen to 40 thousand tons, and by 1972 to 18 thousand tons. In the six 
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years between 1966 and 1972 slate production in 'Wales was halved. B,, this sta-ge 
efforts to revive the industry had proved ineffective. Exports to France, where Slate 
became a fashionable roofing material in the early 1960s and the exploitation of slate 
waste as a marketable commodity, proved to be ineffective. As a result. 1968 saw the 
closure of Dinorwic quarry in Caernarforishire (once one of the larkTest slate quarries 
in the world). The Oakley quarry in Blaenau Ffestiniog closed some two years later. 
With the decline of output came the demise of jobs. The decline of the slate industry 
devastated many communities in both Caernarforishire and Merioneth. In 195 1 the 
industry had employed four thousand workers. In the decade that followed this figure 
was halved to just over two thousand. By 1971 the figure was Just over six hundred. 
In Merioneth, a county once dominated by slate and farming, only 190 workers held 
jobs in the slate industry by 1971, this just 17% of the 1951 number. The decline in 
Caemarfonshire was more profound. In 1951 the local quarries employed 3,607 
workers. By 1971 only 430,12% of the 1951 figure remained. Slate had become little 
more than a fringe industry, employing just 1.3% of the Caemarfonshire workforce 
and 2% of the Merioneth workforce. The slate industry was little more than a 
potential attraction in the growing tourist industry. 
The decline in agriculture was equally striking, although somewhat less advanced by 
1974. As in the case of slate, agriculture was hard hit by changing markets. Advances 
in mechanisation and competition from cheaper, imported goods were particularly 
damaging. Added to this was the threat posed to small-scale farms by the trend 
towards amalgamation and larger units. In 1951 aghculture accounted for 
just under 
six thousand or 16% of the Caernarforishire workforce. By 1971 this figure 
had fallen 
by more than half to just over two and a half thousand, 8% of the local workforce. 
In 
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neighbouring Merioneth agriculture accounted for 3,493 jobs in 1951. By 1971 this 
figure had also been halved to 1,780, although it still accounted for 19.2 as opposed to 
ý7 the earlier 24.3% of the total workforce - testament itself to the shortage o, 
replacement industries and their failure to absorb the lost jobs. Moreover, changes in 
the structure of local agriculture were also detrimental as far as jobs were concemed. 
The declining numbers employed in slate and agriculture, combined with the 
difficulties of attracting new industries, had a significant impact on emploýment 
statistics for both counties. The number of workers employed in Caemarfonshire and 
Menoneth both fell by five thousand between 1951 and 1971. The loss of slate 
quarrying and agricultural jobs inflicted the greatest damage, accounting for o-ver six 
thousand jobs in the former and two and a half thousand in the latter. The fate of those 
losing jobs in staple industries were threefold; 1) to swell the ranks of the unemployed, 
ii) to swell the ranks of outward-migrants; 111) to stimulate a shift in the structure of 
the local workforce from 'old' to 'new' industry. However, it is easy to over-state the 
impact of this transition. Table 8 shows the structure of the workforces of 
Caernarfonshire and Merioneth in 1951 and 197 1. 
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Table 8: Structure of the Caernarfonshire and Merioneth workforce. N-umbers 
employed in selected industries (percentage) 1951 and 1971. 
Caernarfonshire Merioneth 
Industry 1951 1971 1951 9-1 
Agriculture 12.7 6.0 21.3 14.1 
Metal Manufacturing 
and Engineering 
7.1 11.3 3.7 9.4 
Mining and 
Quar ying 
7.2 0.9 5.8 1.3 
Building and 
Contracting 
6.4 3.2 6.6 3.6 
Transport & 
Communication 
8.4 5.8 6.7 5. -5 
Labourers 3.7 5.6 2.2 5.8 
Clerical Workers 6.9 8.9 4.0 7.3 
Sales Workers 11.7 12.0 7.7 9.1 
Services, Sport 
& Recreation 
15.8 16.0 11.0 16.2 
Professional & 
Technical 
7.5 10.4 6.1 9.2 
Inadequately 
Described Occs. 
1.2 4.8 0.7 5.0 
Leather, Wood, 
Textiles, Food 
4.7 4.9 3.8 4.1 
Armed Forces 1.7 0.6 14.8 0.1 
Other 
Nlanufacturing 
ine. Plastics 
0.2 1.9 14.8 0.1 
Total Workforce 49,947 47,400 18,203 14,000 
Source: Taken from Williams, Digest of Welsh Statistics (1985) 
As this table shows, there was a distinctive trend in occupational change in both 
Counties. Agriculture, quarrying, building and transport and communicatIon all 
declined between 1951 and 1971, whilst growth was to be found in metal 
manufacturing and engineering, labouring, clerical work, sales work and the sen-ice 
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sector and in professional and managerial occupations. Howe-ver. the slump in 
traditional industries was absorbed by a wave of neý, ý, construction ývork at the end of 
the 1950s, rather than by a shift towards permanent and better paid posts. In addition 
to the building of the Tryweryn reservoir, work on the pumped storage scheme at 
Ffestiniog began in 1959. These were followed by the construction of nuclear po%ver 
stations in Trawsfynydd and Wylfa in Anglesey. Trawsfynydd employed two and a 
half thousand workers during its construction phase. Later these vvere followed by the 
building of the CEGB underground pumped storage station in Dinorwig and the re- 
building and conversion of Britannia Bridge following a fire in 1971. In the short term 
these projects helped to alleviate local unemployment problems. However, in the long 
tenn they came to be regarded as 'Cuckoo' projects, completely disrupting already 
problematic local labour markets. A particular problem was the in-migration of 
workers during the building phases, who subsequently stayed on locally to swell the 
ranks of the unemployed. Another was the fact that whilst these projects provided 
some local jobs during the construction phase, they were less likely to absorb local 
labour in the longer term, as the scientific, technologically advanced and highly 
educated workforce required to operate the industries thereafter was 
disproportionately drawn from outside the area. 
However, these large scale projects were also accompanied by a trickle of new 
factories during the late fifties and early sixties. Between 1945 and 1963, twenty six 
new manufacturing projects were set up in Caernarfonshire, creating up to four 
thousand new jobs. Between 1966 and 1978, over fifty more manufacturing firms 
came to north west Wales, creating over 2,500 jobs. Within this batch of new 
industries were long term success stories and short term failures. For example, the 
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Greengate and Irwell Rubber Company in Llanberis was a notable success. Set up in 
1958 and employing only seven workers, a decade later the factory employed a total 
of 250 workers, all but fifty of whom were women. Greengate and IrNýell not onlY 
demonstrated what industrial initiatives could achieve. They changed the shape of the 
local workforce to include a higher percentage of female vk-orkers. These jobs were 
particularly welcome in former slate quarrying areas like Llanbens, where creating 
jobs for the male workforce proved to be problematic. 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s many larger firms had entered the region. Ferodo 
(brake linings) opened a new L2.5 million factory near Caerriarfon in 1960; Aro 
Corporation opened a factory in Caemarfon in 1969. Bernard Wardle (plastics) 
eventually brought eight hundred jobs to Caemarfon during the 1960s, whilst the 
more modest Gaskell Footwear brought valuable jobs to Pwllheli by the end of the 
same decade. Caernarfon's industrial estate opened in 1966 and others followed in 
both counties. These allowed a number of smaller concerns to open across the region. 
However, many of these estates failed to live up to expectations. Less than half the 
number of small firms that opened survived as long term employers. Moreover, the 
emerging manufacturing sector had a peculiar character. As one economist has 
argued., 'it was in north Wales, but was not of it 9.13 Most of the firms which were 
established in north-west Wales were 'satellites' of larger firms operating elsewhere. 
Linkages between the local firms themselves were few, despite the fact that local 
firrns often shared common markets. For example, both Ferodo and Bernard Wardle 
in Caemarfon were major suppliers for British car manufacturers. At a time when the 
British car industry boomed, this was not problematic. However, the slump in the car 
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industry provided ominous problems for these t%vo major emp1w,, 'ers (see Chapter 
Three). 
North-west Wales appealed to industrialists for two major reasons. One was the 
abundant supply of clean air and water. The other was the equally abundant supply of 
cheap, routine, mainly female labour. As John Lovering has argued, 'there is a limited 
truth in the claim that Gwynedd was rather like an underdeveloped country courting 
the favours of international - or at least national - firrns'. For example, Ferodo was 
only one example of local subsidiary firm 'with branches in underdeveloped countries 
all over the world'. Few of the local firms were actually oxned by local people. 
Exploitation of the local workforce occurred in other ways. Small businesses (mainly 
involved in construction and tourism) notoriously expected workers to put up with 
conditions which, it is argued, would not have been tolerated in other parts of the 
country. 14 Trade union membership was often prohibited among this section of the 
workforce and pay scales were largely ignored. 
Neither was the development of local manufacturing industry enough to fulfil the 
demand for jobs. As a result, tourism continued to expand as a crucial local employer 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As was argued in Chapter One, reliance on tourism 
as a major source of local employment was a matter of some controversy. On the 
I -time, positive side, the industry provided a large number of full-time and part 
unskilled jobs. On the negative side, these jobs were generally low paid and seasonal. 
They also generally interfered with the efforts made by local politicians to attract 
attention to the serious nature of local economic problems and the need to create 
'proper'Jobs. Tourism became a massive and modem industry during the 1960s. 
Car 
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ownership meant that the beaches and countryside of north Wales vk ere more 
accessible to the affluent, car owning classes of Cheshire and the Nlidlands than ever 
before. By 1973 three million tourists visited Gwynedd every year, pumping o%ýcr E40 1 
million into the local economy. 
However, in reality, tourism flattered to deceive. The sporadic and temperamental 
nature of this industry has already been highlighted. But there were other deep-rooted 
problems associated with the industry. First, the numbers of day trippers entering 
north Wales did not always provide the economic injection which many anticipated. 
Critics argued that day trippers often contributed little to the local economy. Some 
believed they filled up their cars with 'English' petrol and made up picnic baskets 
with produce from 'English' supermarkets - thus contributing little to the Welsh 
economy. Among the negative effects on the Welsh economy was the wearing out of 
already poor local roads and the job of clearing litter, which hit the budgets of local 
councils. There was also the more serious question of how much money from the 
tourist trade actually seeped out of the region. Tourism, like manufacturing, was 
largely controlled from outside the local area. This was partly a result of a series of 
massive investments from the mid 1960s onwards, which included the marina 
developments at Porthmadog, Pwllheli and Port Dinorwic and the construction of 
larger hotels owned by national concerns (as were many of the local tourist 
attractions). As a result it is estimated that up to two-thirds of the income generated by 
tourism poured out of the local area. Moreover, despite the significant numbers 
employed by the industry, many of the larger concerns were often reluctant to employ 
locals. Butlins in Pwllheli was a prime example of a local employer that chose to 
import English seasonal labour. The larger hotels followed the same trend, especially 
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in managerial and supervisory positions. Where local labour was employed the ý, vork 
was generally of an unskilled, low paid and laborious nature. ' 
These occupational changes led to profound changes in the socio-economic structure 
of both counties by 1971. Table 9 shows the socio-economic structure of 
Caernarfonshire and Merioneth in 197 1. 
Table 9: Socio-Economic structure of Caernarfonshire and Nterioneth, 1971 
Caernarfonshire Merioneth 
Employers & Managers 12.1 11.1 
Professional 2.3 2.9 
Skilled Manual 29.6 30.9 
Other Non-Manual 23.5 20.4 
Semi-Skilled Manual 19.8 22.8 
Unskilled Manual 7.5 6.6 
Armed Forces 0.1 0.3 
Source: D. Balsom, Political and Electoral Handbookfor Wales (197 1) 
Both constituencies had a higher than average percentage employed in the 
professional and managenal sector and a lower than average percentage of unskilled 
manual workers. These occupational changes presented a serious challenge to the 
Labour party and new opportunities which could be exploited by its political 
opponents. The 'old' industrial base was being eroded, whilst insecurity was 
increased. 
Language and Culture 
The impact of increasing numbers of in-migrants is also reflected in figures for the 
number of local Welsh speakers in the area. Table 10 shows figures for Welsh 
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speakers in Caernarfonshire and Merioneth from 1951 to 1971, another hi-ghly- 
charged and contentious political issue from the late sixties onwards. 
Table 10: Welsh speaking population of Caernarfonshire and Merioneth, 1951- 
1971 
CAERNARFONSHIRE NIERIONETH 
1951 71.6 1951 7 -5.4 
1961 68.3 1961 75.9 
1971 61.9 1971 73.5 
Source: Williams, Digest of Welsh Statistics (1985) 
Merioneth had the highest percentage of Welsh speakers of any Welsh county by 
1971, and at first glance the shift seems small. However, this xvas a declining share of 
a declining population. Of 30,000 Welsh speakers in 195 1, only 2 -5,000 remained 
by 
1971. In other words, Welsh speakers were leaving and 'Welsh' communities were 
less 'viable' -a factor which would have a significant impact on political debates 
surrounding 'second homes' and the impact of in-migrants on Welsh language and 
culture. However, the decline in the percentage of Welsh speakers living in 
Caemarfonshire was dramatic, falling almost ten per cent in the two decades after 
195 1. From a total of 85,115 Welsh speakers in 195 1, just over 73,000 remained in 
1971. In Caemarfonshire, Welsh speakers were thus a declining percentage of an 
increasing population. Due to the changing age structures, there was little hope of this 
situation improving in the late seventies and early eighties. Children (who would learn 
Welsh) were being replaced by the elderly (who did not). As a result, the fate of the 
language was an enduring feature of local political debates from the mid sixties 
onwards. 
141 
Moreover, debates in the early seventies revealed that these trends were irreversible - 
in the short term at least. The Welsh Council's Economic StrateDý- for north-west 
Wales, published in 197 1, dismissed out of hand an earlier optimistic projection made 
by the Registrar General which estimated that the population of north-west Vi'ales 
would grow in accordance with UK natural growth rates in the period up to 199 1. The 
Council pessimistically noted these forecasts were 'unrealistic', pointing to the Iong I ltý 
established trends of migration into the coastal area and the propensit-v to migate 
from the more remote parts' of the region. As a result, the earlier predictions were 
altered to take into account previous migration trends and the effects of current 
regional policies. New figures assumed a net inward movement of 2,000 people a year 
from 1968 to 198 1, increasing to 3,000 a year in the following decade. However, most 
of this increase would be confined to 'old age groups' as a result of inward migration 
for retirement. The same report predicted that trends among the 15-44 age group 
would remain the same as those in 1968, since it was assumed that there would be a 
continued outward movement of this group. Outward migration of the child bearing 
generation could be expected for the foreseeable future. This would have the effect of 
depressing the rates of natural increase initially predicted by the Registrar General. In 
all a population increase of some 60,000 was anticipated for the region in the period 
ftom 1968-91, but this figure would largely be made up of an elderly and 
economically inactive populace. ' 6 Population trends could therefore be summed up as 
that of a substitution of a young, Welsh speaking, economically active population for 
an old, economically inactive, largely English speaking population. Such a region 
could therefore realistically expect death rates to be high and birth rates low. This had 
a profound effect on political debates concerning social services and healthcare, as 
NN'ell as the wider debates concerning the survival of language and culture (see 
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Chapters Three and Four). Changes in the distribution of the population -ývas al-So 
problematic. The attractiveness of coastal towns for retired in-migrants has already 
been noted. The same towns also grew in size due to the growth of the tourist 
industry. In addition, as the Council for Wales predicted, the population of rural 
Wales would continued to redistribute itself during the same period. This put an 
increased pressure on urban centres, not only in the need to provide employment, but 
also in regard to the infrastructure of these areas. In north-west Wales. as in the rest of 
the UK, increasing demands would be made of shopping, recreational and housing 
facilities as standards of living rose into the 1970s. A viable economy was therefore 
crucial on several grounds. 
Housing provision in Wales underwent a significant transformation after 1945. 
Changes in the structure of housing for Wales as a whole were largely positive, with 
investment in both public and private sector housing growing steadily after 1945. The 
effects of these changes in north-west Wales were substantial. Both local authority 
and private housing building grew significantly in the period between 1960 and 1973. 
However, the increasing trend was towards home ownership. By 1971 
Caemarfonshire's owner-occupation ratio accounted for 55.5% of all housing, whilst 
A Merioneth's figure was slightly lower at 51.8%. Local authority housing accounteC 
for 22.6% and 29.5% of the housing stock respectively. These were amongst the 
lowest figures in Wales by 1971. 
Housing has been identified as an important influence on political affiliation by many 
Political scientists. Table 12 shows the ten Welsh constituencies with the least number 
of local authority houses in 197 1. 
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Table 12: Welsh constituencies with the lowest percentage of population 
occupying council houses in 1971 and correlation with political orientation of 
constituency in October 1974. 
CONSTITUENCY POLITICAL PARTY 
OCT. 1974 
% LA INHABITANTS 
1971 
Caernarfonshire PLAID CYMRU 22.6 
Gower LABOUR 22.6 
Barry CONSERVATIVE 22.4 
Merioneth PLAID CYMRU 21.9 
Carmarthen PLAID CYMRU 21.5 
Flint West CONSERVATIVE 19.2 
Denbigh CONSERVATIVE 19.1 
Cardigan LIBERAL 17.4 
Rhondcla LABOUR 1-5.8 
Cardiff North CONSERVATIVE 9.0 
Source: Taken from Balsom, Political and Electoral Handbookfor Wales (197 1). 
Again, Table 12 suggests that there was a tendency for Labour to perform less 
successfully in counties with a low number of local authority housing. Similarly, the 
opposite trend is also persuasive. In other words, there is some evidence to suggest 
that home ownership may have been a factor in understanding the drift away from 
Labour in some Welsh constituencies from the early 1960s onwards. However, it must 
also be borne in mind that home ownership was not a new phenomenon in many areas 
of Wales. As the case of the Rhondda somewhat surprisingly demonstrates, several 
Welsh constituencies had long traditions of home ownership, stretching back into the 
nineteenth century. Therefore, although a dramatic rise in home ownership cannot in 
itself explain political change, changes in housing tenure and decline in support for 
the Labour party in Wales in the early 1970s may have been related. 
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However, the most significant feature of housing trends impacting on politics in 
north-west Wales by the early 1970s was the issue of second homes. It was not just 
unfavourable socio-economic variables but the politicisation of these as a cultural 
threat that became so significant. By that time the growth in the numbers of second 
home ownership aroused debate at both local and national levels. However, it would 
be wrong to interpret second homes as a purely 'housing' issue. The second homes 
controversy was at the epicentre of local concerns over social, cultural, economic and 
linguistic issues from the early 1970s onwards. The issue tended to highlight many of Z7, C. 
the problems faced in north-west Wales. Such was the concern over second homes 
that in the early 1970s a number of Welsh local authorities undertook surveys to 
assess the nature and extent of the phenomenon and to ascertain the kinds of problems 
which second homes generated. Among these were studies by both Caernarfonshire 
and Merioneth County Councils, two of the counties hardest hit by the trend. At a 
national level, second homes were regarded as part of the 'leisure explosion'. 17 The 
flexibility afforded by car ownership, together with a shorter working week, was 
accompanied by a desire for greater freedom in accommodation arrangements - 
expressed not only in the upsurge in tourism but also in the growth of self-catering 
and caravanning. The tendency for more people to acquire a permanent base for self- 
catering holidays and weekends (in the form of second home ownership) was a 
parallel development. 
As the Welsh Council highlighted, the trends in Wales were part of a wider European 
experience. ' 8 In Britain, as in these European countries, the phenomenon was part not 
only of materialist change but also a desire felt by many to escape urban congestion. 
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The proximity of north west Wales to large English cities such as Liverpool, 
Manchester and Birmingham meant that it became an attractive locality for second 
home ownership. By 1971 Caernarforishire County Council estimated that 7% of the 
total housing stock was made up of second homes. However, distribution within the 
county varied dramatically. In rural areas such as Betws Garmon and Beddgelert and 
in coastal areas such as Llanbedrog and Abersoch on the Lleyn Peninsula, it reached 
30% or higher. In general, most of the second homes were actually situated in coastal 
areas. Merioneth County Council reported a similar trend. In 1971 it estimated that 
second homes comprised 14% of the housing stock, although the majority were to be 
found in the southern part of the county (especially Towyn) where second homes 
made up 24% or more of the total housing stock. 
In Merioneth 80% of second homes were made up of old properties. Local 
distribution was determined by economic change, principally the decline of the slate 
industry and agriculture which led to the availability of property formerly occupied by 
workers. However, as the supplies of these properties dwindled the trend moved 
towards the building of new second homes. This trend was particularly marked in 
some areas of Caemarfonshire, notably the Lleyn Peninsula, where in areas such as 
Llanbedrog (67% second homes) and Criccieth/Porthmadog (57% second homes) the 
supply of old and available properties had been used up by 1971. it is important to 
note, therefore, that the growth in owner-occupied housing was not made up entirely 
of locals moving up the social spectrum. Second home owners in Merioneth tended to 
emanate from the West Midlands, those in Caernarfonshire largely from the north- 
west of England. During the 1960s the first batch of second home owners tended to 
derive from the middle to higher income groups, although by the early 1970s second 
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home ownership among the less wealthy had increased. " This said much about the 
value of local property in the second home bracket. 
Some second homes were owned by those who had left the local area from the 1930.,, 
onwards. As in France, ten per cent of second homes in Menoneth were acquired 
through inheritance, whilst another 60% quoted family links as one of the major 
reasons for second home ownership - English jobs (and 'affluence') providing the I 
necessary capital. In Caernarfonshire, some 30% of second home owners had been 
bom in Wales, 25% had lived in Wales previously and 37% had relatives in Wales. 20 
Even among the younger owners, homes were purchased with retirement in mind. 
This was the case in 59% of Caemarfonshire's and 48% of Merioneth's owners - 
again impacting on long term activity rates. However, the short term economic impact 
of second homes was also a central feature of local social and political debate. 
In both Caernarfonshire and Merioneth, surveys suggested that second homes were 
occupied on average for between 117 and 123 days per year. Whilst homes occupied 
for one-third of the year were not insignificant economically, the social and cultural 
impacts were more severe. Like tourism second homes had a seasonal impact on the 
north Wales economy. The costs and benefits of second homes to the local 
community were an important aspect of the local authority reports. Expenditure by the 
newcomers on improvements to the dwellings and the subsequent provisioning of the 
household were important considerations. Second home families in Merioneth were 
believed to spend E6 10 p. a. on provisions and general services (of which f 350 was 
spent in local shops or the nearest village) whilst Caernarfonshire estimated a spend 
Of some L400 (although this did not include spending when the home was let to 
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visitors other than the owner). Based on these figures, second home ownership 
resulted in the creation of 990 jobs in Menoneth and 480jobs in Caemar-fonshire. -' 
Other economic benefits brought by second home ownership ý'vere more difficult to 
assess. For example, the initial purchase of the second home brought substantial local 
benefit if the sale price was invested locally, although there were no means of 
establishing the extent to which this was occurring. Moreover, as the Welsh Council 
noted, second home owners generally contributed substantially more in rates than the 
equivalent of the services they utilised, particularly in regard to education which xas 
not called upon at all, or social services (which were called on very little). The latter 
situation changes appreciably when the owners became retirees and moved to the area 
permanently. Other benefits included the fact that second homes extended the 
'holiday season', as well as the fact that second homes acted to redistribute regional 
wealth, from conurbations to largely rural areas. 22 
The problems created in north-west Wales by the growth of second home ownership 
were generally regarded as social and environmental as well as economic. Essentially, 
the growth of second homes was seen as a two-stage process. In the first instance 
acquisitions had predominantly been made up of derelict cottages, abandoned by 
depopulated former quan-ymen or farm workers. Investment in these properties did 
not affect the local housing market to any appreciable extent. However, as this supply 
was exhausted, the situation became more problematic. As demand for second homes 
increased this put pressure on local housing markets. Moreover, as the supply of 
remote housing dwindled, second phase housing was increasingly sought in local 
towns and villages. As a result, prospective second home purchasers (with generally 
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higher incomes) competed with often young, low income locals for available housing . 
House prices were pushed beyond the means of the young. This became a hi, -, hl,. 
charged social and political debate, especially as it was feared that locals who could 
not afford property would be driven out of the area, forced to live in sub-standard 
housing themselves, or place increasing demands on local authority housing. 
Another social cost was the effect of second homes on local communities. As the 
Welsh Council noted, the overriding feelings of locals was that rural depopulation 
should not be blamed on second home owners, as depopulation had for the most part 
resulted from the decline of basic industries over a long period. Some of the houses 
empty in winter would not necessarily be occupied even in summer without the 
'holiday' appeal of second homes. However, the impact of second homes on Welsh 
language and local customs and culture was a matter of some concern by the early 
1970s. What is worthy of note here is the impact of second homes on the policies of 
local councils. Several local councils sought ways and means of restricting second 
home ownership by the early seventies. There were practical, moral and political 
forces at work. For example, Arfon Borough Council vehemently argued that second 
homes contributed to the dilution of the 'Welsh way of life' and that permanent non- 
Welsh residents had an even worse effect on the Welsh language. Moreover, the 
Council was committed to old slate quarrying towns and villages where 'an 
essentially Welsh culture needed to be preserved' . 
23 Moreover, Menoneth County 
Council, which consistently argued that their own second home problem was ", orse 
than in neighbouring Caemarfonshire, pointed to the dilution of Welsh culture as one 
of the most prominent factors in a hit-list of concerns. 
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Local authority financing was another contentious area, Controversy surrounded the 
question of improvement grants. Legally, housing authorities in 'Wal sw re obli, ed 1: 1 e ke 'T 
to make standard grants of 75 per cent for providing basic amenities to houses and a 
further discretionary grant of 75 per cent towards the cost of more extensive 
improvements. However by 1974, a number of Welsh authorities had adopted policies 
of not approving discretionary grants on second homes, Lleyn Rural Council 
achieving notoriety for not approving standard grants either (even though this was ltý 
illegal at the time). The rationale for these policies was 'the unhealthy economic 
background created by weak housing legislation' . 
24 NV-hllst it was clear that the lack of 
gants had little impact on the growth of second homes (especially after first phase 
ownership had been completed) social and political tensions also emanated from the 
fact that local residents supposedly subsidised an often unwelcome influx of second 
home owners through grants which then took house prices beyond the reach of 
locals. 25 By the early 1970s even the politically diverse Welsh Council argued that: 
Our own view is that the use of second homes as isolated properties which are 
not in demand from local residents is in general to be welcomed. This helps to 
prevent properties from falling into dereliction, provides a 'cared-for' 
appearance and thus adds greatly to the attraction of the countryside. 
However, we share the views which have been widely expressed that it is 
undesirable for too great a proportion of the properties within any one village 
to be used as second homes, as is undoubtedly occurring in some parts of the 
country. 26 
As a result the Council dabbled with several ideas aimed at halting and reversing the 
problem of second homes. 27 Again, the impact of the second homes crisis on political 
change is difficult to assess, as was its impact on the perceived re-birth of national or 
nationalist consciousness in the 1960s and early 1970s. What is clear, however, was 
that it did have an immense impact on local social and political debate, and served to 
highlight many of the inter-related problems afflicting north-west Wales. 
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There is insufficient space here to elaborate on all the social and economic problems 
facing the region, and insufficient data in some areas. One factor which this chapter 
has not dwelt upon was the measure of poverty still existing within the region b\- the 
early 1970s, although by definition, the high rates of unemployment and the social 
problems in the area suggest that to discover indices of poverty and depnvation would 
not be surprising. A couple of factors underline the problem. First, vvhilst housing 
provision underwent substantial improvement from 1945 onwards, north-west A'ales 
was one of only five regions of the UK where sixteen percent or more of houses were 
still without a fixed bath or shower by 1971 . 
28 Housing provision may, have improved, 
but it was still amongst the worst in the UK. Second, the existence of poverty xithin 
the region was highlighted by the numbers of children receiving free school meals by 
1971. The number of children receiving free meals in Caernarfonshire (201o) \, vas 
higher than any other Welsh county, and nearly five per cent higher than the second 
highest, Merthyr (15.4%). As a Caernarfonshire County Council report into the 
question of free school meals reported: 
The very high percentage of free dinners in Caemarfonshire is mainly 
attributable to that fact that the level of earnings is generally low and many 
parents are dependent on state benefits as a result of the serious unemployment 
that exists within the County. 29 
Moreover, within the County there were evidently poverty blackspots. Caernarfon had 
a particular problem, the Segontium. School in Caernarfon reporting that 471/o of its 
pupils received free school meals. Pwllheli was similarly depressed, Ysgol Botwnnog 
reporting a rate of 46% and Penrallt School 40%. The old quarrying areas were also 
evident. Brynrefail School on the outskirts of Dinorwic reported that 37% of its Pupils 
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received free meals, whilst Dyffryn Nantlle School in Penygroes reported a rate of 
41%. 
Voting behaviour, social conditions and the Welsh context 
The experience of changing social and cultural conditions provided a potential 
challenge to Labour's dominance. How the varying parties attempted to construct that 
local experience was vitally important. It is dealt A-1 1 ith in depth across several later 
chapters. However, political scientists suggest that particular individual or collective 
circumstances may predispose voters to perceive political messages in particular 
ways. Those experiencing certain conditions may have been more 'recepti-,, e, than 
others to any one particular approach. This literature has to be considered in 
discussing the relevance of socio-economic and cultural circumstances to political 
change in north-west Wales. 
Unfortunately, this is particularly difficult for the 1960s and 1970s in general and for 
Wales in particular. Most detailed UK studies of partisan realignment cover the period 
from the mid 1970s onwards. Like many political science projects, they do not seek to 
understand where the shift originated; nor has there been much work on Wales. 
Political scientists in the period under question were still focussing on social class as 
the main determinant of electoral behaviour, and on 'affluence' as a challenge to 
Labour's position. They thus provide few clues to the impact of these other changes 
on political support. 
The problems of applying later analysis to Welsh politics of the 1960s and 1970s are 
considerable. Social data, surveys of attitudes and spending patterns, and data from 
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opinion polls, does not exist for Wales as a unit and certainly not for north-west 
Wales as a sub-unit. Hence, what will be offered here is an extrapolation from later 
studies of the UK and Wales to identify the lype of influences which may have 
encouraged people towards particular political appeals. 
As has been noted earlier, Labour's appeal was based on a 'nationalist' and cultural 
rhetoric and on economic modemisation. Political scientists have argued that 
traditions of voting for a party are not easily broken. 30 Sowhy might conditions have 
changed? Some allegiances were quite recent. In the case of north-west Wales, the 
Liberal party had been dominant until the 1940s. Labour had therefore only been 
dominant for a short while (in comparative political terms). Moreover, some of its 
support may have stemmed less fTom a positive commitment to its policies and 
values, but from opposition to the Tories. This was what some political scientists 
describe as 'negative partisanship'. 31 Another key factor was the impact of 
'affluence'. The 'affluent worker' was not a mythical creation. Labour's support in 
north-west Wales was quite firmly based on the promise to deliver affluence and on 
an anti-Tory backlash which resented the fact that the region had 'missed out' on the 
boom years. Labour's failure to reverse these trends was a crucial issue and an 
important factor in understanding the meltdown of its support. 
'Partisan dealignment and 'class dealIgnment' also Iimpacted on Labour's fortunes. 
The period from the mid 1960s onwards witnessed a 'freeing-up' of political 
allegiances. 32 At the same time, the period also witnessed the emergence of a number 
of new influences - notably home ownership. Some analysts suggest 
that the number 
of employers and managers in a constituency have an impact, because they 'set a 
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tone' and have a disproportionate influence. In Wales, however, itwas a local middle 
class, with its own voice and press, which had a far greater capacit,, to be heard. -- 
All these issues potentially created a difficult position for the Labour party In north- 
west Wales. But there were also other distinctively local andWelsh issues which may 
also have shaped new voting allegiances. Language was undoubtedly a significant 
factor. Language has been used as a key variable in understanding political attiaides 
and national identity in Wales. It now correlates closely with support for devolution. 
Only recently have political scientists begun to question whether primary support for 
the protection of the Welsh language was actually a consequence, not a cause of Plaid 
support. 34 Little attention has been afforded, for example, to the role of the 'educated 
Welsh' on the growth in support for Plaid Cymru. 35 Elsewhere, it has been argued, the 
new professional class of public service workers were likely Labour voters - due to 
their employment in services and a 'professional' commitment to Labour values. 36 
What needs to be examined is whether the same holds in areas Nvhere the 'middle 
class' had a rather different occupational base and set of cultural values. 
The political implications of this was a transition towards a workforce which was 
perhaps less favourable to the Labour party than to rival political parties. Welsh 
electoral evidence from 1974 tends to support this argument. As Table 13 suggests, 
there was a strong correlation between the proportion of professionals and managers 
in a constituency and poor Labour performance in Wales in October 1974. 
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Table 13: Welsh constituencies with the highest number of Professional and 
Managerial occupations as a% of the population in 1971 and political 
orientation of the constituency in October 1974.37 
Constituency Political party Oct. 74 % professional and 
managerial in 1971 
CARDIGAN LIBERAL 17.3 
CARDIFF NW CONSERv'ATI\'E 16.9 
CARDIFF N CONSERVATIVE 16.4 
BARRY CONSERVATI\'E 16.3 
DENBIGH CONSERVATI\'E 16.1 
CONWAY CONSERVATIVE 15.5 
MONMOUTH CONSERVATI'ý'E 15.2 
ANGLESEY LABOUR 14.9 
SWANSEA W LABOUR 14.7 
PEMBROKE CONSERVATIVE 14.2 
FLINT WEST CONSERVATIVE 14.1 
MONTGOMERY CONSERVATIX'E 14.0 
CAERNARFON PLAID CYMRU 13.5 
MERIONETH PLAID CYMRU 13.2 
CARMARTHEN PLAID CYMRU 11.9 
BRECON & RADNOR CONSERVATIVE 11.4 
Source: Taken from Balsom, Political and Electoral Handbookfor Wales (1971). 
Of the top sixteen constituencies shown above, only two (Anglesey and Swansea 
West) were still held by Labour in October 1974. The reverse trend is also the case. 
As Table 14 shows, constituencies with the lowest number of unskilled manual 
workers were also unfavourable, to Labour by October 1974. 
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Table 14: Welsh constituencies with the lowest number of unskilled manual 
workers, 1971 and political orientation in October 1974. 
Constituency Political party Oct. 74 % pop. Unskilled man. 
CARDIFF NW CONSERVATIVE 4.7 
BARRY CONSERVATIVE 5.4 
DENBIGH CONSERVATIVE 6.1 
CARDIGAN LIBERAL 6.3 
CARMARTHEN PLAID CYMRU 6.4 
MONMOUTH CONSERVATIVE 6.6 
MERIONETH PLAID CYMRU 6.6 
MONTGOMERY LIBERAL 6.8 
CONWAY CONSERVATIVE 6.9 
CAERPHILLY LABOUR 6.9 
BRECON & RADNOR CONSERVATIVE 7.0 
FLINT WEST CONSERVATIVE 7.2 
GOWER LABOUR 7.2 
CARDIFF NORTH CONSERVATIVE 7.5- 
CAERNARFON PLAID CYMRU 7.5 
Source: Taken from Balsom, Political and Electoral Handbookfor Wales (1971). 
Of the fifteen constituencies with the lowest number of unskilled manual workers, 
only two (Caerphilly and Gower) were held by Labour in October 1974. Moreover, 
Caemarfonshire and Merioneth once again confon-n to a sub-section of Welsh 
constituencies which were generally unfavourable, to Labour by October 1974. The 
decline of slate and agnculture (both employers of large numbers of unskilled 
workers), and the influence of both affluent 'incomers' and Welsh-speaking 
'professionals' would make life more dIfficult for Labour. 
In addition, both constituencies had a high percentage of self-employed workers. The 
structure of the self-employed workforce was similar to that in Wales as a whole 
b-v 
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the mid 1970s. As psephologists have shown, this category of v, -orker %vas less likely 
to support Labour than other parties. As Table 15 shows, there is indicative evidence 
from Welsh electoral results that suggests that constituencies with a high level of self- 
employed workers were unfavourable to Labour. 
Table 15: Self employed as a% of population and Political persuasion of 
constituency in October 1974. 
Constituency Political Party Oct. 74 % self-eýiýplýoyed 
CARDIGAN LIBERAL 30.1 
MONTGOMERY LIBERAL 27.3 
CARMARTHEN PLAID CYMRU 2 -5.9 
MERIONETH PLAID CYMRU 21.7 
CAERNARFON PLAID CYMRU 20.7 
DENBIGH CONSERVATIVE 2 0. 
PEMBROKE CONSERVATIVE 20.4 
BRECON & RADNOR CONSERVATIVE 19.4 
ANGLESEY LABOUR 16.7 
CONWAY CONSERVATIVE 13.7 
FLINT WEST CONSERVATIVE 13.7 
MONMOUTH CONSERVATIVE 11.4 
Source: Taken from Balsom, Political and Electoral Handbookfor Wales (197 1). 
Of the twelve Welsh constituencies with the highest percentage of self-employed 
persons, only one (Anglesey) was held by Labour in October 1974. 
The period from the fifties through to the mid seventies therefore witnessed 
significant changes in the social and economic fabric of British society. The impact of 
these changes on the shape of local and national politics were not insignificant. Social 
and economic change was accompanied by political change from the late 1960s 
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onwards. The relationship between social and economic factors and political change is 
therefore compelling. But these factors do not provide the whole Story They provideLl' 
a challenge. How parties reacted to that was all-important. 
Labour's relationship with a changing British society was mixed. The party's electoral 
successes in the 1960s would depend on its ability to appeal to 'affluent' Britain, 
whilst at the same time both retaining and expanding support in dlsadvaiita,:; ed area,, 
of Britain where its support had remained loyal during the turbulent fifties. In Wales 
the party would be forced to confront many of the new social issues and pressures 
which came to the fore in the 1960s, not least of which was increasing local decay and 
the political challenge of nationalism. As this chapter has attempted to show, 
economic decline would be the major task facing Labour. But it would also have to 
confront some 'side-effects' of that economic decline - notably concems over the 
Welsh language and culture and the continuation of depopulation. Out of power in the 
1950s, Labour had begun to develop a response to these problems. However, political 
power in the 1960s would mean that the substance of these policies would be put to 
the test. The development and limitations of these policies will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
The Development and Limitations of Labour Policy 
,A 
New Britain - mobilising the resources of technology under a national plan; harnessim,, our 
national wealth in brains, our genius for scientific invention and medical discovery; reversin- the 
decline of thirteen wasted years; affording a new opportunitý to equal, and if possible surpass, 
the roaring progress of other western powers... 
TheNew Britain. Labour party election manifesto, 1964. 
Every concession to the 'Nats' only increases their appetite. 
Ness Edwards to Richard Crossman. 25 June, 1947. 
This chapter focuses on the development of Labour policy at UK and Wales levels, in 
the period 1960-70 and at the appeal and limitations of that policy in north-west 
Wales. Whilst Welsh Labour politics in the 1950s and early 1960s has finally started 
to attract attention, we have only suggestive analysis for what happened in the 
subsequent period. ' The chapter argues that Labour continued to be attractive in 
north-west Wales into the mid 1960s not only because it became more attentive to the 
distinctive needs of Wales, but because it combined its image as 'the party of Wales' 
with its growing national image as the British party most committed to modemisation 
and innovation. It will argue that many in north-west Wales felt they might benefit 
from UK-level policies which aimed to revive the nation's depressed regions. On the 
other hand, north-west Wales also stood to benefit from the creation of a Welsh 
Office, a Secretary of State for Wales with a seat at the Cabinet table and distinctively 
'ýý'elsh politics aimed at reviving Wales both economically and socially. 
However, the second half of the chapter deals with the problems faced by the party in 
attempting to fulfil this promising potential. After attaining power in 1 964 Labour t> 
inhehted a host of problems whIch escalated thereafter. jost of the pol icies 
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developed by the party, both national and local, depended on economic success. Once 
in power after 1964, Labour found that it lacked the resources necessary to implement 
many of its policies. As a result of enforced and conservative fiscal measures, 
Labour's economic policies became unpopular and led to rumblings of discontent 
within the party across Britain, Wales and north-west Wales. Moreover, Labour's 
efforts to become more attentive to Welshness and its status as 'the party of Wales' 
also ran into difficulties. Because of its successful attempts to become more 
sympathetic to the needs of Wales in the period up to 1964, it came under increasing 
pressure to deliver the goods on Welsh issues. By 1966 the party had made 
considerable progress in restructuring both policy and personnel to fit in with its new 
image. The result of the 1966 general election, when Labour won 32 of a possible 36 
Welsh seats, symbolised the Welsh public's approval of this new image. Howe% eF, 
only months later, Plaid Cymru's breakthrough in the Carmarthen by-election 
challenged the shape of Welsh politics. This defeat damaged morale within the 
Labour party and halted its progression as a distinctively Welsh party. Moreover, 
spending cuts undermined hopes that under the Welsh Office, strident steps would be 
taken to tackle Welsh problems. As a result, towards the end of the decade, Labour 
became squeezed on the one hand by its inability to deliver economic prosperity to 
north-west Wales, and on the other by its failing credibility as 'the party of NVales'. 
Preparingfor office: the early 1960s 
Labour's electoral record in north-west Wales in the early 1960s shows it built on the 
successes enjoyed by the party in the 1950s. As Table I demonstrates, electoral 
majorities in both Caemarfonshire and Merioneth increased between the general 
elections of 1964 and 1966. 
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Table 1: General Election results, 1964 and 1966: Caernarfonshire and 
Merioneth. 
Party Caernarfonshire Nlerioneth 
1964 1966 1964 1966 
17,777 17,650 8,420 9,628 
LABOUR (54.4) (56.1) (38.4) (44.2) 
6,998 6,834 3,697 2,490 
PLAID CYMRU (21.4) (21.7) (16.8) (11.4) 
No N, o 7,171 7,733 
LIBERAL candidate candidate (32.7) (35.5) 
7,915 6,972 2,656 1,948 
CONSERVATIVE (24.2) (22.2) (12.1) (8.9) 
9,862 10,678 1,249 1,895 
MAJORITY (30.2) (33.9) (5.7) (8.7) 
Source: B. Jones, Etholiadau'r Ganrif. - Welsh Elections 1885-1997 (Talybont, 
1999). 
The party's electoral majorities in Caernarfonshire continued to match trends 
associated with south Wales. The party's performance in Merioneth, whilst more 
modest, demonstrated its increasingly comfortable control of a small and difficult 
constituency. There was every reason for Labour optimism at this time. Labour's 
rising majorities not only reflected the popularity of the party's messages, both local 
and national, but also the fact that its political opponents were making few inroads. 
Both Plaid Cymru and Conservative challenges fell away in Caernarfonshire in the 
period up to 1964, whilst the challenge of Plaid and the Liberal party also withered in 
%lenoneth. 
164 
In 1966, Labour once again increased its majority in both constituencies. There "ere 
few sips that the Tryweryn controversy (regarded as a potential turning point in the 
development of a nationalist consciousness) had made a significant impact on voting 
patterns. Both the Liberal party and Plaid Cymru performed well, but their support 
was not increasing. As a result of the battles between these 'third' and 'fourth' parties, 
Plaid Cymru's vote remained static in Caernarfonshire and fell in Merioneth. 
Labour's reputation as the party of the local 4gwenn' and as 'the party of NVales' 
remained intact. 
As in many other areas of the UK, Labour's commitment to economic planning, job 
creation, the modemisation of the welfare state, housing, education and the rhetoric of 
4white heat' and 'technological change' were a powerful political aphrodisiac for 
areas like north-west Wales, which had suffered continued economic decay dunng the 
1950s. Whilst 'modernisation' has rightly been seen as the key element of Labour's 
programmes in the 1960s, 2 this was especially apparent after the party's dismal defeat 
in the 1959 general election. The twelve months that followed the election of 1959 
saw the party embroiled in rows over the causes of its defeat. These rows and 
recriminations 'sapped energies' and 'damaged morale' within the party. 3 Journalists 
envisaged a long period in opposition for the party. Some believed that Labour would 
'certainly need two or three elections' to nibble away at the comfortable majOnties 
built up by the Tories during the 195 OS. 4 Clause four and umlateralism dominated 
inner-party quarrels. On the surface at least, forward planning did not appear to be 
high on Labour's agenda. However, the scale and impact of Labour's defeat in 1959 
restarted attempts to unify the party behind an acceptable domestic programme. The 
scale of Labour's defeat and its prolonged period out of office ensured that the left, 
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which might otherwise have objected more vociferously, accepted Gaitskellite 
4modemist' innovations much more readily. Crossman and Wilson's influence can be 
seen behind a re-emphasis of the role which planning could have in modernising the 
economy. As a result, Labour policy by the mid 1960s straddled both sides of the 
1950s divideS. 5 This reunification - and an acceptance of aims and values which ýý ere 
deeply rooted in the party - was a positive step forward. In Labour's electoral 
heartlands, Labour members had become fed-up with internal conflict. NVales was not 
untypical. Sections of the party in Wales tired at the ways in which 'apathy and 
complacency' and 'anti-Toryism' had engulfed the party by 1961. For Labour to 
advance 'renewed enthusiasm and activities' were vital. 6 
Labour attempted to sweep away the anti-Tory, anti-affluence, tone of its 1959 
election manifesto Britain Belongs to You in favour of a pro-socialist dynamic. The 
aim of senior party members and propagandists was to rid the party of 'unfavourable 
issues and attitudes'. However, this did not mean that the party had to abandon long 
standing goals in order to succeed. Nationalisation. might in the past have been seen as 
a typical example of a long term policy aim which had become an electoral handicap. 
However, even the revisionist Anthony Crosland was among those who argued that it 
was not public ownership itself but the 'utterly frivolous' manner in which the party 
had handled and 'chopped and changed' its mind on the issue that had rendered the 
policy a political handicap. 7 As with many other issues, the party's commitment to 
public ownership lacked clarity, but was now being redirected. 'Revisionists' and 
'radicals' - never as far apart as some suggest - were coming together. 
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Labour success also depended on its attitude to 'booming' Britain. The partv%s 
attitude towards the affluent society had been a handicap. There was a concem that 
those moralists within the party who condemned affluence Britain as rotten and evil 
had failed to distinguish between the fact of affluence - which v, -as unreservedly 
welcomed, since it widened the range of choices and opportunities available open to 
the average family - and the less favourable and avoidable attributes of that societv. 
such as vulgar commercialisation and the neglect of social spending. For Labour to 
advance, revisionists argued, the party would have to rid itself of the ima,, -e of being 
pro-austenity and anti-prosperity. 8 Labour could not expect to win by waiting for the 
new society to collapse, or as Crosland put it, 'to wait for the ranks of the unemployed 
to swell so that Labour could climb to power on their backs'. It had to win by showing 
that in its hands the fruits of affluent Britain could be directed into even more positive 
and equitable directions. Again this pleased the party's 'left' and 'right' alike. 
However, Labour had to appeal to affluent Bntain without betra ing its 'core-support' yI _1 
in regions which had remained faithful to the party dunng the 1950s. As the 
experience of north-west Wales highlighted, many of these areas did not experience 
affluence on a scale comparable to that of the affluent south. Labour was committed 
to addressing this problem. Wales was ideally situated to benefit from this Labour 
approach. Recent literature on the history of the Labour party in Wales has largely 
ignored this dilemma. It has concentrated on constitutional issues and on Labour's 
intemal dilemmas over the question of devolution in the 1960s and after. Although 
such issues were important - and make Welsh Labour's dilemma different - the 
problems of regions such as north-west Wales were clearly very similar to problemý 
experienced in many other depressed regions of the UK. In Wales, Labour stood to 
benefit if it offered an enlightened Labour attitude towards devolution and combined 
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it with a more 'old fashioned' Labour approach, which still pursued affluence th-rouzh 
centralised state planning and regional development. This was a powerful (and 
appealing) combination which proved popular with the local electorate in both 1964 
and 1966. 
National Labour policy statements such as Labour in the Sixties, Signposts for the 
Sixties and the party's 1964 election manifesto The New Britain re-iterated the part, ý-'s 
commitment to tackle the problems of forgotten or 'unaffluent' Britain. The fact that 
many 'Welsh' problems were shared by other regions of the UK has escaped many of 
the party's nationalist critics, both at the time and in historical accounts. The basic 
premise behind Labour's regional policies was simple. It was 'to see that employment 
is spread more sensibly throughout the country' and to ensure that there was *effective 
public control over the citing of offices as well as factories'. 9 The party's ambitious 
'National Plan' provided a framework around which regional and industrial policies 
could be built. Labour's 'Plan for the Regions' would allow the party to tackle 
problems at a local level. The 'regional' approach to the problems facing the UK 
attempted to address the 'stagnation, unemployment and under-employment' which 
had become endemic features of many regions under the Tones. ' 0 
The 'Signposts' policy statements of the early 1960s included versions specifically for 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This was not part of a 'nationalist' approach. 
The regions of England were not neglected. On the contrary, along with the three 
n nations they too would be allowed 'control over the location of new facto 'es and 
offices and inducements to firms to move into areas where industry was declining'. 
I 
Across the UK, regional planning boards would be created, equIpped ývith 
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-technocratic', expert staffs working under the general guidance of a %linistrv or 
Department of Economic Affairs. This would also tackle a key Labour concern - the 
fact that many local councils were already over burdened. Regional Plannln(--)), Boards 
would help to alleviate those burdens. Significantly, and in line with Galbraithian 
philosophy, the drive to attract new industries would involve public/pmate 
partnership -a policy which had already been favoured by Labour spokesmen in 
north-west Wales in the 1950s. Labour thus offered an alternative 'modemisation' 
programme to nationalist separatism - better governance within a UK framework. 
The imperative need to tackle the problems of depressed Britain was central to 
Labour's vision of a 'New Britain'. The importance of regional planning reflected 
Labour's concerns not just for the socio-economic problems left behind in the 
wasteland of depressed areas, but also for the effects of regionally confined gro-wth on 
affluent areas. The economic problems of depressed areas often entailed the creation 
of a different but equally troublesome set of problems elsewhere. For example, the 
movement of workers out of depressed regions (like Wales) and into the south-east, 
Midlands and especially London became a major concern for Labour. Depopulation 
meant, on the one hand, that many parts of the UK were 'being drained of their 
younger and more vigorous elements'. On the other it meant that 'big cities, 
particularly London' were 'bursting at the seams'. 12 This accentuated the problem of 
urban congestion, sent land prices in the big cities rocketing and stifled attempts by 
Labour controlled councils to implement town planning to 'clear up the ugly, scarred 1 C, 
face of industrial Britain'. 13 The flood to the cities played havoc with Labour's plans 
for slum clearance and overcrowding, both of which featured in the party's 1964 
election manifesto The New Britain. 14 
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Among the more radical solutions for relieving congested areas was the proposed 
building of new towns, including one in mid-Wales. The need for ne", towns 
reflected the fact that the solution offered by the building of high-rise flats in maj . or 
cities was partial and unsatisfactory, as was continued building in 'g-reen belt' areas, 
which only served to worsen traffic congestion and ruin the countryside. New tmN-ns 
therefore provided a practical solution, tackling two problems simultaneous Iy. On the 
one hand they would ease urban congestion, whilst on the other easing the problems 
of depressed areas, anxious to retain their populations. 
Little attention has been paid by Welsh historians to debates surrounding proposed 
4new town' developments. Where attention is afforded, it has concentrated on the 
unpopularity of a 'new town' in mid Wales from the mid 1960s onwards. Yet it is 
important to note that 'new town' development was initially welcomed, especially in 
north Wales. Moreover, there was competition within the region over where a new 
town could be situated. In addition to plans for a new town in 'mid' Wales, there were 
also demands for a new town in north-east Wales and another in Menoneth. 15 
Supporters of a new town pointed to two promising aspects of the proposed 
developments. First, a new town would provide employment for young Welsh men 
and women who would otherwise be forced to leave the country in search of work. 
Whilst this would do nothing to alleviate the problems of rural areas, there was still 
some consolation in the fact that Welsh language communities would be presen-ed. 
Second, promoters of the scheme, in particular Jim Griffiths, saw the new town idea 
as a financial lever to secure improvements in the Welsh industrial infrastructure, and 
Particularly in the quality of Welsh roads. Whilst it was difficult to justify and obtain 
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the finances for a new A470 linking north and south Wales directly. the possibilitle" 
of improving roads from the north and south to a new town in mid Wales ývere more 
easily explained. A new north-south road link ý, k-ould thus be provided Indirectly. 
Wales would also benefit from Labour's commitment to other *shared' UK-wide 
problems. Labour's 'National Plan for Transport', identified in The Vew Britain, 
permitted regional authorities to draw up transport plans for their own areas, a policy 
which included a further commitment to safeguard public transport provIsIon In rural 
areas. This included a promise to halt 'major rail closures'. 
16 Again this N-vas 
particularly appealing in areas like north-west Wales, which had been subjected to the 
sharp end of the 'Beeching Axe' in the early 1960s. 
Moreover, Labour campaigned with a promise to re-invigorate the welfare state that it 
had created in 1945. By the early 1960s the party estimated that around eight million 
people lived under or on the margins of poverty in Britain. %lodernisation of the 
welfare state was therefore deemed vital. Education was a primary target of change, 
particularly as it reflected 'in vogue' debates on how to tackle long-term pove rty. 
17 
Class sizes were typical of concerns expressed across the UK. In Wales the party 
expressed concerns over the fact that 667 schools in Wales had class sizes of over 
forty. This was part of a 'national scandal' which the party sought to address. 
The 
situation in Wales was not untypical. Labour estimated that around a quarter of 
Primary school children and two-thirds of secondary school children were taught in 
oversize classes and/or in school buildings which were in need of renovation. 
Labour's radical plans for education - centred around a 
determination to conquer 
I elite' education and introduce a system of 'comprehensive' education 
(%vhich 
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included abolishing the 'eleven plus') would conquer some of these problems. Plans 
to raise the school leaving age to sixteen addressed a long standing Labour goal and 
also filled the needs of the advancing 'technological' society. 
Housing was another important component of Labour policy at both UK and local 
levels. The building of 400,000 new houses a year was regarded as a 'reasonable' 
target in 1964. The drive for new house building was envisaged as a public private 
initiative, addressing the needs of both affluent and depressed Britain. Housing was a 
real priority in Wales. In 1967 the WCL argued that housing was the 'most important 
social problem' facing the country. 18 Addressing long kvaiting lists for council houses 
and housing for the elderly were top of a list of priorities. In 1967 the Welsh Office 
initiated subsidies for local authorities to help stimulate house building. 19 Housing 
was hailed as a 'blue ribbon' Labour policy in Wales, and was one of the party's 
major success stories in the 1960s. 
Labour's health package was similarly attractive. This included plans for the 
restoration of a 'completely free health service' as soon as conditions allowed -a 
policy aim which was achieved in 1965 - and a programme of hospital building, 
together with plans for more doctors, dentists, nurses and radiographers. These again 
addressed problems which were prominent in Wales. In 1963 the WCL had carried a 
resolution condemning the Conservative govemment's record on health in Wales and 
calling on the govemment 'to re-examine hospital expenditure in Wales, so that 
hospitals do not have to make reprehensible staff CUtS,. 20 Shortages of doctors, nurses 
and dentists topped a list of concems. In 1965 the party called on the Welsh Regional 
Hospital Board to introduce a radical progamme which would include: more new 
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hospitals; the development of health centres in all parts of Wales. a new medical 
school in Swansea-, a new Welsh research centre for occupational health and a NVelsh 
mentally handicapped centre. 21 Care for the aged, attention to the question of 
industrial disease (another important social and political issue in north-west Wales), 
attention to the escalating problem of single mothers and cervical cancer screening, 
addressed a number of other perennial and 'new' health problems in Wales. 22 
in office, and despite the latter financial constraints placed on the Labour government 
(see below), initial spending on welfare was impressive. By 1967 Labour Nvas 
spending 44% more on the elderly sick and disabled, 42% more on education, 45% 
more on health, 55% more on housing and slum clearance and 45ý, o more on social 
services as a whole than had been spent in 1964.23 There were also important moves 
in other directions, especially with regard to social legislation which kept Labour in 
tune with the changing values of British society. Homosexuality, abortion, hanging. 
divorce and religion were all issues which received Labour's attention between 1964 
and 1970, although it is not clear that these were especially prominent in policy 
statements in 1964 and 1966, nor were they always helpful in all parts of Wales. 
Alongside this, there were still attempts by Labour to devise distinctively Welsh 
policies. In 1958 Labour drew up a discussion document entitled Problems of Wales. 
24 Goronwy Roberts played a central role in writing the draft . This acted as a sounding, 
board for potential Labour policies, many of which were developed In the early 1960s 
and formed the basis of the party's main policy statement of the 1960s, SignPosts tII 
the Nevi, Wales (1963). Economic and industrial problems, local government and 
finance, public services and the constitutional question were all placed in a 
Welsh 
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context. Questions relating to the preservation of theWelsh language and culture were 
also addressed. 
Of particular significance - given Labour's divisions over this policy - the part', 
embarked on an extensive consultation exercise. CardIff HQ drew up a list of 
questions on which local parties were intended to gather feedback. For example, it 
sought suggestions on how the Distribution of Industry Act could be strengthened to 
attract new industries to both south-west and north-west Wales. More significantly it 
paid attention to troublesome local issues. It sought ideas on how industry and 
amenity could be married in the Welsh National Parks, and on the extent to which 
industrial development in National Parks should be permitted. The party expressed 
concern over 'the tendency of present legislation to 'sterillse' national park areas and 
to deprive their areas of much needed industry' as well as the 'apparently unchecked 
encroachment of caravan colonies' on Welsh coastlines. Views on the nationalisation 
of water were also sought. These focussed on how Labour could construct policies 
which would 'prevent the emergence of problems such as the Tryweryn 
controversy? ý. 25 Transport and communication provision in Wales had also been 
addressed. The party sought advice on a number issues, ranging from the priorities 
which a 'Welsh road building' programme should engage to views on whether rural 
bus and rail services should be subsidised. Moreover, it had questioned not only 
whether improved communications between north and south would improve Wales 
economically but would benefit the 'cultural unity of the Country,. 
26 Education and 
language received considerable attention. 27 The party sought feedback on Welsh 
language education. Local groups were asked to discuss "-hether 'the provision for the 
teaching of Welsh (\N, as) satisfactory in your area' and whether vou are in favour of 
174 
(a) no Welsh teaching whatever in schools or (b) the extension of the Welsli langua, -, e 
school'. Other topical 'nationalist' issues were considered. On the issue of 
broadcasting, the party argued that whilst 'few Welshmen would press for the 
economic separation of Wales from England, equally few would deny that Wales has 
a cultural individuality which deserves proper expression'. As a result, the " idespread 
development of television with its 'profound cultural implications' made the 
establishment of Welsh TV an issue 'of obvious urgency -. 28 
The attention afforded to distinctively 'Welsh' issues confinned the Labour party's 
growing confidence as the 'party of Wales'. Inevitably, the 'constitutional question' 
came to the forefront of party discussions. The party talked of 'a widespread feeling 
in Wales' that the constitutional position should be reviewed to gl,., -e Wales 'due 
recopition as a distinct nation with appropriate control over its own affairs'. 'Whilst 
the party admitted that the attitudes towards the problem and suggested solutions I 
varied greatly, they shared the common theme of 'dissatisfaction with the present 
inadequate provision both for the Parliamentary discussion of Welsh affairs and for 
the supervision and protection of Welsh interests'. 29 As the draft discusslon document 
noted, the policy favoured. by the party, from a list of possible outcomes, was the 
establishment of a 'Minister for Welsh Affairs with a seat in the Cabinet'. However, 
it had also sought views from party members on more radical forms of devolution. 
For example, it had sought advice on 'the extent of the feeling in Wales In favour of 
some form of devolution? '; what form of devolution (would) best meet the needs of 
the Principality as an integral part of the United Kingdom; which directions national 
customs and aspirations be encouraged, and what forms and expressions of 
3 
tý nationalisms should be deplored? ' .0 The 
fact that Labour had lagged behind its 
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political rivals in its attitude and approach to devolution had (by the end of the 1950s) 
become an embarrassment to the party's pro-devolutionist representatlý es in north- 
west Wales. The need to address this problem when Labour returned to power was 
acute. 
31 
The Welsh Office 
Not surprisingly, the installation of a Secretary of State for Wales in 1964 was an 
important symbol of Labour's commitment to Welsh distinctiveness, although the 
creation of the Welsh Office was also an intrinsic and essential feature of Labour's 
regional development policies for the UK. The installatIon of a Welsh Secretary was a 
radical advance on the position held by the party a decade earlier and one 
unimaginable under Attlee's post 1945 govermnent. It was under Gaitskell's 
leadership that the party had warmed the idea of a Secretary of State. As Gaitskell, 
speaking at the WCL's annual conference in 1961 argued: 
The present situation made by the government seems to be to be profoundly 
unsatisfactory. How can Mr. Brooke who is the Minister for Welsh Affairs 
give adequate time at all to this side of his work? Wales has to be squeezed in 
between rents, rating, housing subsidies and chalk pits in Essex ... education, health and agriculture are a priority for a Secretary of State. 32 
These formed part of sea changes in the party both inside and outside Wales. In 1959 
the change of attitudes led the Welsh Regional Council of Labour to change its name 
to the Welsh Council of Labour - thus re-enforcing the 'national' identity of the 
Welsh Labour party. 33 Money was made available to publish party leaflets and 
pamphlets in Welsh in time for the 1964 and 1966 general elections, re-enforcing the 
party's bi-lingual image. The party's Welsh language literature proved to be 'very 
successful' and was said to be an important factor in Labour's contInuing success in 
Welsh speaking constituencies. 34 
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The burdens of expectation placed on the Welsh Office ,; vere high. It came to be seen 
as a 'cure-all' solution to a wide range of Welsh problems. Labour spokesmen were 
among those who played up the important roles %N-hich the Office would perform. 
Goronwy Roberts was among those who believed that the 'Welsh Office and Secretary 
of State would make a sigrifficant difference. Roberts saw the former as an essential 
tool in transforming the Welsh economy, the latter as a essential means of uniting I 
opinions within both factions of the Welsh Labour party. Both ývere regarded as 
important first steps on the road to 'proper' devolution. The need to build on the 
functions performed by the Welsh Office was a frequent feature of Roberts's rhetoric. 
The desires were shared by other senior party figures such as Cledwyn Hughes and 
Emrys Jones. Under Hughes's stewardship of the Welsh Office, plans to further 
Labour's commitment to devolution gathered momentum. The re-organisation of local 
government in Wales, and the modemisation of the Council for Wales were both 
important first steps in this process. Emrys Jones's appointment as the party's 
organiser in Wales in 1965 was also an indication of changed attitudes within the 
party and another important piece of the pro-devolutionist jigsaw that was being 
constructed. Jones's role has received little historical attention. Yet, his pioneering 
work in organising conferences across Wales in 1965/66 to 'sell' the ideal of an 
elected Welsh Council and his role in ensuring that the resolution in favour of an 
elected Council was adopted in the WCL annual conference of 1966 was 
immeasurable. The appointment of a Royal Commission on the Constitution and 
installation of a new Welsh Language Act in 1967 furthered optimism in this 
direction. Within north-west Wales, these aspects of Labour's appeal %vere given 
considerable, but by no means exclusive, attention. 
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The creation of a Welsh Office promised Welsh solutions to Welsh problems. These 
were backed by debates within the party which reflected increased sensitivitv t, --) 
distinctively Welsh issues. Moreover, efforts at creating distinctively Welsh pollcles 
also led the party to question the value and relevance of Labour's UK policies in 
Wales. Problems of Wales clearly reflected concerns that many 'English' Labour 
policies did not fit the needs of Wales. For example, the party questioned 'whether the 
policy statement on agriculture, Prosper the Plough (19-58), could be applied to Welsh 
conditions. Similarly it questioned whether the party's policy statement on education, 
Learning to Live (195 8), 'broadly' met the needs of Wales. In particular it questioned 
whether the elimination of the 'Welsh' Grammar School in favour of wholly 
Comprehensive schools necessarily met the needs of Wales, despite the fact that 
comprehensives had been pioneered in Wales. This stimulated debates in the party 
over the number of grammar school places in Wales, and especially a concern that 
quality of education was inadequate compared to the standards of schooling in 
England. 35 Furthennore, on the question of National Parks, Labour policy had largely 
been constructed around the need to preserve and protect the beauty of rural areas in 
Engalnd, not Wales. In Wales, national parks legislation, put through by Labour, 
stood in the way of the party's belief that the people of those areas should enjoy full 
employment, and contradicted support for new industries in Snowdonia. 
The question of National Parks became an enduring feature of debates within the 
party from the late 1950s onwards and had a particular significance in north-ývest 
Wales. National Parks were regarded as a massive burden to industrial development 
in north-west Wales. In Wales, 16.8% of land was designated a National Park, as 
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compared with 4.6% in England and 4.8% in Scotland. The Snowdonia National Park. 
which covered eight hundred square miles, took up three A -quarters of %I erioneth. 
a consequence: 
It prevents the proper economic development of the area because under the 
National Parks Acts, individuals and scenic beauty organ'satlons even from 
outside Wales can protest against any form of de-velopment for economic and 
social purposes and demand a public enquiry even for a building of a school-' 
As a result, the party called for the Snowdonia National Park to be 'substantially 
reduced in size' and for amendments to the National Parks leggislation to stop people 
from outside Wales interfering in and obstructing industrial and social development. 
National Parks were a headache in Labour's plans to bring industry to north-west 
Wales. 
This was a particular concern because unemployment remained a regular feature of 
Welsh life. From the mid 1950s onwards Labour had accused the Conservative 
government of 'mishandling and lack of planning in the industrial affairs of Wales' 38 
and ridiculed the government over its 'pathetic inability' to tackle the problem of 
unemployinent. 39 In accordance with the ideas outlined in Problems of Wales, Labour 
policy from the early 1960s onwards was formulated around more effective use of 
industrial redistribution. This entailed ambitious 100% grants for factory building and 
a low rent policy for govenunent built factories. However, although not explicitly 
noted in Labour literature, many of the ideas being formulated were based on 
expanding and improving the programme of 'advance factories', Implemented by the 
Conservative government from the late 1950s onwards in areas which included north- 
West Wales . 
40 Factory building in 'Central Wales' (which included parts of 
41 Merioneth) was to be supported with even larger financial inducements . 
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g The transition 
from 'old' declining industries to 'new' industrieswas a major problem 
for the Labour government. Unemployment amongst the young was another 
prominent problem which Labour policies sought to address, par-ticularly as 
depopulation was worst among the younger elements of the local population. There 
were a combination of old and new remedies to tackle the problems. Promoting the 
building of technical colleges and expanding the number of apprenticeships available 
to school leavers topped a list of priorities aimed directly at Welsh youth, whilst 
'training workers in new technological processes' addressed both young and more 
mature elements of the workforce. 42 Anticipating the decline of 'old' industries 
became a major pre-occupation. The need to bring in 'new' industries before 
traditional industnes collapsed was paramount, not only in terms of economics, but 
also in terms of social and cultural consequences, notably depopulation. 
4, 
The attempts to bring in new industry after 1964 were not Nvithout success . -' In 1970 
Labour compiled a summary of its achievements in north Wales . 
44 In north-west 
Wales the party reported that industrial planning approvals had been given to 94 
projects, totalling 2,867 square feet. Two advance factories had been established in 
Caemarfonshire, three in Merioneth. Moreover, the party was confident that a total of 
2,200 additional jobs would be created over the next four years, when other advance 
45 factories were completed and filled . 
Welsh industries such as slate and agriculture were to be defended by the Welsh 
Office. Labour was still hopeful that a future could be secured for traditional 
industries. Special help was promised for Welsh agriculture, in particular 
for hill 
farming (which constituted much of the farming in north-, xest Wales), %&-hilst the 
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more positive aspects of mechanisation and technolo-gy promised to promote a more 
efficient, viable, fanning industry. There was similar optimism over the future of the 
slate industry. 
Despite the fact that like agriculture, slate could no longer employ thousands, the fact 
that jobs remained for hundreds was not to be dismissed. Local %IPs plaved up the 
potential of the industry to provide jobs for up to two thousand workers. Two factors 
gave reasons for optimism. As Goronwy Roberts argued, four million British homes 
had slate roofs. So would a 'large percentage' of the houses planned by Labour. 
Moreover, 'red' slate had become a fashionable roofing commodit-y in mainland 
Europe by the early sixties. This raised expectations over future slate exports. Also, 
mechanisation in the slate industry would serve to make the industry more efficient - 
keeping production costs down and productivity high. Welsh local authorities which 
had deviated away from using slate had done so because of the unavailability of slate 
- not necessarily because of the price. 
46 However, even with a more encouraging 
future there was still the problem of attracting workers to an industry which was seen 
as dangerous, unhealthy and low-paid. By the early sixties, Goronwy Roberts argued 
that increased wages and better working hours meant that 'security of tenure In the 
quarries was as good as anywhere'. Those who had left the industry to join 
manufacturing industries were now retuming, due to the fact that they 'missed the 
camaraderie' of the quarries . 
47 Wages were higher than ever, health conditions had 
improved and workers were treated more fairly by the management. Moreover, 
from 
the early 1960s, local quames had developed a more positive, modem, approach to 
the industry. They were aware that problems had been exacerbated by the industry's 
Poor image, which included the unattractive use of slate by architects and the 
damage 
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wrought by inferior and imported slate . 
48 As a result, advertising agencies were 
employed to market local slate and a public relations officer was hired in London. -: ) 
Roberts was optimistic over the future of the industry. 
Action to prevent the exploitation of other valuable Welsh commodities such as water 
were also addressed. The question of a Welsh Water Board featured in continuing 
discussions. Despite opposition from 'one or two' Labour controlled authorities and 
some 'public declarations' which were potentially embarrassing for the party, plans 1. ) 
for a Welsh Water Board were re-affirmed by Labour in 1962. 
The need to modernise a chronically poor local infrastructure was also addressed. The 
merits of the party's transport and communication policy were aired in the run-up to 
the 1964 election and given a distinctively 'local' feel. In 1961 the VVCL also camed 
a resolution supporting the development of 'good communications' in north Wales. 
There were ambitious plans not only for the development of road and rail 
communications but also sea and air communication. Local labour parties took 
Labour's 'jet-age' rhetoric quite literally. Among the more radical policies broached 
was the expansion of airfields in north Wales to cater for civil air services, as well as 
the developments of ports, especially along the river Dee. The development of air and 
sea projects were regarded as particularly appealing ways of attracting new industry to 
north Wales. 50 The Welsh Labour Council were unanimous in their condemnation of 
proposed cuts in railway provision. As the Council argued, the proposed closure of 
railway lines in Wales would 'cause hardship, increase unemployment and aggravate 
the depopulation of rural areas'. 51 In the short term the party called for a deferment of 
the line closures pending formal investigations into the wider implications of the 
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proposed closures. 52 More importantly, plans for the development of the -k-55 linking 
north Wales with the north of England and the Midlands were also aired. These. rather 
than more ambitious plans for improving the A470 (which linked north and south 
Wales) were crucial and more pragmatic options in the attempt to develop industry in 
north Wales -a fact highlighted by Labour figures there from the early 1950s. 
Promised improvements to the A55 (from Holyhead to Queensferry), amounting to a 
cost of up to 0 million promised by the Welsh Board for Industry in 1964. gave 
further cause for optimism even before Labour had been returned to pov,, er. 51 By 1970 
progress had been made. Plans for the development of the A55 were well advailced, 
as were plans to improve the north-south A470 trunk road. Finn commitments to 
extend the twelve miles of dual carriageway in north Wales to eighteen had already 
been made. A further eight schemes to provide a further twenty miles of dual 
carriageway were at 'preparation pool' stage. 54 In the period from 1964 to 1970,0.3 
million was spent on roads in Caernarfonshire and a further E2.4 million in 
Merioneth. 
Other elements of Problems of Wales were followed up enthusiastically in the early 
1960s. Television became a prominent concern - such was the fascination xith the 
'TV age' in general and the assumed impact of TV on voting habits and political 
beliefs. Poor TV reception in many parts of Wales meant that Wales was again 
socially excluded from one of the joys of affluent Britain. As a result, the Labour 
party called for 'booster stations' to improve reception. However there was also the 
more profound concern that even with good reception, programmes did not cater 
for 
the needs of the Welsh people. In 1959 the party passed a resolution calling 
for 
authorities to make more 'intrinsically Welsh programmes' .5ý 
By 1961, ýý, hen this 
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objective had clearly not been achieved, a resolution 'deplonn-, -, ' the quality oý, ` TV in 
Wales was remitted to the party's executive. Moreover, the party expressed concem 
over the way that Welsh TV programmes were shown at 'inconvenient' times and 
called for the party to lobby both the BBC and ITA to ensure that 'the Welsh Lire 
catered for'. 
56 
The attention afforded to the problems facing the youth of Wales encapsulated the 
major impact of the 'new society' on Labour's thinki I ing, not only in 'Wales but across 
the UK. Attention was afforded to policies whichvvould prove attractive to a younaer 
generation of voters. There were also attempts within the party to adopt ne"', 
enlightened, attitudes towards its youth sections. 'Recruitment of young people' was 
intended to be the main organisational task of the party in the early sixties. In many 
areas party organisation was being left to a small and ageing membership. The age I 
structure of the party at gassroots level was 'dangerously unbalanced'. As a result, 
Labour's appreciation of political views among the young xas weak, at a time when 
57 
'the pace of social change had never been so rapid' . Moreover, Labour was 
concemed that it lagged behind its political rivals in terms of youth recruitment. The 
party's aim was to equal and surpass the successful Young Conservative organisation 
of the 1950s, although in Welsh speaking Wales the greater challenge of the 1960S t: ý 
would be posed by the growing appeal of Plaid Cymru. The formation of the YS 
(Young Socialist) movement in 1960 was an 'exciting' attempt to meet the challenge. zD 
There were fifty four YS branches operating in Wales by 1962. From the early 1960s 
onwards, Labour parties in both Caernarforishire and Merioneth encouraged the 
development of youth sections. This was not without success. Small but committed 
Youth sections functioned in both counties. The Caernarfort Labour party in particular 
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attracted the support of an articulate youth section, which included Bettv Williams - 
later to become Labour's MP for Conwy in 1997. The youth section helped the CLP 
win Labour's 'national speaking contest' in both 1966 and 1969. 
These changes were reflected at higher levels %vithin the party. Labour's 
overwhelming Welsh success in the general election of 1966 was attributed to the fact 
that: 
Fortunately we had the right candidates in the right places. In the marginals t) 
Labour candidates were admirably sul ited for those constituencies - young 
earnest and enthusiastic. This rallied our supporters, produced lively 
campaigns and attracted the support fTom the doubtful, uncommitted section 
of the electorate 58 
The emergence of new faces in the 1966 general election typified quite literal 
attempts to modify the image of the party in Wales. The new Labour's MPs were 41) 
generally sympathetic to 'Welsh' or 'nationalist' demands. Figures such as Ednyfed 
Hudson Davies (Conway), Wil Edwards (Menoneth) and Elystan. Morgan (Cardigan) 
59 
were among the most notable new arrivals within the Welsh PLP . 
The shaping of Labour policy for Wales therefore formed an important aspect of party 
activity in the period after 1959. At the same time, there was an attempt by the party 
to improve its own infrastructure and organisation in Wales. The targeting of marginal 
constituencies and the safeguarding of less 'safe' Labour seats formed part of the 
party's electoral strategy. For the 1959 election, Menoneth had been one of seven 
'key' Welsh constituencies to which the party gave special attention both before and 
during the election . 
60 e of 11 Merioneth was a particular concern not only becaus 
Labour's 'small' majority, but because the seat had been targeted by Plaid Cymru and 
had been touted by many Welsh political pundits as a winnable seat for either Plaid or 
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the Liberal party. In the event Labour held on to Merioneth, increasing its vote by 4-- 1 
forty despite a reduction of one thousand in the electorate. In a constituenc. " where 
local Tories were believed to have supported the Liberal candidate. and ývhere grass 
roots support for Plaid Cymru was believed to be growing, this 'vk-as an impressi'Ve 
Labour performance. 
Yet, such performances actually served to stifle modemisation of the party s 
infrastructure. The major problem was that in many Welsh constituencies Labour 
performed well without punching its weight. In the aftermath of the 1959 election the 
WCL were concerned that in 'one or two cases' general management committees of 
constituency parties 'met too infrequently', when they had been asked to meet 
quarterly. 61 Moreover, the membership ratio of one member per eight votes 
(recommended in the 'Wilson Report'), whilst achieved in 'a few' constituencies was 
ignored by the majority of CLP's, where 'serious membership campaigns' had never 
been conducted. This was a problem in constituencies like Merioneth. Organisation in 
constituencies covering 660 square miles, and with 58 polling booths on election day, 
was crucial. Suggestions on how this problem could (in part) be solved were basic and 
pragmatic. Included in Merioneth CLP's advice to canvassers at election times were 
warnings to 'refuse invitations to enter a house for a chinwag and a cup of tea' and to 
'nOt enter into any arguments' - both of which would waste valuable canvassing 
62 time. Moreover, the Merioneth executive were proactive in an attempt to make the 
job of party workers less difficult in Welsh speaking areas. Meetings between 
Merioneth CLP's executive and Hugh Gaitskell in 1959 were instrumental in securing 
the early publication of bi-lingual literature, plus the appointment of a Welsh speaking 
Press and publicity officer for the party. 63 In addition, Menoneth vvere also 
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instrumental in securing TGWU funds for the publication of Labour party adverts and 
maps showing the progress made by the party in the Welsh lanzguaýue press. as well as 
additional funding for Welsh publications. Such was the impact of ", elsh language 
literature that newspapers which normally 'disregarded' Labour viexs. such as Seren, 
were perceived by the local Labour party to have taken 'democratic action' to ensure 
that the Labour point of view had been put across. 64 
The Limitations ofLabourpolicy 
The problems facing the Labour party in north-west Wales after 1964 were profound. 
Some of these reflected difficulties across the UK, others related to Welsh social and 
economic problems, some were intrinsically 'local' in shape and scope. At a UK 
level, Labour's problems were overwhelmingly linked to the economic problems 
facing Britain. From 1965 onwards the issues of deflation and devaluation dominated 
British politics and scuppered many of Labour's plans for modemisation. The knock- 
on effects of devaluation on Welsh Labour politics were substantial. Most historical 
agree with contemporary accounts - that devaluation was a political disaster for the 
Labour party. The mantra of devaluation dominated the economic programmes of 
both the 1964 and 1966 Labour governments. It became 'the great unrnentionable' in 
the corridors of Labour power. The decision not to devalue in 1964 when the party 
first came into power was influenced by the ghost of Ramsay MacDonald and the 
1929-31 Labour government and then the 1945-51 Labour government. Labour 
declined to take this decision - at a time when responsibility for the crisis could 
have 
been deflected onto the outgoing Tories - because it feared that Labour Nvould 
be seen 
as 'the Party of devaluation' and that it would weaken Britain's standing as a world 
6-5 leader. Others, consumed by Wilsonian rhetoric were seduced by the belief that 
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ýsocialist measures could make the economic water flow uphill'. For some partv 
members, the decision not to devalue in 1964 meant that the Labour part%, was 
'damned from the start'. This was a 'great mistake'. Others have suggested that the 
decision not to devalue in 1964 demonstrated Labour's lack of confidence in its own 
economic policies. In part, it is argued, Labour's programmes had been based on an 
overly- optimistic view of the British economy. Quite simply, Labour inherited an 
economy which was in a far worse state than the party had anticipated. When 
devaluation eventually amved in 1967 it was 'a great national and party disaster'. 66 
Labour's commitment to its election manifesto promises and its need to tackle 
Britain's economic problems were largely irreconcilable. By 1967 some believed that 
Labour could only have avoided devaluation by scrapping its manifesto. 67 In the 
event, the implications of devaluation on Labour's manifesto commitments was 
profound. Labour's National Plan, 'signposted' as the epitome of Labourism in the 
1960s, was abandoned in 1966. The DEA (Department of Economic Affairs) and its 
National Plan were to have been 'the greatest contribution of the Labour party to the 
recasting of the machinery of government to meet the needs of the twentieth 
century'. 68 The failure of the DEA symbolised not only the demise of a crucial Labour 
'tool' to tackle regional development, but a failed 'social revolution'. Labour lacked 
an acceptable alternative. The party was forced to rely on 'piecemeal' reforms. 
Moreover, devaluation was accompanied by a series of measures which had profound 
local consequences. For example, hire purchase on new cars was slashed (hampering 
industries dependent on the car industry in areas like north-west Wales). Interest rates 
ýN'ere increased to 8% (thus discouraging new investment and hampenng house 
building). Public expenditure was cut by f 100 million (with the return of prescription 
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charges in 1967 being perhaps the most publicly visible and embarrassMa slo--n of 
Labour 'failure'). Attempts by the party to deflect attention from the problems caused 
by devaluation were generally unconvincing. 
Despite the ambitions of the National Plan and the faith placed in regional planning. 
creating jobs proved an uphill struggle for Labour after 1964. Labour's return to 
power coincided with a significant rise in unemployment rates in north-vvest Wales. 
This was largely due to the fact that large scale local projects such as the building of 
nuclear power stations in Trawsfynydd and Wylfa had been largely completed by 
1964/65. Labour therefore inherited an acute unemployment problem in both 
Caernarfonshire and Merioneth. 
The obstacles which stood in the way of Labour's reconstruction of north-west Wales 
were profound. On the one hand, local authorities were not always attentive to 
Labour's plans. On the other, as has already been argued, Labour faced the even 
greater obstacle of attempting to reconstruct industry in an area dominated by a 
National Park. Combined, these posed a powerful obstacle to Labour's plans for the 
modemisation of north-west Wales. The long local tradition of local councils being 
dominated by Independents became a problem when the party was trying to get things 
done. With no Labour groups functioning on most of the local councils, Labour was 
often powerless to fight against the wishes of local councillors who opposed change. 
Labour believed that co-operation with local authorities was vital in efforts to attract 
new industry. Ironically, Labour often received more support from conserý-ationist 
bodies than local councils when it came to building factories. Caernarforishire County 
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Council were particularly guilty of lacking for-ward plannin, in the early si\tle, -. 
despite the prevalence of unemployment in the area. For example, Nvhen a former 
RAF station in Llanberis was touted as a possible site for a small industrial estate and 
tourist centre in 1964, the council refused planning permission on the grounds that the 
area was on the fringe of the Snowdonia National Park and thus 'the view from the 
surrounding area of Snowdon of terraces of factory roofs Nvould be the most 
objectionable development which could be contemplated'. 69 Paradoxically, the local 
branch of the Council for the Preservation of Rural Wales were actually in favour of 
the development, arguing that 'the branch has always accepted the reasonable need 
for industry in the right setting, and has frequently urged the use of previously 
developed sites or derelict land for such re-conversion for new purposes'. Moreover, 
it preferred attracting industry to Llanberis, to accepting more 'chalet, motel or 
caravan parks'. 70 Overall, local bodies lacked cohesion when it came to the need to 
attract industry. Another attempt to build an industrial estate in Bangor met with 
objections from the National Farmers Union, although on this occasion the scheme 
was allowed to go ahead. 
Such obstacles clearly caused annoyance to local Labour parties. As Goronwy 
Roberts pointed out, the introduction of new Industries depended on the availability of 
suitable sites. The government would not consider plans for advance factories unless 
guaranteed local sites were on the table. The policies of some local authorities - who 
insisted that industries be developed in the immediate vicinity of towns - was even 
more frustrating, given Labour's attempts to halt depopulation from the more rural 
sections of the two counties. In areas such as the Lleyn peninsula and in parts of 
',, Ierioneth, the exact location of the industry came second to the primary aim of 
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creating jobs. The Ferodo factory, built on the outskirts of Caemar-fon provided a fine 
example of how jobs had been created for the entire region -not just for Caemarfon. 71 
Roberts was concerned 'that we do not become too parochial in our approach to nex 
industry in these areas'. 72 Even by the late 1960s Caemarfonshlre County Council's 
attitude to industry remained unchanged. One company - Enston Brothers - 
announced in 1967 that they would wind up their business interests in Caemarfon 
because they were 'weary and frustrated' by the constant refusals of the county's 
planning committee to allow continuation of a E0.25 million development of their 
business, which would include the building of a new factory. 'NIoreover, the company 
asserted that 'they were not alone' in being hampered in their efforts to bring in work. 
As it argued: 
The history of numerous planning refusals by the county council to allow 
development of what is already, and has been for many years an industrial site 
is truly appalling. The attitude has resulted in the loss of jobs for up to 200 
men living in the surrounding villages ... we 
have never had the difficulties in 
any other area that we have had with Caernarfonshire County Council. In our 
business dealings with other counties of north Wales and Cardiganshire it has 
been a pleasure to experience their co-operation ... in strong contrast to the 73 treatment we have received from this council . 
This precipitated a string of letters to the local press, all of which were in entire 
agreement with the criticisms made by Enstons. Arnold Builders, a company with 
roots in Nottingham, wrote arguing that 'of all the local authorities we have dealt 
"'ith, Caemarfonshire is the most backward', and that Anglesey 'was twenty years 
ahead of Caemarfon' when it came to industrial initiative. The company made another 
important point. Caernarforishire had developed a bad reputation as a potential area 
for industrial development: 
Planning appeals from Caemarfonshire must be the highest from anY 
Welsh 
county. Developers are reluctant to come. The word goes round, and 
the 
opportunities during the last twenty years that have slipped through their 
fingers must be enormous. Without doubt the Welsh Office should now, 
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without delay, institute an urgent enquiry Into. the whole affairs of Caemarfonshire County Council and planning authorIty. 74 
Some local ratepayers shared in the condemnation. As one argued: 
Hundreds of people are experiencing the frustrations that this firm has had to 
put up with. Many enterprises are refused by these bureaucratic little martinets 
and the most popular phrase in Caernarfon is 'if planning will let us. ' 
Another local company (Schofields) argued that Enstons had been wTong to say that I 
Anglesey was 'twenty years ahead of Caemarfon'. In fact 'forty years was closer to 
75 
the mark' . 
These attitudes did nothing to alleviate problematic unemployment blackspots within 
the county. The problems of the Lleyn peninsula were particularIv poignant. Lleyn 
became the major hotbed of depopulation and one of the most difficult areas for 
attracting industry. Mechanisation of agriculture and the closure of local stone 
quarries had left a sizable hole in the local industrial structure. Despite Labour's plans 
for the 'creative development' of south Caemarfonshire, job creation proved difficult, 
particularly amongst the young. If building factories was hard, filling them often 
proved impossible. Advance factories were built, but were often left to stand empty. 
These problems were not confined to Lleyn. Of the 24 advance factories approved in 
Wales from 1964-66, only four were actually up and running by November 1966.76 
Lleyii merely provided a profoundly serious example of the kind of problems that 
Labour was experiencing elsewhere. In 1968 the Lleyn area employment office 
reported that youth unemployment in the pwllheli area stood at 16 per cent, Nvhilst 
overall rates had risen to their highest levels for almost two yearS. 
77 Depopulation 
continued unabated. Moreover, the lack of success in attracting industry led to an 
over-reliance on tourism. By the late 1960s the government was giving 'active' 
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consideration to plans put forward by the Economic Development Committee for 
Hotels and Catering for the building, of 'advance hotels'. These plans %\ere 
condemned by the local community. One local Tory councillor ironically commented 
that this was an excellent idea - since empty advance hotels "vould perfectly 
compliment the empty advance factories. 78 
Empty advance factories became a prominent symbol of Labour's problems. There 
were infrastructural problems to contend with across the region. As a result, advance 
factories took too long to build. It was estimated that factories took on average two 
and half years from planning to completion. Attracting tenants to advance factories 
depended on the improvement of local roads. Plans for the development of an v7,5 
dual carriageway from Queensferry to Holyhead to complement the building of 
factories stagnated. By 1965 Labour was being criticised by local councils for the 
defernient of local road improvement projects, including an important flyo,,, er at 
Llandudno Junction which was vital in linking north Wales to the north Nvest trade and 
tourist routes. 
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Spending cuts and devaluation and a downturn in the economy also hurt the economy 
in other ways. The arrival of large local factories such as Ferodo, and Bernard Wardle 
in Caemarfon had demonstrated what could be achieved in north-west Wales. In July 
1965 Bernard Wardle opened a new extension, which created more Jobs. The 
company was hailed as a 'top class manufacturing firm which has won world-%vide 
repute'. 80 As a major supplier to BMC and Ford, the factory appeared to be on a 
sound footing. However, the recession in the British car industry hit the company 
hard. Only a few months later the factory was shedding staff This was only the start 
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of the company's problems. Further job cuts followed in 1966, when it axed a further 
65 jobs - redundancies which embarrassingl. v coincided -Mth the visit of Georue 
Thomas (Minister of Welsh Affairs) to the factory. As Thomas was forced to admit. 
the job losses demonstrated that 'the car industry kvas showing signs of feeling the 
restrictions imposed by the govemment'. 81 Ferodo (ý, k-hi Ii inos to ich supplied brake lini ý 
the British car industry) was in a similar predicament, although its dependence on 
both the new and second hand market restricted the impact of the credit squeeze. 
Ironically, one of the major problems was again that the 'new' industry - just like the 
old - had come to rely too heavily on a single consumer - on this occasion the car 
industry. Problems in the British car industry hit north-west Wales hard, especially 
after 1970 (see Chapter Six). 
The difficulties in filling advance factories and in creating jobs put Labour under 
intense pressure. Party spokesmen became embroiled in conflicting, often 
contradictory, statements over the future of existing industries. The fate of the slate 
industry was a prime example of the way in which Labour mishandled difficult 
situations. In the late fifties, Labour had appeared to come to terms with the fate of the 
industry - accepting the fact that there was little future for the industry as a mass 
employer in an age of mechanisation and market competitiveness. In the early sixties, 
the hope of new industries cancelled out the fears posed by the demise of slate. 
However, as new jobs failed to materialise in sufficient quantities Labour once again 
turned to slate. To some extent Goronwy Roberts and others were guilty of shirking 
responsibility and ftidging Labour's policy. Despite the fact that research had been 
carried out in the mid 1950s, Roberts was still promising to 'take a good look at the 
industry, in 1964. Whilst Labour accused the Tories of 'wasting thirteen years' it 
has 
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been argued that the same could be said of the Labour party. Policies N\,, nt 
undeveloped during the 1950s or melted without trace under the intoxicating 'white 
heat' rhetoric of the early 1960s. 82 In truth, Labour either lacked ideas on how to 
revive industnes like slate or over-estimated the impact of 'modernisation' on job 
creation. Throughout the sixties, Roberts and others played up the importance of the 
slate industry and its future in the hope of securing substantial government grants 
which would aid the industry. 83 He thus raised false hopes in the urban areas which 
had grown around the industry. Often the local public were misinfonned over the 
progress' being made. In 1965, when further job cuts were made, Roberts talked of a 
'brighter future' for the industry, of the redundancies which had just been made as 'by 
no means the pattern of the future' and of the fact that the 'real problem' of the 
industry was the need to attract and retain young workers with adequate wages, 
security of employment and modem conditions of work. 84 A great deal of hope was 
invested in the use of slate bi-products. Hopes were pinned on the export of 'red' slate 
to countries like France, where it became a fashionable roofing commodity in the 
1960s. In reality, however, as slate owners were well aware, the use of bi-products, 
whilst a marketable possibility, involved the creation and sustenance of few jobs, 
whilst 'red' slate exports from Dinorwic and Penrhyn quarries used up existing 
stocks, did not require any additional extraction, and thus again did not lead to the 
creation of jobs. Neither was the impact of moderrusation (and mechanisation) as 
clear-cut as some believed. Mechanisation (as well as declining demand) vý-as belleved 
to have led to a substantial loss of jobs. In truth, however, the reverse was often true. 
For quarries like Dinorwic, mechanisation had been severely restricted because of the 
age and construction of the quarries. As a result, in a highly competitive market, it 
could not feasibly hope to compete with its rivals. 
85 The reality of the situation facing 
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the slate industry was rarely faced in public announcements. The hopes pinned on the 
future of the industry by those like Goronw. v Roberts ultimately lacked credlbilltv. 
The closure of most of the local quarries by the late 1960s - Dinonvic and Oakl, ý,, - 
being the most notable - did little to aid Labour's credibility or the personal 
reputations of local Labour members. 
Moreover, despite the promising and optimistic rhetoric which had accompanied 
Labour's plans for agriculture, the policies developed by the party did not fit the 
needs of the farming community in north-west Wales. As has already been argued, 
Labour's policy statement on agriculture published in the late 1950s, Prosper the 
Plough, had generated some reservations in the Welsh Labour party. These concerns 
were justified by the content of Labour's White Paper on Agriculture, published in 
August 1965 and the Agriculture Act 1967. This legislation advocated the 
development of large scale, cost-efficient, farm units at the expense of the small scale 
units which dominated local agriculture. Instead of promoting the titled theme of the 
White Paper - 'Development of Agriculture' - many percev, ýed the Act as a threat to 
the small farmer, and one that promised to scupper traditional local farming practices. 
The fact that farming had to change - to keep abreast of another highly competitive 
market - was drowned out by the overwhelming desire to conserve traditional local 
farming methods and with it local fartning communities. Nonetheless, Labour's 
credibility as a party with concern for rural areas was again questioned. As one Welsh 
political commentator argued: 
The term 'development' is now in doubt as all the White Paper, and especially 
the Act seem to imply is that what is entailed is not a development of rural 
areas but a re-organisation to meet market forces ... this ýxjll only 
lead to 
further depopulation. 86 
196 
Neither did the new factories that ýý'ere created compensate for tJJC jobs lost by the 
decline of old industries. By the mid 1960s the Caernarfonshire employment service 
expressed concerns over the high levels of unemployment in -,, -illages surrounding the II 
slate quarries such as Llanberis, Deiniolen, Bethel, Brynrefail, Cwm-y-Glo and 
Llanrug. Finding jobs for 'older' men and the disabled was particularly problematic. 
Labour's political opponents scored valuable political points by appearing to be more 
attentive to these kinds of problems. 87 Ironically, one of the problems faced by some 
of the small factories that came into the area was that they could not recruit new 
workers - despite the constant existence of unemployment. Finding female ", orkers 
was particularly problematic, but there was also the problem of attracting young male 
workers into the new industrial sector. By the mid 1950s local manufacturing 
industries were crying out for more female workers. Greengate and Irwell in Llanbens 
employed 220 women by 1965, but could not find women to fill another fifty ý-acant 
posts. 88 In a drive to attract workers, the company arranged cr&che and nursery care 
for young children, but were forced to abandon the scheme because of a lack of 
interest. Moreover, despite Labour's plans for technical colleges and closer co- 
operation with the local university, local firms often found it difficult to attract young 
talent. Bernard Wardle was only one firm frustrated by the fact that local school 
leavers did not find industry an appealing career option-89 As the employment services 
were aware, many local firms found it difficult to compete with the tourist industry, 
especially where women's jobs were concerned. The seasonal and sporadic nature of 
tourist related jobs had an appeal as well as drawbacks. Many local women apparently 
found the notion of a summer job attractive, as it lacked the long term commitments 
associated with a 'proper'job. Flexible, part-time, working hours which could include 
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evenings and weekends suited the needs of many local Nvomen with families. ýýhilst 
the 'cash in hand' nature of some jobs mitigated the problem of lo, %N, pay. 
Moreover, tourism itself had come to be regarded as a much more viable and 
respectable 'industry' by the mid 1960s - in part at least due to the problems 
encountered in attracting alternative 'new' industries. During the 1960s Labour had a 
change of heart over the values of tourism. The 'unsatisfactory' status of the industry, 
described by Goronwy Roberts in the 1950s, gave -wa-y to a neiN approach - 
understandable in view of the fact that 78 per cent of local workers were belie% ed to 
be in jobs that relied on the tourist industry in one form or another. Howe-ver, whilst 
there were concerted attempts by Labour to promote the tounst industry (including 
close co-operation with the Welsh Tourist Board and the creation of a new 
Countryside Commission) contradictions within the remit of regional planning 
backfired on the party. As has already been argued, Labour's plans for stimulating the 
depressed regions of the UK had been emphatic. However, not all the policies met 
with either the success or approval which the party had hoped for. A classic example 
was the Selective Employment Tax. SET was introduced by Labour as part of its 
Regional Employment Premium. This in itself was an important aspect of the party's 
regional development plans. SET aimed to stimulate manufactunng industry by 
allowing employers concessions on tax paid on behalf of employees in addition to 
receiving a premium for every employee-90 Manufacturers in development areas were 
entitled to claim a further tax concession of 30s a week The tax was modified after 
1967. Following these measures only employers inside development areas were 
allowed to claim the 7s 6d SET premium. By 1968 SET was therefore directly 
targeted at development areas. 
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SET was not well received in north-west '\Vales. Criticism of the tax came not only 
from Labour's political opponents, but also from factions within local parties. Critics 
of the tax argued that in supporting manufacturing industry, the government penalised 
local service industries. Instead of encouraging local industries such as tour-ism and 
agriculture, the Labour government was hampering their grow-th. Critics also argued 
that the premiums paid encouraged employers to treat workers contemptuously - 
taking workers on to receive SET concessions, but then laying them off as soon as 
orders took a downward turn. This was another example of a policy designed for UK 
needs that did not fit local circumstances in Wales - or an example of a poor (or 
poorly thought out) policy. 
Attempts to ensure that Labour's image as the 'party of Wales' ý, vere substantiated 
also caused problems. Despite the party's attempts to deal with problems within both 
industrial and rural Wales, it found it difficult to shake-off the image of a party which 
was predominantly interested in the problems of south Wales. There was some truth 
in these perceptions. There was a general consensus within the Welsh Office in the 
1960s that the real and urgent problems of Wales were those of the industrial south - 
where the bulk of Welsh jobs were situated-91 However, the Welsh press, political 
opponents and some party members tired at the ways in which south and 'mid' Wales 
dominated the party's plans. This led to criticism over Labour's handling of north- 
West Wales. Essentially these revolved around the perception that whilst the party 
I-IaVe sufficient attention to the needs of south and mid 
Wales, the north was 
neglected. It was not difficult for the press or Labour's political opponents to latch on 
to examples of bias. 'Welsh Day' debates in the House of Commons Nvere nch 
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pickings, dominated as they often were by the problems of south Wales. '12 Labour's 
concerns over the future of 'mid' Wales also caused annoyance. Local newspapers 
were prominent in attempts to expose the Labour governments complicity in the 
4propaganda' which stressed the problems of mid-Wales. As one newspaper argued in 
1965: 
We who are living in Anglesey and Caernarforishire are getting rather tired of 
the constant propaganda over the problems of mid-Wales ... the problems are 
no different from our own. The propaganda comes mainly from the Nlid- 
Wales Industrial Development Association but when %ve look closely to find 
what the Association is doing we find that it mainly fishes in the same water 
as we do - namely in the Liverpool and Manchester areas. Rivalries of this 
kind make no sense ... Mid Wales is a shadowy land where communities dream dreams among the rushing waters. One does not know where it begins or ends. 
One moment it includes Welshpool, the next Penrhyndeudraeth, the next 
Aberystwyth or even Llandrindod Wells. 
Due to the attention given to 'mid' Wales there was therefore concern that the 
problems of north Wales would be neglected. The Caernarvon and Denbigh 
expressed those concerns when it argued: 
North Wales is just dragging along. The futility of 'mid-Wales' is a plain 
hindrance to us. We need to press very hard for the recognition of the whole of 
north Wales as a single region. ' 93 
Similarly, local Labour MPs were forced on the defensive following cnticism of the 
government's manipulation of trade figures. Critics argued that the tendency to use 
'all Wales' figures in press releases and announcements tended to disguise the fact 
that most of Labour's industrial development successes had come in south Wales, not 
the north. 
Press concerns over the domination of the party by the south were replicated within 
the party. Party members in the north felt meetings were constantly scheduled at 
southern venues, whilst committees were filled with south Wales members as a result. 
The feeling \vas so pronounced by the mid 1960s that senior party members and NIPS 
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from the north took little interest and seldom participated in many crucial WCL 
meetings. 94 Thi III is did little to prevent the problems from escalating. Even when the 
WCL was prompted to address north Wales they tended to miss the point bein, -, made. 
In 1964 the WCL conference appeared to grab the bull by the horns, stressing that it Cý 
viewed with 'continued concern' the 'citing of conferences in the Cardiff and 
Porthcawl areas' and urged the WCL to give consideration to 'other areas in 'Wales'. 
By this it meant 'Swansea and adjacent areas'. 95 Whilst Welsh conferences did rotate 
on a three year cycle after 1964 - visiting north, mid and south Wales in equal 
measure - committees continued to operate largely from the south. 96 This may have 
been logical, given that most of the population was in the south, but it was hardly 
diplomatic or good for party morale. 
A great deal of hope had been pinned on the creation of a Secretary of State for Wales 
and a Welsh Office in 1964. Even amongst Labour's political opponents there had 
been widespread support and approval for this landmark decision. However, the 
question of a Secretary of State brought Labour as many problems as it did successes. 
The record of the Welsh Office flattered to deceive. First, there was almost continual 
discontent over the lack of power vested in the hands of the Welsh Secretary and the 
Welsh Office, not only ftom. Labour's political opponents, but also from party 
members, senior civil servants and often the post-holders thernselves. Second, and at 
the same time, the political credentials of those post-holders was often problematic for 
the government. Third, the policies pursued by Welsh Secretaries often proved less 
than Popular with local political audiences. 
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Getting things done in the Welsh Office proved problematic. There was not j. ust due 
to the problem of expenditure cuts outlined above. Progress was also held back by 
bureaucratic back-biting and the territorial control imposed by some senior civil 
servants. Some Whitehall Departments had been hostile to the creation of a Welsh 
Office in 1964.97 Sir Idwal Pugh expressed his belief that the Welsh Office was 
crubbish'. 98 As a result of this hostility, and other problems, the Welsh Office did not 
function particularly well in the period from 1964-70. Permanent Secretanes at the 
Welsh Office at the end of the 1960s still saw establishing the credibility of the 
Office, making it a 'proper' Department, as a priority. For these senior civil servants, 
the Welsh Office did not begin to perform well until the 1970s, some of the notable 
achievements being made under the Conservative Secretary of State Peter Thomas in 
1971 and Labour's John Morris in 1974. 
The latter 1960s 
The problems encountered in the latter 1960s were diverse. In the period from 1968- 
70, George Thomas felt that the Welsh office 'had difficulty priontising the problems 
of Wales' and complained of too many delays when trying to get things done. For 
example, a 'planning survey of rural Wales' had still not been initiated by 1969, 
despite being on Labour's agenda for half a decade. The lack of powers vested in the 
Welsh Office was another major problem. This was not lost on members of the 
Labour party from across the border. Richard Crossman opposed it as inefficient - 
another bureaucratic hurdle. The Welsh Office did not have power over many areas of 
Policy (a problem for Wales) but it had to be consulted on UK policy (a delaying fact 
for the UK). 9' An entry in Benn's diary for 7 February 1965 refers to a meeting with 
Brian Faulkner, the Northern Ireland Minister of Commerce and continues: 
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I reallsed the scope that Northern Ireland Ministers had, unlike for example, 
the Scottish Secretary or the Welsh Secretarv in this country. because not onl", 
does Northern Ireland get more than Scotland and NVales as result of the 
Imperial Settlement following the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, but also 
because Faulkner was able to concentrate all his mone, ý, where he needed it 
and didn't have to spend it in accordance with the rigid rules laid down from 
London. 100 
Along with the limitation of power came the limitations of sympathy within the UK 
Labour party over the particular problems faced in Wales. Cled-ývvn Hua-hes felt 
Transport House less than sympathetic to the uniquely 'Welsh' reperctissions of 
devaluation. In March 1968 Richard Crossman wrote to Hughes, enclosing a -bneC 
on Labour's 'post-devaluation strategy', asking Hughes for 'errors' and/or 'suggested 
improvements'. The reply from Hughes was straightforward - 'Yes - the Welsh 
extrapolation'. In early April Crossman wrote again. The reply fTom Hughes - 'Yes - 
I want the Welsh dimension'. 101 The Welsh dimensions or extrapolations are not 
visible in Hughes' papers. 
There were problems both political and personal. Whilst the hope that a Secretary of 
State for Wales would wield a magic wand had been unrealistic, few expected that a 
Secretary of State would be seen to actively conspire against the interests of Welsh 
business. Jim Griffiths's selection as the first Welsh Secretary had been widely touted 
since the early 1960s. Griffiths was a natural choice -a 'party man' and neutral who 
despite emanating from the south was sympathetic to the Welsh language and to the 
problems of the north. Griffiths' appointment, along with that of Goronwy Roberts as 
Minister of State, was symbolic of Labour's attempts to live up to its image as 'the 
party of Wales'. Yet even this combination was not without its problems in north-west 
'ýVales. The controversy over Caemarfonshlre County Council's policy on roofing was 
especially embarrassing for Labour in general and Goronwy Roberts in particular. 
In 
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1965 Caernarforishire Council had imposed a planning condition stipulating that new I=) 
houses under construction in Bangor had to be built with slate roofs. Howýfver. 
following a public enquiry, Jim Griffiths overruled the council, varying the condition 
to read 'the dwellings may be roofed with slates or tiles'. This led to xidespread 
condemnation of Griffiths, Labour, and the government from quarrymen. As a local 
TGWU spokesman argued: 
The Secretary must remember that there are people who live on making slates, 
a fact that he seems to have forgotten since he was here a few weeks ago 
forcasting a bright future for the industry. 
Other prominent members of the local Labour party, such as Idwal Edwards, found 
the decision 'difficult to understand in view of the recent statement from the Welsh 
Office regarding the slate industry'. As he continued: 
We find, after over a century of roofing with slate only, right in the heart of 
the Ogwen district, that the Secretary of State has decided to authorise the use 
of roofing other than slate in the area, and this at a time when the industry 
needs a boost and the employers are struggling to modernise it to increase 
production not only for the home market but also with the view of possibly 
entering once again the export market. 102 
Moreover, from 1966 onwards the selection of Welsh Office political leaders did not 
go smoothly for Labour. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, but is 
worthy of brief note here. Cledwyn Hughes' appointment as Griffiths' successor, was 
decidedly unpopular with some sections of the Welsh Labour party. Many felt that 
Hughes was too sympathetic to Welsh nationalism and nationalist sentiments - one of 
those Labour figures who put nationalism first, socialism second. 103 This mirrored the 
enormous gulf that existed within the Welsh PLP between the interests of south and 
north Wales Labour members that some Labour MPs found quite shocking. 
104 Neither 
Nvas antipathy towards 'nationalism' confined to south Wales constituencies. Hughes 
and Roberts may well have been some of the figures who the Merioneth Labour party 
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had in their sights in 1959 when it complained to Hugh Gaitskell that the Labour party 
in north-west Wales was being undermined. Hostile nationalist propaganda was one 
fact but: 
The problem is complicated by prominent Labour party members ha- ing a foot in both camps - Labour and Welsh Nationalist. 105 
Anti-nationalism, and suspicion of nationalist intentions, were deeply ingrained 
within sections of the Merioneth CLP, where a belief in centralism and 'Britishness' 
remained strong. In the 1970s this led some of the party's members into an unstudied, 
and deeply committed, support for the anti-devolutionist 'No' camp during the 1979 
Welsh devolution referendum campaign. ' 06 This did little to sustain Labour's local 
image as a party concerned for distinctively Welsh issues - which included 
devolution. 
On the other hand, when George Thomas arrived at the Welsh Office in 1968 the 
pendulum swung in entirely the opposite selection. Despite being close to members of 
the party in the north, such as Goronwy Roberts, Thomas was regarded as 'very much 
a southwalian' with little interest for the problems of north Wales, particularly the 
language, and with a particularly hostile attitude towards Welsh 'nationalism'. His 
hostile attitude to devolution was potentially damaging for the Labour party in Welsh 
speaking Wales. Moreover, Thomas and Goronwy Roberts both hated Welsh 
nationalists, and the former in particular waged a war against its advocates. 107 Instead 
of presenting a united front on the question of Welshness, the Welsh Office and its 
incumbents became a symbol of the way in which the Labour party was once again :D 
become divided over the issue, particularly after Plaid Cymru's by-election successin 
Carmarthen (1966), and near successes in Rhondda (1967) and Caerphilly (1968) (see 
below). The dismay felt by some Labour supporters over the record of the Welsh 
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office was typified in an attack by the young academic Labounte Dr. K. O. 
-%Ioraan, 
which was published in Socialist Commentan- - in 1967. Accordin, -, to Nloman the 
Welsh Office was an 'administrative desert' and its record woeful. Time-wasting and 
a general lack of decision making were its main feature. Moreover, despite polic%, 
commitments, there had been no development of an economic plan, no elected 
council, no equality for the Welsh language, no Welsh Water Board, no planning 
board, nothing to capture the imagination and nothing which remotely measured up to 
Labour's own vision of a 'New Wales'. 108 
In fact, George Thomas's arrival at the Welsh Office reflected efforts to subdue the 
rising importance of 'nationalist' issues within the Labour party following Labour's 
poor performances in the mid 1960s by-elections. These performances had kvide 
repercussions for Labour policy and for the long term fortunes of the Labour party in 
north-west Wales. Defeat in the Carmarthen by-election in July 1966 was a heavy 
blow for the Labour party in Wales. Coming months after the party's overwhelming, 
success in the General Election of 1966, Carmarthen had a crushing and demoralising 
impact on sections of the party who believed that steady progress was being made on zn 
the party's Welsh policies in general and devolution in particular. Cannarthen was 
(falsely) portrayed both at the time and in historical accounts as an indication that a 
grand nationalist awakening had occurred in Wales. Yet combined with the results in 
Rhondda and Caerphilly it provided Labour with a far more serious message. First, 
failure to deliver the goods on both local and national social and economic Policies 
rendered the party open to a political challenges, even in its traditional Welsh 
heartlands. Secondly, Labour was now confronted with a new, credible political 
challenge in the form of Plaid Cymru. In the wake of these by-electlons the dangers of 
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under-perfon-ning should have been made clear to the Labour part, y. As Gýý I lym Prys, 
Davies, Labour's candidate in Carmarthen has recalled, campaii ing in the bv- 
election had very little to do with traditional 'nationalist' issues. Moreover, Da-vies 
himself had impeccable nationalist credentials. The by-election could indeed have 
been interpreted as a battle between two different types of Welsh nationalism - one 
which was housed in the Labour party, the other in Plaid Cymru. 109 However, in fact 
local and national issues relating to Labour's incomes and economic policies and the 
seaman's strike dominated the by-election. The contradictions evident in Labour's 
egalitarian policies were a particular problem. Granting pay rises to doctors and not to 
seamen, Davies recalled, was a difficult policy to defend and accounted for the 
disaffection of many traditional Labour supporters. The resignation of Frank Cousins 
was another untimely embarrassment. Local Labour policies such as the closure of 
rural schools, planned by the Labour controlled LEA, were also deeply unpopular. 
' 10 
Similar factors accounted for another poor Labour and good Plaid Cymru 
performance in the Rhondda by-election of 1967. As contemporary political pundits 
pointed out, the Rhondda result was perhaps more significant than the one in 
Carmarthen, coming as it did in a 'safe' Labour seat. As they also argued, a similar 
decline in Labour's vote would be enough to lose Labour eight seats in less-safe 
constituencies. Both Caernarforishire and Merioneth were among the eight. 
"' 
Frustration at the failure of Labour policy initiated a series of hostile attacks on the 
party in the Welsh press. These will be discussed In greater detail in Chapter Five, yet 
the tone of those attacks is worthy of brief note. As an editorial in 
Y Faner 
commented, it was: 
Hard to understand why this govenurient has strayed so far 
from socialist 
ideals or from its promises to the electorate ... there are psychological 
reasons 
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for the peoples loss of faith in the government. Harold '%Vilson is unable to 
present himself as a fair and honest politician ... we in Wales. and Scotland. have even more reason to reject the government. They gave us the NVelsh Office (with lesser powers than Scotland) and a Secretary of State. they 
refused to give us an elected council even though there was a demand for It 
throughout the nation; it refused to give us a '%Vater Board; it refused to -Ti %e us an Assembly like Northern Ireland; it played down the principle of equal 
status for the Welsh language ... we can assume therefore that we will have a 
change of government at least when the election comes. The nationalists will 
make big holes in Labour's shield. ' 12 
The Carmarthen, Rhondda and Caerphilly by-elections were part of a generally poor 
Labour party by-election record in the period between 1966 and 1969. Labour's 
performances in Welsh by-elections were no worse than others in England and 
Scotland during the same period. However, as one political commentator observed, 
changes in Wales and Scotland, where swings towards nationalist parties had also 
been evident, were the most notable political development in the UK in the late 
1960s. 1 13 The differing implications of Labour's performances in Wales and Scotland 
(as compared to England) was not lost on Welsh political commentators. The point 
was astutely made in 1967. The slump in Labour's vote in Rhondda had been virtually 
identical to the slump in another by-election in Nuneaton (35% as opposed to 34'ý'o). 
However, as one commentator argued: 
Most of the old Labour voters in Nuneaton showed their displeasure simply by 
not voting. In Wales, thousands turned to Plaid Cymru. This is what separates 
the Welsh by-election results from the English ones. It is perhaps easier to 
appease the dissenters in Nuneaton with some policies for 'development areas' 
but it will be more difficult to undo the permanent influence which the results 
in Wales have manifested in the nation ... it is obvious 
to many people that 
nationalist sympathy in Wales is much stronger than the Plaid Cymru vote 
over the years has suggested, but that loyalty to the Labour party and 
especially loyalty to the leaders of the Labour party has kept it under the 
surface. 114 
Moreover, apart from the local issues which dominated those by-elections, and 
Labour's failing image at national level, there was still a much more basic element to 
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those poor performances. Importantly, they represented disappointment 'with Labour's 
image as the party of Wales, and at the unfulfilled potential which carried Labour into 
power in 1964 and 1966. As Barn went on to argue, I had everv right to in 1964 
believe that this was her government'. Labour's successes in Wales had an important 
impact on Labour's slim electoral majority. The huge success of 1966 had indicated 
the continuing faith placed in the party. Yet, for many, 1966 had the opposite of the 
desired effect in that 'since Labour has increased its majority ... it no Ionger has to 
appease Welsh members'. This culminated in a series of disappointments. The 'Welsh 
Office served to be a white elephant. Through its creation, 'Labour inadvertentl-v 
raised the hopes of a nation'. The problem was not the Welsh Office, but the fact that 
the 'existing machinery of government' was ill-equipped with the demands placed on 
it. However, this was not helped by Labour failures, including lack of leadership, poor 
vision and weak decision making. 115 None of this was helped by Labour's weakness 
in north-west Wales - weaknesses made worse by declining membership and activity 
rates, as well as limited local organisation. 
Attacks on the personal credibility of Labour MPs in north-west Wales also 
intensified towards the end of the decade. Their failure to address the decline of the 
slate industry and 'failure' to bring in 'new' industries was increasingly blamed on 
them as individuals as well as their party. Moreover, the alleged commitment made by 
local MPs to their own Westminster political careers sometimes served to undermine 
their credibility as dedicated constituency members. Goronwy Roberts' personal 
Popularity and credibility suffered as a result of allegations of personal political 
ambitions. Following his period as Minister of State at the Welsh Office from 1964 to 
1966, Roberts remained a government minister, with penods at the Department of 
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Education and the Foreign Office. However, Ministerial responsibilities led to Roberts 
being seen as something of an absent father, neglecting, serious constitueric", matters 
in search of a political career. One example of the problems faci ing Roberts worthy 
of note. In 1969 he promised Welsh Office attention to the need to attract a new 
factory in Talysarn, to alleviate the problems of the decaying slate districts. The new 
factory in Talysam was intended to complement another new factory which had 
already been opened in neighbouring Penygroes. Howe%-er, before the Talysarn 
project went ahead, the new factory in Penygroes had already closed. When an 
emergency meeting was held to discuss the crisis, Roberts ý, vas absent, sending his t) 
wife, Marion, to the meeting instead. Condemnation of Roberts's absence was 
profound and precipitated a series of letters in the local and Welsh press. As one 
constituent argued: 
Does this sad situation not call for his personal attention" Mr. Roberts was not 
too busy to go to the Investiture in Caernarfon ... but I wonder if he realises 
that there are men in his constituency who are desperate for work because 
industries in this area are closing down? ' 16 
These attacks, and Roberts's absence from his constituency because of Ministerial 
commitments, were a major factor in the decline of his personal popularity and 'were 
believed by some local figures to have been a significant factor in Labour's defeat in 
1974.1 17 
Labour organisation and the collapse of its appeal in north-west Wales 
Despite the fact that measures had been taken to improve the organsation of local 
Labour parties from the early 1960s onwards, there were still evident deficiencies at 
the end of the decade. First, Labour was unanimously unsuccessful in its attempts to 
create Labour 'groups, within local councils. Despite calls in the early 1960s for 
'Labour' councillors to show their true colours at election time, little progess was 
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made on this front. Members of the Caemarfon Labour party who stood as councillor-, 
did so as independents. This was on the grounds that they were councillors for their 
respective villages, not the Labour par-ty. 118 Goronwy Roberts were also aware of the 
fact that in rural Wales, some voters were influenced by personalities, not part-v 
politics (a factor which had aided Roberts's own popularity). NýNlst this factor 
comforted Roberts when Labour under-performed in local elections, it nevertheless 
obscured an important aspect of Labour performance and popularity at a local level. 
By 1965 the Caernarfon Labour party's irritation at the nature of the problem was 
profound. In a letter to Ernrys Jones the CLP argued: 
You are probably aware that there is no great tradition of politics In local 
government in this part of Wales. I feel that now is the time to do this, and it 
would be facilitated if the Labour government and individual ministers began 
to show that they feel that local Labour party organisations were important. 
Patronage is not a good thing, but I believe it is time for the Labour movement 
to get its own people into positions of responsibility in these areas. 119 
Ironically, the Secretary of the CLP, Bert Thomas, was one of those 'Labour' 
councillors who stood as independents. ' 20 Disappointing local election results in 1966 
added to the anxieties felt within the party over this perennial problems. As the WCL 
pointed out in 1966: 
Many seats, particularly in rural areas were not contested by official Labour 
party candidates. It is hoped that constituency Labour parties through local and 
ward parties will contest every possible seat with Labour candidates in the 
future. 121 
There is little evidence to suggest that these attempts were successful. On the 
contrary, it was Labour's main opponent - Plaid cymru - which had greater 
successes, making inroads into the 'independent' tradition during this crucial period 
(see Chapter Four). 
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Despite attempts to modernise local organisations, local parties Aere still dominated 
by 'cliques' at the end of the 1960s. In Caernarfonshire, GoronNA-y Roberts's 'political 
machine' was reportedly a personal one, and by the early 1970s run by an ageing. 
close-knit band of Goronwy Roberts loyalists. 122 There 's little reason to dispute th's 
claim. 
The lengths taken by Merioneth CLP to defend the power and privilege of these select 
factions is worthy of note. In 1959 the party had met with Hugh Gaitskell in a bid to 
extract increased organisational grants. At the time the party argued that: 
The constituency is one of the best organised in north Wales, but it is felt that 
the voluntary work of the undertaken was stretched to breakin-g point - from 
the point of finance and also the pressure of work. 123 
However, when the party promised additional funds for the party to employ a full- 
time organiser, this was rejected. Preservation of the clique appeared to be an 
instrumental factor. A similar situation developed in Caernarforishire. Increasingly, 
constituency meetings occurred on an 'ad hoc' basis. Organisation was largely 
neglected between elections. Attempts to establish new branches and to revive 
branches which were flagging were notably weak in the period up to 1970. 
' 24 
Moreover, Roberts' position as a government minister served to dampen his old 
radical fervour. His election campaigns during the 1960s contained little of the radical 
rhetoric of the 1940s and 1950s, and were instead infused with a defence of 
. 11"Ovemment policies and strategies. For example, Roberts 
became a staunch defender 
of devaluation in 1967, arguing that 'this has been advocated for many years 
by 
People of all parties'. The same edition of a local newspaper which aroped that: r-I 
The devaluation of the pound is an admission of the government's abysmal 
failure to deal with Britain's economic problems over the last three years. 
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Chaos ... has followed meddle and muddle ... vve have had no constructive thought, let alone vision. 125 
By the end of the 1960s Roberts was busy defending Labour's belea 'ider, guered Ic. 
Harold Wilson, calling for 'steadfast loyalty' to Wilson at Caemarfonshire CLP's 
AGM (which was reported in the local press). According to Roberts, Wilson had been 
subjected to 'incessant political abuse' designed to 'shake his nerve' from 'day one'. 
He argued that Wales owed much to Wilson, 'constitutional recog iti gni ion, a 
commission to examine devolution and modem new industry through development 
area regulations'. 126 Such observations said much for his loyalty, but they paid scant 
attention to the predicament facing north-west Wales or the government's troubled 
record over devolution. In fact they seemed politically over-confident if not simplý, 
incorrect. 
Moreover, the party's failure to deliver the goods in north-west Wales in the 1964-70 
period was difficult to disguise, even in the party's own literature. Labour's Record in 
North Wales (1970) provided a classic account of how key policy aims from the early 
1960s had largely failed. As has already been argued, advance factories proved to be 
little more than a 'white elephant'. The problem of attracting firms to these factories 
was clear. As the party argued of one advance factory in Anglesey: 
Although the Amlwch factory has been suggested to 44 firms only 2 firms 
have visited it and there is still no tenant in view. The factory was authorised 
in June 1967 and was completed in May 1969. The small number of visitors to 
the factory reflects Mintech's difficulties in persuading industrialists at present 
to consider more remote locations. 127 
Neither did north-west Wales enjoy a proportionate share of other industries that had 
been attracted to north Wales. As the party's literature demonstrated, the majority 
O"t of 36) new factories, projects and extensions had actually arrived in north-east 
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Wales, not the north-west. Moreover, 'improvements' to communications in north 
Wales were generally disappointing, but particularly so for the north-west. There vvere 
few visible signs of what had been achieved in the Caemarfonshire and Merioneth 
constituency areas. In actual fact, none of the trunk road improvement programmes 
undertaken by Labour from 1965 onwards touched on roads in either constituencv. 
The schemes that did were still in the pipeline in 1970 when Labour was removed 
from power. On classified and principal roads, the party could only 'boast' of a 0.63 
mile improvement in Caernarfonshire - but nothing for Merioneth. Little mention was 
made by 1970 of the plight of local railways. 128 
Despite Labour's efforts at addressing long-standing Welsh concerns, its increased 
commitment to devolution and to Welsh linguistic and cultural concerns, the 
popularity of the party in north-west Wales had waned towards the end of the decade. 
The limitations of Labour policy and criticism aimed at the party in north-west Wales 
resulted in a dramatic reversal of the party's fortunes in the General Election of 1970. 
Table 3: 1970 General Election results, Caernarfonshire and Merioneth 
Party Caemarfonshire Merioneth 
LABOUR 13,627 (40.0) 8,861 (39.8) 
PLAID CYMRU 11,331 (33.4) 5,425 (24.3) 
LIBERAL 2,195(6.5) 5,034 (221.6) 
CONSERVATIVE 
MAJORITY 
6,812 (20.1) 
2,296(6.6) 
2,965 (13.3) 
3,436 (15.5) 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
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As Table 3 demonstrates, Labour's majority in Caernarfonshire 'ýý'as dramatically 
reduced. The party's vote dropped by 4,000 (even gn, -en a larger electorate). Its share 
of the vote dropped from 56% in 1966 to 40%. Most of Labour's lost votes were 
undoubtedly lost to Plaid Cymru, whose share of the vote rose by 11.70, o to 3-3-40o. 
There was also a renaissance in Liberal fortunes, which also affected Labour's 
majority. The Liberal party fielded a candidate in Caernarfonshire for the first time 
since 1959. Whilst modest, the party's -accumulation of just over two thousand votes 
was significant. By 1970 Caemarfonshire was no longer a 'safe' Labour seat. 
The picture in Merioneth was somewhat more confusing. Labour's majority in 
Merioneth actually increased from 8.7% in 1966 to 15.5%. However, its actual vote 
declined by some eight hundred, whilst its share of the vote declined by 4.4% to just 
40% in 1966. The most significant changes in Menoneth occurred within the fortunes 
of Labour's opponents. Again, the rise of Plaid Cymru was a significant factor. As 
with the position in Caernarforishire, Plaid's vote rose by 12.9% from 11.4% in 1966 
to 24.3%. However, whilst the fortunes of the Liberal party in Caemarfonshire had 
improved (in line with national trends) the Liberal vote in Merioneth went in the 
opposite direction. The share of the party's vote declined by exactly the same 
percentage as Plaid's rise - 12.9%. Therefore, whilst the decline of the Labour party 
in Merioneth was not as apparent as in Caemarfonshire there were nevertheless 
worrying signs for the party. Not only had Labour's actual support and the party's 
share of the vote declined, but the election had also witnessed a substantial 
redistribution in the balance of political power within the county. 
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As results in both constituencies demonstrated, the period from 1966-70 -ý, vitnessed 
growing problems for Labour. The UK party's policies in government th%varted 
heightened expectations. The emergence of a credible political alternative to Labour 
ited. The in the form of Plaid Cymru meant that these weaknesses could now be explol 
development of this challenge will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Four 
The Emergence of a Political Alternative: The Development 
of Plaid Cymru's Organisation and Policies, 1964-70. 
In a word, there is every cause for optimism. It would be foolish to saý that losing eighteen 
contests was in some contrived form a victory. The situation is difficult. But there is every cause 
for realistic optimism. There is a future for Plaid Cymru. 
YDdraig Goch, 1966 General Election post-mortem 
This chapter focuses on the development of Plaid Cymru as a political force during 
the 1960s. It will be argued that like the Labour party, Plaid Cymru underwent a 
significant process of modernisation from the early 1960s onwards. This programme 
of modernisation focussed on two areas where Plaid had traditional Iv been ýveak - 
organisation and policy. The chapter will argue that whilst Plaid's electoral 
breakthrough in Carmarthen in 1966 was significant in helping to establish the 
electoral credibility of the party, the impact of this success has often been overstated 
in nationalist mythology and has served to obscure more profound and important 
changes that were taking place within the party both before and after that success. 
This chapter focuses on the way that Plaid became a more credible alternative to 
Labour, subsequent chapters at the way in which this manifested in an anti-Labour 
assault across Wales and specifically in north-west Wales. 
Despite the impact of Carmarthen in 1966, there were still many obstacles which 
could stifle Plaid's development as a serious rival to the Labour party in Welsh 
speaking constituencies. As election results after 1945 had demonstrated, the appeal :M 
of a moderate nationalism based on cultural and linguistic ideals and practical 
economic policies had been hampered by Plaid's narrow views and virtually 
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nonexistent policies on the latter. Labour. not Plaid Cymru, combined a form of 
Welshness with modernising, Welsh, economic policies. 
There were other problems. First, Plaid was handicapped by ineffective oroanisation. 
It lacked the financial strength of the big political par-ties and the personnel to 
spearhead local campaigns. Plaid's best electoral performances always came in 
elections, when the party could rally its limited forces from across Wales in one-off 
battles. In general elections, when these forces were scattered, Plaid found 
campaigning more problematic. Second, whilst the activities of the 'Welsh Langua,, e 
Society and the Free Wales Army may have gained approval from a pseudo- 
intellectual Welsh speaking elite, they were not consistent with a traditional 'radical' 
Welsh culture. The perceived association of the party with a fanatical fringe xhich 
had little respect for law and order was an electoral handicap. 
However, as the chapter will show, there was a positive Plaid response to these and 
other challenges. Firstly, whilst Plaid could not match the Labour party financially, it 
was capable of countering this problem through the modernisation of local 
organisation. Modernisation concentrated on attempts to place the party at the heart of 
local communities. These included demolishing the 'independent' tradition of local 
council politics by ensuring that 'Plaid' councillors stood under the party's colours, 
This was an area where Labour had traditionally enjoyed little success. 
Secondly, the party also began to shake off its image as the party of the intellectual, 
Welsh speaking elite. It abandoned the ideological purity of the founding 
fathers. I 
Instead, the party began to portray itself as a young, dynamic, organisation pursuing 
226 
modem and relevant political alms and ambitions. From within this neýý. youthful 
'set' emerged a dedicated group of individuals committed to initiating an ambitious 
review of the party's economic policies, alongside the construction of a viable and 
credible programme. As a result of these changes, Plaid's image as a middle class, 
fringe party, devoid of coherent policies, was partially eroded. In Its place the party 
was increasingly attentive to both local and national problems and be, 2an to develop 
its position as a credible political alternative to the Labour party in north-west Wales. 
Whilst the Labour party continued to gain comfortable electoral victones at both 
Welsh and local levels in the General Elections of 1964 and 1966, the same elections 
brought more disappointment for Plaid Cymru. Despite the image changes that had 
accompanied Gwynfor Evans's period as president after 1945 the party continued to 
perform woefully. As Table 1 shows, even in Welsh speaking heartlands the party did 
not come close to challenging Labour's superiority; 
Table 1: General Election results, 1964 and 1966: Caernarfonshire and 
Merioneth, 
Party Caernarfonshire Merioneth 
1964 1966 1964 1966 
17,777 17,650 8,420 9,628 
LABOUR (54.4) (56.1) (38.4) (44.2) 
6,998 6,834 3,697 2,490 
PLAID CYMRU (21.4) (21.7) (16.8) (11.4) 
No No 7,171 7,733 
LIBERAL candidate candidate (32.7) (35.5) 
7,915 6,972 2,656 1,948 
CONSERVATIVE (24.2) (22.2) (12.1) (8.9) 
Source: B. Jones, Etholiadau'r Ganriffelsh Elections, 1885-1997 (1999). 
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Building a local base 
General election results showed little signs of the grand nationalist awakening which 
events such as Tryweryn were meant to have precipitated. Instead, the early 1960s 
were a difficult period for the party. A. Butt Phillip describes the early sixties as a 
2 
Cy I in period of 'drift and fragmentation'. The creation of the Welsh Language Soc'et1v ' 
1962 demonstrated the extent to which 'old' and 'new' factions within the party 
clashed over the party's role and purpose - particularly on the question of the Welsh 
language. The emergence of other marginal nationalist groups such as the FrCc '\Vales 
Army (however limited in terms of actual membership) nonetheless created an 
unfavourable 'nationalist' image which Plaid was forced to deal with. Yet the notion 
of 'drift and fragmentation' should not be over-stated. As influential party activists 
from the 1960s such as Phil Williams have argued, the Carmarthen by-election 
victory of 1966 was the result of positive changes that had already taken place - not 
the catalyst for the start of those changes. Williams sees the early 1960s in a much 
more positive light, arguing that insufficient attention has been paid to the 1959-66 
period when Plaid 'gathered its strength' and was in the process of becoming a force 
in Welsh politics. 3 Unlike the 1950s when Plaid had been satisfied with its role as a 
potent political pressure group, elements within the party had become dissatisfied 
with the party's inept electoral performances in both local and general elections. 
There were attempts to rectify this situation. Emrys Roberts' arrival as the party's 
secretary was just one of a series of changes which precipitated the party's 
Modemisation. Others included the growth of the party in south Wales in the late 
1n 1950s and the entrance of a 'new wave' of English speaking patriots into the party 
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fold. As a result, from the early 1960s owwards, Plaid CNmru became - more of a 
denomination than a sect'. 4 
in the early 1960s the party began a process of maturation -a period wlien the partv 
renewed both its electoral strategy and organ'sation In a bid to become a 'proper' 
political organisation. In the 1950s Plaid had been an 'umbrella group' containilig 
many ideologically diverse strands of Welsh nationalist sý, Tnpathies under one co,. -er .5 
The changes from the early 1960s onwards had been precipitated by the partý, s 
decision to fight more seats in the 1959 election. Electoral incursions into English 
speaking, Labour territories in south Wales were particularly influential in engagi _. . ging a 
new generation of articulate English speaking activists, who might otherwise have 
been lured into Labour politics. 6 Many of these new members were to become 
influential members of the party's executive. Three distinct wings of the party 
emerged by the early 1960s; those who wanted Plaid to remain as a language pressure zn 
group, who felt that too much time was being wasted on elections whilst the language 
died; new members from the south who believed that too much attention was paid to 
the language issue; and those who wanted Plaid to get involved in direct action 
campaigns. If the 1960s were a turning point for Plaid Cymru this was largely the 
result of the victory of the middle group over the other two. The language issue 
became less problematic for Plaid following the formation of the Welsh Language 
Society in 1962 (see below). Direct action campaigns were not considered a N-lable 
option. In 1961 when a motion calling for 'direct action to meet acts of aggression' 
ýN-as put before the party's summer school it was heavily defeated. 
7 The emergence of 
English speaking activists from Labour backgrounds was believed to be particularly 
influential in modemising the party. They, unlike the idealists of the 1940s and 1950s, 
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had been immersed in the belief that 'Politics ", as about power'. This ", as a crucial 
ingredient of the change of attitude and emphasis within the party during the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
Attempts to modernise the structure of the party, to make it more responsi-ve and 
accountable to its supporters had therefore begun before the party's disappointing 
showing in the 1964 General Election (although the party's performance in both that 
election and the 1963 Swansea by-election re-enforced the need and urgency for those 
changes to take place). The Swansea by-election was a significant factor in forcinIg the 
pace of change. Despite the pooling of resources (both financial and physical) from 
across Wales, a well known and popular Plaid candidate had only received 1,600 
votes. Whilst some satisfaction could be taken from the fact that intervention had 
forced rival parties to address local issues during campaigning, the by-election 
highlighted serious organisational deficiencies. For some within the party the by- 
election showed that Plaid was neither one thing -a potent political pressure group or 
the other -a credible political party. The latter, especially, was impeded by 
organisation factors. As the Welsh Nation noted: 
Despite the considerable growth in Plaid Cymru activities, penetrating areas 
where the party's message had not previously been heard on the doorsteps and 
street-comers, and influencing in the most uni-nistakable manner, the thinking 
and proclaimed policies of parties far from Welsh in spirit, yet the solid 
achievements and obvious advances that betoken widespread public 
acceptance are still to seek. Wherever Plaid Cymru made its mark during the 
last twelve months, it was emphatically not in the electoral field, where some 
hard won bridgeheads were lost, no advance was recorded, and where previous 
promise turned to dead-sea fruit ... Many 
in Plaid Cymru have stubbomly 
refused to face the problem of practical political organisation or serious 
political thinking. Byzantine dialects and the taking of perfectionist positions 
must give way to the less spectacular duties that press in on the months 
immediately preceding a general election. 
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The seemingly aimless drift of the party was an area xhich required major attention. 
As Emrys Roberts, in a shrewd and sober assessment of the party's performance in 
1964 argued: 
In the past we have tended to think that all we had to do was put up candidates 
every five years, and each time they would get a few thousand more votes 
until the great day dawned. We've been shaken out of this complacency. ýVe 
shall not succeed until we have earned success; we realise that extra hard work during an election campaign is no substitute for constituency hard work, -year in, year out. 8 
For Roberts, one of Plaid's fundamental electoral handicaps was the conservat"'e, 
parochial and old-fashioned image of the party. One of the main obstacles in Plaid's 
development as a credible political force was the 'image we have of a party always 
fighting a rearguard action to preserve a decaying past, almost irrespective of the 
value of what we are defending'. Instead, a more confident, modem approach was 
required. As Roberts continued: 
Instead of always being on the defensive, we must move on to the attack. 
Instead of trying to rebuild a nineteenth century Wales, we must build a 
twenty-first century country with all our traditional values but also with all the 
exciting new materials and patterns that this will involve. 
Roberts' imagery did not go down well with traditionalist factions of the party. Some 
believed Plaid was being drawn in to the commercial and cosmetic game of politics - 
not only reducing the party to the levels of 'English' parties, but distracting Plaid 
from its 'spiritual' mission. Of concern to these traditionalists was the fact that Plaid, 
in an effort to conform to a more popular Image, had watered down its nationalist' 
credentials. As one critic, H. W. J. Edwards, argued: 
"The image" is a journalistic effigy of probably Yankee provenance. It seems 
to be of quite recent invention and may be traced to the publicity hounds and 
the advertisement dogs ... do we, that 
is, decline a little in uttering the word 
'nationalism'? Has nationalism, perhaps, become a dirty word because some 
Pious prigs in the Labour Unionist Party tell us we ought to be more 
humanitarian and internationalist? ... I am so averse 
from the use of the word 
'image' in this context that for years I have been trying to persuade people to 
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be nationalists because nationalism is right rather than because it i., something, 
that attracts them. 9 
However, for modernists within the party, these beliefs had been the cause of ffie 
party's electoral failures. At an ideological level the cnticism reflected concerns over 
the future of long standing Plaid policies - especially the ultimate question of whether 
the party should water down its traditional objective of dominion status or 
independence for Wales (see below). However, Roberts chose to avoid this issue, 
arguing that only through thorough planning and organisation could modernisation of 
the party be achieved. Financially, the party could not continue 'drifting from one 
crisis to another'. Branch, district officials and election a,,, ents would all have to be 0 
trained to ensure maximum efficiency. Moreover, every member's 'capacity' would 
be utilised to the full. 10 The party's propaganda would also receive attention: 
Our propaganda must be more up-to-date and professional in its presentation - 
none of this cramming everything into a small dull space in the best nineteenth 
century style; more attention to design and layout - to eye appeal. And all this 
must be backed up with proper research in forward looking policy and with 
properly directed field work. 
The need to generate activity betweens elections was paramount. Topping a list of 
priorities was the need to promote the communitarian appeal of the party. This 
involved a determined and ambitious attempt to establish the party at the forefront of 
local politics, from community to county councils. Modemisation involved some 
shrewd political manoeuvring. Despite the fact that Plaid had been unable to challenge 
Labour in parliamentary elections in north-west Wales, it was capable of exploiting a 
void in local electoral politics. As has already been argued, the independent 
orientation of local councils in north Wales had been a feature of local politics 
throughout the twentieth century. Plaid's attempts to break this mould 
followed 
232 
similar, unsuccessful attempts by other political parties (notably Labour) for most of 
that period. 
The need to address local concerns echoed the ideas expressed by local Labour parties 
since the 1930s. The desire to break the independence of local councils emanated 
from the belief that this long-standing tradition delayed and disrupted decision 
making processes and prevented Labour from demonstrating its capacity and 
commitment. Like Labour, Plaid believed that independence led to inefficiency. 
Getting things done would involve forming partisan groups on local councils. Plaid, 
like Labour, had also been frustrated by local attempts to ensure that the party's voice 
was heard on local councils. In the early 1960s the party was dismissive of this 'small 
scale effort', which fell well short of the 'great effort that was needed' at local level. 
1 
Elfed Roberts believed that Welsh problems could only be solved (for the time being) 
through local government. For example, in areas like Menoneth, where native Welsh 
speakers were being anglicised in local primary and secondary schools, the absence of 
a Plaid group on the county council had not helped matters. Although fourteen 
'independent' members of the local council had strong nationalist sympathies, they 
did not act as a gToup. 12 By the end of the decade the importance of communitanan 
politics permeated Plaid policy. As the party was to argue: 
Local government represents a measure of self-government 
for Wales and Nxe 
have to capitalise upon this for both the sake of the communIty and as one of 
the means of winning Welsh freedom. 
' 3 
Re-drawing the map of local governance could therefore open a new chapter In 
the 
history of Welsh politics (see below). 
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Building up the party's local council base was also important to the party'ý, 
organisation and ultimately to its political future. Plaid bell ie d that Labour's strcn,, --th 
in the south reflected the fact that the party ý, ýýas immersed IIII in the social and political 
life of valley communities. In the south, it argued, local Labour figures %N-ere "ell 
known leaders of their communities. Labour's success emanated from its implantation 
in local politics I - not because of Westminster Polit-CS. 
14 
Moreover, unlike the Labour, 
Liberal and Conservative parties, (who were able to try out various electioneering 
methods at UK level) Plaid only had Welsh elections. It vk'as thus vital that the party 
contested as many of these elections as possible. This \, ý'ould provi 11 ing ide essential train' 4, 
in organisation, and an opportunity to gather feedback on popular reactions to party 
policy. 
Plaid believed that local politics would help the party build efficient local branches 
and district committees. Effective work and accountability at community level would 
serve to build up confidence in the party's ability and the opportunity to prove the 
viability of the fundamental changes taking place in the party's ideology and ethos. 
Local politics would also provide the training ground for party members, spokesmen 
and potential MPs. Leading party figures would (eventually) emerge from this 
background, steeped in a knowledge and understanding of local issues, concerns and 
political attitudes. This was a significant area of Plaid's development in the 1960s and 
one of the comerstones of the party's later electoral successes. 15 Plaid councillors 
would play a prominent role in local branch activities, acting as branch secretaries or 
chairmen and promoting themselves as effective local community leaders. However, Z:, 
these efforts would be wasted if maximum publicity Nvas not extracted. As a result, 
I ith councillors would be encouraged to develop responsible, pro-active relationships w 
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the local press - who in turn would help the party sell the new compassionate, 
committed, image. 16 This in Itself addressed a traditional party concern - the fict that 
the Welsh press had too little interest in Welsh social and economic problems. 
Moreover, the importance of establishing a local government foothold was essential to 
the financial viability and ultimately the future of the party. Electoral failure meant 
financial crisis. Finance thus became a major party pre-occupation and an important 
facet of the need to modernise the party. 
The party appreciated that these efforts would be met with resistance in some 
quarters. These plans were more likely to be , velcomed in the south (ývliere partisan 
local politics dominated) than in the north, where old habits would be hard to break. 
Up until the 1960s, the party's propaganda had obscured the real state of the party at 
local level. In an effort to exude a buoyant image of the party, membership figures 
had been 'hopelessly optimistic'. Many of Plaid's branches existed 'on paper only'. 
During the 1960s the party became strong enough to face realities. 17 
The party tried the stick and the carrot. Inducements for local parties to conform to 
modemisation centred around a tightening up of branch 'privileges'. Under new 
arrangements introduced in 1966, Plaid branches would not be recognised or given 
branch rights in district committees or annual conferences unless they satisfied more 
stringent conditions regarding local government elections, meetings, finance and 
membership. This combination of carrot and stick was not without Its spectacular 
sometimes dubious) successes. Some Plaid branches undoubtedly exa,,, erated 
membership figures in order to satisfy the new demands. The Merioneth constituency 
Party provides a classic example. fn October 1966 membership stood at forty. By 
Jul-v 
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1967 it had increased to a thousand. However. in propaganda terms isi n- in- 
membership, exaggerated or not, raised morale within the party. 
Even before Carmarthen, positive changes had also. occurred within the party's 
campaigning efforts, although the rewards for these efforts had not been forthcoming 
in the 1966 general election. Despite stagnant election results in 1966, there v, -as a 
determination within the party that it should not renege on the commitment to 
modernisation. Some feared that factions would once again appear. calling for either a 
return to traditionalism or for the party to engage in more vigorous displays of 
nationalist protest. These alternatives were neither acceptable or feasible. As one party 
spokesman argued: 
The next phase in the campaign is clear. It does not lie in abdicatin, from 
politics either by becoming a non-election fighting do-good society, a sort of 
political Cyrnrodorion; or by resorting to the imbecility of blowing up 
installations with all its dangers to life. 18 
Moreover, there had been some forward momentum. The determination to embed the 
party at the bosom of local communities was reflected in the party's tactics for that 
election. There was a profound shift of emphasis, which broke away from local 
electioneering traditions. The 'cnoc ar y drws' ('knock on the door') dominated 
Plaid's campaigning for the election. This was similar to the successful 'operation 
knocker' carried out by the Merioneth Labour party in the late 1950s. 
19 Largely 
abandoning the traditional election meetings in damp village halls, Plaid instead 
launched an energetic campaign of home-visits. Local branches were encouraged to 
vary the ages and gender of canvassing teams, to encourage new, enthusiastic, 
members to take a prominent role in campaigning and to listen to the concerns of 
local 
voters. It strongly opposed the practice of leaflet droppingg - believing that this created 
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as much antipathy as sympathy for the cause. The success of these campaigns -, N, a-, 
noticeable. As one advocate argued, this new approach: 
Ensured that we held our ground in twent, ý' constituencies, won more new 
members than ever before in such a short space of time, raised more money 
but more than that to show that Plaid Cymru ý, ý-as serious enough about its 
politics to go out with its message. to answer question, face its opporients. -, ct the neutrals thinking and to convince those who already sympathise with Plaid 
aims to take that crucial extra step. 20 
These efforts were considered a major factor in the Carmarthen victory a few months 
later .21 However, as 
has already been argued, Plaid was adamant that these efforts 
should not be suspended once elections had passed. Efforts made in the party in the 
aftermath of the 1966 were indicative of the way in which organisational efforts 
combined with efforts to modernise party policies. Local constituencies were 
encouraged to select candidates well in advance of actual elections. Candidates would 
then be encouraged to canvass 'samples' from each constituency, concentrating not on 
'typical' areas of Plaid Cyrnru support but also 'suburbia, council estates, industrial 
22 
villages, market towns and seaside towns' . 
By the late 1960s the new wave of party activists who had entered the party in the 
early 1960s had began to make their mark in constituency activities and politics. 
Often, these candidates were very different to those who had represented the party in 
past - they entered parliamentary elections with the intention of winning. 
Too often 
in the period up to 1966 the party had been represented by candidates who stood to 
make a political point. They had no intention of winning. One candidate 
had even 
23 stepped down when he realised that winning was feasible. 
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An emerging generation of leaders 
The new generation of Plaid candidates were aware of these problems. New face, in 
the party included Dafydd Wigley, Phil Williams and later Daf-vdd Elis Thomas. 
'Political to their fingertips' they represented a new desire for power and succCSS. '-I 
They were also aware of the importance of personality in the local party's popularity, 
especially in north-west Wales. Dafydd Wigley provides a classic example of how 
this new generation of Plaid candidates were acutely aware of the political game. 
Having been touted as Plaid's prospective candidate in Merioneth in 1967, Wigfley 
had been eager to discover whether his selection recel,,, ed the democratic appro-val of 
the local party. He would not be seen as an 'outsider'. Despite the fact that he 
emanated from Caemarfonshire, Wigley had been educated at Manchester University 
and then worked in London as an industrial accountant - traditionally the kind of 
candidate who had been out of touch with the values of 'g-, verin'. Icnew that 
his knowledge of Merioneth was limited. He was particularly concerned that his 
knowledge of agricultural problems was not up to scratch. Moreover, because of his 
career, he was unable to live in the county - another factor which may have been an 
electoral handicap. 25 
These concerns were quashed. Wigley was informed that his selection had been 
democratic. Largely through the salesmanship of Emrys Roberts, Wigley had rece, ved 
seventeen out of eighteen selection committee votes. Local party workers and activists 
were to work closely with the candidate, introducing him to influential local 
figures 
and educating him in the nature and scale of local problems. Living outside the count-N 
would not be a problem. 26 A press release announcing Wigley's selection 
hammered I =ý II 
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home not only his connections -with the county but also hi ions ý, vith Welsh is connecti 
culture: 
Mr. Wigley is not a newcomer to Merioneth, since he lived at Dol-gellau foi- 
two years in his youth. His wife, Eleanor Bennett, the well kno,. N, n harpist. also 
comes from the county, and her parents, Mr and %Irs Emrvs Bennett Owen, 
reside at Dolgellau. It was in Llanu'vvchlyn that %1r and \Irs ý%ere 
married last year ... 
he was for two years leader of the London -\elw,, d of Urdd 27 Gobaith Cymru. 
Even those in the local Labour party who despised Plaid Cymru admired Wigley for Iý 
his deten-nined effort at embedding the party in Menoneth, particularly in 'Labour' 
towns like Blaenau Ffestiniog. 28 Wigley became the I-, -nchpin not onlIv of the 
development of party policy but also in the expansion of organisation in the county in t) I 
the late 1960s. Among these developments was the publication of 'Triban Metrion' - 
a party newspaper distributed free every other month from 1968. The development of 
a local policy group also produced distinctly local versions of party policy. - 
Local election results in 1967 justified the faith placed in Plaid's modemisation 
strategies. The party had fought more local elections and had been more positive. As a 
result, across Wales the pairty boasted a total of four hundred county, town and 
borough councillors following the local goverru-nent elections. 'Most' of these 
councillors had stood as official Plaid candidates. Those who had not had done so 
were in areas where there was an established 'independent tradition'. 
30 Plaid kvas also 
happy with the fact that most of these councillors were younger than councillors of 
other parties - thus re-enforcing the young Image which the party sought to conve'ý . 
31 
In reality the progress made at local level was minimal. However, breakthroughs in 
Labour dominated councils were still satisfying and made good propaganda. 'Most of 
these successes occurred in the south, although there were notable victories in the 
north, particularly in Blaenau Ffestiniog, where three councillors Nvere elected. There 
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were also successes also in other unlikely places, including RhvI and Wrexham.. '- 
'Disappointing' results followed in the May 1968 local elections, ýýhen from a total of 
sixty five 'official' candidates only six were elected. None of these successes ý, vere in 
north-west Wales. But as the party argued, in terms of the part-,, -'s modernisation, 
these were still 'early days'. 33 In general, however, the battles with the independents 
had not been successful. These problems would not be resolved until the 1970s (see 
Chapter Six). 
Membership campaigns and fund raising activities re-enforced Plaid's plans for 
community integration. The array of activities organised by local branches was 
overwhelming. Plaid activities often provided local communities with much needed 
(and indeed their only) sources of entertainment -a factor which helped to warm 
sceptics and counteract the image of Plaid supporters as 'extremists, fanatics, 
hotheads, dreamers, exhibitionists' and 'intolerant people with chips on their 
shoulders'. 34 There was the expected organisation of traditional Welsh cultural 
activities - folk dancing and concerts being the most notable - 
but there was another 
new, modem, dimension and one that appealed to those tumed-off by the 'old 
fashioned' face of Welsh cultural 'nationalism'. The party went out of its way to 
appeal for new ideas and initiatives which would increase its popularity. 
35 Quiz nights 
and fashion shows provided two popular examples of this 'new wave' of party 
activity, whilst growing and increasingly active local women's sections. 
These 
successfully set up local market stalls which again promoted Plaid within small 
local 
communities and demonstrated its eagerness to attract female activists. 
The diverse 
range of social and cultural activities were not only important 
from a financial 
viewpoint, but potentially enabled the party to embed itself across 
local generational 
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and class boundaries. Membership campaigns. local activities. and growing 
dissatisfaction with Labour policy ensured that Plaid had broken through even in the 
most unpromising local towns like Blaenau Ffestinlog by 1967. As Y Ddraig Goch 
was proud to announce: 
At last it seems that the party is breaking through in Blaenau Ffe-stiniog, 
Labour's major bastion in Merioneth. The branch meets regularly e-v-er,, - 
month ... the job of canvassing and finding new members is going ahead happily. A youth branch has been established and the branch has alreadY 
organised a folk dancing evening that was very successful. 
The incursion into Labour strongholds was not confined to 'Merioneth. In 
Caernarfonshire a branch was reformed in Llanberis in 1967. Other traditional Labour 
areas such as Pontllyfni, Dyffryn Nantlle and Llanrug all reported buoyant branches 
by the late 1960s. In Porthmadog a local newsletter was distributed - an idea which 
was later adopted by several other branches in north-west NVales. 36 
However, the growth of the party after 1966 put a strain on the party's fragile 
finances. Party literature highlighted the fact that finances had to grow in line with 
membership. Sustaining a growing party involved larger financial responsibilities. In 
order for the party to grow even further it needed funds to employ full-time party 
workers. Organisation (both central and local), publicity, finance and administration 
(in particular typists) were all needed. In 1966 the party's fundraising activities had 
generated a total income of just f 25,000. This was insufficient to fund the ambitious 
infrastructure which the party had in mind. As the party was aware, it could not 
continue to evolve as a modem political force in the long-term whilst relying on the 
impassioned and commItted support of under-paid members of staff. 
37 Still, 
commitment to the cause was undoubtedly a major party strength. As the fVelýh 
Nation argued in the aftermath of the 1966 election: t-5 
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There is no exaggeration, those who -, vork for Plaid Cymru have no illu i ions 
as to the immediate outcome; they can expect no honours. no titles or 
invitations to fashionable official functions for themselves and tlicir wiN es: no trips abroad on public funds; or fat Parliamentary salaries. no hope of 64plums"; in fact quite the reverse. Plaid Cymru workers can only expect 64sweat and tears" in the service of their fellow countrymen. 38 
Moreover, Plaid's improved by-election performances also demonstrated the 
importance of financial strength to the party. Rhondda provided a classic example of 
the power of money in electioneering. In the 1966 general election the party had spent 
a total of f 70 on its Rhondda campaign - and performed miserably. However, in 1967 
the party spent f 600 - and performed respectably. Of course, the expenditure does not 
explain the performance, but a more professional approach to organisation gave the 
party an edge and self-confidence. The party was not afraid to learn from the 
established tactics and electioneering skills of its political opponents, even if the 
'lessons' the party extrapolated were a little naive. For example, Plaid believed that 
Labour won the Rhondda by-election in 1967 between 7 and 9pm on polling day, its I 
superior organisational skills in every ward meaning that last-minute supporters were 
rounded up and transported to the poll. By contrast, Plaid bemoaned the fact that lack 
of party personnel, transport and organisation in general had let the party down. Some 
three hundred party members from across Wales had aided the Rhondda campaign, 
but even with a small army of party workers, Plaid argued that campaigning was 
ineffective because misdirected. Rhondda provided an example of this. As the party 
admitted, the campaign had got off to a bad start. The first meeting had attracted a 
grand audience of one. This was attributed to the fact that meetings were advertised 
by loudspeaker only, and not backed up with leaflets and posters. When this problem 
was addressed, attendance at Plaid's meetings boomed. 
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Plaid also recognised that systematic 'core' organisation 'vý'as necessary for the party 
to perform well in the 'normal' conditions of General Elections. It could not rely on 
the kind of support it had received in Carmarthen and Rhondda wheii t1here was a 
contest everywhere, and when voters were less likely to protest at their 'normal' 
party's performance. It was therefore important for individual constituencies to 
19 improve organisation, becoming more self-sufficient and independent. ' In other 
areas, however, the lessons were being learned a little quicker. The level of planning 
going into the organisation of public meetings suggested that the party ýk'as getting to 
grips with the political game. For example, in preparation for a public meeting in 
Caernarfon in 1966, organisers and party members were given strict guidelines to 
6stage-manage' the event. Organisers were warned that the hall must be full; that the 
atmosphere at the meeting had to be enthusiastic and up-beat and that questions from 
40 the floor had to be 'responsible' and 'relevant' . 
Plaid's willingness to learn from its opponents also carried over to its policies for the 
development of youth sections. Ironically, whilst Labour was concerned at the 
attractiveness of Welsh nationalism to sections of Welsh youth, Plaid was attempting 
to understand how to develop its youth sections by following Labour's model. The 
need to develop youth sections became a high priority after the 1966 General 1: 1 
Election. As Y Ddraig Goch's youth editor admitted, the election had given the party 
little cause for celebration, apart from respectable performances in Caernarfon and 
Carmarthen. However, building up viable youth sections came to be seen as an 
integral component of the party's modernisation, an attempt to set the foundations on 
which future party growth could be based. Moreover, attention to youth 
became even 
more crucial as the voting age was lowered to eighteen in time for the 
1970 election, 
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especially as this created a new voting class which Plaid believed it could monopolise 
in some parts of Wales. 
The party was dismayed by the fact that even in potential electoral taract 
constituencies like Caemarfonshire, no youth branches existed in 1966. The 
geography of the county, the fact that many locals Nvent a-way- to college and,, or left I- 
home for jobs outside Wales, was part of the explanation. 41 On the other hand it ", as 
also aware of the fact that its political rivals, notably Labour, had active -youth 
branches within the county. It pointed to the fact that Labour was much better at 
publicising youth activities, and used its youth sections positively in propaganda. I 
Goronwy Roberts provided a fine example of shrewd political gamesmansliip at work. 
Roberts was among those who had attributed his convincing electoral success in 1966 
to support received ftom young voters. As Plaid argued: 
It is very doubtful that this was true when one looked into the matter ... but 
perhaps Plaid's leaders should try this sometimes ... I am not saying that Plaid 
should soft-soap youth members, but it could give an emphasis that appeals to 
youth, something that shows that it is a party of the future, a young party, a 
party of new ideas. 42 
Plaid was aware of the fact that its efforts in the past to sustain youth membership had 
backfired. Too often, youth members served as little more than glonfied pamphlet 
sellers, who were rarely involved in 'serious' party activities or decision making 
processes. Efforts were made to address this problem. South Wales branches led the 
way in organising 'Saturday Schools' in the winter of 1965. These formed the model 
for more ambitious 'all Wales' Schools from 1966 onwards. whilst these schools 
acted as a force for positive change, the negative impact had also to be considered. 
The clashes between modest and more vigorous forms of Welsh nationalism, as well 
as the difference in ideological emphasis between members from the north and the 
244 
south, had to be addressed. For example, organisers were reminded that the purpose 
of the Schools was to educate youth members in party principles. It ", as imperatiVe 
that meetings did not degenerate into 'flaming rows'. As v Ddraiga Goch -stressed, 
there was always an onus on Plaid's youth to 'disagree courteously and 
respectfully' . 
43 There was a senous point to the messa---e. Sections within the partý 
were very aware of the way in which various 'nationalist' organisations ývere 'tarred 
with same brush' by the general public. It was therefore important for Plaid's 
'Saturday Schools' to act as a forum for serious political discussion, to demonstrate 
that Plaid's young members were responsible democrats and thus to distance the party 
44 ftom the more unsavoury forms of youth activism and protest . 
The emergence of 'student' activism in demonstrations and protests and the 
renaissance of nationalist agitation in the mid 1960s was often difficult for Plaid to 
handle. Despite deep-rooted, traditional, sympathy for 'nationalist' causes and 
concerns in Welsh speaking Wales, the emergence of 'non-violent' direct action 
protests, particularly when involving the setting off of explosive devices, were 
publicly unacceptable. The electoral implication of such 'nationalist' actP"Ism for 
Plaid Cymru was profound. Throughout the 1960s (despite sympathy within some 
sections of the party) Plaid sought to distance itself from these forms of protest - and 
particularly from 'lunatic fringe' movements such as the Free Wales Army. 4; fn 1967 
the party's executive committee presented a motion at the party's annual conference 
instructing 'branches, sections and committees' to 'expel anyone who is connected in 
any way to the organisation or activities of the FWA or Patriotic Front' as these 
organisations were 'harmful to the best interests of Wales and the growth of the 
party'. 46 
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The association of the party with the activities of the 'Welsh Language Society was 
more complex. In many ways it was a double-edged sword. This %%as a particularlY 
delicate area for the party after 1962 and one which the party was forced to handle 
with care. As Phil Williams has highlighted, a great deal of mythology surrounds the 
'birth' of the WLS: 
Several writers have suggested that Cymdeithas was a breaka,, N-a%- from Plaid 
Cymru ... 
it is important to put on record that O'nideithas kvas set up followlil,! 
a resolution to the annual conference of Plaid Cymr-u and was -,. 'ery much a 
child of the Blaid. 47 
On the one hand the sip painting activities of Ci'mcleithas lost the party potential 
voters. On the other hand, many youthful members of Cymdeithas could be regarded 
as almost certain Plaid voters. It was therefore important not to alienate this support, 
whilst attacking it could cause internal difficulties by alienating traditionalists within 
the party. As many Plaid spokesmen were aware, many youthful members had been 
attracted to the party through the Welsh Language Society and the dynamic, strident, 
'trendy' activism which these activities promoted. Dafydd lwan ýwas just one young 
member who felt he had 'no choice' but to join the WLS in 1963, representing as it 
did a 'new spirit' among one section of Welsh youth . 
48 More to the point, despite the 
fact that there was tension between the movements in the mid 1960s, many members 
of the WLS were also members of Plaid Cymru. For lwan, Plaid and the WLS were 
natural bedfellows: 
Two sides of the same coin ... 
for the WLS there was ... a 
definite purpose, one 
which was to fight directly to change people's attitude towards the Welsh 
language 
... 
Plaid's role was different in terms of means and tactics ... and the 
road had to be followed differently ... 
but the aims and directions were still the 
same. 49 
Moreover, Plaid and the WLS worked in harmony in terms of traditional nationalist 
pressure group politics. Both were important in alleging duplicity and contradiction in 
the policies of the 'British' political parties over Welsh social and economic issues - 
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not just language. Whilst Plaid Cymru itself often came in for criticism from the WLS 
over its position concerning the Welsh language (which led to the formation of the 
WLS in the first instance) the propagandist 'work conducted by the society C) - 
undoubtedly aided the already influential critique of 'British' political parties 
conducted by Plaid. 
Moreover, there was a great deal of sympathy within Plaid Cymru, especially in the 
north, for the principled stand made by Cymdeithas Yr Iaith. There were still many 
who wanted Plaid to develop a closer relationship with the society. In 1969 the party's 
Dyffryn Ogwen branch attempted to table a motion at the annual conference which 
called for the party to give 'all possible support to the Welsh Language Society - 
including financial support'. The motion was not presented before the conference. ýO 
Others welcomed the existence and tactics of the WLS (and FWA) because, by 
comparison, Plaid Cymru came to be seen as moderate and respectable. 
ý' If 
Cymdeithas Yr Iaith focussed on language, Plaid did not have to. Of course, there was 
a danger that it might be forced to do so, by party members who did not see Plaid's 
4retreat' as a division of labour but as a betrayal, but there was some potential In this 
approach. 
The Ddraig Goch actually encouraged Plaid's youth movement to arrange and engage 
in more protests. It also encouraged young Plaid members to join Omdeithas Yr 
Jaith. 52 A significant concern addressed in one article dealing with the issue was not 
the electoral repercussions of nationalist activism on Plaid's electoral fortunes, 
but the 
fact that the party's budding young protestors lacked protest songs which could 
be 
sung at demonstrations -a problem addressed by lwan. 
53 The aim was to create a 
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'Welsh' movement that was as democratic and fashionable - as much a part of 1960, 
culture as broader protest movements. By contrast, Labour appeared old and old- 
fashioned. 
By the end of the decade the party had made significant organisational progress ii-i 
north-west Wales. As has already been argued, new branches were established 
throughout the region. Merioneth became the party's fastest growni, collstituellcv 
party from 1967 onwards, and the party's major fund raising constituency before the I- 
end of the decade. 54 Youth branches were buoyant in Bro Dysynn', Llanbedr, 
Barmouth, Penrhyndeudraeth, Dolgellau, Llangynog, Blaenau Ffestiniog and zn 
Edeimion by the end of the decade. Branch offices were established in Dolgellau and 
Blaenau Ffestiniog by 1969.55 Caemarfonshire was not far behind. Redundant 
branches were reformed in important centres (including Caernarfon) by 1968, whilst 
incursions into Labour territories continued. These ývere aided by the rapid 
development of the 'Merched Y Wawr' women's movement. Thirty three 'Merched Y 
Wawr' branches were functioning by 1968, the majority of these in Caemarfonshire 
and Merioneth. Branches of one hundred members or more were not uncommon. Not 
only, as Plaid argued, did 'Merched Y Wawr' 'demonstrate the party's support for 
Welsh women', but they also served to re-enforce Plaid's community integration. 
Despite the modernisation of organisation much work remained to be done. The 
party's canvass of 94 homes in Aberystwyth in 1968, reported In the party press to 
inform the movement, indicated some of the problems still facing the party. Of the 94 
homes only 9 were supporters of the party. A total of 41 stated that they would 
. consider' supporting the party. The remaining 44 were less likely to do so. 
The 
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reasons for reservations and indifference towards the party underlined the problems It 
faced. Visits to twelve homes revealed that householders did not consider self- 
goverment to be a viable option. Ten refused to support the party because of its 
strong links to the language - some fearing that television would become flooded by 
programmes in Welsh. A further nine pointed to 'extremism' as a turn-off. However, 
by far the most prominent reason, expressed by thirty six homes, was the fact that 
they 'knew nothing about Plaid Cymru policies'. 56 As the report concluded: 
This is a sign of the task that still faces us, even after Rhondda and 
Carmarthen. If people don't know our policies, we have no chance. 
Modernisation of party policy, as well as organisation was therefore vital, and an area 
where - without altering or questioning key areas of Plaid's activiity - progress could 
be made. 
The Development of Policy 
Along with the need to modernise the party's organisational machinery came the need 
to modernise the party's policies. In reality the two sides of modemisation were 
intertwined. Organisational modernisation had to be backed up with the development 
of serious, coherent and credible policies. At the same time, policy development could 
not be 'sold' by a party machine which was out of touch with the realities of modem 
political campaigning. By the early 1960s some believed that the lack of definitive 
policy undermined Plaid's reputation. As one party spokesman argued in 1963: 
In the first place, nationalism in a vacuum, divorced from social issues of the 
day is an impossible concept and an impossible position to maintain ... how can 
Plaid Cymru object to the closure of Welsh railways without expressly or by 
implication advocating the kind of transport system it would like to see in a 
self-governing Wales? How can we criticise our present educational system or 
our present TV service without suggesting what -we would like to see in their 
place ... and to suggest what we would like to see in their place is 
to take up a 
Positive position on social issues of importance. It is to take tip general 
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political attitudes which, although they are intimatel,,,, connected Nvith our 
nationalism are not exclusively nationalist. 
However, the ideological transition required to develop Plaid's policies was not 
always smooth. Even by the late 1960s some members of the party still belleved Its 
fundamental strength was as a powerful pressure group, raising the profile and interest 
of 'English' political parties in Welsh social, economic and political issues. This was 
an area where Plaid believed it had achieved a modicum of success. Through the 
1950s and early 1960s the party believed that it had helped ensure the growing 
recognition of Welsh needs among its political rivals, especially the Labour party. 
As a result of its pressure group mentality, the design of coherent and competitive 
policies had often come second to the need to criticise or condemn the policies offered 
by its political rivals (this approach will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 
Five). Due to the party's limited development and popularity in the 1950s this often 
placed it in a fortuitous position, for whilst it could criticise solutions offered by its 
rivals and could point to its prophecies when those policies failed, it was unlikely that 
its own 'policies' would be put to the test. As one political commentator argued in the 
1950s, Plaid's pressure group status was enhanced by the fact that it did not have to 
suffer 'the vulgarisations ennui of power'. 57 This was an important and perceptive 
point. As Vic Davies, Plaid's candidate in the 1967 Rhondda by-election noted, Plaid 
often straddled the pressure group/political party divide. If Labour solved the 
unemployment problems in the Rhondda before the next general election, then Plaid 
could justifiably feel that its role as a pressure group had been successful. If, on the 
other hand, Labour failed to deliver then Plaid could benefit electorally. Even if 
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theoretically weak, this thinking was valuable in terms of propaganda and inner party 
morale. 
During the 1950s much of Plaid's own rhetoric concentrated on the need for Wales to 
be given greater political autonomy - and ultimately independence. Welsh 'freedoni' 
was regarded by propagandists as a 'cure-all' solution to Welsh social and economic 
problems. The intricacies of policy content were rarely elaborated in part%, statements. 
A great deal of the party's propaganda concentrated on the extent to which other 
countries (of roughly equal or smaller size to Wales) managed to surv* ive 
independently. The work of leading economists from both inside and outside Wales 
(who concurred with many of the party's arguments) gave (some) credence and 
credibility to the party's declarations. As electoral results clearly demonstrated, Welsh 
voters were not convinced. Moreover, the need to develop policy was made implicitly 
clear from Plaid's experiences in local politics. The party had too often taken 'one 
step forward and two steps back'. Seats won were too easily thrown away when up for 
renewal, largely because party representatives lacked firm and definite policies on key 
issues. 58 The party could not hope to progress at national level whilst it entertained the 
same problems. 
Nonetheless, this negative emphasis remained popular in the early 1960s. For 
example, the election addresses of Plaid candidates in the 1964 general election 
its focussed on the ways in which Wales was not receiving a fair return for C 
contribution to British taxation, with the result that other small countries similar to 
Wales enjoyed fa r higher standards of living. The exploitative nature of NVales's 
colonial' status thus formed an important strand of the party's campaigns. Plaid 
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argued that the Welsh tax bill of E300 million was double that paid by many lar, -ýer 
countries. Moreover, even small countries like New Zealand and Austria enjoyed a 
much higher standard of living than Wales. As the election literature of R. E, Jones in 
Caernarfonshire noted, old age pensions in New Zealand vvere paid at a Youn-ger a-, -, c 
than those in Wales (60 not 65) and were then paid at a higher rate (married couples 
being paid some f3a week more than couples in Wales). Within Britain, Plaid argued 
that Wales was treated as a 'second class citizen'. Wages in the coal industry provided 
a classic example of this disparity - even for voters in north "'ales. As Jones 
highlighted, wages in the Welsh coal industry were the lowest in Britain - despite the 
'fact' that south Wales valleys contained some of the richest coal seams. 
However, this concentration on the benefits of independence obscured some more 
fundamental policy aims which were developed in the early sixties and w1ilch formed 
the basis of the more elaborate policies developed by the party towards the end of the 
decade. A growing realisation within the party of the need to compete with Labour, 
was portrayed in a Plaid policy statement published in 1963. The socialist appeal and 
agenda of the party was clearly defined, in both economic and social policy. Plaid 
embraced state control of industry, close co-operation with trade unions, a 
commitment to a welfare state, internationalism and high degrees of public spending. 
Social equality became a watchword for the party. Equal status for the Welsh 
language in Welsh education and in public and civic life was a more traditional 
COMMitment, expressed as part of a modem agenda, based on justice and equality. 
ý9 
Whilst the party was attentive to the appeal of socialist policies Nvithin Wales, it also 
sought to extend their appeal. The party's industrial policy was nfluenced by more 
252 
than a hint of Welsh 'syndicalist' traditions. Whilst the party was not dismissi"-e of 
the principles of state control it argued that 'stringent' controls or control b". -remote 
bureaucratic boards' were to be condemned. In their place, Plaid favoured 'real co- 
operative ownership', with industrial controls being located in the hands of xvorkers 
and technicians' together with 'Suppliers, consumers and local authorities. ' National 
Industrial Boards would be created. These would co-ordinate the efforts of the nation 
and work in close co-operation with government agencies whose role would be to 
stimulate industrial development. Trade Unions would also pla-y in active role. The 
formation of a Welsh T. U. C would be 'actively encouraged. ' 'Welsh trade unions 
would be encouraged to work closely with international workers' organisations. All C) 
sides would work together towards the successful adoption of co-operative ownership 
and workers' control. As workers' control was achieved, and the need for trade unions 
regressed, the unions would take on a new role, ensur-ing that social amenities 'xere 
provided in the workplace, offer-ing advice for members on a range of issues and t-- 
undertaking technical, scientific and medical research connected with their industries 
and providing representation on local bodies. Traditional Welsh industries, such as 
agriculture, were afforded considerable attention. Under a Plaid government, a 
National Land Board would be created. The Board would control the disposal of all 
Welsh land. However, the party's agriculture policy also contained a strong element 
of traditional party beliefs and aims. The conservative desire to protect the shape and 
structure of small Welsh farms was profound. Food production would become Welsh 
agriculture's major responsibility. A considerable amount of self-sufficiency would 
protect the country from the fluctuations of international trade'. Countries like Wales, 
which were geared priman were at the same time being 
forced to ily for export trade, 11 
rely on imported goods for many of their basic raw materials. However, the 
drive for 
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self-sufficiency would be accomplished not through restructuri I I n, -, traditional 
smallholding methods but through consolidating them. As the party argued 'empha-sis 
will be placed on the traditional unit in Welsh agriculture - the small farm'. The 
desire to protect and promote traditional farming methods was not only driven bv 
parochial conservatism but by pragmatism. As Plaid argued, smallholdina,, s would be 
encouraged: 
Not only because it is the traditional unit but also because small farms spread 
ownership of land and reduced hired labour to a minimum, because thev 
encourage the application of the principle of co-operation and because 
production per acre is higher on small farms than on large farms. (Production zn 
per man is higher on large farrns, but we need greater production and more 
jobs, not fewer jobs and less production). 
The internationalist spirit of the party was also evident. Plaid called for 'Wales to be 
given a seat in the United Nations as a prelude to full Welsh invol-výcment in bodies 
such as UNESCO and the WHO. The party supported the development of a 'ýVorld 
Government'. Such a government, it argued, could only come about when national 
governments developed a willingness to devolve some of their power to international 
bodies such as the UN. A central factor in the need for such a government was to 
restrict 'the making, testing and using of nuclear weapons'. 
Problems closer to home also received some consideration. The party's policy on 
social services was both basic and pragmatic. Equality was the guiding principle. 
Benefits, pensions, etc. would be provided equally for men and women. These would 
be paid at a rate which would provide a 'reasonable standard of living' and without 
the need to resort to 'other means of assistance'. All social service payments would 
automatically be index-linked. This would relieve the bureaucratic burdens attached to 
increasing levels of benefit and would ensure that payments never fell below 
levels of 
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acceptability. Housing provision was also addressed. The principal alm "vas that all 
Welsh men and women would become homeowners under a Plaid -2overnment. 
Tenants would be given the right to purchase their homes at current market values 
after they had lived in a property for ten years. The leasehold s", stern would be 
abolished. Local authorities would be encouraged to provide 'generous' -, rants and 
loans for the improvement of property. Until the aim of total home o,, Nnership was 
achieved, Welsh tenants would be afforded protection against unreasonable rent 
increases and eviction. Whilst the party was now discussing social and economic 
policies, it was still in part campaigning by promising a better life. It did not address 
practical issues such as the impact of such policies on taxation. 
Neither were 'typical' Plaid considerations ignored. Education was to be a vital area 
of interest for a Welsh parliament. Educating children in the importance and values of 
'full citizenship' at community, local, national and international levels was a priority. 
So too was the need for children educated in Wales to be fully conversant with all 
aspects of Welsh history. As the party argued, only through understanding Welsh 
history could a new generation make 'a full contribution towards its future 
development'. English and Welsh would be taught in both primary and secondary 
schools. Smaller classes would be encouraged to develop a 'real human relationship 
between teacher and pupil'. School curricula would include 'practical preparation for 
life in the surrounding area'. Vocational training as well as subjects 'pro-, ý-idin- a more 
liberal education and subjects that will provide openings for other and more 
specialised careers' would be encouraged. The need to protect and promote Welsh 
culture and the language would be facilitated by the development of Welsh TV and 
radio, government aid for the publication of Welsh books, a 'National Theatre, 
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Orchestra, National Art Gallery together with academies which would 'provide tuition 
in all aspects of the arts in both languages'. Amateur oronanisations would be giveii 
full governmental support. In particular the National and International Eisteddfodau 
would receive 'full support and increased grants' for the extension of their activities. 
Plaid's policies in the early 1960s therefore combined a brand of populist socialism 
with respect and attention for more traditional, conservative aspects of the parT-,, ', --, 
appeal. The development of policy was already underway by 1964 - although too late 
to influence the party's programme for the 1964 general election. The party's 
conference in 1964 indicated the kind of issues which the party sought to address. Oil 
prospecting off the Welsh coast, a Welsh Water Board, a Welsh Power Board and a 
co-ordinated transport policy were all afforded attention. So too were farin prices, 
local government reform, broadcasting and television. An indication of policies 
developed by the Research Group towards the end of the decade were also aired - 
notably the idea of a 'Welsh Economic Development Authority' - later changed to 
become 'Welsh Development Authority'. This was an important feature of the 
Economic Plan of 1969 and a similar concept to Labour's 'Welsh Development 
Agency', which was established in the mid 1970s. 
However, the influx and influence of a young generation of -power brokers' from the 
early sixties onwards ensured that a dramatic transformation of policy aims was 
taking place by the end of the decade. The primary aim of policy development was 
initially to plug the huge gaps in Plaid's policies. New groups such as the 'Ne", t:, 1 
Nation Group' made a start at sorting out these problems. Among the achie-vements of 
the New Nation Group was the development of a concrete and 
detailed policy 
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statement on local government, which was presented to the party's summer school in 
1965. The development of the local government policy demonstrated the impact made 
on the party by the English speaking, university educated, political activists -", N-ho had 
permeated the party. The policy is noteworthy not only for Its thoroughness but also 
for its content. Whilst emphasising and re-enforcing the communitarian 'feel' of the 
party, it moved away from the strident support given to *syndicalism' only a fe%ý 
years previously. 
The development of policy on local government was not accidental. Rather, it was a 
response to Labour's plans for restructuring Welsh local govenu-nent, in particular the 
proposed development of larger authorities. Here Plaid was sceptical. WhIlst not 
dismissing Labour's proposals out of hand, the desire to 'keep go -e ent as local as ,% Min 
possible' meant that any Labour alternatives would require in-depth research before 
60 
they could be supported. Whilst keeping clear of the controversial waters of local 
government re-organisation, the party developed seemingly practical altematives to 
the problems affecting the smooth running of Welsh local goverriment. Plaid 
envisaged greater co-operation between Welsh local authorities. Encouragement 
would be given to authorities to set up their own industries (for example the 
manufacturing of bricks, paving slabs etc. ) eventually leading to self-sufficiency. 
Authorities would be encouraged to take the initiative as regional developers, not to 
sit around waiting for industry to be attracted by central government and then taking 
steps to improve local infrastructures (notably roads). They would have greater 
responsibility for attracting industries themselves, especially by improving local 
iriftastructures before attempting to secure new industries. 
61 
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More complex were arguments surrounding the political role which local authorities 
should adopt. Here there were evident contradictions %vhich reflected the ne-, N- 
difficulties experienced by having to construct policy around north anti south 'Wales. 
Rather than endorsing the need to politicise Welsh local authorities who were 
dominated by independency -a problem in the north - the part. v expressed the need 
for local authorities to 'be above party policy, - thus addressing a problem in the 
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south. These dilemmas had not been resolved by the end of the 1960s. 
More change came with the formation of the 'Research Group' of which Phil 
Williams, Dafydd Wigley and Gareth Morgan-Jones were the most influential 
members. The Research Group was officially born in 1966. Stimulus for the group 
was provided by Nevin's Structure of the Welsh Econon7.1, (1966) and a speech gi %, eii 
by the author at Plaid's summer school in Dolgellau in 1965. As with the Nevv Nation 
Group, the initial aims of the Research Group had been to sort out basic flaws in party 
policy and 'to clear the myths out of party propaganda'. 63 From the outset the group 
focussed on areas of policy where figures and statistics quoted by the party in its 
literature were fundamentally flawed or out of date. However, the urgent need for the 
group to develop more comprehensive policies came after the party's success in 
Carmarthen in 1966, when Plaid found itself 'in the first division but wasn't even sure 
it could field a full team'. 64 
However, some of the ideas which were incorporated in the Economic Plan were 
initially developed to tackle local problems. Wigley was a key player in this process, 
developing a local research group in Merioneth in 1968 xhich focussed on 
distinctively local policies, most notably the idea of 'growth centres' in 'NIerioneth (an 
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idea which was applied to other areas in the Plan). This provided a response and an 
altemative to Merioneth County Council's widely condemned scheme for the 
development and expansion of Bala in the late 1960s. 65 
The Economic Plan 
In the historical accounts that exist of Plaid Cynu-u's development during this period, 
the Economic Plan developed by the research group has received some attention. 66 
Yet, few of those accounts have actually discussed the content of the Plan or 
explained its significance within the context of Plaid's evolution as a political force. 
The Economic Plan, published in 1969, provides the clearest picture of the ways in 
which Plaid policies had developed by the end of the decade. The plan also provided 
the credibility which was to help sustain political success in north west Wales in 
1974. The economic plan was in many ways a natural outcome of the changes 
occurring within the party during the decade. It was also a response to the political 
developments taking place in Wales in the 1960s, in particular the Commission on the 
Constitution, and Plaid's promising by-election performances. However, it was also a 
response to Labour policies, in particular the National Plan (1965) and The Task 
Ahead (1969), coupled with Labour's 'failure to produce a plan, or even a realistic 
economic assessment of the Welsh economy'. 67 As with the development of Plald's 
ideology earlier in the decade, the plan was inspired by the economic philosophies of 
Edward Nevin, Roy Thomas and Leopold Kohn 68 Some have rightly descriibed the 
economic accounting that underlay many of the policies in the plan as 'a little 
na*fve'. 69 For example, the Commission on the Constitution, which examined the plan 
as an integral part of Plaid Cymru's evidence in support of devol-ved governance, 
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thought that the budget calculations and projections, 'achieved' in the plan', 
blueprint, were a little fanciful - as generations of Chancellors had not managed to 
balance the budget for the UK; Plaid offered huge expenditure tar, ýiets for Wales and a 
balanced budget at the first attempt. Neither was the plan -vvithout basic logistical 
faults. For example, whilst in condemned SET on the one hand - and ýý as committed 
to scrapping the tax - it also used the money earned from the tax within its projections 
for the Welsh budget. Nonetheless, Lord Crowther, who chaired the Commission 
before his untimely death, described the plan as an impressive achievement and a 
genuine and thought provoking contribution to the devolution debate . 
70 Moreover, 
simply by havin a plan, Plaid was declaring itself as a 'practical', left of centre party, 
and not just a cultural pressure group. 
The Economic Plan was not an attempt to hijack the political case for self-government 
by presenting a powerful economic argument. On the contrary, as the party argued: C) 
If experts were to prove that Wales would benefit economically from self- 
ý, h nj I government, then of course we would demand the ng t to e joy increased 
prosperity; but if they were to prove that Wales was heavily subsidised by the 
rest of the United Kingdom, then true to our pride and with even more 
determination we would demand the right to stand on our own feet. 
However, as it also argued, the plan represented a maturation within the party -a 
realisation that: 
A party like Plaid Cymru (must be) prepared to accept the responsibilities of 
national government, must realise that economic control is one of the most 
important powers that such a government can exercise... (and that) the 
economic consequences of a transfer of control from Westminster to Cardiff 
must be carefully anticipated. 
This was a carefully worded if blunt attack on traditional party ideology. If the 
creation of the research group had marked a tuming point within the party, the 
Economic Plan marked a significant departure from traditional Plaid economic 
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policies. The plan had been formulated to drag the party for-ward into the sphere of 
modem politics. It initiated an assault on those in the party who -wanted to re-e, ., tablish 
traditional, old fashioned, nostalgically based Wales under the guidance of a 
parochial Plaid Cymru government in an independent Wales. Those who sought to 
drag Wales back in time had to realise that: 
An underdeveloped country, where the majority of the population live in 'self- 
sufficient life on the land, may be able to survive years of economic chaos, a 
modem industrial country, where, for example, 16,000 men are employed in a 
single plant cannot survive economic disruption. For this reason the economic 
policy of Plaid Cymru must be carefully developed. 71 
However, whilst the plan did, in part, represent an effort to construct a definitive 
economic policy for the party, it readily admitted that the solutions offered within the 
plan were, in some areas, partial and patchy. As with other areas of the party's 
development, lack of resources ensured that some necessary research was not 
completed. Some feasibility studies were not developed. However, the patchiness 
was passed over as Plaid claimed it was anxious not to fall into the trap of political 
parties who constructed grandiose, abstract economic plans without undertaking 
feasibility studies to discover whether the plan might work. The Plan reinforced the 
co-operative and responsible image which the party sought to develop. As the plan 
also drew on the policies recommended by other parties - where these were deemed 
suitable and appropriate to the needs of Wales - the authors argued that it should not 
be taken as a 'distinctive Plaid Cymru policy in every detail', the rationale being that 
'the future of Wales does not lie with Plaid Cymru alone: it lies with the people of 
Wales'. 
The writing of the Economic Plan reflected the extent to which the creation of the 
Welsh Language Society had lessened the language burden which had earlier 
261 
dominated Plaid's policies. With the Welsh Language Society now 1ooking after' 
Welsh language issues, Plaid was free to concentrate on other (more serious) 
economic and social matters. It also reflected the extent to vhich the party's 
development and modemisation in the 1960s had been driven by south Wales. Some 
historians and political scientists suggest that the plan was developed specificalk, to 
win the party support in Labour's south Wales heartlands. Adamson has argued that 
the plan not only marked a watershed as the first Plaid Cymru policy statement that 
was almost entirely economically orientated but: 
More significantly it was directly relevant to the economic needs and political 
debate in industrial south Wales rather than the means of support in the north 
on which Plaid Cymru had historically depended. 72 
Yet this argument misses the important point that the plan aimed precisely to 'tackle' 
the big social and economic problems which afflicted north Wales. As Adamson 
acknowledges, the main objectives of the policy was dealing with the major 
challenges of unemployment and depopulation. These were as much a problem in the 
north as in the south. 
Other historians have argued that the development of, and interest in, economic policy 
was indicative of Plaid's adaptation of the 'growthmanship ethos' of the Labour party. 
The establishment of new growth areas, and the need to attract capital investment 
were vital components of the party's 'managerial' approach to policy, which blew 
away the old syndicalist tendencies. 73 Nevertheless, whilst the plan was a dynamic 
reflection of ideological change within the party it still drew on some old fashioned 
methodology and thinking. The disparity between the economic situations of 'Wales 
and England was afforded its usual dose of attention. As Plaid admitted, one of the 
remits of the plan was to address the imbalance between Wales and England. 
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Unemployment ratios were a particular concern. The plan sought to address the fact 
-4 that 'When England has a chill, Wales gets pneumonia'. The companson of WaIcs 
with other small nations was also present - an indication of '-,, "evin and Kohr', s 
influence in the writing of the document. Again, in terms of unemployment. the 
experience of other small countries like Switzerland (whose unemployment rate was 
0.01%), Luxemburg (0.1) and New Zealand (0.1) proved that full employment and 
self-governance could be bedfellows in a 'New Wales'. However, there %ýas a 
modicum of realism. As Plaid was aware, Switzerland was fortuitous in the fact that 
two of its major industries - agriculture and tourism - complemented each other 
seasonally. In Wales this was not feasible as 'the delights of Pumlumon in mid 
January are appreciated by too few people for this to occur in Wales'. The document 
was not just about accepting growth. It was an economic, but also a political 
document, an indication of change and internal development shrouded by traditional 
ideas and the defence of the small nation state. 
The problems associated with depopulation were given considerable attention. Whilst 
the party argued that 16,000 new jobs were required to get unemployment in Wales 
down to English levels, it also argued that Wales suffered from a higher level of 
'hidden unemployment' than was evident elsewhere in the U. K. Two factors were 
particularly worthy of note. First, Welsh employees were forced to retire at an earlier 
age than was evident in England. When 'old' industries expired, fe", opportunities 
were available for men aged over 50. As a result, 55 had become a common 
retirement age in Wales. In England on the other hand, in areas like the Midlands, 25 
per cent of those over 65 continued to work. Second, Wales had a higher percentage 
of Young people staying on at school. This did not reflect higher intellectual 
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attainment in Wales, but instead the lack of opportunities available to school leavers'. 
In certain parts of Wales. Children who lacked the intellectual capacity to sta% on at 
school inevitably faced the dole queue. " In Gwynedd alone, 'h1d&n' uneniplo, -, 111ent 
stood at 3,400 - 9,300 if women were also included. 
The future of some traditional Welsh industries was addressed. A large amount of 
space was afforded to the problems faci II ing ing the steel and coal industries (lendi ý 
weight to the belief that the document was drawn up with south Wales in mind). 
There is insufficient space here to elaborate on the plans for those industries in detail. 
However, it is worth noting that the party's projections for these industries was 
overwhelmingly gloomy. Coal was in trouble because of the competition offered by 
gas. Reductions in coal consumption had come about because 'elimination of the 
Welsh coal industry was ... so clearly a gove=ent PoliCY9.76 Few solutions to those 
problems were offered. Steel, similarly, faced a mountain of problems. The demise of 
the steel industry was also well advanced. As Plaid argued: 
In our long term planning we must not assume that the steel industry is 
guaranteed to survive the 1980s as a major component of the Welsh 
economy. 77 
As with coal, competition from rival products had dealt a serious blow to the industry. 
An extensive and 'massive' research programme would have to be undertaken to 
explore the possibilities of salvaging some sort of future for the industry. To some 
extent the party clutched at straws. One of the more interesting suggestions was that 
one of steel's major 'problems' - the fact that it rusted - could be the saviour of the 
industry, since this was 'essential in a consumer economy that dare not produce 
eN-erlasting goods'. This was hardly attentive to the political need to ýxin the south. 
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However, other traditional Welsh industries were offered even less constructive 
attention. The future of the slate industry was not mentioned in the plan. 'Neither were 
discussions over the future of agriculture much clearer. Few solutions were offered to 
the problems facing the industry. As Plaid argued, the lack of a coherent agricultural 
policy emanated from the fact that too many 'uncertainties' surrounded the industrv. 
Plaid argued that the development of agricultural policy was impeded by two distinct 
factors. Firstly it argued that the Agricultural Act of 1967 had caused chaos in Welsh 
farming. The government's backing for large, cost-efficient units meant that up to 83 
per cent of Welsh farms faced extinction. As a result, whilst agoriculture was not a 
declining industry it 'was a rapidly declining source of employment'. Secondly, the 
U. K. 's proposed entry into the E. E. C. further complicated matters. Here, the partý 
drew on research undertaken by the Department of Agricultural Economics at the 
University College of Wales, Aberystwyth in reaching its conclusions. These 
conclusions were cloudy to say the least. At best entry into the E. E. C. would increase 
Welsh farm income by 5%. At worse it would result in a 'catastrophic' drop of 24.78 
These concerns re-enforced calls for a Welsh government which would represent 
distinctively Welsh needs in E. E. C. negotiations. The lack of attention afforded to 
slate caused some concerns in Plaid's north Wales heartlands. At the party's annual 
conference in 1969 - when the Economic Plan was considered - the 
Merioneth 
District Committee presented a motion calling on the government to natIonallse the 
Welsh slate industry, for the industry to be run as a co-operative with a 'ýVelsh 
national organisation ensuring efficient management and development . 
79Despite this, 
slate was still not included in the remit of the plan. 
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Other 'Welsh' industries like tourism were afforded more concrete att, -ntion. As Plaid 
admitted, tourism made an important contribution to the Welsh economy. HoNvever, it 
was adamant that service industries (which were dominated by tourism in areas like 
the north-west) should not be a substitute for manufacturing industries. However, the 
party was reluctant to force change from service to manufactunng, as S. E. T. had 
attempted to do. Reductions in the number of sen,, ice sector jobs amonc, men (from 
52% in 1969 to 41% in 1976) was a specific target. On the other hand, service sector 
jobs for women were to be welcomed, the party envisaging a 70% ratio of female to 
male service sector jobs by 1976. The future shape of the industry was also afforded 
some attention. Vvhilst tourism was to be encouraged, Wales had to be more selective 
in the kind of tourism it encouraged. High class tourism was to be supported, 'cheap' 
tourism rejected. Extended stays in expensive Welsh hotels which offered a 
distinctively Welsh experience were good. Day trippers and the vulgar attractions of 
seaside resorts (and places like Rhyl) were to be discouraged. 
Tourism offered a partial solution to the unemployment problem in north-west Wales, 
but not all Welsh regions . There were still 
huge problems to overcome across Wales. 
Plaid argued that the greatest problems faced Denbigh, East Carmarthen, Glamorgan, 
Monmouth and South Brecon - traditional coal, steel and agriculture areas. Anglesey 
and Pembroke 'were also facing major difficulties'. in mid and rural Wales, the party 
argued that emphasis should be placed on creating a 'relatively small number of well- 
paid jobs'. Low activity rates -a particular problem in rural areas would also 
have to 
be addressed as 'the potential workforce among women represents an important asset 
that Wales can offer new industry'. Where to locate new industry in each 
Welsh 
re oi I g on was an area of policy afforded significant attention. IdealIN 
Plaid favoured 
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industrial locations 'which reflects the existing community pattern aiid attempts to 
n full economic life in each town or village' - an approach maintal II inspired by the Llie 
Valera administration in Ireland. 80 However, as Plaid argued, whilst appealing. this 
was impracticable because of 'budget constraints'. The answer to the problem was to 
develop a limited number of 'growth centres', situated a maximum of thirty miles 
from each Welsh district. In selecting where the growth centres would be developed, 
the party would not be swayed by nostalgia or sentimentalism. As it argued: 
it is essential that we choose areas with natural economic advantages, even if 
our sentiments would suggest centres with a richer historic association. 
As it continued: 
The ideal spot for a new industry would be an area with existing urban and 
industrial amenities, at a nodal point for communications, kvith plenty of room 
for building, preferably near a deep water port. Additional advantages would 
be an attractive climate and access to areas of outstanding natural beauty. 81 
Development of 'green-field' sites was fundamentally rejected, not onlý, on 
environmental grounds but because 'community is fundamental to the political 
philosophy of Plaid Cymru' and emphasis therefore had to be placed on 
strengthening and expanding existing towns. Consistent o, -ith the party's critique of 
Labour's plans for a new town in mid Wales, it rejected 'any economic plan which 
up-roots tens-of-thousands of people' - in particular the suggested development of 
Caersws to reach a population of 80,000. However, there was support for other 
government plans. The development of Newtown from a population of five to ten 
thousand was welcomed, as was the proposed development of Swansea Bay. 
The development of 'freestanding communities' was preferred. Freestanding 
cOmmunities were described as those which were not 'parasites' on nearb, ". 
larger 
cOmmunities for any services considered, i. e. they did not depend on aný, other 
267 
community for secondary schooling or hospital services. Growth centres were 
preferred where populations within ten miles were between thirty and three hundred 
thousand people. To address the fact that this -was unrealistic in mid and rural Wales. 
the minimums were adjusted to fifteen thousand people. Other factors would also be 
taken into account. Existing road provision was important. So was the potential to 
develop roads. Areas where it was impossible to improve or expand roads for 
geological reasons, or because of perennial fog and snow problems, should also be 
rejected. Similarly, suitable industrial sites could not be taken for granted. This 
applied to both south and north Wales. In the industrial south, communities had found 
difficulty in finding a level surface to lay a rugby pitch. This did not bode well for the 
construction of modem factories requiring sites which were level, well drained and 
big enough for expansion. In former coal mining areas subsidence was also a serious 
problem which had to be overcome. Errors in attempting to build factories in 
unsuitable places had been made in the past. Hirwaun provided a classic example of a 
site chosen by the Board of Trade for industrial development, which was then 
hampered because of marshy ground. As Plaid argued: 
This mistake would, of course, have been avoided if civil ser-%'ants responsible 
had had any understanding of Welsh - sufficient at least to understand the 
meaning of "Hir-waun" ! 83 
Whilst northern areas shared some of these problems, industrial development in the 
north had to contend with additional problems. Climate was a particular problem. In 
England new town development was only considered in regions with less than forty 
inches of rain annually. In Wales such a target ývas unrealistic. Regions with averages 
Of fifty inches or less still had to be considered. Only sites with over sixty inches of 
rain should be ignored - as should sites a thousand 
feet above sea level. Natural 
beauty was another problem area. Like Labour, Plaid insisted on the need 
for 
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development to take place in areas of 'outstanding natural beauty'. At the -same time. 
the opportunities afforded of living in such a scenically and recreationally rich area 
was one of Wales's greatest economic and industrial assets. As the party ar-, -, ued: 
If we look forward to the time when the majority of people vý-ork four daý-s a 
week, ready access to the coast, to mountains and to rivers will become an important part of the total life of any communivy. In all these respects Wales is 
at a tremendous advantage. About 97% of the population live v. -ithin 30 miles 
of the coast, and nowhere is more than 60 miles away. Similarly almost the 
whole population live within 30 miles of a National Park. 84 
However, there was still an obvious clash between the beneficial and detrimental 
impact of natural beauty. Nowhere was this more evident than in the north-ý, ý-est. Yet, 
Plaid's plans for the economic regeneration of the area show how it hoped the two 
aspects could be accommodated. Plaid considered Holyhead, Bangor, Caemarfon, 
Llandudno Junction, Penrhyndeudraeth and Corwen as possible gowth centres. 
However, the Menai Straits area between Bangor and Caernarfon (the area described 
as 'Glan Menai') provided the greatest potential for development. The area was 
selected for its population (100,000 people living within a twenty mile radius) and the 
fact that it was served by four trunk roads, six principal roads and a railway. It would 
be conveniently situated for the proposed dual camageway linking Holyhead with 
Wrexham and major English cities (described elsewhere in the plan). Moreover, 
development along the Menai Straits 'below a two hundred foot contour' would not 
spoil the scenic beauty of the area. Development of the B4366 trunk road (as a tourist 
route) would ensure that 'panoramic' views of Anglesey and Snowdonia would be 
preserved, with industrial development out of sight. Secondary growth centres - 
including one in the 'Deudraeth' area (which included Blaenau FfestinioOf 
Porthmadog and Trawsfynydd) - would also be created specifically to cater 
for a Iar 
smaller' population. 'Special efforts' would be made in addressing the problems n 
caused in this particular area because of depopulation, and the decline of quarrying 
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and agriculture. A thousand new manufacturing jobs - divided equally bem-een men 
and women - was an initial target. 
Considerable thought was put into the question of establishing the right industries in 
the right areas. In selecting industries for the north-west, as with other parts of Wales. 
consideration would have to be given to viability, whether the industries ý, ý-erc 
economically feasible or desirable and suitable geographically. The close proximity of 
a university in Bangor (in addition to a technical college) was an important 
consideration in selecting suitable industries. As a result, north-west 'Wales was 
deemed a suitable area for the development of electronic industries. The Uniýrersity's 
electrical engineering department provided an exciting opportunity for the region to 4D 
develop major electronic industries. The development of electronic industries would 
also provide several important functions. First, they would provide a number of highly ZD 
paid jobs for the cream of local talent - the kind of people who had traditionally been 
forced out of the area in search of quality, well paid jobs. Second, and simultaneously 
they would cater for another key aim of the economic plan - to ensure a better 
distribution of jobs through the socio-economic classes. They would help address the 
'marked deficiencies' in managenal, technical and administrative opportunities 
evident in areas like the north-west. Thirdly, they would provide a number of semi- 
skilled jobs for the large number of local women without employment. Last, these 
were the kind of industries which would offered training opportunities to employees 
and apprentices - courses which could be facilitated ln the nearby techn, cal college at 
Bangor. Moreover, encouragement and financial inducements for the development of 1ý 
a new technological faculty within the University would be forthcoming. Close 
links 
between local industries and the local colleges would be encouraged. Moreover, in 
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addition to electronic industries, marine food processing. manufactunim, of metal 
goods and specialised yacht building 'were also on a hit list of 'suitable' 
manufacturing industries for the area, 
Other aspects ofpolicy 
As has already been argued, the Economic Plan was an important strand of Plaid 
Cymru's evidence to the Commission on the Constitution in 1970. Moreover. Plaid's 
evidence provides another important insight into the development of policies at the 
start of the decade. Despite the focus on economics, language remained an important 
consideration within the party. Whilst Plaid felt the Welsh Language Society led I 
propaganda campaigns to ensure that equal validity for the language was observed by 
private and public bodies, there were still those within the party who saw language as 
the key area of party policy. The most prominent of these spokesmen was Robyn 
Lewis, Plaid's candidate in Caemarfonshire in the 1970 general election and a former 
Labour party candidate. 85 Lewis led a strident attempt to locate language at the 
epicentre of the devolution debate. He combined condemnation of government policy 
(in particular the 'permissive' Welsh Language Act of 1967) with legal and moral 4D 
justification for preserving the language. 86 Yet, despite the linking of language with r) -- 
the devolution debate, Lewis' statement to the Commission on the status of the 
language was indicative of the fact that there were still those within the party who sa", 
Plaid's role fundamentally as guardians of Welsh language and culture, rather than as 
an important political party with an all-round programme. For this faction, lanatla, e, 1: 1 __ 
rather than the emotive quest for devolution, explained Plaid's growing populanty in 
Welsh speaking Wales during the late 1960s. As Lewis argued: 
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It would be no exaggeration to say that the Welsh language has become. and is, the major talking point in Wales today - possibly to a greater extent than 
any other major issue, the issue of a Parliament for\ValeS. " 
Yet, whilst some traditional party aims were kept alive, the quest for modemisation 
continued unabated. The need to develop a dynamic, modem Wales was made clear in 
the party's developing educational policy. Plaid's educational policy in the 1960s was 
influenced by the devout nationalist Professor Jac L. Williams of Aberystw-ýIh, ýý ho 
as early as 1963 highlighted the deficiencies of technical education in '"'ales. As 
Williams argued, it was essential that Welsh education adapted to modem demands 
for 'economic prosperity is more closely linked with education in our time than ever 
before'. Williams had been highly critical of the 'eleven plus' examination - and 
highly supportive of comprehensive education because 'stratlficatlon and status 
groups are alien to the Welsh social structure'. He had also been critical of the 
Robbins Report, with its 'essentially English and Conservative' concern for the 
education of an elite entering universities and colleges at a certain age. Again this did 
not fit in well with Welsh needs which would demand the acquisition of new skills 
and retraining at an older age. Moreover, as Williams argued, 'Wales must aim at 
educated communities, not an educated elite'. Bilingual education was also essential, 
not only on cultural but also on economic grounds, for knowledge of both languages 
placed those seeking employment in Wales at a distinct advantage to non-Welsh 
speakers. These beliefs formed the cornerstone of Plaid's education policies at the end 
of the decade. 88 
shortage of skilled labour was regarded as a key disincentive to industrial 
development in Wales -a factor which industrialists had confirmed . 
89 Educational 
Z, provision was partly responsible. The distinctively Welsh tradition of manufacturing 
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generations of schoolteachers as opposed to technicians now stood in the %-%-a%- of 
progress. As the party argued, 'emphasis given to academic. rather than techilical 
education ... is wrong'. As it continued: 
Sending 46% of school leavers to tertiary education is of no use at all if 
factories that establish themselves in Aberystwyth find a shortage of capstan 
lathe operators and find that they cannot expand ... the sad thing is the 
enormous expansion of teacher training in Wales has been far oTeater than in 
industrial retraining centres. 90 
Planning also became an influential feature of evolving Plaid policy. Whilst the partýý 
wholeheartedly favoured devolved governance, it also promoted the de%-elopment of 
close links with the rest of the U. K. where industrial planning was concerned. This 
would ensure that 'we were not cutting each other's throats'. The same principle 
applied to the development of tourism. Lack of planning had ensured a 'haphazard' 
development of the industry - of an industry which now attracted four to four and half 
million visitors 'who spent very little' - and of local authorities who were 'too lax' in 
allowing the development of caravan sites. Planning would ensure the de, ý, elopment of 
manufacturing industry to acceptable levels. This would mean that tourism could 
develop as a high class industry, providing 'icing on the cake'. As Plaid argued, 
tourism could not be regarded as 'the basic staple'. 91 
The rethinking of policy was reinforced by the results of the 1970 general election. 
The party fought all thirty six Welsh constituencies. It also made significant inroads 
into Labour majorities. As Gwynfor Evans argued after the election, this was crucial 
in Plaid's development as it reinforced the party's credibility. Even more satisfaction 
could be taken from the fact that, according to Evans, 1970 was the first real 
'T. V. 
election'. Plaid had held its own in an election largely dominated 
by U. K. rather than 
local issues. " Moreover, a perennial Plaid concern - underexposure in 
the media - 
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had been exacerbated by television companies who had afforded inferior air time to 
the party. The national (U. K. ) press, whose coverage had (naturally) been dominawd 
by the 'big' parties, was matched by a more enli- in ightened attitude towards the party i 
Wales by the Welsh press, which had given the party 'fair' coverage. Plaid had done 
well against the odds. Those who supported the modernising strate(y%, had their 
commitment reinforced. 
Moreover, calls for devolved governance had also been enhanced by the result of the 
1970 election. The Conservative party's UK victory v, -as hardly endorsed by the 
people of Wales. Despite 'ruling' Wales, the party enjoyed the support of onlý, 27.6"o 
of Welsh voters. Thus, over 70% of Welsh voters, who according to Plaid found the 
Tories 'repugnant', had to stomach up to five years of alien governance. Yvlhilst the 
new government had increased the powers bestowed on the Secretary of State for 
Wales (adding responsibility for education), Plaid pointed to the fact that the 
Secretary still did not answer to a Welsh government. To add 'Insult to injury', neither 
'the Secretary of State or the Minister of State was elected by a Welsh constituency'. 
According to Plaid, the goverment were 'Interlopers' in Wales. The 1970 result 
highlighted the need for devolution -a central facet of Plaid's policies. For those 
within the Labour party who were still sceptical or fundamentally opposed to 
devolution the message was clear: 
We shall make the point that the Labour party seem to prefer a Tory 
government in London to a Welsh government ln WaleS. 
93 
For Evans, the 1970 election marked the 6coming of age' of Plaid CyTM. WhIlst 
Plaid had relied heavily on disgruntlement with the Labour party and the 
Labour 
goveMment in its by-election 'successes' in the period from 1964 onwards, 
Plaid's 
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vote in 1970 was perceived as a reflection of the party's popularity rather than of 
Labour's unpopularity. According to Evans, it was natural that Plaid had taken vote, 
off the Labour party in those by-elections, especiallý, as both Labour and Plaid were 
'radical' parties and thus competed for 'radical' -votes. Moreover, as Plaid was aware. 
it benefited from being able to attract protest votes from 'Welsh voters who could not 
bring themselves to vote Conservative, andwho increasingly often were not -iven the 
option of voting Liberal. Plaid Cymru were thus a 'safe' protest vote. Howe% er, in 
1970 the party felt that it had not benefited from protest votes. Plaid argued that 
morale within the Labour party had been high both before and during the election. 
Plaid's canvassers had not found evidence of unhappiness amom, 'core' Labour 
supporters. As Evans argued, 'people who voted for us v, ýere people who largely 
supported our policies'. 94 
As this chapter has shown, Plaid Cymru underwent a significant process of change 
after 1959. It began to talk about a broader range of political issues and constructed 
policies which it felt were designed to deal with the social and economic realities of 
mid twentieth century Wales. Importantly, as far as the party's chances of electoral 
success were concerned, the party began to shed its exclusive, middle class, 'VVelsh 
speaking and elitist image. In Welsh speaking Wales, the party began to permeate 
staunch Labour areas. Development of policy meant that Plaid had begun to talk the 
language of the unemployed and of council estates, as well as that of 
lecturers, 
schoolteachers and eisteddfod-goers. As the results for the 
1970 election 
demonstrated, the modernisation of organisation and policy after 
1959 seemingly did 
not go unrewarded. 
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The 'modernisation' of policy had several significant aspects. It convinced VOLincy 
activists that Plaid was a se ous political party that ývas startin-, to rt th ir -' eflec el n or N IeNý s. 
it contributed to the public images of Plaid as a party 'vý'hich could provide 
alternatives, and which was interested in more than the langua-ge. It meant Plaid ýas 
publicly participating in the business of 'proper' politics. There was certainly a 
serious attempt to sketch the outlines of policy areas, something which could and did 
reflect a blend of intellectual influences from 'small is beautiful' to varieties of 
socialism. Yet pragmatically this had to be married with traditional concerns, such as 
the protection of agriculture, and with a negative critique of 'the British'. In some 
respects, policy proposals were there to show that Wales (if independent and under 
Plaid) could do better. Yet the proposals were largely uncosted, and depended on very 
dubious assumptions and some very sketchy ideas. There was still a strong 'negative' 
element to the party's ideas, whilst prominent members (like Robyn Leýý'is) still 
stressed the language as a primary concern. These holes and disagreements only 
'mattered' if they were exposed - or in the extremely unlikely event of Plaid 
achieving power. 
The significance of this reorientation was enhanced by another powerful contribution 
to Plaid's growing reputation and popularity. Despite the commitment to become a 
competitive political party, Plaid did not abandon its pressure group tactics. In 
actively seeking inclusion in the game of power politics from the mid 1960s omvards, 
Plaid could draw on its experience as a pressure group - and especially the 
propaganda machine that had facilitated success for the party in this area - for 
Political gain. This approach provided a third dimension to undermining Labour's 
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superiority in north-west Wales, -a powerful emotive critique, in which the prý-scncc 
of a 'practical' Plaid alternative was just ammunition to be simplified and fired. 
increasingly strong frustrations aired by Welsh political commentators through the 
columns of the Welsh press, and devoid of 'hard' alternatives, serxed to undermine 
Labour's credibility in areas like north-west Wales. The development of this critique 
of Labour will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Five 
Undermining Credibility: The Nationalist Critique of V Government Policy and Images of the Labour partY 1964-73 
Studies show that people do not even select 'the most important issues' in an election- b% far the 
most important factor is the part,, image, which is in effect a mental set or impression o' f 'ý% hat a 
party stands for' gathered from impressions, propaganda and discussion. 
N, ew Sociei),. October 1964 
For any challenger, the problem is that Labour could win at least half the Welsh seats with 
candidates proved to be polygamous, atheistic, alcoholic and tone-deaf. 
Nfer%vn Jones, N ew Statesman, 1966 
After 1966 there were significant changes in the structure of Welsh politics. Despite 
Labour's overwhelming success in Wales at the 1966 electi inance 'on, Labour's domi 
was unchallenged in many constituencies thereafter. The period sa,, v Plaid Clvmru's 
emergence as a credible political challenger to Labour. Plaid Cymru's \ Ictory in the 
Carmarthen by-election was followed by dismal Labour by-election performances in 
Rhondda and Caerphilly, where Plaid again provided a surprising, but fonnidable 
challenge. Labour was rocked in its heartland. 
This chapter examines Plaid Cymru's attempt to build on this potential, and on the 
party's attempt to exploit some of the issues which could undermine Labour's 
of its orgarnsat, on and reputation. Although Plaid had undertaken a thorough revi I c:, 
policies in the 1960s - understanding that it needed to refine 
both if it wished to 
become a serious 'player' in Welsh politics - its propaganda was less cerebral. 
Its 
main attack was on the sentiments expressed by Labour's Secretary of State for Wales 
from 1968-70, George Thomas, that 'no government has ever done so much for Wales 
as this Labour government'. Nowhere was this critique more apparent than in 
Welsh 
t _ý 
tinctively Welsh language newspapers and journals, where Labour's attention to dis 
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social and economic problems was rigorously examined, satanis, -d, distorted and 
refuted. As in the 1950s, this campaign ý, vas led by Plaid C,, mru, through the -y 
columns of the party's two newspapers, Y Ddra ig Goch and the J Felsh Natio n. 
The purpose of the critique was two-fold. On the one hand its purpose initially waý, to 
apply pressure on the Labour party to live up to its image as 'the party of Wales'. 
Thus, the Welsh press often saw its role as an important Welsh political lobby, 
reminding Labour of the responsibilities that came with its dominance of Welsh 
politics - particularly when Labour policies disappointed or fell short of expectations. 
On the other hand, and as time went on, there were also more concerted efforts to 
undermine Labour's credibility. Among these more openly hostile attacks were 
attempts to highlight the alleged duplicity of Labour policy; to argue that the Labour 
party in Wales was little more than an irrelevant 'branch' of the 'English' party; to 
stress the inefficient and corrupt nature of Labour's personnel and the general 'failure' 
of Labour policies. Labour's response was far less potent or unified (as the final part 
of the chapter indicates), a reflection of internal divisions and a declining 1. ) 
organisational capacity to fight back. 
The Nationalist Critique ofLabour and Government Policy 
During the 1950s Plaid Cymru had - to a large extent - focussed on the perceived 
duplicity of Labour policies on Welsh issues. From supporting Labour's MPs who 
were sympathetic to 'nationalist' issues, the Welsh language press and Plaid Cymru 
became highly critical of those within the Labour party whose attitude towards 
'Welshness' was less favourable. Labour's members from the south were particular 
I 1950s these had included senior party and frequent targets of indignation. In the C 
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members such as Ness Edwards, Cliff Prothero, George Thomas, James Cal'i3glixi 
and more surprisingly, Jim Griffiths. Exceptions to the rule included S. O. Davi, -s and 
Tudor Watkins. ' 
Labour's handling of the Parliament for Wales campaign - probablv more than 
Tryweryn - had led to widescale condemnation of the party in the Welsh lan,, uae 
21 
press. Discomfort within the Labour party over the campaig gn - especially threats to 
expel its supporters from the party - had provided both Plaid Cymru and the \Velsh 
language press with bountiful ammunition to attack the contradictions and 
inconsistencies evident in Labour's policies for Wales. They viewed the Parliament 
for Wales debacle as a symptom, not the cause, of Labour's problems. In spite of the 
arrival of new Labour MPs who were sympathetic to nationalist causes in the period 
after 1945, anti-devolutionists and those allegedly unsympathetic to 'Welshness' 
continued to dominate the party throughout the 1950s. The Welsh language press, 
especially those sympathetic to nationalist demands or to Plaid Cymru, felt their 
concems were marginalized by the south Wales, anglicised, leadership of the Labour 
party. The nationalist critique attacked the validity of Labour's democratic values, the 
impact of the party's 'socialism', its paranoid reaction to the 'rise of nationalism' 
(especially given Labour's dominance of Welsh politics), the deficiencies of Labour 
policy and the general lack of interest afforded to Wales by Labour's London leaders. 
Despite Labour's positive attitude to Welsh issues, signified by the installation of a 
: -I 
Secretary of State for Wales and its continued success in Welsh speaking areas, the 
Welsh language press stressed that such people were still a minority of the partY. 
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Labour's return to power in 1964 was thus welcomed - but sceptlcally. As Barn 
noted: 
Wales should be grateful for a Labour government. It should be remembered that more than half Welsh voters have supported Labour for thirty ycars. It 
will be interesting to see how grateful Labour rt Without '11 be for this suppo doubt, this government has given Wales more in two da,,, s than in its pre%-1OL11% 
six years of government. No doubt Plaid Cyrnru and the Liberals will ar, _'ue that this is, indirectly, a sign of the pressure exerted by them. ' 
Appointing a Secretary of State was a step in the right directioii, a fact enthusiasticall%- 
supported by younger Labour MPs, who began proclaiming the virtues of Labour', 
status as the real 'party of Wales'. 4 For nationalists, the real battles still had to be 
fought. Labour's overwhelming grip on Welsh politics merely demonstrated its 
potential. Delivering the goods would be more difficult. As the article continued: 
It is not administrators that are lacking in the Labour party but vision. There 
are no leaders in the party who are prepared to organ'se a united effort to stan(I 
up for Welsh causes. Many Welsh socialists are prepared to defend the Welsh 
language and make a stand against the building of an English new town in mid 
Wales. The leadership is not there because too many talented young 
Welshmen decided to fight outside the Labour party. 
Labour did indeed face a problem. On the one hand, its electoral victory placed the 
party in a favourable position to deliver policy commitments on regenerating Welsh 
economic and industrial infrastructures. On the other hand, its victory placed Plaid 
Cymru in a stronger position. In the 1950s and early 1960s Labour had been the 
popular anti-Tory, anti-govemment force. Mismanagement of the Welsh economy had 
been blamed on Tory inefficiency and incompetence. But as nationalists pointed out, 
Labour now had to deliver on those promises if its reputation was to remain intact. As 
Plaid argued: 
For thirteen years the majonty of Welshmen have blamed the Tones for everý, 
weakness. When the government's shortcomings become obvious now, they 
will be unable to say that things will be better when Labour is in: 
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Moreover, some nationalists felt that Labour's small majority was an added bonus. 
They hoped that Labour's MPs, sympathetic to the nationalist agenda, could use the 
government's small majority as a lever to extract concessions in return for continued 
backbench support. 
In reality, as many were aware, this was an unlikely prospect. Whilst nationalists were 
correct in assuming that the Labour party in Wales remained deeply divided, after a 
long period in opposition it was unlikely that even the most patriotic of Welsh 
members would undermine the government supporting the nationalist cause. The 
motivation for Plaid to continue its important pressure-group role was therefore clear. 
Plaid believed that without its existence and its pressure-group tactics, the pro-Welsh 
faction within the Labour party would be weakened. 
Initially, these tactics did not change. Condemnation of the 'powerful (anti-Welsh) 
local bandit chieftains' who controlled the party in the south continued. 6 Clearly, 
some elements of the Labour party were more commendable than others. The problem 
was that the commendable elements of the Welsh Labour party were a minority force. 
As the Welsh Nation noted: 
We admit that the Labour party in Gwynedd is not what it is in some parts of 
our southern valleys and that there is a world of difference between, say, 
Goronwy Roberts and lori Thomas. But the Gwynedd tail has never wagged 
the Labour dog, and it is where Labour is most powerful and longest 
7 established that we must look for its true image . 
No credit could be taken for apparently enlightened attitudes towards some form of 
devolution in some quarters of the party. The sceptics had not been won over. On the 
contrary, for Plaid Cymru, Labour would use its pro-devolutionists to stifle the growth 
of nationalism. Demonstrating a continuing belief in the importance of Plaid's 
pressure group role, the editorial continued: 
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In support of this it is argued that there are many good men in that party whose 
attitude is very close to ours, and who are doing good work. This xý-e rcadily 
concede. Few in numbers they certainly are, and beset by all kinds of 
difficulties. And it is precisely for their sake, among other considerations, that 
we must refuse to join them. For if Plaid Cymru ceased to function these 
patriotic spirits would have nothing to threaten or reproach Labour with and 
their influence would be even less than it is now. 
The political beliefs of Goronwy Roberts, T. W. Jones and Cled", yn Hughes were 
untypical. Much more typical of Labour's real views were the views of members from 
the south, where sympathy and support for 'Welshness' - notably devolution - was 
still found wanting. By 1966 Barn estimated that of thirty two Welsh Labour ', 'vlPs, 
only half -'eighteen or nineteen' - could be relied upon 'to understand the national 
point of view'. 
8 
The appointment of a Secretary of State for Wales was explained away, rather than 
recognised as a sign of positive change. Some thought it was a cynical political move, 
aimed at cutting off the supply line of nationalist sentiment. Plaid Cymru clearly 
believed that it forced Labour's hand. It was 'slowly succeeding in establishing Wales 
as a political entity'. Establishing the post was 'another tribute to nationalist 
strength'. 9 If some saw the establishment of the post as a crucial first step toward thýý 
much more significant goal of Welsh devolution, others were concerned that the 
installation of a Secretary of State was an example of Labour 'fudging' an attempt to 
find a cheap and painless 'final solution' to the 'Welsh problem'. ' 0 
Attacks on the people appointed as Secretary of State were frequent and often savage. 
Positive representations of the powers of the Welsh Office - and its achievements - 
declined rapidly when Labour was in power and worsened under the Tories. In part, at 
least, this was an indication of Labour's deteriorating relations with the press in Wales 
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up to the mid 1970s. 11 The weak and ineffective marketing of the IýVelsh Office - not 
allowing for its many faults and failures - ý, vas described in the Kilbrandon report as a 
key factor in the growing support for further devolution. 11 Nationalist pressure 
undoubtedly played a significant role in this process, for the Welsh language press 
increasingly acted as a nationalist voice. 
Initial criticism of the Welsh Secretary focussed on the limited powers given to the 
incumbent. 13 To Plaid this demonstrated Labour's lack of faith in Wales' ability to 
control its own affairs. It was portrayed as a de-centralist gesture which ensured that 
real power remained safely housed in Westminster. Neither was the image of the 
office aided (in north-west Wales at least) by seemingly inappropriate and 
inconsistent decision making. As has already been argued, Jim Griffiths had come 
under fire in 1965 for his refusal to back the interests of the slate industry in north 
Wales (see Chapter Three), and the critique intensified under Cledwyn Hughes. 
Hughes' spell at the Welsh Office (1966-1968) coincided not only with the low-point 
of the 1964-70 Labour governments, but also the (associated) pinnacle of Plaid 
Cymru's 'surge'. Hughes' status as one of those Labountes sympathetic to a 
nationalist agenda raised expectations and hopes among many nationalists; but 
economic constraints, poorly constructed goverrunent policies and lack of Support 
(particularly among the PLP and within the Cabinet) made it difficult for Hughes to 
deliver popular Welsh reforms. 
Some nationalists grudgingly saw Hughes's appointment as a sign that Labour 
intended to live up to its status as the party of Wales. 14 Yet, almost immediately the 
, I, ovemment was placed on the back-foot by economic problems and Plaid's electoral 
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success. The former made policy commitments almost impossible to achieve. The 
latter helped intensify unfavourable attitudes within the party. 15 In time, Hughes , vas 
redesigned as a 'disappointment'. 16 Yet, as Plaid propaganda stressed, this was no ltý 
more than many in nationalist circles had predicted. Individuals could do nothing. For 
some, Hughes' appointment was part of the arch-villain Harold Wilson's plan to push 
through more unpopular measures in Wales. He wanted 'a popular and able 
Welshman to do 1t%17 
Events after 1966 lent credibility to the proposition. There were plenty of 'unpopular 
measures' to go around. Hughes' period at the Welsh Office coincided with several 
controversial policy issues; a new town for mid Wales; the re-organisation of Welsh 
local government; the Welsh Language Act and growing pressures on the Welsh 
economy, to name but a few. More sceptics and cynics began to describe Hughes' 
appointment as a smokescreen, which disguised ambiguities in Labour's Welsh 
policies. Contrary to the image which Hughes helped to convey, they argued that 
support for a 'nationalist' agenda and respect for 'Welshness' remained weak within 
the party. Despite 'the successes of conscientious Welshmen in the Labour party and 
in Wilson's appointments', there were 'dark clouds' on the horizon. The party's anti- 
devolutionism provided high profile examples of this 'betrayal'. However, the rot had 
also set in at local level. As Barn argued, those willing to support a 'nationalist' 
agenda on local councils had deteriorated in number. Up until the 1960s, Welsh local 
councils - often dominated by Labour - had incorporated an 'older briýgade'- 
Often 
Welsh speaking and typically emanating from radical, non-conformist backgrounds, 
they were sympathetic to 'Welshness'. However, an emerging generation did not 
Possess the same values. Instead, 'anti-Wales Welshmen, English Welshmen' or 
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'Welshmen with little knowledge of Wales' were becoming worryingly familiar. I -- 
Labour not only had to address its status as *the party of Wales' at 'Westmisnter. but 
also on local councils. This was ominous, especially in light of plans for local 
govemment re-organisation. As Barn argued: 
It is at this level rather than at Westminster that the Labour party needs more 
enthusiastic Welshmen. The work of Emyr Currie Jones as Labour member of 
Cardiff City Council, for example, deserves more respect than the sudden rise 
of Elystan Morgan-' 8 
Even when Labour appeared to respond to its Welsh responsibilities, the critique of 
the party continued. Instead of accepting Labour's Welshness, nationalists accused the 
Labour party of trying to manipulate the growing sympathy for nationalism for 
political gain. According to Barn, Labour used 'nationalist' candidates to kvin 
important seats, and to consolidate its power, whilst still remaining unsympathetic 
towards nationalist demands. In Conway, Merioneth, Denbigh and Maldwyn, Plaid 
Cymr-u believed it had lost votes to 'attractive', 'nationalist' Labour candidates in the 
1966 general election. Conway was a prime example. In taking 506 votes from Plaid 
Cymru, Labour had won the seat with a majority of 581. Ceredigion was another. 
There, Labour had selected a candidate who had been one of Plaid Cyrnru's 'leading zn 
lights' only nine months earlier, and until joining Labour had 'shown very little 
interest in socialism'. For Barn this was a cynical Labour tactic, remin-iscent of Cliff 
Prothero's backing for Lady Megan Lloyd George's candidature in Carmarthen in 
1957, only a couple of years after his bitter opposition to the Parliament for Wales 
campaign (led by Lady Megan). This was not a sign that nationalism or Welshness 
were being respected, but yet another sign of Labour skulduggery and politically t: ' 
motivated cynicism. For Plaid, Labour - just like the Liberal party 
before them - 
exploited nationalist sentiments that already existed, whilst at the same time showing 
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little interest in developing those sentiments. However, as the Liberal parvy's 
experience had shown, the Welsh public would not be fooled by this. Plaid C%Tnru 
would continue to build its machine and wait for 'the call. '19 
Others on the left of Plaid Cymru saw the influx of former 'non- socialists' into 
Labour ranks as less surprising, given Labour's increasingly right-wi C, ing stance on a 
number of policy issues. According to these nationalists, Labour was betraying its 
socialist roots. Foreign policy (especially government support for US involvement in 
Vitetnam) defence spending and deteriorating relations with trade unions, provided 
just three examples. These were all issues which were subject to intense and sustained 
anti-Labour propaganda in the period up to 1974. 
Plaid pointed out (at great length), that Labour's neglect of its roots, betrayal of 
socialist principles and failure to address popular discontent had all contributed to the 
party's defeat in the Carmarthen by-election. T. Glynne Davies argued, that, in the 
aftermath of Carmarthen, Plaid Cymru's position had never been stronger given that: 
It was probably easier now than ever before for any Welsh socialist who has 
had a bellyful of government policies to turn to the radicalism of Plaid 
Cymru. 20 
Some nationalists still feared that by challenging the Labour party more vigorously, 
Plaid could split the pro-Welsh vote and thus let in parties who were less sympathetic 
to 'the cause'. However, sections of the Welsh language press pointed to the fact that 
any Plaid's victories would not 'ruin Labour's chances of forming an 
administration'. 21 This was fine whilst Labour had a majority, but it might not be 
valid at the next election. Davies noted that if Plaid was right in arguing that the 
Carmarthen result demonstrated that a 'new spirit' of Welshness had been aroused, 
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and that it would be fighting every seat in the next general election. there ýý-as a 
danger that seats occupied by prominent 'nationalist' Labour NIPs might be 
endangered. These were not seats that Plaid Cymru had a chance of winniiia. but 
'ones that could be won by candidates who had not a bIt of sympathy for Welshness'. 
Inserting pro-nationalist Labour men was a half-gain for 'the cause'. Labour ýý as bad 
- but not half as bad as the Tories. As Davies continued: 
Can Wales afford to lose the likes of Elystan Morgan, Ednyfed Hudson 
Davies, Goronwy Roberts, Emlyn Hooson, Geraint Morgan, Wil Edwards and, 
come to that, Gwynfor Evans himself?.. the danger is that all the hard work that 
has been put in lately will go to waste because Plaid will be more important to 
some people than the principles its stands for. 22 
This stimulated a political debate over Plaid's reason d'etre'. If the party's aim was to 
improve the long-term condition of Wales - socially, economically and culturally - it 
had to be a political party. However, the party's active participation as a 'proper' 
political party, especially as it grew in strength, could threaten the Welsh cause in the 
short-term. This was a difficult problem to reconcile, especially in Plaid propaganda. 
If nationalist sympathy in Westminster weakened because Labour 'nationalists' were 
defeated, policies could then be developed that paid scant attention to, and showed 
little understanding of, Welsh needs. However, some nationalists argued that this was 
already happening. Despite the existence of a number of MPs who were sympathetic 
to the nationalist cause, government policy had demonstrated that those voices were 
ineffective. Numerous examples were c1ted, but the controversies surrounding the 
Welsh new town became one of the most prominent. This was a largely economic 
Policy which, nationalists argued, paid scant attention to Welsh social and cultural 
needs. 
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Feýw government policies aroused more hostility from nationalist quarters that plans to 
build a new town near Caersws in mid Wales. The NeNv Towns Act of 1946 ývas 
considered by many contemporaries as one of the post-war Labour govemment's 
ýmost exciting achievements', a 'truly socialist concepti 3 Modern housing, new 
community services and a new set of surroundings xould be among the attributes of a 
new town development. In Wales, as has already been argued, a new town also 
promised to make a valuable and important contribution to the development of a 
Welsh economic and industrial infrastructure (see Chapter Three). However, new 
town developments were also seen as a classic example of a policy designed largely 
for England which did not fit Welsh needs - particularly the needs of Welsh speaking 
rural Wales. A new town, as developed by Labour, would cause immense damage to 
Welsh culture, the language and traditional Welsh communities. 
Concerns over a new town had been aired by Plaid Cymru well in advance of the 
conu-nissioning of the goverment's official report, A A'ew Town for Mid Wales, 
published in 1966 . 
24 As early as 1964 the new town idea had been met with suspicion. 
Whilst acknowledging the positive aspects of the desire to breathe life into rural 
Wales, Plaid spokesmen such as Pennar Davies had expressed concems that, without 
a Welsh govemment, the town would become a 'pathetic cipher in the 
disproportionate distribution of British economic power'. 25 Others shared the same 
concerns. As lorwerth Peate argued, the new town idea was another example of mis- 
directed attempts to tackle the problem of depopulation. Labour's plan did not 
concentrate on the need to expand job opportunities, whilst at the same time 
preserving communities. It was another large scheme which paid scant attention to 
local needs. This theme was expanded upon by T. Glynne Davies: 
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This is an opportunity for Birmingham to share its smoke with Wales ... it 1S not an attempt to put mid-Wales on its feet. Politically, spiritually and for the 
community it can do no good in the long term. At a time when people inside 
and outside the Labour party are attempting to make people discover the 
Welshness in their hearts, here is Welshness being drowned by a flow from 
England which couldn't care less about Welshness and as figures count in a 
democracy, here is an eternal blow to Welshness. In one blow the percentage 
of Welsh speakers will decline dramatically. In one blow a count-v which is 
solidly religious will turn into a materialistic mess, the 'werin' being 
swallowed up by the proletariat. 26 
In one short critique, Glynne Davies summarised the fears of Plaid's traditional 
supporters, but infused it with a populistic rhetonc. The critique of the new town 
developed by Plaid was aided by the Welsh press. As Barn argUed, the new town ýxas 4D 
another example of Labour policy which looked good on paper. 27 However, the 
party's limited interest in the views of local people in mid Wales was used once again 
to suggest Labour's arrogance and detachment. So too was the fact, admitted in the 
report, that the decision to build a town in mid Wales was a purely political 
decision. 28 It provided a fine example of the Kilbrandon Report's conclusion that 
approval for devolution had flourished, in part because 'government is remote and 
insufficiently sensitive to the views and feelings of the people'. 29 If one of the 
potential consequences of a new town development was that a substantial number of 
new jobs would be created, the official report made little secret of the fact that these 
would not be catering for Welsh needs. The new town would help to solve 'overspill' 
problems in the midlands rather than unemployment in rural Wales. 30 
In 1966 Plaid Cymru published a propaganda pamphlet, Develop all Wales, which 
dealt exclusively with the issue of a new town. The pamphlet combined condemnation 
of government policy with constructive views on how similar types of development 
could be made to work in a self-governing Wales. Plans for the new town to serve as I 
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an 'overspill' area for Birmingham vvere dismissed as 'a plan hatched by gentlemen 
sitting in London'. 31 Develop all Wales and other nationalist literature on the issue 
focussed on a few key issues. It dismissed government claims over the value of the 
development. It argued that the new town would not halt depopulation in rural areas. 
Neither would it relieve the burden of local ratepayers or tackle the serious problem of 
unemployment. On the contrary, it would exacerbate the problems of depopulation by 
4seducing' young from other rural areas of Wales. It would not mean improvement for 
the Welsh, simply because the town was 'a gift for England'. 2 Labour's plan -, vas 
about England, not Wales, would not bring economic benefit to the kVelsh poor, 
Plaid's critique was infused with a language implying that a new town ývould involve 
the corrupt and immoral contamination of the Welsh people. 
Even though Plaid Cymru admitted that the idea of a 'growth centre' was sensible, the 
problem was that this was yet another example of the 'English' government exploiting 
(or showing little regard for) Wales. It provided further evidence that 'govenu-nent 
still did not treat Wales as a nation', but as another problematic region of the UK. It 
might attempt to aid Wales with a patchwork of policies, but these showed little 
regard for traditional Welsh communities, culture and the language. Instead, like 
Scotland, Wales was treated as a 'fringe province' of England - abused in the same 
way as Brittany was by the French. Policies rejected in England could be imposed on 
the Welsh 'from above'. Plaid argued that new town developments had been rejected 
by Hereford, Warwick and Shropshire, but had been 'dumped' on mid Wales. 33 The 
solution was devolution. As Plaid argued, the only way to save rural areas was to 
bring work to every region, town and village. This was not an impossible feat, since It 
had been achieved by other small nations such as Switzerland and Denmark. 34 
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Although the plan was postponed because of economic cuts in May 1967, Plaid feared 
that the govemment would resurrect the nex town project at a future date. Plaid 
pledged to 'bury the report' by continuing to highlight its inefficiencies and 
contradictions. Second, it proposed to 'offer something better instead'. Of the two, 
Plaid considered the former much easier than the latter - not only because of the 
gaping holes which littered the report, but also because of their own limited 
experience of policy development. However, using the research group's findings and 
policy ideas Plaid were able to present a more 'practical' solution for de-veloping 
4growth centres', which still recognised the distinctive social and cultural needs of 
Wales. Plans for such growth centres had featured prominently in the 'Economic 
Plan' published in 1969 (see Chapter Four). Plaid now tried to go one stage further, 
marrying rhetorical attacks with its own constructive suggestions - and trying to 
become a more credible force in the process. Parallel developments were part of the 
party's growth in north-west Wales, and in Merioneth in particular. As has already 
been argued, Plaid's opposition to goverm-nent plans to expand Bala allowed the local 
party (through the influence of Dafydd Wigley) to develop policy ideas that would 
later feature in the Economic Plan. 
There were also numerous other propaganda opportunities which arose from the 
nature of Labour's policies, although on most of those occasions 'constructive 
altematives' were hardly to the fore. The local Labour MP, Wil Edwards, xas at the 
centre of these controversies. Edwards was one of the young, emerging 'talents' in the 
party, having replaced T. W. Jones as Merioneth's MP in 1966. However, unlike his 
predecessor, who had been cautious on cultural issues, Edwards was less astute. 
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Given local concerns over depopulation, the emergence of the 'second homcs' debate. 
the growth of Plaid Cymru and the 'Vv'elshness' of the county, Edwards' views on 
Bala's development provided local reinforcement for the doubts raised by Plaid over 
Labour's plan for the mid-Wales new town development. 
Edwards (showing honesty unbecoming of a politician) readily admitted that 'growth 
centres' would be used to attract English in-migrants. Unlike GoronNN--,,, Roberts and 
Cledwyn Hughes, who claimed that the economic development of north-west Wales 
could lead to the 'repatriation of migrants', Edwards was less certain. His arguments 
also seemed to imply that in-migration was necessary because the Welsh ", ere 
materialistic and lacking in 'energy'. According to Ed,,,,, ards, the new wave of in- 
migants: 
Would not come from the slums of Birmingham and Liverpool. Those people 
are going nowhere. The people who will be moving will be those -Vvith a bit of 
go in them. It is nonsense to talk of boys from Wales coming here. They are 
all doing too well in England to want to come back ... the English who will 
come into the area will be a benefit to the local community. They are people 
with energy. We have to accept in-migrants - and they will be English. 
For Plaid Cymru this was a sign of the Welsh Labour party's 'politics of deceit'. It 
11 ability of local was a sip that the local Labour party had lost all faith in the 
communities to fend for themselves. The government's solution to the problems of 
north-west Wales was to build factories that were so unsuitable to the local area that 
they would destroy local communities or new towns that would swamp them. Like his 
party, Edwards refused to acknowledge that the problems facing Merioneth could be 
solved by Plaid's altematives: 
The 'madcap' schemes of 'the new towns' are built on this principle, 'Let us 
turn small towns into big towns and agricultural communities into industrial 
communities and we will have solved the problem'. These are the ideologies 
of 'quack doctors' who don't know how to treat the 'flu so give the patient 
typhoid and try to treat that instead. 35 
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In reply, Plaid suggested that a much larger conspiracy was at hand. It claimed that 
Labour's scheme for Bala was only one strand of a much larger project, which had 
little to do with providing jobs for local people. On the contrary it was part of a much 
gander scheme to make central Wales a 'Birmingham back-vard'. As the article 
continued: 
Mr. Edwards's speech has shown that he is quite vvillinor to see NVelsh t) 
communities destroyed for the sake of Birmingham. Even though he is an NI P 
for a Welsh constituency, he is merely a pawn in the game of those -"N, ho see 
eradicating Wales as a feasible answer to the problems of Wales. 36 
Language was another divisive and highly controversial issue which was used in anti- 
Labour, anti-Westminster, propaganda. Whilst language has often been over-stated as 
one of the driving forces for Plaid Cymru's development as a political force, it was 
nonetheless an important factor. In addition to reinforcing the sentiments addressed 
above, its preservation appealed on another level to traditional, culturally minded and 
educated Welsh speakers. It was also one of several driving forces behind support for 
Plaid Cymr-u and the quest for devolution by the early 1970s - and a particularly 
important political factor in north-west (Welsh speaking) Wales. It was an issue which 
Labour had to treat with care, given that most of its supporters spoke English and 
were concerned about the domination of Welsh speakers. As the Kilbrandon Report 
recognised: 
The attitude survey suggests that, although there is a notable degree of 
sympathy among non-Welsh speakers for the idea of preserving and teaching 
the Welsh language, there is also a feeling that those who speak Welsh would 
be the ones to gain most ftorn devolution. 37 
Labour was certainly alive to the importance of the language issue in the 1960s. The 
Welsh Language Act of 1967 symbolised the government's concern to address the 
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issue. However, the Act was another example of a Labour policy 'achievement' that 
failed to please Plaid Cymru. The Act was another *milestone' go-vernment polic%, 
which, like the Secretary of State for Wales and the nevv town, met with a torrent of 
criticism from Plaid Cymru and some sections of the 'VVelsh press. Plaid CýTnru's 
leading propagandist on the language issue was Robyn Lewis, the party's candidate 
for Caernarfonshire, in the 1970 general election. Lewis was a former member of the 
Labour party, having stood as the party's candidate for Denbigh in the 195-5 election. 
Having joined Plaid Cymru in the early 1960s, he was one of those -, xho soucht to I: - 
revive language as a feature of Plaid Cymru's appeal. However, this was not an old- 
fashioned, cultural concern for the language reminiscent of the party's founding 
fathers. On the contrary, he used the language issue as a symbol of much wider 
governmental contradictions and failures. 38 
There is insufficient space here for a detailed discussion of those controversies, but 
some aspects of the debate are worthy of note. Lewis - and Plaid's - condemnation of 
the Welsh Language Act emanated from its failure to deliver equal validity for the 
Welsh language. 39 Labour's shoddy handling of the Welsh Language Bill was touted 
as one of the reasons Lewis left the party. Alongside Labour's desertion of the 
campaign for devolution, and the party's plans for a new town, the Language Bill 
showed: 
The lip-service which Labour's Welsh Ministers have given to the equality of 
our (and their) language, and their utter inactivity when young Welshmen of 4") 
impeccable character were being thrown into prison for putting that so-called 
equality to the test. 40 
Equality for the language had taken on an Orwellian dimension. Thanks to Labour, 
41 
'both languages (,,, vere) equal, but one language (was) more equal than the other' . 
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Some of Lewis' points of contention were complex, technical and related to the finer 
points of British law (in keeping with the author's legal training . However, mor, 2 
basic points developed Plaid's chtique of government inefficiency and duplicity. 
Lewis, and other critics of the act, bemoaned the contradiction between granting 
4equal validity' and listing thirty one 'recommendations' over language use which 
unpicked and qualified the commitment. As a result, the governinent opened up more 
discontent and provided the platform for a series of campaigns v, 'hich would keep 
language high on the political agenda well into the 1970s. Government forms in 
Welsh, tax discs, passports and TV licences were just some of the issues which kept 
language at the epicentre of nationalist debates in the early 1970s, a period which also 
witnessed one of the high-points of Cýymdeithas Yr laith activism and 'show trials'. 
Two of the recommendations made by Hughes-Parry (in the report that preceded the 
Welsh Language Act) and rejected by the Labour government provided more bad 
publicity. The first was the proposal that 'heads of government departments in Wales 
should be Welsh speaking', the second that 'where proficiency of the language is 
essential for the efficient discharge of duties in the office, an extra allowance should 
be paid'. In the atmosphere of the 1960s, the former attracted great attention. Labour's 
decision not to implement the recommendation may have been shrewd - it was 
probable unworkable and hardly meritocratic - but it became a stick used by 
nationalists to beat the government cluring the high tide of language activism. Related 
criticism followed Labour's attitude to appointing staff at the Welsh Office. 'ýVilson's 
selection of George Thomas as Secretary of State, and Eirene White as Minister of 
State were deemed 'totally unsatisfactory', given that they were not Welsh speakers. 
"' 
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However, this was portrayed as a symptom of a malaise afflicting all of Wales. one 
that called for more positive government intervention in Welsh education: 
The truth is that a non Welsh speaking Welshman is no more suitable to rule 
Welsh speakers than a non-English speaking Englishman would be ruling the 
English. Mr. Thomas acknowledges this by saying that he is learning it, or that 
he has 'Rhondda Welsh', but until we demand a Welsh educational policy and 
that Welsh is taught to every child, it is only in exceptional circumstances that 
43 we can judge a Welshman who does not speak his mother tongue . 
Neither did Labour MPs in constituencies with a large Welsh speaking population do 
themselves any favours when it came to the language issue. Gi,,, -en the traditions of the 
Labour party in north-west Wales, the press capitallsed on instances ", hen Labour 
MPs appeared ignorant of those traditions. Wil Ed, %vards was again a culprit. He 
demonstrated his political inexperience in 1967 when, during a Commons debate on 
the use of language in schools, he admitted that 'bilingualism was not a priority for 
the government'. Barn felt it unsurprising bearing in mind 'the traditions of the party 
he represented'. Providing the essentials in life - such as shelter, food and medical 
care - had always been the priority of socialists. These concerns were understandable. 
However, the problem was with other 'priorities' v, 'hich had concerned Labour since it 
returned to power in 1964 - homosexuality, sexual offences, national sweepstakes, 
Scottish policemen, and wild birds - to name but a few. The question was who 
decided where Labour's priorities lay. The answer was that all these issues had been 
addressed because of 'English' pressure on the government - the same pressure that 
had forced the government to go ahead with re-nationali sing steel before addressing 
other key Welsh concerns. The article concluded by suggesting that Edwards - like t: l 
Labour - may have been playing a political game, attacking nationalism by exploiting C) 
the fears of the south, placing a concern with economics (and south Wales) over the 
language (and north Wales): 
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It is hoped that Wil Edwards presented his own opinions not those of his 
government or the Welsh Office ... for plaýrinlg, one half of Wales off a-zainst 44 the other really would be treacherous . 
Local government re-organisation provided further ammunition for Labour's critics, 
especially as the debate over local government reorganisation in Wales tied in with 
the debate over devolution. Under Cledwyn Hughes, the Welsh Office had hoped to 
use local governrnent re-organisation as a lever towards gaining an elected Welsh 
Council. In the event, Hughes was allowed only to put forward a form of co-opted 
council, the Economic Council for Wales . 
45 The failure to gain approval for an elected 
council was the result of hostility from major figures in the Cabinet and south Walian 
MpS. 46 However, some nationalists blamed Hughes for 'turning his back on an elected 
47 
council' . Others took a more balanced view, seeing it as a classic example of 
Labour's (continued) domination by anti -devol uti oni sts. This Nvas again exploited by 
Plaid. As Plaid argued, this was not simply a matter of anti -devol utioni sm but of anti- 
Welshness, a long-standing government 'disease' v,, hich had been accentuated by 
Plaid's by-election successes. 48 Others, like Dafydd Wigley, argued that Labour's 
rejection of an elected council, and its negative attitude towards devolution in general, 
had resulted in an upsurge of nationalist extremism, and had made it easier for 
extremist groups to recruit. This was 'making the job of those who favour 
conventional or democratic means more difficult'. 49 Along xith Wigley, other Plaid 
candidates from the north-west, such as Robyn Lewis, regularly attacked local Labour 
MPs for 'going quiet' on devolution. Adopting scathing and populist rhetoric, they 
argued that Labour MPs had been seduced by the trappings of power, had lost their 
radicalism and put the interests of the party's whip above the desires of their own 
constituents. io These arguments were not dissimilar to those used by youthful Labour 
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radicals, and were no doubt part of a rebellious 1960s culture - but thev had a 
particular, popular, resonance in north-vvest\Vales. 
Widespread support for an elected council from local authorities provided more 
negative publicity for Labour. Some authorities demonstrated their opposition to plans 
to another nominated body by refusing to nominate representatives to serve on the re- 
designed council. This campaign (which originated within Cardi-anshire Countv 
Council) received support in north-west Wales, particularly from Caemarfonshire 
County Council, and provided Plaid Cymru with valuable anti-Labour propaganda in I 
the local press. Not surprisingly, nationalists serving on the council were the most 
vociferous opponents of the nominated council, none more so than the ageing stalwart 
W. R. P. George .51 An address by George to the council (vvhich received prominent 
coverage in the local press) articulated a much wider body of concern. 
George argued that the government's rejection of a Royal Commission on local 
government reform had led many to believe that its White Paper would reflect a 
commitment to action, including 'radical' reforms. Amongst these was the widely 
anticipated delivery of 'an elected council for Wales, with executive powers' to deal 
with 'urgent and pressing matters'. In the event, all the government had managed to 1: ) 
come up with was: 
A timid, unoriginal and undemocratic proposal as this so-called 'New Welsh 
Council', which is neither new, nor Welsh, nor a Council. 
Again, the 'timidity' of the government's proposals was blamed on the Welsh Office. 
As George continued: 
The real explanation for this timid White Paper is that the Welsh Office is 
itself merely an Agent of the central government and Whitehall. The Secretary 
of State for Wales is not a master in his own house - but give him a 
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democratically elected council , vith executive po, %vers and there %\, ould be 
altogether a healthier set-up in WaleS. 53 
The problem was also one of priorities. Once again, as George argued, 'Wales played 
6second fiddle' to 'special legislation to legalise abortion ... and homosexual acts 
between consenting adults'. Here again, rhetoric was populistic, and infused ývitli 
comments which struck a chord with the traditionally minded. 
In early 1968 Caernarfon County Council wrote to the Welsh Office, confirming that 
it was 'against the setting up of a nominated Welsh Council as proposed in the White 
Paper either now or in the long tenn', and re-iterating its view that 'the only 
democratic basis for a Welsh Council is that it should be an elected council with 
executive powers'. 54 The reply from the Welsh Office showed a modicum of 
sympathy for the council's view. As it argued: 
The Secretary of State ... has asked me to say that he does not believe that there 
are significant differences of opinion between him and your council. ý5 
Despite the sympathy, the controversy demonstrated that the Welsh Office had been 
out-manoeuvred by the Labour 'machine'. Local authorities refusing to nominate 
members for the new council were to be advised that even in the event of changed 
government policy, 'some time - hardly less than three years' would have to elapse 
before an elected Council came into being. 56 In the meantime, Labour's opposition to 
devolution was exploited by the party's nationalist opponents, whilst its faltering 
responses to Council's provided more evidence of vacillation and 'cowardice'. 
Whilst Labour's 'nationalist' credentials came under attack, so too did its position on 
some 'left-wing' issues that had a wider basis of support amongst a liberal 
intelligentsia. This included national and international Labour policies, especially 
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defence spending and US policy in Vietnam. Labour's (deteriorating) relations with 
trade unions and cuts in goverm-nent spendincy, were a vital component of a critique 
developed, in part, by Plaid's more radical elements. As Y Faner noted, government 
spending once again highlighted that priontisation was not one of its strengoths: 
The government cannot afford to give teachers a pay rise or adequate 
buildings to work in, provide old people with pensions and gi%-e NVelsh 
motorists good roads despite the tax we pay ... yet they can afford arms, and developing planes like Concorde, originally supposed to cost E500 million but 
now close to f 800 million ... a gamble played with taxpayers money ... there are 
no ideas of priorities, no talk of putting important things first ... it is'ývrono, that 5- Wales is tied so close politically and economically with such an ideolo,, y. 
The distribution of govenunent spending across the UK was also a matter of 
considerable debate. Plaid Cymru and the Welsh press bemoaned the fact that 
infrastructural spending in England was allegedly not matched in Wales. As Y Faner 
pointed out, even given that Wales was one-sixth the size the England, the disparities 
between the two were still vast and 'unfair'. For example: 
Road improvements: England 1000 miles, Wales 1-7; f 3.7 million spent on 
Coal Board development and research, but only I per cent of this in Wales; 
During 1966/67 Mintech spent f480 million in England, E6 million in Wales; 
Since 1948 f 235 million spent on electrifying railways in England, E6 million 
in Wales; the government spends f6 million advertising in English 
newspapers, f", 000 in Welsh ones; in 1965/66 the goverment spent E2,250 
million on defence, 74 per cent of this in England, 3 per cent in Wales, since 
1945,60 per cent of English children have gone to new schools, 25 per cent in 
Wales. 58 
Industrial strife, and Labour's deteriorating relations with the unions provided ample 
opportunity for nationalists to further condemn the 'rightward' road taken by the 
party. In Place of Strife, widely criticised inside the Labour party, was also exploited 
by Labour's opponents. Some sections of the Welsh press saw the policy as 'the final 
nail in Labour's coffin', and a 'disgrace to a party with such a large majority'. In davs I 
gone by, In Place of Strife would have led to a rebellion in the ranks of the PLP, but 
no longer, 'all the boys are in on this and it makes you think that the whole thing 
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(Westminster) is nonsense -a circus - ", 1 1 th the work'nzg class like sho, %N, horses'. ý" -ýs 
one columnist argued, what was needed was a spirit of rebellion among the -, vorkers. C, 
4more strikes, not less ... to hammer the Labour party'. 
60 Nonetheless, if this was an 
element in Plaid's critique, it was surprisingly not one developed in official, all- 
Wales, propaganda. The party did not shift this far to the left, and at local and national 
level attacked largely on the lines outlined above. 
Labour's removal from office in the 1970 general election naturally influenced Plaid's 
attacks. Plaid's propaganda now focussed on the way in which Labour's contempt for 
devolution had led to a further period of unpopular and undemocratic Tory rule in 
Wales, combining this with a continuing assault on the duplicity of Labour policies 
and increased attention to the inefficiencies of the party's personnel. Some Plaid 
Cymru figures viewed the aftermath of the 1970 election as the beginning of a 'five 
year war'. 61 Others in the party saw the result of the 1970 election as 'Welsh voters 
getting what they deserve. 962 
Elements within the party were concerned that the Conservative victory would 
strengthen Labour's appeal as an anti-Tory force. Propaganda thus focussed on the 
'fact' that successive Tory and Labour goverm-nents had proved that there was little 
difference between the rule of either party so far as Wales was concerned. Labour's 
own anti-government and anti-Tory rhetoric was viewed by Plaid as 'little more than a I 
scheme devised to try and resist the advance of Plaid Cymru'. As the party argued: 
For the fact is that the years of Labour rule were every bit as devastating as 
those of Tory rule. 63 
Labour attacks on the failings of Conservative government were simply not credible. 
As Y Ddraig Goch noted: 
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It would be better if Labour kept quiet about Tory governance in NVales. 
because it is Labour stubbornness over Welsh devolution that ensured that we 
now have to suffer a Conservative govemment ... a higli price to pay for 
government posts for Cledwyn Hughes, Elystan Morgan, George Thomas and 
Goronwy Roberts is having to suffer the governinent from a party that only a 
minority of the Welsh people support. 64 
From the early 1970s Plaid's reconstruction as both a 'radical' and 'socialist' partý, 
enabled it to stress Labour's 'desertion' of radicalism and socialism. 'Welsh 
radicalism' was interpreted by Plaid to have alwa,.,, s entailed a notion of de- 
centralisation. Unlike Labour and the Tones - 'bureaucratic, centralist, umonist 
parties' - Plaid argued that it was the only credible political party in 'ýVales to support 
Welsh political traditions (the Liberal party was not deemed worthy of inclusion in 
the equation). Stressing decentralisation located Plaid within a form of 1960s 
radicalism which also permeated the Labour party. As a propaganda tactic it provided 
a 'political' rather than a 'cultural' case for change, which might appeal to Labour 
voters. Finally, it saw devolution as a 'Welsh' policy, again potentially rooting it in 
'acceptable', almost 'idealist' sentiments. 
The desire to portray Plaid as a 'socialist' party was confirmed in discussions at the 
party's annual conference in 1970. Deemed by the Welsh press as a 'left-tum', it was 
an indication of the increasing importance placed on communitarian politics. As the Zý 
party announced: 
Plaid Cymru is a socialist party ... it has always 
been vitally concerned with the 
social conditions of the people and has always pointed to the capitalist system 
as being divisive, destructive and oppressive. But the socialism that it adopted 
was a people's socialism and not the state socialism which the Labour party - 
that breeding ground of bureaucrats - proudly claimed as its own. 
65 
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Labour's response to the nationalist critique in the 1960s 
The challenge posed by Plaid Cymru in the 1960s and early 1970s provoked a di% er-se 
response from the Welsh Labour party. Some in the party sought to beat Plaid Cyrnru 
at their own game. They wanted Labour to live up to its reputation as the party of 
Wales by delivering policies which were attentive to distinctively NVelsh aspirations. 
Others advocated a more defensive position, proposing hostile attacks on nationalist tl 
doctrine and even Plaid's conception of 'Welshness. ' Even for 'neutrals' there was a 
problem. The party's abject by-election performances and condemnation of 
goverm-nent policy by large sections of Welsh society led many in the party to 
question the party's political strategy, organisational machinery and personnel. Some 
in the party, like Ted Rowlands, wanted special help in countering the nationalist 
threat . 
66 Increased action - at the very least - was essential. 
The 'nationalist' element in the party had grown in strength. The mid 1960s xitnessed 
the emergence within the Welsh Labour party of a number of young prospective MPs, 
whose sympathies for 'nationalist' issues was unquestioned. Among the most 
prominent of these were Gwilym Prys Davies and Elystan Morgan, both of whom had 
been active in Plaid Cymru before switching to Labour. 67 The growing challenge of 
Plaid Cymru made it imperative that Labour kept its traditional integrity in Welsh 
speaking constituencies. The selection of candidates who were 'able'. 'attractive ,, 
68 
Welsh-speaking and (perhaps more importantly) 'loyal' was a major concern. 
Many of these candidates were products of a more 'nationalist' environment. 
Switching between Plaid and Labour in the 1950s and 1960s ,,, -as not uncommon. 
Those who left Plaid Cymru for the Labour party had often stressed the g-reater 
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likelihood of making progress on 'Welsh affairs (notably devolution) within the 
Labour arty. In the 1950s, Megan Lloyd George had provided a high-profile example p 
of such a shift when she abandoned the Liberal party in favour of Labour, ar, -, uing that I 
it was 'only through the Labour party that I can do my best for Wale, . 
69 This 
stimulated an intellectual debate over the ways in which the forces of 'radicalism' in 
Welsh politics were being divided. A new generation of patriotic political activists 
was emerging which was sympathetic to nationalism and socialism. 
Sympathy for a more 'nationalistic' approach had been especially evident amon, -, 
radical university students, some of whom moved into Labour politics. In the early 
1960s the journal Aneurin appeared as a direct response to a changing climate. 
Aneurin sought to convey 'student socialist opinion in Wales'. 70 There were se-ý, -eral 
aims: to contribute to contemporary debates on the principles of socialism, but also, 
and more importantly, to further nationalist support and increase nationalist 
consciousness within the Labour party. The main concern, however, was to channel 
nationalist sympathies away from Plaid Cymru and into the Labour party. 
This theme was developed by several contributors to the journal. The first edition of 
the journal contained a contribution from W. John Morgan entitled the 'Welsh 
Nationalist Party from a Socialist Standpoint'. Morgan was concerned with the fact 
that Plaid was becoming an increasingly potential threat to the Labour party in'W'ales. 
He viewed Plaid as youthful, ambitious, enthusiastic and highly skilled at attracting It) 
media attention. Its potential threat was more serious because: 
Plaid has cornered some of the spirit and fire which in Wales - and I'm sure 
the Nationalist party members will find this a comic, back to front way of 
putting it - one would always hope would express itself within the Labour 
party. 
F1 
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This was a challenge which the Labour party could not afford to ignore. Aneurin 
claimed it would draw the attention of the Labour party in Wales to the need to 
'capture the radical spirit among the young people'. As Morgan argued, th's was 'no 
small service'. For Morgan, the longevity of the Labour party depended on its abilitý, 
to be seen as a modem, radical party that recognised and respected the demands of 
Welsh society. It was also important for Labour to recogmise the traditional spirit of 
radicalism: 
It is quite possible to have ... historical sense, to have passion foryr hen w1ad, 
to want a greater degree of devolution, to want to preserve the Welsh 
language, without being a member of Plaid Cymru. The Labour party still 
seems to me the most likely to achieve what want to see done in Wales 
Aneurin's ambitions exceeded its circulation, but it worked hard to show it was a 
legitimate part of a Labour tradition. In another edition of Aneurin, the paper gave 
space to the views of the veteran 'nationalist' socialist, David Thomas. As the article 
made clear, Thomas's 'nationalist' credentials were second to none. Like many within 
Plaid and a minority in his own party, what worried Thomas most about Wales in the 
1960s was the 'nuclear bomb' and 'seeing so many English people coming to live in 
rural areas'. Aneurin wanted to show that 'prophets' like Thomas had not lost their 
faith in the Labour party as the party of Wales. Thomas had not abandoned his hope 
of seeing a Federal Wales. Also, unlike other influential Labour figures such as Huw 
T. Edwards, he had not been tempted to join Plaid Cymru. For David Thomas the 
problem was not with Labour, but with other parties who distracted Labour from their 
spiritual mission. Parties like Plaid Cymru actually slowed down the process that 
would eventually lead to self-government: 
Plaid are a bit of a nuisance ... because they 
do their utmost to dra"- nationalists 
out of the Labour party, and to some extent they are successful. This '%veakens 
nationalism in the very places where it needs strengthening. 
72 
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Aneurin provided a medium for some young Labour figures to express their vieNNs. 
However, it is significant not for its direct results, but as a sýyrnbol of chanics that 
were taking place in some areas of Labour politics. 73 From the mid 1960s onwards. 
the Labour party's organiser, Ernrys Jones, tried to ensure that a ne", 'breed' of 
Labour candidates, mostly sympathetic to devolution, made their way rapidly through 
74 the party system. Even amongst those for whom electoral success was the main 
concern, nationalism was a challenge to be addressed. This committed and confident 
young generation was anxious to mould the party in its own image. 7i Ideolo,, %,, 
pragmatism, generational change and organisational influence helped to ensure 
changes in Labour's orientation. The party increasingly sought candidates ývho could 
'deal' with nationalism. 
Yet such changes did not transform the party. Carmarthen, Rhondda and Caerphilly 
were more important ingredients in the evolving debate over devolution. As has 
already been argued, local issues and discontent over Labour policies dominated all 
three by-elections. 'Nationalist' agendas (notably devolution) were, in the main, 
peripheral issues. Yet, the impact of these by-elections on Labour's devolutionist 
strategies was profound. Some contemporary political commentators from outside 
Wales suggested that up to 1966, 'the government previously thought that it had 
quieted Welsh separatist feeling through the appointment of a Secretary of State'. By- 
election perforinances in both Wales and Scotland (where support for the SNP also 
gew) were 'a considerable surprise' to the government . 
76 The question was whether 
Labour would address the problem by incorporating devolution, or see *nationalism' 
as a force to be stamped on and stamped out. 
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Those who had entered the Labour party in the hope of influencing the part-v* s We] sh C) 
policy were alanned at the nationalist challenge. Writing to Richard Crossman in 
1966, Gwilym Prys Davies highlighted difficulties within the party. For Da,,, Ies. the 
Welsh Labour party faced a crisis. His concerns reflected a number of those which 
had already been aired by Plaid Cymru: 
Manned by too many opportunists and non-thinkers at local goverment IeN el 
and parliamentary level the Labour party in Wales appears to have been pre- 
empted of its radical idealism and to have transformed itself into a 
domineering caucus in local affairs and into a permanent alternative 
government in the set up of ins and OUtS. 77 
This was not the kind of party which supporters of Welsh radical politics had 
traditionally favoured. Too often the Labour party took its superiority for granted, 
either underestimating or treating political opponents with contempt. The dangers of 
this continuing were clear. As Davies continued: 
There is a very ancient Welsh attitude of not trusting such a party. In these 
circumstances we cannot afford the delusion that the Welsh people -V"'Ill 
continuously support Labour candidates where sermons are hollow ... there are 
only a few thousand Welsh nationalists who accept no limitations to the 
demands nationalism makes on them, but they should not be dismissed too 
lightly. 
For Davies, sociological changes had two potential impacts - both beneficial to the 
4nationalist movement' and detnmental to Labour. The impact of world-wide 
technological and cultural change had a powerful impact on the 'ideas and beliefs at 
the base of Welsh society'. Consequently: 
For many of the elderly cherishing the past, Plaid Cymru stands for that which 
they regard as being best in their heritage. 
However, if this implied that Plaid support was limited to the narrow, old-fashioned 
I cultural nationalists' who had supported the party in the 1930s and 1940s (see 
Chapter One), this was not the case. On the contrary, support for Plaid was also 
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enhanced by the impact of the same processes on a younger generation. As Davi t) les 
continued: 
As the older generation passes on a younger, forward looking generation is 
coming to the fore which is thinking and reacting in terms appropriate to the 
decades in which they grew up. The young Welshman knows nothing of the 
heyday of Methodism, or the struggle against the savage exploitation of 
labour, he is uninterested in the stale controversies of history and shows none 
of the profound respect for his elders for established authonty. It is a 
generation which is in revolt against authority and the . -alues of a by-gone 
age. 78 
Importantly, Davies argued that it would be mistaken for Labour to see Camiarthen 
and Rhondda as 'the result of a temporary political climate', brought about by -an 
unpopular government'. Much more fundamental (and permanent) changes were 
underway. It would be a mistake to think that the 'nationalist tide' would subside 
when 'the climate improved'. The party 'faced a crisis', largely because it had 'Oven 
no systematic thought to Wales as a national community'. There was hope of renevval, 
but for this to occur serious re-thinking would have to be undertaken: 
It is my submission that the Labour movement in Wales can only recover its 
dynamic and raison d'etre by precipitating inside itself a newer distillation of 
the spirit of socialism intimately related to and inspired by our national 
heritage. 79 
In the aftermath of Carmarthen, Da-vies was unsure whether Plaid's success was a 
positive or a negative development, especially in furthering the case for devolution. 
Attempts to attract Davies back to Plaid Cymru failed despite his misgivings over 
Carmarthen as, 'this was not the time to preach Welsh politics. 
80 
If the Crossman letter clearly articulated Davies's dismay at Labour's predicament, an 
extended version of the letter, published in Barn demonstrated that his real concerns 
were much more profound. Some important ingredients were added. On this occasion 
Davies was more critical of Plaid Cymru - and the Labour party. He argued that 
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support for Plaid Cymru was aimless, and typical of the support given in England to 
movements like CND. As he argued, young people: 
See in Plaid Cymru a chance to undermine the institutions which their parents 
generation were over respectful of, but without thinking what kind of 
institutions should take their place. 
More interesting still were his views on the Welsh Labour part-,.,. Davies argued that 
Cledwyn Hughes' period at the Welsh Office was crucial. So too was the influence of 
senior Welsh civil servants such as Goronwy Daniel, 'the power behind the throne'. It 
was imperative that the functions of the Welsh Office were strengthened, and it was 
vital that the Welsh Office be seen to be actively re-building and re-designing the 
Welsh economy, whilst at the same time establishing policies to protect and preserve 
the Welsh language. However, the signs were not good. Fear of a nationalist surge 
meant that a nervousness had engulfed the Labour party. The 'Welsh Office and the 
Secretary of State were easy targets. But problems ran much deeper. As Davies 
argued: 
Cledwyn Hughes's task would be a thousand times easier if the majority of 
Welsh Labour MPs supported what he was trying to do. This is without doubt 
the saddest fact. In criticising the Welsh Office's lack of achievement, vOu 
cannot ignore the mentality of the majority of the Labour party in Wales. The 
sad fact is that the suspicion of nationalism and Plaid Cymru within the party 
has certainly deepened over the last eighteen months. This is one of the direct 
consequences of the blind efforts to move Labour out of "'elsh political life 
like it was an enemy and a font of every evil. 81 
G, xilym Prys Davies was not alone in voicing these concerns. Similar observations 
were made by Ednyfed Hudson Davies, Labour's MP for Conway. As Hudson Davies 
argued, Plaid's by-election performances had given the party 4a degree of credibility it 
I had not previously possessed to the nationalist cause'. 8- This was as an astute point. 
Victories had not only added to Plaid's credibility with voters, but also to the business 
and industrial community in Wales. 83 Moreover, he was anxious that nelther Plaid, or 
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its representatives, were under-estimated by Labour. He argued that G,, N'Ynf6r Evans 
was 'an astute politician', highly skilled in maximising Commons debates as a 
propaganda platfonn to reach the Welsh press, bodies which in return gave Plaid's 
views 'extensive coverage'. This was aided by the 'fact' that Plaid had 'the best party 
machine in Wales'. 
Whilst well aware that the by-elections were a backlash against unpopular Labour 
govemment policies, Davies was concemed that 'grievance based voting' might go on 
to become a firmer allegiance to Plaid. Labour should not assume that protest voters 
would return 'faithfully to the fold' at the next general election. For one thing, Davies 
was concerned that many of the grievances that prompted the protest vote would still 
exist when the election was called. He was also concerned that having taken the 
considerable step of supporting Plaid for the first time, many Labour voters would no 
longer feel so 'committed' to the party. Sigonificantly, Davies suggested that Plaid's 
development as a political force depended as much on Labour as it did on the party 
itself. As he concluded: 
It may well prove to have been easier for the nationalists to demonstrate that 
they could, in certain circumstances, win seats than it will be to convince the 
electorate that they have a viable, constructive policy. But they may be saved 
this trouble and will thrive on negative grounds of discontents if Labour 
cannot produce, to meet positive and proper demands, a policy for a 
significantly greater degree of self-determination in Wales and cannot achieve 
considerable improvements in the standard of living and the leý-el of 
employment in Wales. 84 
These concerns were not unusual within the Welsh Labour party at the time. The 
threat posed by Plaid Cymru was deemed both real and dangerous. The party s 
reaction to the result of the Rhondda by-election was symptomatic of those concerns - 
and of Labour's ability to resist the slide. The WCL launched a detailed investigation 
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into the causes of the Rhondda. collapse III In I . 
The activities and propa anda deployed by 
Plaid Cymru were of particular interest, but the council also examined local factors 
which it felt had led to a downturn in support. Unemployment at nine per cent had 
'doubled over the last nine months'. This was the key issue. As a result, the 'WCL 
wrote to the Welsh Secretary demanding that steps be taken which would help the 
party re-establish its electoral superionty. This included a demand for ne", industries 
to be brought in and that 'every effort should be made to have the Royal Mint cited 
near the Rhondda'. 85 
The same concerns were aired after another near disaster in Caerphilly in 1968. On 
this occasion, the party's poor performance led to a flood of motions callin, for the 
governrnent to tackle the problem of unemployment. At the party's annual conference 
a motion was carried expressing: 
In strongest terms its protest and condemnation at the unemployment which 
has been allowed to develop in Wales, amounting to nearly double the national 
average, and which will be further seriously affected by pit closures and the 
pending re-organisation of the steel industry. This conference demands that the 
Secretary of State take immediate steps to provide alternative employment 
prior to further pit closures; that industry be directed into areas of mass 
unemployment; that industrial estates be established - and o'wned by the 
government - throughout Wales. 
86 
Alarm over the party's perceived decline in its heartlands was also evident in the 
north. If Labour was in danger where it had traditionally been strong, the implications 
for the party in marginal seats was profound. Merioneth Labour party called on the 
government to conduct 'pilot schemes of re-habilitation ... to revive the 
fortunes of 
such Welsh towns as Blaenau Ffestiniog which have declined in conjunction Nvith the t: ý 
decline of basic industries', as well as urging the WCL to hold 'as soon as possible a 
one-day conference of all the CLP's in Wales to discuss the strengthening of n 
organisation' and 'the present political climate in Wales'. 8- Others also demanded 
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drastic action. At a meeting of the WCL executive in July 1968, BrýTimor Johii argued 
that the party's abject by-election performances 'added strength to the case for change 
to the party's constitution'. According to John, by-election failures were the result, 
not only of a decline in the individual membership of the party, but also the collapsnit-T 
'strength of the party ... which was especially noticeable at constituenc. v John 
pointed to three key weaknesses in the structure and power of the NVCL. Firstly, there 
were insufficient funds coming into the WCL for it 'to do the work that should be 
done'. A possible solution was to raise affiliation fees and call for donations from 
within the party. As John pointed out, Plaid generated an annual income of t25,000 
from its 'May Day' appeal. Labour should attempt to do the same. Secondly, he 
argued that the WCL 'was not as prominent as it might be'. This was: 
Partly due to the opposition of newspapers in Wales and to the fact that we 
have no organ of publicity such as a monthly or even a quarterly nev'-s sheet or 
propaganda broadsheet. 
This was particularly galling given the fact that 'the nationalists have two regular 
publications, The Welsh Nation and Y Ddraig Goch'. These were concerns shared by 
Emrys Jones, who also identified the 'weakness in the propaganda activities of the 
Labour party'. 89 This ultimately led to the establishment of the (eventually 
unsuccessful) party journal Welsh Radical. 90 It was also noted that Plaid was more 
attentive to the need for research on Welsh affairs - especially as the work of the 
'Research Group' became known. John claimed that Labour suffered because there 
was 'insufficient information on Welsh affairs' and called for 'specialist groups ... co- 
opting persons with special knowledge'. 91 Yet if such people wanted to fight back, 
they did so by stressing Labour's need to become a more effective 'Labour' party. 
There was less emphasis on 'Cymruising' the party or on clevolution. 
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An even more widespread concern was the attitude of the 'Welsh press. As Secretary 
of State, Cledwyn Hughes had become concerned over 'tendentious' and 'rather 
cruel' reports relating to the government's handling of the NVelsh Language Act and 
nationalist issues. Whilst this was a general problem, it vk'as especially evident in Y 
Cymro. In a letter to the paper's publishers, Hughes complained that figures relating 
to the use of Welsh forms were inaccurate and detrimental to the government. So too 
were reports that Hughes had made 'personal and discourteous attacks on Welsh 
students' . 
92 Moreover, Hughes was irritated by what he perceived to be the indulgent 
amount of free publicity afforded to Plaid Cymru in the paper. As he continued: 
3 There is also in last week's Cymro a diary of the year's events. I note that )7 
of the entries are Welsh nationalist in character or spirit ... 
frankly this is of 
little moment to me, but I think it is nr-io,,,, ht that you should know about these 
things ... 
it is of course true that the Cymro does publish from time to time 
unbiased and constructive features, but a great deal of it is written by Welsh 
nationalists who are obsessed with their cause ... 
I am not asking you to do 
anything about this, nor do I mind criticism - and I get plenty of this as you 
know - but I do object to unfair comment. 
93 
Hughes' genteel response was combined with a desire to address real problems - for 
others a hostile media became Labour's excuse. Labour's capacity to fight back 
against Plaid was undermined by lack of leadership and personal divisions at the top. 
Appointments to the Welsh Office served to 'sour' relations within the minority, pro- 
devolutionist or 'nationalist' camp. As Minister of State for Wales under Jim 
Griffiths, Goronwy Roberts had been hopeful of succeeding Griffiths In 1966. In the 
event, Cledwyn Hughes was appointed. This soured relations between Roberts and 
Hughes, and ultimately weakened the north-west axis within the Welsh Labour 
party. 94 Hughes' departure, and the arrival of George Thomas in 1968, was considered 
a 'disaster' by the emerging generation of pro-devolution prospective candidates in 
the party, and a serious setback to Emrys Jones's attempts to mould a ne-v,, - party 
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image. 95 If some members of an older generation - like Thomas and Roberts - still 
found much in common outside devolution, they found it difficult to act ass a united 
block on Welsh policy as well as dealing with ministerial issues in London. 96 
Hughes' appointment ahead of Roberts as Secretary of State in 1966 ý\ as a 
controversial issue. Wilson's decision to appoint Hughes was justified on the grounds 
that it was not government policy to promote from ývithin the same department. Itwas 
explained to Roberts on the grounds that Wilson wanted him to gain broader 
experience. 97 Roberts was moved to the Department of Education. Contemporary 
Welsh political commentators were less than convinced with this explanation. One of 
these commentators, John Gay Davies, could not understand the logic behind 
Wilson's decisions. Before an official announcement had been aired, Davies gave his 
sceptical views on subject: 
The man I think is logical (for the post) would be Goronwy Roberts. He has, 
after all, understudied Jim Griffiths and has a very good grip on what the 
problems of Wales are. I heard a curious story that there is a tradition that a 
number two in a department cannot succeed his number one, which seems to 
me crazy. I've also heard that there's a possibility that Cledwyn Hughes may 
be brought over from the Commonwealth Relations Office ... this seems to me to be absolute nonsense. 98 
At the same time, it perhaps came as less of a surprise to Roberts than some believed. 
Whilst at the Welsh Office, Roberts was held responsible for its 'overly nationalist' 
attitudes by 'a number of Welsh MPs' from the south, 'particularly Cardiff, 
Morunouth and Glamorgan'. 99 They accused Roberts of exerting undue 'nationalist' 
pressure on Jim Griffiths, pushing Griffiths 'too hard and too fast along the lines of a 
separate culture'. 100 Roberts' papers reveal that he was less than happy with the 
limited responsibilities afforded to the Welsh Secretary, and made determined efforts 
to see those powers extended. Memos to Jim Griffiths reveal his concern that the 
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Welsh Office be seen as a progressive institution. He was concerned that Labour -was 
inattentive to 'what Welsh opinion has supported and definitely expects' and , vas 
alive to the implications of these decisions on 'the political situation in Wale s '. ý01 He 
supported the 'gradual transfer of Ministerial authority' in 'well thought out phases' 
and 'full consultation on any matter relating to Wales' by all other government 
departments. This included a demand for 'all relevant departments to provide separate 
statistical retums for Wales'. 102 If these appeared (and were) conservative, given 
Roberts's impassioned reputation, drafts of the same memo reveal that Roberts had 
considered a more ambitious approach. This included a much more strident (and 
characteristic) demand for the Welsh Secretary to 'have overall supervision of all 
matters relating to Wales'. 103 In the event, the latter was unlikely to have made a 
difference since, according to Griffiths, 'the PNI still remains adamant against transfer 
of any Dept as a whole'. 104 If the memo sent to Griffiths was conservative, a speech 
delivered by Roberts at the National Eisteddfod at Newtown was more indicative of 
long-standing beliefs. As Roberts argued: 
Our aim is, by agreement of all sections of the Welsh people, to build an 
effective system of devolution which retains our economic link with the rest of 
the kingdom whilst enabling the Principality to mobilise its material and 
cultural resources... 105 
By 1966, Roberts's 'strong views in favour of a federal constitution for Great Britain' 
had not diminished. 106 This did not go down well in all quarters of the party. Rumours 
of Roberts's departure had been circulating before 1966 - as Roberts was aware. As 
one local union official, Tom Jones, wrote to him: 
I was naturally sorry that you hadn't been given the job of Secretary of State 
for Wales, but I gather from what you told me some time ago that other forces 
had been at work. 107 
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However, not all those sympathetic to the "Welsh' cause were sad to see Roberts Lo. 
As Huw. T. Edwards (back in the Labour party following a spell with Plaid C-,. Tnru) 
wrote to Cledwyn Hughes: 
I think Goronwy has been appointed to a post that will suit him far 
better ... education is much more up his street than his previous post ... old Harold is doing his job wonderfully, and he knows his people well. 108 
At the same time, civil servants were said to have been 'yery happy' with Hu,,,,, Iies* 
selection. 109 Others like Michael Foot thought that Hughes was Labour's finest 
Secretary of State for Wales, since he not only understood the north and south Wales 
dimensions of Welsh Labourism, but also knew how the "'elsh party machine 
operated. ' 10 Members of the Welsh establishment were also content. As R. E. Griffith 
of Urdd Gobaith Cymru wrote to Hughes: 
Things are improving. Elystan's victory was excellent, and so was Ednyfed's 
in Conway. The Labour party has never been healthier. and with you at the 
helm in Wales I believe that we are starting a new and important period. ' 11 
In reality, however, Hughes found the Welsh Office a difficult ship to steer. He 
became frustrated by his inability to see through desirable changes and was 
disappointed that the Welsh Office did not live up to its potential. In 1964, Hughes 
had hoped that the Secretary of State would act as an important link in creating a 
'healthier, happier and 'Welsher' Wales'. ' 12 A more prominent Welsh Council, a new 
town, a Welsh Water Board and an Industrial Planning Board, answerable to the 
Secretary of State, were all part of his strategy. Most of these plans had fallen by the 
wayside by 1967. Indeed, this had turned into a frustrating period for the government. 
Writing to the devout nationalist Alwyn D. Rees, Hughes bemoaned the fact that: 
I had a hard time when I came to this post, having to pull everything through 
thorns as it were ... it is one thing to promise to 
do things, another to translate 
those promises into practical policies. " 3 
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The reply showed sympathy for Hughes, but not for the government he r, -presented. 
As Rees pointed out: 
I do sympathise with you for having to work in a situation were it is obvious 
by now that it is impossible to do what should be done. But I do not 
sympathise with you for having to defend the authorities and people %ýho do 
not desire change. 114 
Unable to reply with constructive action in the way they wished, and faced N\ Ith 
unfailingly populistic attacks in the press, even Welsh Labour 'nationalists' resorted 
to counter-propaganda. Hughes produced an uncharacteristically hostile attack on 
Welsh nationalists in a speech at Colwyn Bay in 1967. He was reported to have 
labelled Plaid Cymru supporters as 'unchristian', 'bad people' who were 'harming the 
best interests of Wales'. ' 15 Hughes was unhappy at the constant cnticism of the 
goverm-nent, and of his efforts to deliver constructive VVelsh policies. There -v,, -as little 
sympathy for this reaction in the ranks of Plaid Cymru. As Y Ddraig Goch noted: 
Of course we are critical - the government is a failure. We were critical of the 
White Paper on the economy because it lacked any sort of plan ... 
Nevin -a 
special consultant to the government was also critical of it - we were critical 
of the White Paper on local government reform because it did not give Wales 
an elected council ... several 
Labour members were also disappointed by 
this ... we were critical of the 
language act ... 
David Hughes-Parry himself 
admitted that it did not give equal status to the Welsh language ... we were 
critical over Europe ... so were many 
Labourites ... quite simply the 
Secretary of 
State is a disappointing man, scraping the bottom of the barrel to distort Plaid 4! ) 
Cymru's contribution to the political discussion of Welsh problems and 
needs. 11 6 
The desire to fight fire with fire became more evident towards the end of the decade, 
when George Thomas became Labour's new Welsh Secretary. ' 17 Thomas was 
unhappy with the emerging conclusions of the party's working party which was 
preparing a submission to the Commission on the Constitution. The timing of these 
conclusions (which favoured the establishment of an elected Welsh council) ýk'as 
inconvenient for the party. Writing to Emrys Jones, Thomas argued: 
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As I said to you last Sunday the Welsh Nationalist Party are in a state of 
considerable disarray at present and I have a deep conviction (not unsupported by evidence) that there is a move back towards us in 'ýVales. In mv 
it would be a tragic blunder if at this stage we exposed the party to bitter 
internal battles on the nature of our constitutional proposals. ' 18 
Thomas became the doyen of anti -national i sts within the Labour party. He was 
credited in nationalist circles with a cynical attempt to undermine the nationalist cause 
by staging the Investiture of the Prince of Wales at Caemarfon Castle in 1969. Little 
attention has been afforded to the Investiture by Welsh political historians. This is 
surprising given that reactions to it were symbolic of much wider Welsh political 
debates and controversies during the late 1960s. Contemporary political 
commentators from outside Wales (approvingly) observed that the Investiture was an 
orchestrated political attempt to use the monarchy to 'prick the bubble of Welsh 
nationalism'. ' 19 As the Financial Times argued, the Investiture was: 
Most importantly a political act. All the symbolism of Westminster and the 
monarchy ... in particular the popularity of the Queen ... is being used to sell the 
unity of the UK against the separatist demands of the Welsh nationalists. 120 
Other political commentators also viewed the Investiture an 'idiosyncratic' event, 
aimed at consolidating Labour power in Wales. 12 1 As YFaner also claimed: 
The policy of the English political parties was made perfectly clear. To an 
English party like the Labour party the Investiture was a wonderful (if 
expensive) attempt to tie Wales closer to London. The Labour government did 
not realise it was disturbing a bees nest. ' 22 
The long term impact of the Investiture on the fortunes of the Labour party in north- 
west Wales is difficult to gauge. In the short term, it was viewed as a considerable 
Labour success. As one Plaid activist has pointed out, the Investiture awakened Plaid 
to the fact that British nationalism still had support even in the heart of Welsh 
speaking Wales. Sympathy for the Welsh language, culture and, to a point, devolution 
ni hi Nvere mixed with strong attachments to the monarchy and 'B itishness'. 
I ", T is was 
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something which Plaid had previously under-estimated and had to address in the early 
1970s, both in tenns of policy and propaganda. 
Plaid's official policy on the Investiture was neutrality. 124 However, this did not 
prevent the Welsh press from launching scathing attacks on Labour's orchestration of z! ) 
the event. The national and local controversy may have fuelled disillusion with the 
conduct and politics of local Labour MPs. For example, Goronwy Roberts received 
considerable negative publicity over his support for the eý-ent. Roberts's own 
'Britishness' clashed with his support for 'Welshness. In a speech at Caemarfon in 
1969, Roberts clearly stated his support for the event, arguing that the Prince had 
already 'shown Wales more respect than those who sought to ridicule him'. 
Moreover, Roberts' strong support for the establishment was also aired in a call for 
Caernarfon to respond to the Investiture in 'the spirit of a royal town, a royal country 
and a royal people'. For some these views demonstrated Roberts' betrayal of his 
status as a radical and a socialist. As Barn argued: 
We could not believe our ears when we first heard this ... who would have 
thought that a staunch royalist would have spent so many years representing 
the 'gwerin' as Caernarfon's Labour MP? And we always thought that he was 
one of us! 
This was seen as another sign that Roberts had become an establishment figure. In a 
desire for status and importance, it was claimed, his 'radicalism' had been abandoned. 
The same was true for the Labour party in general. Like others in the Labour partý,, 
Roberts had betrayed long-standing socialist principles by condoning a vastl,, tl 
expensive charade: 
We might hazard a guess that the Tories came up with the idea vý-hen 
nationalists started finding their feet ... what 
is surprising is that the Labour 
government have gone along with it. No true socialist has any sympathy "'Ith 
royalty and imperialism - which we saw in support for the Investiture - and it 
must have dismayed real Welsh socialists to see Jim Callaghan, TAV. Jones, 
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George Thomas and I. Bowen-Griffith courting, xith all the snobs and the 
aristocrats ... and among the guests were other Welsh socialists CledNvyn Hughes, Goronwy Roberts, John Morris and Elystan Morgan ... proof that this was a circus aimed at undermining nationalism. ' 
At a local level, concerns were expressed that the monies spent on modernising 
facilities in Caernarfon for the event could have been better spent on renovating, 
council houses in the town - expenditure which the local authority could not afford. 
Moreover, at a time when Welsh industry was crying out for support and assistance, 
the Investiture had granted contracts to only eleven Welsh firms (from a total of 150) 
manufacturing souvenirs for the event. As YFaner reported: 
This is the state of our country. Ninety nine per cent of the merchandise sold 
to visitors will have been made outside Wales 
Increasingly stung by such attacks, which in south Wales were often vieý, ved as 
examples of nationalistic xenophobia, Labour responded in vvays which did little to 
enhance the party's reputation among borderline 'nationalist' voters. The 1970 
election campaigns are remembered as 'dirty' campaigns, notable for the vociferous 
and, at times, over-enthusiastic exuberance of Plaid Cymru's local campaigns, and 
memorable in Caernarforishire for a Nazi salute delivered by Goronwy Roberts to 
Plaid supporters at the count. 126 
Labour's chief protagonist was George Thomas. Thomas' anti-nationalist views were 
regularly aired through his column in the Liverpool Daily Post. This continued in the 
early 1970s. These were, in his words, 'deliberately provocative'. ' 27 Some, such as 
Dafydd Wigley, believed that the column had a hugely negative impact on the image 
of the Labour party in north-west Wales and played a significant part in Labour's 
doAmfall. 128 This is a view shared by party activists and MPs from north-west 
constituencies. 119 Thomas was one of a group of south Wales Labour N, /lp's who 
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feared nationalists in the way that some in the party had feared communists. I" ') The 
response was not popular. Some within the Labour party have gone as far as arguing 
that Thomas' sentiments were not simply anti-nationalist, but anti-Welsh. 1 
Thomas's attacks emphasised (and exaggerated) the racism of Plaid CYT=. 
13,2 For 
example, the Immigration Bill, presented by the Conservative govemment in 1971 
provided Thomas with an opportunity to launch a largely unsubstantiated, scare- 
mongering tirade against those vvho favoured devolution. It was according to Thomas 
'a blueprint of what we could expect form a Parliament for Wales if we ", ere ever 
crazy enough to support the separatists', for 'crude nationalism drips from every 
clause in the Bill as freely as it spouts from the mouths of our Welsh language 
extremists'. 133 According to Thomas, a Parliament for Wales would provide a 
breeding ground for anti-English sentiments. 'English haters' in Wales 'would love 
the Bill'. As the Immigration Bill sought control over immigration into the UK, so a 
Welsh parliament would see population control as a top priority. They would 'stop 
once and for all the threat posed to Wales by skilled tradesmen moving here from 
Lancashire and the Midlands' and, in the process, 'destroy all hopes of economic 
growth and full employment' -a consideration unlikely to trouble Plaid's 'academic 
dreamers'. Neither were watered-down forms of devolution acceptable to him. Even 
local government re-organisation (still under discussion at the time) was also 
dismissed. Here, more logical points were made. Just like Goronwy Roberts and 
others in the 1950s (see above), Thomas was not convinced by the notion of 'Welsh 
identity. As he argued: 
Nationalists in Carmarthen scream like tormented souls in hell at the proposal 
to link their county with Cardiganshire and Pembrokeshire, 'we have nothing 
in common with them' they wail at every comer. In the north, Anglesey looks 
at Caemarfonshire with as much affection as a rabbit looks at a stoat. Theý- 
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fear being swallowed up. Merioneth may love the thought of combining with 
Flintshire but they are singularly coy about saying so ... to talk of N'Vales as a 
united country is as foolish as talking of hell in terms of hý, mn singing-We 
know which side our bread is buttered. 134 
There was much more sympathy for extending '\Velsh representation at Westminster. 
An unlikely duo - Ness Edwards and Goronwy Roberts - were credited for their roles 
in forming the Welsh Grand Committee and for showing a cletermi I in to 'a ination ak' 
Welsh terrier clinging to a bone'. 135 Countering the .,, Ie"-s of nationalists who were 
dismissive of Westminster, Thomas argued that both Roberts and Edwards: 
Are aware that the Welsh examine (parliamentary) deliberations as carefully 
as chapel-goers scrutinise sermons. 
As a result, it was not surprising that members of his own party were 'getting more 
aggressive' and showed 'growing resentments' in their probing of (Tory) government t) I 
policy. 
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In this aggressive defence of a certain type of Labour politics, Labour turned the 
tables and accused Plaid of duplicity. The National Eisteddfod - to be held in Bangor 
in 1971 - became an unexpected concern. According to Thomas, nationalists were 
making determined efforts to take control of the eisteddfod's council. The outcome, if 
they succeeded, would be 'tragic for Wales'. The strength of the eisteddfod lay in its 
non-political ethos. Competitors arriving at Bangor would come from Labour, 0 
Conservative, Liberal and nationalist homes - united only by their Welshness. Unlike 
those in the Welsh Language Society, who saw Welsh culture as the preserve of 
Welsh speakers, Thomas argued that: 
The major lesson that the Bangor eisteddfod can teach the Welsh Language 
Society is that Wales is one nation with two rich languages. If the Welsh 
Language Society could shed their persecution complex and abandon the 
adolescent belief that those opposed to their tactics are automatically enemies 
of the language they could yet serve Wales well. 
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The annual report of the Welsh Tourist Board provided another opportunitv for 
Thomas to espouse the dangers of nationalism. The achievements of the tounst board 
had been 'remarkable', visitors to Wales spending f 100 million in 1970. According to 
Thomas, 'few things tickle Welsh fancy more than the ceaseless music of cash 
registers'. 137 However the most significant aspect of the WTB's report was that ninety 
per cent of Welsh visitors came from other parts of the UK, less than ten per cent 
from overseas. Thus, 'Welsh bank accounts are healthier because English, Irish and 
Scots purses have made their contribution'. The dan-ger was that nationalists could 
ruin this: 
Tourism can succeed here only when our traditional Welsh warmth is felt by 
those who do not share our heritage. Anti-English sentiments are more 
damaging to tourism than our wet weather. ' 38 
By contrast to this populist rhetoric, official Labour propaganda was limited and 
delayed. In 1970 the party had stressed its work for Welsh jobs, including f 60 million 
spent on grants to aid development in the Valleys, use of industrial development 
certificates to attract new private industries and direct relocation of state organisations 
to Wales (the Royal Mint to Llantrisant, the Census Office to Newport, the DVLA to 
Swansea, the RAF to St Athan). 139 Yet the shock of defeat delayed further action. In 
1973 Gwynoro Jones, Labour's MP for Cannarthen, and a devolutionist, wrote a 
pamphlet defending the record of the 1964-70 Labour govenunents. The Record Put 
Straight: Labour's Record in Wales, 1964-70, showed more than a little Irritation at 
the criticism levelled at Labour, not only from nationalists, but also from the Tones. It 
combined an outdated (and now stale) repudiation of 'the Tory legacy' of 195 1-64 
with condernnation of nationalists 'who had allowed hostility to the Labour 
movement to take priority over the interests of the country theý, purport to serve'. 
i . 41) 
Whilst defending Labour's record in government it also conceded weaknesses. The 
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pamphlet was not only a defence of Labour's past but a clanon call for the party in 
Wales to embark on a new future. As Jones argued: 
The Labour government made mistakes. They did not find final solutions- to 
the Welsh problem. The tragedy is that they Nvere not given the opportunItYtO 
build on the foundations which they laid ... they were unfortunate in their 
economic inheritance and the adverse balance of payments which constrained 
them, even though they overcame that in the end. 'ýVhat is remarkable is that 
they did so much in spite of this. The Tory Government 'which inherited a 
favourable balance, and who far from fulfilling the promises that won them the 
election, have by their neglect, set the clock back a decade in "'ales ... our 
chief task now is to build for the future; to create new policies -, xhich will 
match Welsh aspirations and to work for a Labour govemment that will 
implement them. 141 
Behind the scenes, Labour officials in Cardiff had been striving to give Labour a new 
and positive approach - supported by some of Labour's younger MPs and some of 
those with 'nationalist' sentiments. Their attempts to get a pro-devolution submission 
to the Royal Commission on the Constitution was hardly uneventful, but was 
ultimately successful. 
142 
The publication of the Kilbrandon Report in 1973 raised the stakes of Welsh 
devolution and placed the issue firmly on the agenda for the 1974 general elections. 
The Commission on the Constitution was left with a negative impression of the 
Secretary of State system. As it argued: 
(The) system has been criticised as giving an inadequate degree of devolution 
to Scotland and Wales. The freedom it confers ... is largely illusory. 
The main 
complaints are ... that the functions are too restricted ... that although the system 
may give Scotland and Wales more funds, it does not enable best use to be 
made of those funds, the budgets being subjected to detailed Treasury control-, 
that the system gives too much power to officials ... that politics and 
democratic influence remain concentrated in London, with Scotland and 
Wales being political voids ... to the extent that these criticisms are valid 
they 
might call for a quite different form of devolution. 143 
At loner last, some argued, the party was beginning to address such concerns. 1ý 
However, what appeared was un co-ordinated, contradictory, and probably too late. 
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This chapter has outlined the nature of Plaid Cymru's increasirigly virulent attacks on 
Labour during the 1960s and 1970s. Whilst the content and tenor of cnticism changed 
once Labour fell from office, and also shifted to the left, there Nvere siggnificant 
continuities. These included the use of emotive language, the exploitation of 
individual issues to make much broader points (about Labour or the British state) and 
a shift away from the idea that benefits could be gained be reinforcing the nationalist 
element in the Labour party. By contrast, Labour's response was muted, a reflection 
not of a limited analysis or complacency, but of limited energy and disunity. Over 
time, and as Plaid's attacks became more exaggerated and personal, Labour's 
response became more combative and opposed to change. Although Labour's 
'nationalists' worked for a different approach, these divisions were unresolved when 
another election was called in 1974. 
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Chapter Six 
The Culmination of Political Change: The General Elections 
of 1974 
The people of Wales are fortunate to have an alternative to the tNso tired, punch-drunk English 
parties. The Labour party is too riven by dissension to knoN-, ývhich NN ay it is going. Plaid CN mru 
offers a real change to the people of Wales. 
Daf)-dd Wigley, Caernarfon & Denbigh Herald, 8 Februar-, 1974. 
This chapter takes a broad look at the circumstances surrounding Plaid Cymru's 
victories and Labour's defeats in the 1974 general elections. It argLies that Plaid's 
electoral victory in February 1974 was not the result of a protest vote but the 
culmination of a much longer process of political change, stretching as far back as the 
1950s. In so doing, the chapter will argue that the general elections of 1974 witnessed 
the manifestation and political impact on politics of the social and economic changes 
(identified in earlier chapters) and of Labour's inability to address them and to refute 
Plaid's attacks. As a result of these changes, loyalties to the main political parties 
were much weaker by 1974 than at any point since the Second World War. Across the 
UK these trends meant much improved performances for the Liberal party, but in 
Scotland and Wales nationalist parties made a substantial showing. 
Plaid Cymru's improved performance locally during the 1970 general election had 
suggested that an alternative to Labour was emerging. Local and national issues in the Zý 
early 1970s compounded Labour's problems and consolidated Plaid Cymru's growing 
appeal. Long-standing social and economic issues such as depopulation and 
unemployment continued to be at the forefront of local political debates. Added (and 
related) to these were a number of 'new' issues (such as second homes) and 'old' 
issues which assumed a 'new', resonance in the climate of the early 1970s 
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(particularly the question of the Welsh language and, most notably devolution). As the 
chapter will show, these were powerful issues, demanding serious attention. Added to 
this was the unpopularity of Labour's programme for the UK, in particular the partý`,, 
attitude to social welfare. By 1974 Labour's commitment to such issues no Ion-ger 
seemed as credible. In power for most of the 1960s, Labour had failed to deliver on a 
number of its promises. Moreover, under the surface the party was weak. It lacked an 
organisational infrastructure which could stabilise its decline once it was under 
pressure. The conversion of a large middle class Welsh element to Plaid Cymru - 
evident in the attitude of the Welsh press - made it even more difficult to oppose a 
more organised and 'socialist' assault from a much changed nationalist party. 
Perceptions of Political Change 
The general elections of 1974 were seen by contemporary political scientists as a 
turning point in British political history. As the authors of the February 1974 Nuffield 
electoral study argued: 
The result - despite an unexpected Labour success of sorts - was a snub to 
both major parties and the increased strength of third parties nationally and 
regionally suggested the possibility of a turning point in the British party 
system. 1 
To other observers, the general elections of 1974 focussed (more than was usually the 
case) on social and political events and debates, in particular industrial unrest and 
management of the economy (see below). Yet, as these observers were eager to point 
out, the impact of short-term influences can be over-stated: 
The outstanding features of the outcome - the decline in two party dominance 
and the lack of a clear winner (in February) - must not be seen as the outcome 2 
of events of early 1974; they were the fruits of a decade of political change . 
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As previous chapters have highlighted, political change north-west Wales in this 
respect conformed to a much wider pattern of change occumng elsewhere in the UK. 
What requires explanation is why this resulted in a Plaid upsurge - and an upsurge 
leading to victory - when elsewhere the increase was more temporarý- and less 
successful. 
During the 1951-55 period, the govermnent lost over 20% of its vote In Just 2% of by- 
elections. This figure grew to 10% in the 195-5-59 period, to 18% dunn,, 1960-64. and 
,3 34% during 1966-70. It remained high at 24 per cent during 1970-7-3. 'Punishing' 
poor govenunent performances therefore became a common feature of British -voting 
tactics and habits after 1966. Two often forgotten features of public opinion in this 
period ment attention. The Kilbrandon report, published in 1973, highlighted the 
remoteness' of government from the electorate. 4 Opinion polls in the period up to 
1974 also supplied 'devastating' evidence on how poorly politicians were regarded by 
the public, particularly politicians associated with the two main parties. This was one 
of the attractions of 'third parties' like the Liberals, who 'won support because they 
appeared as a party least like a party'. 5 Across the UK voters were believed to have 
become disillusioned with the 'fact' that not only the policies but also the personnel of 
the two main parties had become too alike (another factor stressed at length in Plaid 
Cymru propaganda). Both parties were believed to have suffered because of the 
professionalisation' of politics, a process which witnessed the emergence of cloned 
'University educated meritocrats' lacking either the passion, personality or 
commitment of an earlier generation of MPs- 6 
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There was, however, a more serious concern over the thin line that divided the 
Conservative and Labour on key policies, and the failure of both parties to de% ise 
distinctive solutions to problems. As the Nuffield studies somevvhat sarcastically 
noted, divisions within the two main par-ties over policy were often more marked than 
those between them. Popular discontent was fuelled by the fact that 'each part\, when 
in government turned to policies they had earlier attacked when out of office'. ' 
However, one of the most fundamental complaints was that changes in governinent 
had little impact on policy output, particularly in economic terms. As Butler and 
Kavanagh argued; 
When one party in government inherited the problems of the party it 
displaced, it also seemed to inherit the solutions - notably over Europe, over 
incomes policy, over industrial relations and over industrial intervention. 8 
Discontent with the failure of successive govenunents to tackle the crucial issue of 
unemployment (and economic problems generally) was not confined to north-west 
Wales, but given that economic problems here were more acute than in many other 
areas, it would be unwise to minimise their significance. 
For many voters, therefore, there was little to choose between the two main political 
parties at national level. In the past the 'third party' in north-west Wales had lacked 
credibility, whilst anti-Tory sentiment was profound, entrenched (and perhaps a badge 
of 'Welshness'). Labour had therefore entered campaigns with several advantages. 
However, Plaid Cymru became increasingly successful as a third force across this 
period. Mobilising popular discontent was a key element of Plaid Cymru's election 
strategies in the period up to 1974.9 
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Plaid propaganda sought to ensure that the industrial, economic and social problems 
of the 1970-74 period were channelled into frustration -ývith the British system of 
government and with the ability of the two main parties to implement effecti% e 
change. This assumed an added resonance in Wales, coinciding as it did with a period 
of Conservative rule in a country which was decidedly anti-Tory. Industrial strikes 
also became a feature of the early 1970s. There is insufficient space here to elaborate 
on the political events surrounding those strikes, but it is clear that they had a 
detrimental effect on the image of government. Labour's relations with the unions in 
the late 1960s had deteriorated, notably over In Place of Strýjc. Heath's Conservative 
government was no more popular. The Industrial Relations Act (1971), the 
unpromising start made by the new DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) and the 
government's clumsy handling of the Rolls-Royce financial crisis provided high 
profile examples of the government's difficulties and caused alarm among its critics. 
Among the most prominent strikes were the electricity work-to-rule and 'blackouts' 
(1970); UCS (Upper Clyde Shipbuilders) liquidation, followed by a work-in (1971); 
fines of unions, British Rail work-to-rule and dock strikes (1972); a miners overtime 
ban, and ASLEF work-to-rule. This culminated in a 'three day week' (1973) and the 
miners strike (1974). These were all accompanied by a constant (and failing) process 
of negotiation between govenunent and the unions. Labour might suggest it was 
better at handling such disputes, but its claims now lacked credence. To others, 
Labour's potential support for such action was won-yingly radical. Even on this 
'Labour' issue, Plaid could develop a potentially popular critique. 
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Some of these strikes had a knock-on effect in north-west 'Wales. For example. 
problems in the car industry had a devastating impact on local factories, such as, 
Bernard Wardle and Ferodo, which were 'branch' suppliers to the British car 
manufacturers. As 'branch' factories they were particularly vulnerable to poor trade 
conditions, such as those in the period up to 1974. They also relied heavily on British 
consumer markets, where competition was strong. Economic recession and industrial 
disputes hit existing local factories hard, whilst at the same time making the 
development of similar 'branch' factory initiatives extremel,,, difficult. As a direct 
result of the Ford stnke in 1974, one hundred jobs were lost at Bernard Wardle in 
Caernarfon, adding to a growing number of jobs lost in this factory alone since the 
late 1960s. Moreover as branch factories, local workers were often 'dragged' into 
industrial action which they did not understand. 10 Labour's economic 'solution' form 
employment problems in the north-west - new industries - and its association kvith 
industrial discontent were increasingly problematic for its electoral appeal. 
High levels of local unemployment in the early 1970s were portrayed as symbols of 
government failure. By the early 1970s unemployment in north-west Wales had 
reached crisis point. Local authorities became increasingly concerned and agitated by 
the problem. In 1971 and 1972 Caernarfonshire County Council were involved in a 
series of emergency meetings which aimed to find solutions to these 'serious' 
difficulties. Council members, Welsh Office representatives, local \, fPs and 
industrialists all attended. There was widespread agreement locally that the problems 
of the early 1970s were of much older origin. The completion of large and labour 
lesev intensive building projects, such as the nuclear power station in Wylfa on Ang 
and the Anglesey Aluminium plant in Holyhead, had 'disguised' the (even greater) 
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need for sustainable, long-term, permanent employment. 'Heavy redundancies' i in 
local factories, together with the continued demise of 'old' industnes (including jobs 
still being lost in local quarries, in the forestry industry and in farming). exacerbated 
those problems. Finding jobs was difficult. As one report noted, finding Jobs for forty 
six men, most of whom were over the age of 45 (which the closure of the Trefor 
quarry precipitated) was almost impossible. A Caernarfonshire County Council report 
on unemployment argued that 'the situation has worsened considerably since August I 
1970' with the loss of a further thousand local jobs, bringing the total local jobless 
figure to over two and a half thousand. " Central and southern parts of the county 
(where quarrying and farming jobs were being shed) were of particular concern. 
These 'old' industrial areas were also the hardest affected in neighbouring Merioneth. 
Industrial decline fed other forms of discontent. These were discussed in Chapter 
Two, but need to be stressed as influences underlying political change. The second 
homes controversy was an obvious symbol of regional problems in the early 1970s. 
The fact that outsiders could purchase local houses (at low prices) simply and 
gTaphically demonstrated contrasting incomes, with affluent (English) incomers 
benefiting from local (Welsh) economic collapse. The issue was accompanied by 
huge media exposure, and led to the development and publication of a series of 
reports by local councils, highlighting both the causes and effects of second home 
ownership. Whilst the fonner highlighted government failure and inefficiencies in 
providing jobs, the latter leant support to distinctively nationalist concerns (especially 
the preservation of the Welsh language and Welsh speaking communities). 
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Some of the (partial) solutions offered to those problems had distinctive political 
implications. In the early 1970s Cynideithas Tai Gwynedd was formed to secure local 
housing for Welsh speaking families, whilst another association, Adfer, financed a 
small furniture factory in one attempt to 'restore' local Welsh communities. These 
organisations were significant because of their close relationships ývith the nationalist 
movement. Housing associations received substantial publicity in Plaid Cymru 
propaganda. Party members were encouraged to invest personal money in the 
associations. Moreover, issues such as the closure of small rural schools also became 
highly politicised. There were conflicts over language use in schools and controversial 
plans for separate English and Welsh speaking comprehensive schools. The follokving 
sections show that only Plaid Cymru offered a positive alternative - at least in 
propagandist terms - to Labour's largely unaltered policies, whereas the Liberals and 
Conservatives did not. 
The Liberal Party 
As Table I shows, the Liberal party was not a serious political force in 
Caernarfonshire after 1945 and thus was in no position to benefit from a UK-wide 
Liberal upsurge. Despite a more prolonged and dogged resistance in Merioneth, the 
party's challenge there was also falling away by the early 1970s. Indeed, in 
Merioneth, the Liberals were as much the party of a (failed) establishment as Labour. 
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Table 1: Liberal share of the vote in general elections, 1964-74 
UK NlVales Caernarfon Nlerioneth 
1964 11.2 7.3 No candidate 32.7 
1966 8.6 6.3 No candidate 35.5 
1970 7.5 6.8 6.5 22.6 
1974(F) 19.3 16.0 7.2 18.4 
1974(0) 18.3 15.5 10.7 1 15.4 
Source: B. Jones, Etholiadau'r GanriflWelsh Elections, 1885-1997 (1999). 
This is not to say that the party was devoid of ambition. On the contrary there were 
frequent attempts to 'revive' the party at both Welsh and local le%, els. In the early 
1960s there had been attempts to revive ailing Welsh Liberal Associations (which 
were considered a 'disgrace' by Madoc Jones). 12 A chief organiser was appointed to 
tackle the problem, but little progress was made (in fact, the appointment ma e 
matters worse by depleting the party's already weak finances). By-elections, such as 
the one in Swansea East in 1963, demonstrated that enthusiasm within the party was 
limited. Unlike Plaid Cymru which turned by-election 'crusades' into a fine art in the 
1960s, Welsh Liberals bemoaned the fact that help from across Wales was often 
promised but seldom materialised: 'more action and fewer words' was required from 
party members. 13 The 1964 general election did not witness a Liberal recovery in 
Wales (as it did in England). The party fielded only twelve candidates and won 7.3 
per cent of the Welsh vote. The situation in Caemarfonshire, where no Liberal 
candidate stood, was worryingly familiar. Lack of funds, enthusiasm and organisation 
hampered a political recovery. In the early sixties new branches had been formed in 
Caemarfonshire, especially on the Lleyn peninsula, where support for the party 
remained strong. 14 Criccieth's Liberal association provided a fine example of the 
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party's potential in the area, given that the part-y' s 'spring membership campaign . in 
1963 enrolled a total of 470 new members. 
However, these foundations were largely illusory. Poorly attended executive 
committee meetings symbolised a much deeper and more fundamental malaise, which 
eventually undermined the party's efforts to field a candidate in 1964. As a party 
report noted: 
The meeting discussed the state of the party in the constituency. It was felt that 
the poor attendance at this meeting indicated a lack of interest in the prospects 
of the candidate and it was decided to inform Mrs. Pritchard that the executive 
had become despondent about the chances of the candidate at the general 
election in October, and it was decided that the decision on v"hether to 
withdraw should be left to her. 
Unsurprisingly, the candidate withdrew. 16 The party's position in Merioneth - where 
it offered a stubborn (but ineffective) challenge to Labour - was the exception rather 
than the rule. 
Little headway had been made by 1966, despite further attempts to re-invigorate 
organisation and policy in the intervening period. In 1965 the party had embarked on 
a programme to develop a distinctive Welsh Liberal Policy - 'Brav, e New Wales'. 
Included in this was a blueprint for rural areas, the 'Plan for Mid-Wales'. But there 
were few distinctive or different policies in the plan. 'Radical' offerings were 
confined to a 'rural development corporation', and a promise to 4radically overhaul' 
transport facilities and links between north and south Wales - all policies with a 
distinctly familiar (Labour) theme. Moreover, whilst the plan's concern for retaining 
agriculture as the basic industry of rural areas may have pleased -traditional' voters, 
plans for the 'new town' expansion of Aberystwyth may have served to dampen that 
enthusiasm. 
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As it transpired, the 1966 general election was a disaster for the L'beral partly. 
Another Welsh seat - Cardiganshire - was lost, reducing the party's ýVelsh 
representation to one. Candidates were fielded in only eleven consti I ituencies and the 
party's vote in Wales declined to 6.3 per cent. Subsequent changes within the party',, -, 
structure in 1966 fuelled optimism. A purge of the party's organisational structure 
meant that both the north Wales and south Wales Liberal Federation Nvere scrapped 
and replaced by 'regional committees', whilst the party officially became known as 
the Welsh Liberal Party. This was an obvious attempt to fight back against the 
growing challenge of Plaid Cymru. 17 Like Labour, the Liberal party became 
preoccupied with the nationalist threat after 1966, reflecting Labour's concern with 
the 'excessive' attention paid to Plaid by the Welsh media. Madoc Jones was at the 
forefront of Liberal attempts to address the 'dynamic' nationalist challenge. 18 As 
Jones argued, only through a fundamental reform of the party could such a challenge 
be met: 
Liberalism in Wales is in need of drastic reform both as to its organisation and 
its fighting potential as a progressive political entity. And we allow this 
unhappy image to continue - at peril of its decay and final extinction. 
19 
The formation of the Welsh Liberal party reactivated a number of loyal Welshmen, 
who welcomed the commitment to develop policies with a consistent Welsh 
dimension. 20 A more enthusiastic spirit permeated the upper-echelons of the party by 
the late 1960s. As a result of this optimism the party appointed a general secretary in 
1968. Plans to build-up local organisations and select parliamentary candidates were 
also developed. Some also favoured reaching electoral understandings with Plaid, 
but 
these did not materialise. However, in the Welsh by-elections of the mid to late 1960s 
the party performed woefully. Welsh voters expressed discontent by voting 
for Plaid. 
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not the Liberal party. In the Can-narthen by-election of 1966 the partv polled a 
respectable 20.8 per cent of the vote, but this 'was down on Its 26.1 per cent poll In the 
1966 general election. In Caerphilly the party polled an embarrassing 1,2 57 votes. -1.6 
per cent of the poll. The Liberals failed to put up a candidate in Rhondda West. As a 
party report noted of the Caerphilly debacle: 
This was frankly a shambles ... nearly every basic mistake that could be made 
was made. 21 
These performances demonstrated the kind of diff lculties that faced the party at 
constituency level. Financial difficulties were an indication of the crisis. Local 
finances were so bad in 1967 that the Caemarfonshire Liberal Association could not 
afford to pay its 'dues' of E5 to the Welsh Liberal party. 22 As a result of these 
financial problems, the association became reluctant to nominate parliamentary 
candidates unless they were 'top drawer material' -a rare Liberal commodity in the 
late 1960s - whilst 'bringing the vote up' rather than actually winning became the 
only electoral ambition. 23 Local associations became agitated when the Welsh Liberal 
party was 'extravagant' in trying to re-build its position. The appointment of a Welsh 
Liberal general secretary in 1968 was just one example of the party spending money 
that it could not afford, whilst a new headquarters in Aberystwyth running at a loss of 
f 300 a month was also attacked . 
24 Some felt that this was a classic example of an 
over-ambitious party executive. Only by a 'miracle' did the Welsh Liberal party 
remain f 3,000 'in the black' by 1969. Abolition of affiliation fees, 'local views of 
financial re-organisation' and 'apparent lack of communication as to what Welsh 
Liberals are doing' all hit fundraising hard by depressing local activity. 25 
Other ambitious schemes also caused dismay within the party. In an effort to contest 
all thirty six Welsh seats in the 1970 general election, local associations were told to 
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raise minimum campaign funds of E1,000. Martin Thomas, the secre-tary of the Welsh 
Liberal party, believed this scheme to be 'nonsense ... absurd'. bearing in mind that 
4many constituencies' especially in South Wales could be fought *for t400, ji%cii a g 
young candidate'. 26 Senior party figures, such as Lord Ogmore, believed that 'unless 
we watch things, the present WLP executive will bankrupt us very quickly'. '7 
It was also felt that 'delusions of grandeur' affected policy forination. The Liberals 
attempted to replicate a successful Tory attempt at appealing to industry, which had 
raised over two million pounds. This attempt 'failed miserably'. The reason was that 
I industrialists (felt) that the Welsh Liberal industrial policy was non existent or non- 
credible'. 28 As a result Lord Ogmore urged the party to adopt a more realistic 
approach, arguing that 'the Liberals should engage in jungle warfare, and not act as if 
they were forming the next government 9.29 
The policy of trying to field candidates in all thirty six Welsh constituencies was 
unsuccessful. However, a larger number of candidates (nineteen) were presented by 
the party in the 1970 general election. This included a candidate in Caemarfonshire, 
who polled 6.5 per cent of the vote. If this was progress, the opposite was true of 
Merioneth where the party's share of the vote fell to 22.6 per cent - votes clearly lost 
to Plaid Cymru. At UK level the party's fortunes continued to wane, whilst at Welsh 
level the additional eight Liberal candidates only accumulated an additional 14,639 
votes for the party. 
Changing social, economic and political circumstances made conditions more 
favourable for the party in the 1970-74 period. Yet the signs of renewal were not 
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obvious in Wales. In the Merthyr by-election of 1972, Plaid Cvmru again captured the C 
third-party vote, the Liberal candi idate polling a disastrous 765 votes or 2.1 per cent of 
the poll. A 'shoe string budget' and 'enthusiastic chaos' once again hampered the 
party's efforts. 30 However, a significant recovery ývas made in the February 1974 
general election. A total of thirty one candidates were fielded. The party captured an 
additional seat, doubling its Welsh representation. A quarter of a million Welsh votes 
were secured for the first time since before the Second World 'ýVar. Howe-ý er. this 
progress was not evident in north-west Wales. On the contrary, whilst there was a 
modest rise in the party's share of the Caemarfonshire vote (7.2% as compared to 
6.5% in 1970), the party's support in Merioneth fell to 18.4 per cent (and 15.4', o in 
October). Votes were once again lost to Plaid Cymru. Whilst across Wales the Liberal 
revival (of sorts) hurt Plaid Cymru, in north-west Wales quite the opposite was true. 
At a time when the Liberal party found a new appeal in other parts of the UK, it did 
itself few favours in north-west Wales. Some of the party's opponents felt quite sorry 
for Liberal candidates, chosen as they were at the last minute and thrown into the heat 
of local political battles. 31 Local Liberals were anxious that a realistic approach be 
taken to the party's political future. As one member of the Caernarfonshire Liberal 
Association argued: 
A start has been made, which in comparison with previous elections shows the 
importance of organisation ... but please 
don't let kid ourselves, we ha,,, -e as yet 
only scratched the surface. 32 
Others believed that the party's performances in 1974 gave cause for optimism. Some 
believed that 'Caernarfon could once again become a Liberal stronghold', pointing to 
the fact that 'whilst Plaid Cymru lost 26 out of 36 deposits, we only lost 6 out of 3 1'. 
In reality, however, 1974 was a false dawn for the Welsh Liberal party, and did not 
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spark a renewal for the party in north-west Wales. In the 1979 general election, the 
party's vote in Caemarfonshire slumped to under two thousand, its share of the \ ote 
falling to 5.7 per cent. In Menoneth the party's decline also continued, the party's 
share of the vote reaching only 12.1 per cent. This was not a platform from which a 
serious challenge to Plaid Cymru could be mounted. In the 1970s the Liberal party 
was not a credible political alternative to Plaid Cymru in north-west Wales. 
The Conservative party 
It would be a mistake to ignore Conservative support in north Wales, or to dismiss it 
as the party of 'Incomers'. The party had a strong base in some parts of both north- 
east and north-west Wales, including support from powerful and influential farming 
families and small property owners. 33 Nonetheless, it support was lower than in Wales 
as a whole across the 1960s, and collapsed dramatically - and aberrantly - in the 
1970s. 
Table 2: Conservative party's share of the vote in general elections 1964-74. 
UK Wales Caernarfonshire Merioneth 
1964 42.2 27.6 24.2 12.1 
1966 41.3 27.0 22.2 8.9 
1970 46.4 27.7 20.1 13.3 
1974 (F) 37.9 25.9 16.7 15.0 
1974(0) 35.8 23.9 12.6 11.2 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
As with the Liberal party, lack of finance, organisation and candidates were visible 
symbols of the party's problems, although unlike the Liberal party, the Conservative 
also had to contend with the weight of traditional local antipathy towards the party. 
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and its association with families like the Penrhyns. Most local Conservatives , vere 
realistic about the party's prospects. As one party agent noted, the party at election 
times was generally consumed by the desire to finish above the Liberal party in the 
poll. )4 However, there were others who held higher ambitions. In the earlý 1960s 
there had been more concerted electoral efforts. For example, the Caernarforishire 
Conservative party selected its prospective candidate - Tom Hooson - in 1963, 
(unusually) well in advance of the actual election. These were combined with efforts 
to resurrect and build-up local Young Conservative organisations. 35 However, try as it 
did, the party's efforts ended in disappointment. By September 1963 the party was 
concerned that Hooson had not begun to formulate plans for the election, or been 
visible in the constituency. By October 1963, he had withdrawn his candidature, 
citing 'Lord Home's selection as Prime Minister' as the official reason for his 
decision. 36 As a result, the party's campaign for the 1964 (typically) fell into disarray, 
the party (whilst 'succeeding' in coming second to Labour) actually losing over 1500 
votes. As a party report on the election noted; 
Transport was weak ... meetings in general 
badly attended througho 
i 
ut the 
constituency ... the party 
has lost nearly all the farmers votes in the 
constituency, largely due to the candidates inability to speak Welsh-posters 
were not colourful enough, and there were too many words ... too many people 
away on holiday. 37 
These were trends which hampered the party for the next decade. Getting 
Conservative Welsh speakers to fight seats in Welsh speaking areas was 'quite 
impossible'. 38 However, the report perceptively noted that that this was only partly 
responsible for the party's fortunes, bearing in mind that some 'good local candidates 
had been selected in Wales ... and 
both had lost their deposits'. 39 
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Finances were also a problem. By the mid 1960s the party's financial posItIon was in 
a 'very serious' state. 40 It had not improved by the end of the 1960s. 4ý This 
constrained the local party's attempts to sustain organisation, let alone develop policv,. 
In 1969 the Caemarfonshire Association bemoaned the fact that whikst it was 
4essential to get a full-time agent if we are to win the next election' it could not do so 
because of 'present inadequate salary' and the impossibility of offering higher v, ages. 
Further attempts were made to revive the party in the early 1970s, largely throuah the 
Young Conservatives. However, these efforts were met with a disillusioned and 
apathetic response. As party officials reported, attempts to fire-up the Young 
Conservative movement had faltered largely because: 
The Welsh nationalist party seemed to have a hold of the local young 
people ... organisers 
had tried to make a go of the Young Conservatives, but 42 
apparently had not succeeded . 
Problems encountered with the young were replicated at senior level. As the party 
also reported, there was 'a general difficulty in creating enthusiasm' and 'no 
possibility of forming a men's branch in Caemarfon ,. 43 By 1971 Caemarfonshire had 
no agent and no secretary, rendering any plans redundant. When the party sent 
invitations to sixty local members in the hope of kick-starting the organisation, 
'disappointingly' only twelve turned up for the meeting. 44 
The party's annual report for 1972 confirmed the party's malaise when it 'regetfully' 
confin-ned the closure of the Abersoch men's branch - the only men's branch still 
active by that stage. By 1974 dramatic revivals were out of the question, although 
greater attempts had been made to put up candidates in keeping with 
local 
ion was a requirements. In Merioneth, the party's candidate for the February elect' 
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Welsh speaking man from Tremadog. As the candidate proudly announced 
(inadvertently reflecting the party's problems in the process), this was: 
The first time for the Merioneth Conservatives to choose a local candidate 
who was genuinely Welsh and genuinely local ... this %vill be a bl-, -, help. 
"5 
However, as Y Cymro astutely noted; 
This will of course be ruined by local representatives who are as much 
members of 'y werin' as the House of Lords, and about as Welsh as the blue 
stickers proclaiming 'back Heath, vote Roy Owen'. 
The paper also argued that the Conservative party's support in Menoneth NA-as large1v I- 
confined to English 'in-migants' who had settled in the county's coastal tow-iis and 
idyllic rural areas. This was also claimed to be the case in Caemarfonshire, where 
another Welsh speaking candidate appeared. Before the election Y Cvmro predicted 
the party's fate, 'anti - Kj lbrandon ... 7,000 votes ... and that will be 
It,. 
46 In reality 
Welsh speaking candidates made little difference to the party's fortunes. Even with a 
Welsh speaking candidate, the party's share of the vote in Caemarfonshire still 
declined from 20.1 per cent to 16.7 per cent, whilst Roy Owen's 'genuinely' local 
appeal in Merioneth attracted only 427 extra votes for the party. When Owen stood 
again in October, these extra votes were lost - and a few hundred more beside - the 
party's share of the vote falling from 15 per cent to 11.2 per cent in the process. In 
Caemarfonshire, candidature was again a problem. Another new candidate - Robert 
Harvey, a twenty-one year old non-Welsh speaking journalist - was installed for the 
October election. As Y Cymro noted, Harvey was 'an impressive candidate who 
knows his stuff. However: 
He undoubtedly has a glittering political career ahead of him ... but it won't 
be 
in Caemarfonshire, where knowledge of Welsh is as essential as any other 
political attribute. 47 
358 
Only in 1979 did the Conservative party begin to make inroads in north-west Wales. 
It came second to Plaid Cymru in Menoneth, capturing an Impressive five thousaiid 
votes or 23.6 per cent of the total. It also improved its position in Caemarfonshire. 
with a much improved 19.9 per cent of the poll, and a total of just under 7,000. Whilst 
this did not allow the party to mount a serious challenge to Plaid Cymr-u's dominance. 
it did allow it to mount a challenge to Labour's position as the second force in north- 
west Wales -a feat which it achieved in the 1980s. 
The Labour Party 
Even less has been written on Labour policy in the 1970s and in particular on the 
opposition years of 1970-74, than on the 1950s and 1960s. Whilst some authors 
highlight a shift to the left in the 1970s as the beginning of Labour's descent into the 
electoral abyss of the 1980s, few have examined the party's efforts to provide a 
practical alternative. Left-wingers within the party were apparently able to produce 
policy proposals which were 'virtually unopposed' and 'with obvious consequences 
for the tone of party policy statements on economic and industrial strategy'. 48 The 
party's policy statement, Labour's Programme (1973), provided a clear indication of 
the extent to which party policy was shaped by socialist thinking. It stressed an 
ambitious programme of public ownership initiatives, backed by a more extensive 
assault on capitalist enterprise. As the party argued, because 'social reform (could) not 
itself bring about effective progress towards equality', economic power must be 
transferred from a small elite to the mass of the people'. 49 Some in the party sa\v the 
rise of the left in the 1970s as a direct consequence of the malaise which engulfed the 
party following its failed 'Gaitskellite' adventure under Wilson in the 1960s. 
50 Others, 
believing that the party's message was stale, had urged it to 'find a fresh rhetoric'. 
51 In 
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Wales such debates were accompanied by a desire to rebuild which nonetheless 
produced little that was fresh. 
One example of this desire to fight back was the launching of a new party newspaper. 
Wales Radical, in 1970. It was intended that TVales Radical should act as a forum for 
inner-party debate and as a medium through which internal party differences could be 
thrashed out. As the first edition of the paper argued: 
The Labour party has a tradition of frank discussion. Our columns will often 
be controversial. You will often read things that make your hackles rise. 
Please don't swear and throw the paper away. The debates NN-111 be about your 
future and your children's future, so join in to keep the party mo%, ing on the 
right lines ... above all, remember that Wales Radical is a paper for socialists of 
every hue, in every part of Wales ... let's go on educating oursehýes so that ýve 
can properly decide the priorities and avoid selfish squabbles within Wales. 
Getting the party to understand the concerns of rural areas - of the north as well as the 
south - was an important consideration for some early contributors to the paper, who 
saw this as a higher priority than internal ideological discussions. As Caerwyn 
Roderick argued: 
On those occasions when a tug-of-war develops between them, both town and 
the country are the losers ... I hope Wales Radical will provide a 
forum which 
will lead to a better understanding of each other's point of view. For instance 
we complain about bus services in the towns - but how many townsfolk 
realise there are no buses at all on the roads of Radnorshire and Breconshire? 
There was a serious point political point to these complaints. As Roderick continued: 
In the past we have seen nationalists capitallse on the fears of the people in 
rural areas ... there are so many issues where the 
interests of the Industrial areas 
and the rural areas clash, and where one side can neither see or understand the 
needs of the other. 53 
Others such as Emlyn Sherrington (Labour's candidate in Caemarfonshire in October 
1974) used the paper as a forum to launch scathing attacks on the party's domination 
by south Wales. As Sherrington pointedly argued: 
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With some trepidation I launch myself at the Welsh Council of Labour on the 
grounds that mid and north Wales are inadequately represented on that bod"-I 
Mid and north Walians are becoming increasingly alienated from the Welsh 
Council of Labour. To most members of the Labour party outside the 
industrial complex of south Wales, the council is about as meaningful as the 
Soviet of Outer Mongolia. 
Sherrington was acutely aware of the nationalist threat and of the 'anti -e stab I ishment' 
dimension of Plaid support. He was impressed by the 'heartening aspects' of S. 0. 
Davies's victory in Merthyr in the 1970 general election, arguing that 'here the 
electorate could punish the establishment without voting Plaid. Here they voted for 
socialism against machine politics'. 54 Accountability was the key to future Labour 
success. Labour had to live up to its status as the party of Wales and wake up to the 
needs of the whole country: 
In asking for more representation for north and mid Wales, therefore, I am not 
advocating a Llewelyn type invasion of Deheubarth. It is not a matter of 
hordes of wild men from Gwynedd, Powys and Ceredigion imposing their will 
on the south. Rather it is a question of bringing the WCL closer to the people 
55 of those regions... 
However, Wales Radical failed to live up to its early potential. Subsequent editions of 
the paper were dominated by south Wales issues and politics. Not surprisingly, 
circulation figures fell. By early 1971 the Caernarforishire CLP had become 
concerned over the falling sales of Welsh Radical. 56 Running at a loss by late 197 1, 
the party abandoned the venture. Plaid Cymru exploited this fact. As the Welsh Nation 
argued: 
It is a blow, a mortal one, to those who believe that the Labour party can in 
any way be turned into a party that truly believes in Wales and is willing to 
give that nation something for the votes that have helped it to power in 
Westminster in the past. Make no mistake, large sections of the party in Wales 
are crowing over the paper's demise. The paper had a nasty habit of, even 
under the censorship of party officials ... of 
looking under the carpet and 
picking out those Welsh issues that had been kicked out of sight (until the next 
election). The paper was started by that small group in the Labour party that 
wished to do good for Wales ... it 
has taken this Welsh minded group in the 
Labour party eleven months to realise what others have known for years: the 
institution will NOT be changed. 57 
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Finding new solutions to old problems was not easy for the party in the carIv 19-0s. 
There was not much 'fresh rhetoric' in the party's policies de-veloped after 1970. Yet 
the party's left-turn in the early 1970s should not be over-emphasised as a 'reason' for 
Labour's defeats in north-west Wales. In fact, perhaps the most damaging feature of 
the party's leftward drift in the early 1970s \vas that it served to reinforce many of the 
(failed) solutions to regional problems which had been offered in the 1960s. For 
example, the renewed belief in state intervention meant that the 're,, -,, Ional 
development' formulas of the 1960s remained largely unchanged. State 
encouragement for the redistribution of industry and 'advance factories' were just vxo 
policies that remained prominent in Labour's programme. Labour's Welsh policy 
statements for the 1974 general elections did not mark a drastic departure from what 
had gone before, except that was for the fundamental support given to the proposal for 
an elected Welsh council (at the February election) and for full-scale devolution and a 
Welsh Assembly (in the October election). If the rhetoric that accompanied Labour's 
Programme indicated a significant change of ideology and policy, the party's Welsh 
and local policy statements adopted a more cautious, moderate, approach. 
Some Welsh problems did feature in the February and October manifestos. The Welsh 
Labour party was unhappy with the powers invested in the Welsh Office (a criticism 
aired at length in the 1960s), whilst devolution (fundamentally rejected in the 1960s) 
was now (tentatively) seen as a viable and pragmatic solution to long-standing 
problems. The party argued that Welsh transport faced a 6growing crisis'. Public 
transport was in decline - thus requiring increased subsidies - and private transport 
was booming. However, the absence of an 'integrated transport system' was 
'agg s blity'. it was Impossible for gravated by the split in Ministerial respon , 
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improvements in transport to be achieved gi-,,, en existing Welsh Office powers. 
Instead, the party called for the Welsh Office to *ha%, e sole responsibilitý, for all road 
transport ... and joint responsibility with the Department of the Environment for rail 
transport . 
58 Housing was another policy area where there was a significant chan-, -, e of 
emphasis. The party called for a 'progressi-vely larger' council house building 
programme, for privately rented accommodation to be brought into public ownership, 
for steps to be taken to 'nationalise' building land (due to the fact that house purchase 
prices were being pushed beyond the means of 'average' families). Of importance to 
north-west Wales, there were calls to abolish tax relief on holiday hornes. ý" Labour's 
new education policies were also attentive to Welsh problems. Additional nursery 
schools were viewed as 'a particular boon to working wives in Wales', as the activity 
rate among women was lower than in most other parts of the UK. In addition, the 
party promised to 'reconsider' the policy of closing schools in rural areas in view of tn 
'the disastrous impact given by such closures to the further depopulation of the 
countryside'. Poor youth and further education provision was also addressed, through 
plans which included the establishment of a new polytechnic college to serve 'north 
and central Wales'. Moreover, Labour pledged to support 'devolved power' to LEA's 
which, under a Labour government, would be 'free to devise and implement' Welsh 
language policies 'best suited to their areas'. Parent Teacher Associations would 
'promote the spirit of co-operation between school and home and between diverse 
linguistic elements in a school district'. " Whilst this addressed 'Welsh' problems, it 
also seemed (in part at least) a confirmation of Plaid's own analysis. It admitted 
problems Plaid had identified. it sought solutions in structural changes in governance 
- but of a less clear-cut and dramatic kind to those proposed by Plaid. 
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Social welfare policy was also addressed vkith a new, compassionate, emphasis. As 
Labour argued, Wales had a heavier dependency on social security pro,, -ision in 
proportion to its population than other parts of the UK .61 As a result. 'special %Velsh 
problems' would be addressed including increased weekly benefits (which reduced 
dependence on means tested benefits) and increased provision of social services 
administered by local authorities. Other policy initiatives on a UK level - such as the 
plan to redesign family allowances and thus eliminate FIS means-tested benefit - 
were also supported. Yet the shift to the left was not necessarily to the party's 
advantage. As the Tories later success was to demonstrate, high welfare payments did 
not attract support from employed voters - whilst even those on benefit might aspire 
to jobs, not welfare. 
Whilst Labour was still attentive to Welsh needs and circumstances, 'new' policy 
initiatives were also accompanied by rather older, out-dated, ideas. For example, plans 
for transport included 'improvements between north and south Wales', a 'priority' 
which the party had seminally failed to address in the 1960s when it had the power - 
but lacked the finances - to do so. Agricultural and rural policies also 
had a familiar 
tone. Worryingly a problem from the 1950s still existed - the fact that 'an agriculture 
policy for Wales will largely depend upon the party's policy for the UK as a whole'. 
62 
Moreover, plans to re-establish the Rural Development Board (disbanded by the 
Tories) symbollsed a belief in an old solution to a long-standing problem and faith in 
a policy initiative that had enjoyed only limited success in the 1960s. Other promises, 
such as those to provide more subsidies to hill farmers and to cut down imports of 
high-priced produce from the Common Market, signified another inconsistency 
(given 
that the party had previously exalted the virtues of Common Market membership). 
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The most significant policy shift was the party's support for devolution. Throughout 
the 1950s, support for a Welsh parliament had been a distinctive feature of local 
Labour politics, and one that marked local Labour %IPs from some of their 
counterparts in south Wales. In the 1960s, and particularly after 1966, Labour seemed 
in a position to deliver an extended form of devolution, but as has already been 
argued, this attempt fell apart. In the early 1970s, Labour's renewed passion for 
devolution seemed less credible. As nationalist propaganda highlighted, Labour's I 
interest in devolution seemed to coincide with election campaigns. The idea of an 
elected council - abandoned in the late 1960s - re-surfaced for the 1970 general 
election, again in the Merthyr by-election of 1972 and for the party's February 1974 
manifesto. But the commitment to devolution lacked conviction. In February 1974 
Labour argued that: 
In recognition of the natural expression of Welsh identity we consider that the 
Welsh nation could and should contribute more effectively towards its own 
goveming 
However, it still rejected full-scale devolution on the grounds that it was: 
A wasteful duplication and inevitable confusion which would anse from a 
separate Welsh Assembly with legislative powers. 63 
However, only seven months later, in October 1974, the party had performed a u-turn. 
On this occasion 'wasteful duplication' and 'inevitable confusion' had been forgotten. 
Now the party argued: 
Labour supports the unanimous view of Kilbrandon and rejects talk of an 
independent Wales or a federal structure for the UK ... weakening 
democracy 
can only be addressed by radical reform of the machinery of 
govenu-nent ... (involving) a wide range of 
decision making. 64 
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In addition to the party's UK and Welsh policies, Labour's popularity in north-west 
Wales was also based on distinctively local policies and appeals. Defence of the 
4gwerin' had formed an important aspect of the party's appeal throughout the 1950s 
and early 1960s. Goronwy Roberts and T. W. Jones had both been vociferous 
defenders of Welsh culture and the Welsh language, and committed advocates of 
traditional Welsh speaking communities and values. Ho%vever, by the early 1970s, 
Labour's reputation on several of those issues had been undermined. Depopulation 
had not been halted. Successive governinents (not only Labour but also the 
Conservative) had failed to address the unemployment problem In north-west Wales. 
With outward migration came inward migration, and with it fears concerning the 
decline of Welsh communities. Many of those 'traditional Welsh speaking 
communities' which Labour purported to represent, felt threatened. By the early 
1970s Plaid Cymru, not Labour, appeared more in tune with the concerns of locals 
than the Labour party (see below). 
There were few dynamic and original Labour responses to the problems of north-west 
Wales. Regional employment premiums, special development area status and plans 
for advance factories were still favoured as solutions to the problem of attracting 
industry into the region. 65 The success record of these policies in the 1960s cast a 
large question mark over their actual effectiveness, especially bearing in mind that 
UK economic conditions were still less than favourable. Only after Labour defeats in 
the north-west in the February election were commitments to tackle the problems of 
rural areas made more evident. More plans for ad,,,, ance factories were accompanied 
by the promise of seven thousand cIvil service jobs (some of which would be n the 
north), an E8 million derelict land programme, a Welsh Development Agency and a 
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Railways Act which promised a 'major investment in Welsh railways'. Moreover, 
public expenditure would be used to implement schemes of 'rural development'. As 
Labour argued, rural areas were: 
Still being impoverished by the drain of young people with the result that 
those communities are no longer self-supporting. 66 
'New initiatives' to 'use and develop the social fabric and economic resources of rural 
areas to the full' were promised. Again, Labour's comments seemed to confirrn 
Plaid's analysis - whilst also lending support to its claim that Labour only responded 
because Plaid's support was growing. 
Labour's past popularity was not just about policies. The importance of personality - 
often at the expense of partisan concerns - had been a long standing feature of politics 
in north-west Wales, particularly on local councils but also so far as local MPs were 
concerned. Both Goronwy Roberts and T. W. Jones had cultivated large 'personal' 
votes in their respective constituencies. Roberts claimed he had a personal following 
which guaranteed him nine thousand votes at election time. 67 Party workers were told 
to go out and get the rest. 68 However, there were problems. T. W. Jones's successor in 
Merioneth Wil Edwards, whilst young and the type of new candidate favoured by 
Emrys Jones, lacked the personal appeal and the political craft of his predecessor. 
69 
Edwards was prone to stating outspoken and controversial views on local issues. 
70 As 
Y Cymro perceptively noted: 
The big plus is the personal appeal of Wil Edwards. The big problem Is his 
tendency to put his foot in it, and lose friends as easily as making them. 
" 
Senior Labour party figures in Menoneth also bemoaned the fact that Edwards 'lost 
his head' after his election to parliament in 1966 and, as a result, failed to cultivate the 
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constituency. 72 These observations are bome out by official Labour part-v reports. As a 
party report into the results of the 1974 general elections noted: 
The Labour MP did not devote enough time to this constituency and in an area 
like this, this is a fatal mistake. It was enough to let in the nationalist '%N'ho, 7, 
while he is as active as he has been since February, will be difficult to shift. ' 
When attempts were made to dissuade Edwards from standing again in October, these 
failed because of the MP's successful attempts to lobby for continued support from 
various constituency branches. This was a 'disaster' for the local party. Inevitabl-v, 
Edwards's vote deteriorated even further as a result. 74 
Difficulties were also encountered in Caernarfonshire. Roberts' considerable personal 
reputation showed signs of ageing by the early 1970s. As a young MP in the 1940s, 
Roberts had turned down the offer of a junior government post from Clement Attlee, 
stating that he wished to concentrate on the considerable problems facing his 
constituency. 75 Despite Plaid's claims to the contrary, he evidently did so. Ironically, 
during the 1960s, the understandable distraction of government posts were 
instrumental in undermining his personal popularity and reputation. Government 
responsibilities meant that he was often absent from the constituency when 'crisis 
meetings' discussing the demise of the quarries were taking place. His spell at the 
76 
foreign office was seen as particularly damaging. Roberts also suffered from the 
longevity of his 'reign' as Caemarfonshire NIP. Policies, doctrine and personal 
reputation aside, some believed that he had simply become a stale commodity, 
I ic especially when confronted with a credible challenge from a young and enthusiast' 
candidate. 77 However, the biggest problem facing Roberts was that the party lacked 
the local organisational capacity which would enable it to counter the emerging 
challenge of Plaid Cymru. 
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Organisation was an acute problem within the Labour party in the early 1970s. Left- 
wing Labour members felt that across the UK, the NVIlson government had created 
6great disillusionment' within the party's rank and file. 78 If, as Tiratsoo has shown, 
this was an exaggeration, there were problems in Wales kvith even moderates reacting 
against goverment policies. Recent work by Steven Fielding on Labour's 
organisation in the 1960s has highlighted 'the ability of active members to subvert 
officials' plans to improve the effectiveness of the party's organisation', showing that 
the UK party elite 'was not as powerful as some suggested at the time'. 79 Others have 
shown that across Wales, Labour's dominance from the Second World War omvards 
was not matched by organisational ngour. 80 
One of the key problems facing the Labour party in north-west Wales - and 
particularly in Caernarfonshire - was the commanding electoral majorities enjoyed by 
the party in the two post-war decades. Goronwy Roberts believed that this was a safe 
seat with loyalty to him (and Labour) created and sustained by his work for the 
constituency, Welsh culture and Wales. This also meant that the local party became 
afflicted by some of the organisational problems common in the south. The ease with 
which Labour swept to electoral successes did not encourage the local CLP to embark 
on energetic membership campaigns or maintain an efficient election fighting 
machine. 
Organisational problems were not new to the Caernarfon constituency. When the 
Welsh party had launched organisation drives in the past, Caemarfonshire was one of 
the constituencies typically found wanting. As a WRCL report commented of one 
such effort in 1954: 'Caernarfon - little activity in the forin of a campaign. 
There have 
369 
been constituency meetings, but the main problem is that of membership'. 81 
Alarmingly, Labour found difficulty forming branches even in larger urban centres. 
As the same report noted, branches had been difficult to sustain in Caernarfon and 
Porthmadog. During the same period, the North Wales Sub-Committee of the NVRCL 
bemoaned the fact that of the region's constituencies only Caernarfonshire and 
Merioneth had failed to submit regular constituency party reports. 82 Hubert %IoraLin, 
the party's organiser, complained that 'organisation in north 'Wales constituencies left 
much to be desired'. 83 
The party's continued successes in the 1960s hid a similar set of problems. In 
Caemarfonshire, organisation was largely non-existent between elections. 84 When 
meetings were held, these were often arranged at very short notice. According to his 
agent, these meetings were normally conducted when Goronwy Roberts 'wanted to 
get something off his chest'. 85 Despite overwhelming electoral success, party support 
remained weak in many areas of the county. Poor organisation (and the lack of active 
branches) meant that the problem was never addressed. 86 There were few 
opportunities for branches to act on their own initiative and demonstrate Labour's real 
local concern. By the end of the 1960s and early 1970s the party was run by a small 
(and largely ageing) group of stalwarts, who were ill-equipped to cope with the 
vigorous and energetic challenge posed by Plaid Cymru. The tradition of 
local councils, and Labour's failure to address this problem, did not help the party to 
develop sustainable 'roots' in local communities. With the Welsh language press 
increasingly hostile, Labour had little opportunity to develop its case. 
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Serious problems faced the party well before 1974, but they became more evident in 
the early 1970s. Correspondence from senior members of the Caemarfon Labour 
party to Goronwy Roberts and Hubert Morgan (Labour's assistant regional organiser 
for Wales), provide a valuable insight into the scale of the malaise. The over-riding 
problem troubling the party were those of finance and organisation. In a letter to 
Hubert Morgan in October 1973, J. C. Williams, the Caemarfonshire CLP's vice- 
chairman, expressed concerns over the financial state of the party: 
As you are aware, the financial affairs of the constituency were found to be in 
a sorry mess when Idwal took over as treasurer, how this came about is 
altogether too obvious, and the only reference I can make is that the dire 
consequences of stirring dirty water only achieves the end product of dirtier 
water emerging. 87 
Such was the financial state of the party that it could not afford to pay its 1973 
affiliation fees without 'going into the red'. Lack of financial support from local trade 
unions was one serious problem. These were worsened by poor organisation. As 
Williams pointed out: 
Whilst two or three branches who are progressive in field work have made 
donations from their fund-raising activities, others have not been 
forthcoming ... the ugly fact is that this constituency is in distress financially 
and it should not expect Goronwy to do the spade-work on its behalf, no man 
can do the impossible. 
Lack of money hit the party hard in other areas. Labour had won in 1970, but this was 
no thanks to financial or organisational efforts. As Williams continued: 
Our efforts in the last general election were pathetic and mediocre.. - Idwal and 
I had to hide at the back of Caernarfon institute to escape embarrassment by 
the appearance of the 'Blaid' with their sophisticated broadcasting equipment 
blaring away on the move, contrary to the Noise Abatement Act. 
Williams was anxious that machinery (and financial support) be put in place before 
the next election. He was concerned that Goronwy Roberts could no longer rely on his 
4 parliamentary and constituency record' to ensure continued electoral success. This 
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was especially important as Roberts faced the prospect of a 'three party fi-c-Yht*. 'Worse 
Still Williams 'had a sneaking feeling that the Liberals rnw, ,- also emerge'. " 
Given the severity and urgency of the CLP's predicament, the lack of response from 
Morgan to Williams' concerns was surprising (and perhaps signified that a much 
deeper problem existed across all levels of the party). A month later, Williams wrote 
again, re-iterating and expanding on his earlier concerns. For Williams, the lack of 
response to his earlier letter was symptomatic of the problems facing the Labour party 
not only in Wales but the country in general. 'Over-centralisation' and 'the 
bedevilment of distances' were contributory causes to Labour's organisational 
difficulties. Politically, the party 'were over relying on old doctrines'. 
The 'shambles' which Williams identified within the Caernarfon CLP bordered on the 
farcical. Despite his efforts to address problems, he was alarmed to find *a secretary 
who completely failed to work with me or answer any of my letters', and meetings 
attended by senior party members 'who were not aware of the reasons for the 
ing a party branch in meetings'. Moreover, when an attempt were made at reform* 
Caernarfon in 1973, it ended in embarrassment for the party. At a meeting held in a 
local hotel, and designed to generate support from Caernarfon: 
Two-thirds of those present were fTom outside Caernarfon, that is from 
surrounding villages, and the occasion being of course for the formation of a 
branch in Caernarfon itself, the end-product of the meeting was that a lot of 
Labour supporters from the town were left out in the cold, disastrous in Its 
implications. 89 
This was particularly distressing as 'Caemarfon represents one-sixth of the 
electorate'. 90 These were problems that continued in the February 1974 election 
campaign. For example, on one occasion the CLP's secretary was unaware of an 
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electoral meeting - starring Goronwy Roberts and Cledwyn Huahes - that was taking 
place in Caernarfon, until she read of the meeting in a local newspaper. " 
Unsurprisingly given Labour's organisational problems the party's campaign in 
February lacked the energy of its main rival (see below). Labour lacked the manpoNN, er 
to compete effectively with Plaid's vigorous approach. Caernarfonshire NN-as a Nvidel, ý' 
anticipated Labour casualty. The Welsh Labour party's post-election report ar, -, ued 
that 'the only real surprise was Pembroke'. 92 Cardiff s reports on the malaise in the 
north-west claimed that organisation, rather than the rejection of Labour policy ", as 
the main reason for the party's demise. As was the case xith Wil Edwards, Goronwý, 
Roberts was seen as the architect of his own downfall. As a Labour party report 
argued: 
The constituency was held in check (by Goronwy Roberts) ... no one was able 
to work without his consent or backing ... now, 
freed from this restraint, they 
are pushing forward - with our help and encouragement. 
93 
Letters written to Goronwy Roberts in the wake of his defeat reveal the views of other 
party supporters on the origins of that defeat. One correspondent pointed to the fact 
that 'nationalist sympathies, sips, pictures and propaganda' in local government 
offices had been evident 'some two years before the election'. 
94 This was a significant 
factor bearing in mind the large number of local voters employed in local government. 
Moreover, public sector workers were often Labour supporters elsewhere. Plaid's 
growing base in local government may have been useful to Its appeal. 
9ý Other 
correspondents blamed young voters for the party's demise. In the 1970 election 
(when the voting age had been reduced to eighteen) Labour's majority in 
Caemarfonshire had declined dramatically. By 1974, local Labountes were adamant 
that Labour had not captured the local youth vote. As one supporter \NTOte 
to 
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Goronwy Roberts, 'they should never have gi%, en the vote to eighteen year olds. "'liat 
do they know about the issues of the dayT. Others shared the same sentiments: 
Who brought it into force that children of 18 could vote, as they don't knoxv 
what it means ... all they know is how to hold a pencil and put a cross on a 
piece of paper. 96 
Another commented that: 
The majority of their (Plaid) votes came from ill-educated 18 'ý"ear olds ... this is one thing that should never have gone through, I hope the age goes back up 
to 21, because 18 is too young to understand what politics are all about. 97 
The same outcome was blamed by others on schoolteachers who had 'Indoctrinated' 
young voters with nationalist values. 98 Whilst this analysis may have reflected the age 
and prejudices of the party members, collapsing Labour support amon, (, Tst the youngg. 
and in local government was plausible enough. Labour had been ýveakened as a 
community organisation. The press and other organisations had helped nationalism 
permeate the community. Some of Roberts' political friends commented in ways 
which indicate a failure to understand nationalism, and a tendency to malign it 
(perhaps understandably given the bitter campaign). One local journalist described 
Plaid as 'so many zanies operating on the ffinge'. He continued 'we are in for years of 
lunatic politics'. 99 The problems facing Labour were accentuated by its slim electoral 
majority in Parliament: 
The main thing that worries me about the situation in Wales is that the Nats 
are now in better position to extract concessions than they dared contemplate, 
than if they had won a thumping string of seats ... I've already written to 
Cledwyn telling him that I think anything you concede to them v6ll be 
danegeld, and heaven help us at the end of the road. 100 
There was thus support for the type of anti-nationalist rhetoric produced by George 
Thomas. 
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Labour's position deteriorated still further between February and October 1974. In 
Merioneth this was blamed on Wil E&A-ards. Hovvever, a new candidate. Emh, -n 
Sherrington was selected as Labour's candidate in Caemarfonshire, ývhen Goronwv 
Roberts moved to the Lords. Like his predecessor, Sherrington -, xas a local man and a 
finn advocate of devolution who also favoured a *communitanan' form of Labour 
politics. A historian and a passionate orator, his culture was European rather than 
Welsh, nationalist rather than religious. 101 If on the one hand speeches xhich 
contained references and rhetoric relating to the 'gwenn' seemed to signify that 
Sherrington was a 'natural' successor to Roberts, some of his other political vieývs, 
and particularly his views over how the constituency should be organised, were a 
radical departure fTom the old regime. 
Sherrington's adoption may have been influenced by Ernrys Jones. He was also one of 
an increasing number of 'left-wing' candidates selected by the party after 1970. Like 
others, he had been influenced by Gwyn Alf Williams at Aberystwyth, and by the 'red 
dragon and red flag' political views of Cledwyn Hughes and Aneurin Bevan. ' 02 Such 
people were actively supported by Emrys Jones - at least if he felt they would 'pep- 
up' the seat. Sherrington was a self-confessed 'extremist', backing up this profound 
claim by explaining: 
I am an extremist when it comes to injustice and failure. I am an extremist 
when it comes to the living standards of the 'werin'. What's wrong with being 
an extremist when it comes to fighting against injustice? 
His political platform for the October election emphasised his 'left-wing' beliefs. In 
line with Labour manifesto pledges (see above), Sherrington supported government 
intervention in industry and economic affairs, arguing that small, seml-Industrialised 
regions such as north-west Wales could not compete with 'giants' like the Midlands, 
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and could only do so through positive government intervention in industrial affairs. 
This, Sherrington believed, was a key point which marked Labour's campaign apart 
from the other parties. As he argued: 
All the other candidates are against this because they believe in free markets. 
Free markets are all well and good when the competitors are equal. But what 
do you do when one is a giant, the other a dwarf, when one is Birmingham the 
other Cesarea. 103 
Other strands of Sherrington's campaign focussed on Labour's plans for 
Caernarfonshire including 'special development status' for the constituency to attract 
'investment, factories and work', a strengthened rural development board, a 'National 
Enterprise Board' to direct industry into Gwynedd, govenunent contracts for factories 
in Gwynedd, 'equalisation' of water rates and an elected 'senate' for Wales to 
supervise the work 'of forty nominated bodies and deal with delegated legislation', 
the 'most revolutionary development in Wales for four hundred years'. ")-' The 
campaign also focussed on Labour's delivery of promises after February. The end of 
the three day week, the social contract with trade unions, subsidies on food, increased 
pensions and special development status for Gwynedd were all notable achievements, 
whilst a 'start' had also been made on a number of other promises including a 'new 
deal' for pensioners, more houses, 'saving the health service', the re-negotiation of 
Common Market entry, an oil development commission for Wales and equal status 
for women. 1 
05 
Sherrington's approach to local organisation differed radically from his predecessor's. 
Like many on the left, Sherrington believed in the political expediency of organisation 
and of youthful energy. Not surprisingly, a radical overhaul of local party organisation 
took place after the February defeat. With the help of a team of young activists (many 
of whom like Betty Williams were young Socialists' in the 1960s), nex branches 
376 
sprung up across the constituency. 106 This, together with 'outside help' provided by 
the party including 'guest speakers', 'bi-lingual literature' and members from outside 
constituencies, all contributed to a significant improvement in Labour's challenge to 
Plaid Cymru. As a Labour report argued: 
We had a really first-class campaign - the best in the constituency in the 
memory of those active there. There was a strong reaction to losing the seat in 0 February - membership increased dramatically and there vk-as a quick growth 
in local branches ... our hope depends on this growth being maintained. 
The significant progress made after February was also confirmed by the Welsh prc,, s. 
As Y Cymro pointed out: 
Labour's effort is much more energetic than last time. They have followed 
Plaid's pattern of campaign songs, one of which ends 'give your vote to 
Sherrington'. Wigley's songs are also being played, but they are not as 
dominant as they were in February. ' 08 
However, despite these efforts, Labour's vote continued to decline. The party's share 
of the vote fell from 3 5.6 to 34.1 %, with an actual loss of over a thousand votes. This 
was a pattern replicated in Merioneth, where the party's share of the vote fell from 
32% to 30.9%. In Caernarfonshire, the party attempted to find scapegoats for its 
failures. As with Roberts a few months earlier, the Welsh party placed some of the 
blame for the party's demise squarely on Shemngton's shoulders: 
The candidate Emlyn Sherrington worked extremely hard. He is a first class 
speaker, but not ideal for this constituency. He can't resist attacking the 
individual - but he is not above reproach himself - so he opened the way for 
his nationalist opponents and in some way suffered for it. ' 09 
In a 'dirty' campaign, Sherrington was portrayed by Plaid Cymru as a communist and 
an atheist. This had led to some unpleasantries being returned in the opposite direction 
(see below). But these were not the real reasons for Labour's defeat. Labour's 
problems were deep-rooted. As Sherrington himself has pointed out, organisational 
effort - whilst valiant - required four years work, not six months. 
Labour's problems 
could not be fixed ovemight. The steps taken to 'repair' the damaged party between 
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February and October 1974 collapsed thereafter. They stemmed the tide, but did not 
turn it back. As a result, Labour was not a credible challenger to Plaid Cymr-u in the 
1970s, 1980s or 1990s. 
Eventually Plaid and Labour - natural enemies and bitter antagonists in 1974 - shared 
some similarities. However, Plaid - like all nationalist parties - had the capacitv to 
draw on a broader base. Between February and October 1974, Plaid made little 
impression on the Labour vote, but gained from Liberal and Conservati-ve defections 
in Merioneth and from the Conservative decline in Caernarfonshire. 
Table 3: General Election Results, February and October 1974 General 
Elections, Vote and (% Vote): Caernarfonshire. 
PARTY FEBRUARY 1974 OCTOBER 1974 
Conservative 5,803 (16.7) 4,325 (12.6) 
Labour 12,375 (35.6) 11,370 (34.1) 
Liberal 2,506(7.2) 3,690 (10.9) 
Plaid Cymru 14,103 (40.5) 14,624 (42.5) 
Turnout 34,787 (82.4) 34,004 (80.8) 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
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Table 4: General Election Results, February and October 1974 General 
Elections, Vote and (% Vote): Merioneth. 
PARTY FEBRUARY1974 OCTOBER 1974 
Conservative 3,392 (15.0) 2-509 (11.2) 
Labour 7,235 (32.0) 6,951 (30.9) 
Liberal 4,153 (18.4) 3,454 (15.4) 
Plaid Cymru 7,823 (34.6) 9,543 (42.0) 
Turnout 22,603 (85.1) 22,367 (84.0) 
Source: B. Jones, Welsh Elections. 
At least at this stage, it was not Labour's weakness that mattered, but Plaid's abilit"Oo 
present a broader appeal. 
Plaid Cymru 
Plaid's victory in 1974 was testament to the significant advances made the party, both 
in terms of organisation and policy, from the early 1960s onwards. Some historians 
have viewed the result of the 1970 general election as disappointing for Plaid t:, 
Cymru. 110 Defeat in Carmarthenshire was matched by huge Labour victories in both 
Rhondda and Caerphilly. They also view the Caemarfonshire and Menoneth results as 
disappointing, given the rumoured expectation of Plaid breakthroughs in the region at 
the time. But as this study has shown, such observations do not take into account the 
difficulty of eroding political loyalties, the (still) formidable reputations of local 
Labour MPs or the fact that Plaid organisation and policies were still in an embryonic 
condition in 1970. Plaid built up its position skilfully and to great effect over a 
substantial period of time, exploiting opportunities with populistic propaganda. 
,I, right Organisation was felt to be a key contribution to potential success. Having the 
- 
candidates in the right constituencies was deemed essential if the party -ý, vas to make 
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electoral breakthroughs in 1974. Somewhat inadvertently, this had been achie%-ed 
before the 1974 general election. Dafydd Wigley (the party's candidate in Merioneth 
in 1970) was selected as prospective candidate for Caemarfon in 1972, whilst a young 
local academic, Dafydd Elis Thomas, had replaced Wigley as the party's candidate in 
Merioneth. These were both crucial factors in the party's success. Wigley had felt 
decidedly uncomfortable in Merioneth (see above). By comparison, he felt 'more at 
home' in Caemarfonshire. 111 He had experience of the Plaid 'machine' there, having 
worked for the party in the 1964 general election and having been touted as a 
prospective candidate for the constituency in 1965.112 Given the lon, traditions of the 
party in Caemarfonshire, the strength of the local organisation and his familiarity with 
the constituency, Wigley did not find Caemarfonshire difficult to cultivate. Plaid's 
organisation was also well advanced by the early 1970s. In 1972 the constituency had 
two thousand members and twelve thriving branches. '' 3 Family in the seat, football 
contacts and a mother who was an active member of the local Women's Institute were 
all important in getting Wigley known in the constituency. 114 Moreover, and 
significantly, he believed that his local reputation had also been enhanced because of 
the his involvement in the party's research group and his co-authorship of the 
'Economic Plan', which had attracted valuable local as well as national media 
attention. 1 
15 
Dafydd Elis Thomas in Merioneth was an equally attractive local candidate. Like 
Wigley, Thomas's youthfulness may well have been an electoral asset. Also like 
Wigley, Thomas inherited a local organisation which was in good shape. As has 
already been argued, Merioneth had been Plaid's fastest growing constituency in the 
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1960s and generated the party's highest income. Policy development, put in place 
largely through Wigley's efforts in the late 1960s, was also well advanced. 
Of course, Plaid Cymru was not without its own problems in the earlý, ý 1970s. For 
example, despite attempts to break the 'independent' stranglehold of local g0vernment 
politics in the region, progress made on this front was patchy. Local parties had been 
encouraged to fight as many local elections as possible, and to persuade 'unofficial 
Plaid' candidates to stand in the party's name. As local branches reported, finding 
candidates willing to represent Plaid on local councils was not a problem. However, 
even Plaid officials were less prepared to break with local 'independent' traditions. As 
Elfed Gruffydd (the secretary of Plaid's Pwllheli branch) pointed out in a letter to the 
party's secretary Dafydd Williams in 1971: 
I am quite willing to stand ... but of course I will be standing as an independent, in keeping with the traditions of this part of the world. 1 16 
Things had not improved by the end of 1972. As the secretary of the party's Arfon 
branch also wrote to Williams: 
There are only one or two prepared to stand as official Plaid Cymru candidates 
in the local elections, although, of course, many will stand as independents. 117 
These problems precipitated an agitated response within the party. Some demanded 
radical action. A National Council memo in 1973 demanded that: 
Plaid should not be blackmailed by independent council candidates in 
favourable areas where there is a good alternative ready to fight ... we should 
ensure that there is no money or manpower for 'Plaid' independents. '' 8 
As local election results for 1973 highlighted, Plaid was far from resolving these 
problems. In the 1973 county council elections, whilst the party won more seats than 
Labour (six as compared to four) the independent tradition triumphed, with 56 
independent councillors elected in all. In district council elections the story was the 
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same. In Arfon, whilst Labour vvon more seats than Plaid (e, 
--ght as compared to 
Ci % 0, 
27 independents were elected. In Merioneth all 39 seats were won by independent-IN. ' 19 
Only in 1976 was some progress made in district councils, Plaid vvinning a total of 13 
seats in Arfon and Labour five (independents falling to 22). In Merioneth the 
independent tradition was finally broken, with Plaid winning eight seats. Labour three 
and independent representation falling to 28.120 
Moreover, whilst local branches and the party's membership in the region had growii 
spectacularly since the 1960s, some branches had also gone into decline and members 
had been lost. For example, in 1972 there had been efforts to form a new branch in the 
Llanbedrog and Mynytho area of Caemarfonshire. Dafydd Williams supplied a list of 
'lapsed' members, showing that Plaid had lost a total of 51 'paid-up' members in the 
area, one having last paid 'dues' in the 1950s, 36 in the 1960s and fourteen in the 
1970s. 121 Other local branches were also concerned at the loss of members. In 1971 
the Nefyn branch of the party had tabled a motion at the party's annual conference 
calling for subscription fees to be reduced, fearing that 'it (was) unattractive to those 
people on the fringes of the party and might become members' and that 'there (would) 
be far fewer members because of the increase - and this may have a great effect on 
the number of Plaid votes in the next election'. 122 Others were concerned that the 
party had gown too quickly and that it lacked the infrastructure to deal with this. The 
danger was that Plaid would lose its 'homely' feel. Losing contact with nevv members 
was a real concern. 123 In the late 1950s and early 1960s it was not uncommon for 
party officials to know all of the party's branch members on first-name terms. 
"4 This 
was no longer feasible by the early 1970s. There was also the fear that because of its 
increasing size, party organisers 'tended to think of organisatIon in terms of 
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distributing leaflets'. 125 In order to rectify this the party's national council stressed 
that 'straightforward contact with people is far more important than leaflets' and 
suggested that a local candidates attendance at 'non-political functions' (such as 
football or rugby matches) was 'more important' than political meetings in making 
communities familiar with the face of the party. 126 
Despite a growing membership, Plaid was also far from being a wealthy party by the 
early 1970s. It still lacked the money (and manpower) to fight effectively on a 36 
constituency basis -a policy adopted by the party for the 1970 general election. This 
caused tensions within the upper-echelons of the party. For example, some believed 
that fighting elections in the south Wales valleys was a wasteful venture and that the 
party could 'do without another expensive battle in this unpromising territory'. ' 27 For 
general elections, modernisers within the party, including Dafydd Wigley and Phil 
Williams, believed it was essential to focus financial and organisational resources on a 
number of 'key' seats -a suggestion opposed but eventually endorsed by the party's 
executive. 128 These were not necessarily seats which Wigley and Williams believed 
Plaid was capable of winning, but ones where Plaid would obtain maximum publicity 
for its campaigns. As a result, in addition to target seats like Carmarthen, Rhondda 
West, Caerphilly, Caemarfonshire and Merioneth, others were selected because 
attacking the sitting MPs 'provided good press copy'. Seven further seats were 
contested to capture media attention. These included Anglesey (Cledwyn Hughes), 
Montgomery (Emlyn. Hooson), Merthyr (S. 0. Davies), Cardigan (D. E. Morgan), 
Pembroke (Desmond Donnelly), Llanelli (D. J. Davies) and, of course, Cardiff West 
(George Thomas). 129 Yet the party also recognised what it was to learn in 
Caemarfonshire - levels of Liberal support would also determine its prospects. 
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Caemarfonshire was the only seat which Plaid realistically expected to win in 1974. 
'Beyond Caernarfon' the party's ambitions were relati,.,, elv modest. I 
The result of the February general election confirmed the party's limitations across 
most of Wales. As a party report into the contest noted, Plaid's performance and 
support had been at best 'patchy'. As it went on to argue: 
Sweeping gains were made in north-west Wales ... little progress in south Glamorgan, a few gains in the Gwent valleys and slump in the cities ... weak 
seats became noticeably weaker. ' 31 
The Liberal revival which was evident in England made no real impact on the party's 
fortunes in Wales. Nonetheless, Plaid believed that it had done enough to disturb its 
progress in many constituencies. Ironically, and as the party's founding fathers had 
envisaged, the 1974 elections had confirmed Plaid's status as the party of Welsh 
speaking, rural Wales. Outside these 'heartland' constituencies, the party struggled to 
capture the 'third party' vote from the Conservative and Liberals. Plaid argued that 
the existence of Liberal candidates had a 'big influence' on Plaid's performance, as 
was the 'presence of very good local Conservative candidates, many of whom were 
Welsh speaking'. 132 Tristan Garel-Jones, the Tory candidate in Caemarfon, was cited 
as a prime example. This, Plaid argued, led to 'the Conservatives recovering the vote 
from both Liberal and Labour in strongly held Labour seats'. 
Plaid's in-house psephology revealed that in 'anglicised areas', the 'third party vote 
went to the Liberals', leaving only 'hard core' support for the party. This -was 
especially true of eastern counties, where 'mainly English TV channels were 
received' and 'where voters never even hear of Plaid Cymru in the media'. 
' These 
were also areas where Plaid organisation 4was at its weakest' (many constituencies 
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only being fought for the second time), and "here 'candidates were chosen at the last 
minute' -a problem shared by both the Liberal and Consen-atives in constituencies 
across Wales. In some seats where Plaid had not saved its deposit, such as Gower, 
Ogmore and Rhondda, the party's performance had been woeful. 
Yet in the longer term, as Plaid was also aware, the chances of continued Liberal 
renewal were slim: 'the Liberals have no organisation outside Cardiff and the rural 
areas of east and mid Wales'. ' 34 Plaid on the other hand was 'much stronger in terms 
of membership and organisation' and more cohesive politically, considering that 'the 
old fashioned Liberalism of rural Wales is very different from the new Liberalism of 
south Wales'. Comfort was thus taken from the fact that 'this was a media election par 
excellence - and Plaid Cymru survived it'. 
135 Some of this belief in organisation - and 
in attracting non-Labour voters - had influenced tactics in north-west Wales. In 
Caernarfonshire, Dafydd Wigley's campaign had officially started in March 1973.136 
Publication of local party newspapers and the canvassing of large sections of the local 
electorate were both initiated during that year. Organisational effort was seen as vital 
if the party was to win the seat. As Wigley argued in the first edition of Triban Arfon, 
published in September 1973, a massive effort was required from the local party: 
We can win Caernarfon in the next election, but only through activism of a 
kind which we have never seen before in this constituency ... I am willing to 
do 
all I can ... but this is beyond the work of one man. 
137 
At the same time, as Wigley was also aware, the importance of personality was vital. 
This was addressed by Wigley's personal canvassing campaign, which involved 
meeting three thousand local voters during the eleven months before the February 
election. 138 As was the case with Thomas in Merioneth, Wigley became an active and 
prominent spokesman in local social and economic debates. A key component of 
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Thomas' election strategy in Merioneth was to act as the local NIP before he v. -as 
elected. This entailed dealing with 'constituents' concerns and problems. a tictic 
which fitted in with his 'communitarian' ethos. 139 Consen-atives and Liberals were 
not neglected. Close links were formed with the local farming community - -vvinnin, -, 
the party admirers in rural areas - whilst Thomas' active membership and actiVe 
involvement in local TGWU affairs had a positive impact in the county's urban 
centres - particularly Blaenau Ffestiniog. 140 
Whilst personality, community and sheer graft demonstrated the local party's respect 
for traditional electioneering methodology, there was more than a hint of 
'Arnericanisation' and 'razzamatazz' in other features of the campaign strategies. As 
has already been noted, local party campaigns from the 1950s onwards had become 
renowned for their vociferous and enthusiastic nature. Enthusiasm - in all its guises - Z: ) 
mushroomed in the early 1970s. Noisy, up-beat campaigns became the norm. 141 In 
preparation for the general election, local branches had been encouraged to prepare 
for their campaigns by purchasing 'radio-cassettes' and 'loud- speakers', both of 
which were essential for the (loud) repetition of 'recorded messages and up-beat 
songs' in local markets, towns and remote country areas. 142 
Brian Morgan Edwards (the party's director of communicatlons) encouraged the 
carnival mood of campaigns with plans for TA systems', 'cassettes of election tunes', 
together with 'dayglo green' beer mats, 'balloons', 'sticker badges', 'tin badges', 'car 
143 stickers' and 'paper caps' . There 
had been concerns that winter campaigns would 
hamper Plaid's efforts at generating a carnival atmosphere. 144 These concerns were 
quashed in both February and October. 'Scores' of canvassers braving the elements 
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became a feature of Plaid's campaigns. Such was the enthusiasm of Plaid's, workers 
that it was not uncommon for a house to be visited 'three or four tirnes'. '-" -ý In 
Caemarfonshire, Wigley's canvassers conducted 'poster counts'. In local villa-ge, 
Wigley's distinctive 'dayglo green' posters -gre", with every %-Islt': 
Even in the council estates which had been loyal to Labour, the poster 
campaign was being won by the end of the campaign. 146 
The same was equally true of Merioneth where, as Y Cvmro reported, Plaid 'had more 
canvassers than the rest of the constituencies put together'. 14- 
Large, well-attended meetings were also a feature of Plaid's campaigns. Wigley Iý 
believed that Plaid attracted large crowds in Caemarfonshire partly because of 
rumours that the seat was about to change hands. Plaid estimated that around four 
thousand people attended various party meetings in the constituencies. Large meetings 
were not confined to Plaid but Labour's well-attended meetings Plaid claimed, were 
'artificial' and 'constructed': 
The difference between their audiences and ours was that they had to depend 
on well-known figures to attract supporters, whilst we, apart from the last 
night, capitallsed on the hundreds of voters who came to listen and consider 
before making up their minds. 148 
The political side of the campaigns focussed on local and national Welsh issues. 
Wigley's election campaign for the February election was given a valuable (and 
appropriate) kick-start because it coincided with a Parliament for Wales rally in 
Bangor - planned before the election had been announced. Kilbrandon and devolution 
obviously featured prominently in the party's campaigns (see below), but it was far 
from being its key component in either Caernarfonshire or Merioneth. 
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Obviously there was some mileage in the Kilbrandon debate, and this was exploited 
by Plaid's propaganda machine during the election campaign. In February, Labour's 
timid support for an elected council was regularly pilloried. In October, after Labour 
had abandoned plans for an elected council in favour of an assembly, Plaid's 
propaganda exploited the fact that Labour's planned concession to Wales was less 
than that offered to Scotland. According to Plaid, Labour had 'shocked Wales' bv 
offering it an 'Inferior' assembly. 149The party's press releases also utilised Labour's 
discomfort over the issue. As one, citing the opinion of a 'Labour candidate' argued: 
The feeling that Wales is getting something less (than Scotland) is political 
dynamite of a kind that Wales will find hard to handle. 150 
Although devolution was obviously the central mechanism for delivering all Plaid's 
policies, it was these policies, rather than devolution per se, that were emphasised 
during the election campaigns. In both constituencies jobs - and economic issues 
generally - dominated. Distinctively local adaptations of national party policies were 
aired. As Y Cymro noted of Wigley's campaign in Caemarfon, 'all his arguments 
corresponded with Plaid's national arguments'. 15 1 The economic plan (which Wigley 
had helped to write) still provided the main thrust of Plaid election manifestos in 
1974, although policies developed after 1970 were also evident (see below). 
Tecentralisation' and 'democratisation' were the themes of Plaid's manifestos. 152 
Plaid's solutions to Welsh problems still obviously revolved around the proviso of a 
Welsh parliament. Economic problems were blamed on the failure of 'the system'. 
The proposed solution to these problems demonstrated the influence of 'socialist' or 
leftist' thinking within the party. At the same time there were also appeals to more 
traditional party concerns and aspirations. 
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Rhetoric that had featured prominently in Plaid's propaganda in the late 1960s aiid 
early 1970s featured prominently in the manifesto. As it argued: 
Our system of government has failed. Failed to involve people in the decision.,, 
which affect their lives. Little thought has been gi%-en to shanno, 'xealth more 
fairly or to establishing a system of industrial democracy which would lead to 
harmony or co-operation instead of industrial unrest ... successi%-e 
Labour and 
Conservative governments failed to recognise the nature and se\-enty of the 
problem. They have attempted a series of mechanistic controls in the hope that 
the problem would go away ... these policies 
have failed. The present crisis is 
fraught with danger ... some politicians and newspapers are calling 
for 'firm 
leadership' - without asking where such leadership might take us. Under the 
present government it could lead to authoritarianism, totalitarianism and 
dictatorship, always a threat when a declining empire becomes obsessed with 
previous 'glones'. 153 
The manifesto argued that industrial decline was the result of massive structural 
problems. Wales was 'one of the oldest industrial nations in the world' ývith an 
industrial base that was still 'very strong'. However, it had never: 
Been able to attract the wide range of profitable manufacturing industries that 
would create full employment and a high level of income. 
The reasons for this were obvious: 
Roads are out of date and over crowded, our rail network has been mutilated, 
not a single mile of railway has been electrified and facilities for technical 
education are inadequate. 
In line with the economic plan, 'growth centres', 'industrial parks' and a 'National 
Development Agency' were proposed as solutions to those problems. Agriculture was 
also a key theme. Pleasing traditionalists, Plaid called for 'medium sized 
family 
farms' to be the 'basic unit of Welsh farming'. It also called for the sale of agricultural 
land to be restricted to 'genuine' farmers and for the development of a 'land 
development bank' to assist young farmers. 
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Plaid's social policies had a much more radical feel. In addition to plans for a national 
minimum wage tied to the cost of living, a 'reduction of the -wealth -, ap' and 'effecti%, e 
controls of prices and unearned incomes', there were also plans for an lncomes 
Maintenance Policy' to replace social security and entailing the scrapping of national 
insurance contributions and the means test. The IMP, financed directly from taxatioii 
and tied to the cost of living, was intended to include a wide range of recipients. " 
Under the IMP the unemployed would be encouraged to do 'sociallý, useful ývork' of a 
kind that 'would not deprive anyone of a full-time job' in return for the national 
minimum wage -a policy which reflected more than a hint of the TVA progorammes 
that had captivated the party's attentions in the late 1930s and 1940s. 155 
Leftist sympathies were also evident in the party's 'industnal democracy' policies 
which included the immediate repealing of the Industrial Relations Act, xorkers 
rights to representation on management boards, the abandonment of the 'stocks and 
shares' system and the 'national 1 sation of industries vital to the nation'. Housing was 
also addressed. The manifesto called for 'the municipalisation of all privately rented 
property and second homes' where there was an ýurgent need' in local communities. 
Healthcare was also addressed. 'Community health centres' and 'community 
hospitals' were favoured means of delivering health services, with responsibility for 
health services 'devolved' to county and district councils. Here support for local 
(public) services was the key, with little mention of the steps necessary to pay for 
them. 
Plaid's education policies combined the modem and the traditional. The rapid 
expansion of nursery and technical education (paid for by the money that a IvVelsh 
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government would not 'waste' on defence) topped a list of priorities. Others included 
a national craft apprenticeship scheme, and a radi II in ical overhaul of higher education i 
Wales. The University of Wales came under scrutiny. It would be enlarged to include 
polytechnics, colleges of education and the Open University. The federal scheme of 
the university would be strengthened with 'one or t, \N, o colleges at most' designated as 
6centres of excellence' in each discipline 'to avoid wasteful duplication'. A college of 
'business and industrial affairs' would also be established, together xith a second 
medical school (in Swansea), a vetinary school and a 'centre for transport studies'. 
More controversially a desire was expressed to: 
Prevent money from being wasted on university expansion for the sake of 
reject English students. 
Local government was also addressed, with expansion of powers for local authorities, 
4open governance' and 'new powers to establish industry' all featur-ing prominently. 
Concerns relating to the use of language in government were also addressed. 156 
Bilingual documents, 'instantaneous translating equipment in all areas of public 
debate, as well as 'officials capable of transacting business in Welsh as well as 
English' in all departments of public service, combined pragmatic solutions with 
others which were much more controversial. Europe (a contentious issue in the party 
from the late 1960s onwards) was also addressed, the party advocating a referendurn 
as a favoured solution to a troublesome issue, whilst support for a 'fourth' channel 
completed the party's package. 
Distinctively local themes were also developed in the campaigns through local 
publications. Plaid - unlike Labour - could seek to set its own agenda, despite 
limited 
coverage in the UK dominated media. In addition to the publication of Triban, Plaid's 
activists in Caemarfonshire produced another newspaper, Yr Herald Ni, which 
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focussed on local issues and aimed to undermine the local Caernaýfon & Denbi,, h 
Herald's traditionally anti-nationalist rhetoric. 157 Tký'enty thousand copies of Hcrald 
Ni were distributed on the last weekend of the FebruarY election campaign. ' ýs For the 
October election campaign the party produced 'special election editions' of the fVel.,; h 
Nation for both Caernarfonshire and Merioneth, distributed free as election 
newspapers. In Caernarforishire, housing was the main concern. Plaid pointed to the 
fact that the local housing waiting list consisted of 1,800 people, amongst the highest 
in Wales. 'Housing Action Areas' - to include Llanbens, Trefor and parts of 
Caernarfon - would be created to solve the problem. 
159 Further aid in the form of 100 
per cent mortgages charged at an interest rate of five per cent to those eaming less 
than f 50 a week would also be provided by a State Advances Corporation. Moreover, 
Gwynedd County Council would also be encouraged to buy houses that went up for 
sale in the private sector to ensure that local housing needs were met. This initiative 
aimed at expanding the highly visible and successful work done by local housing 
associations, such as Tai Gwynedd. 160 
Silicosis, poor TV reception, pensions and 'the crisis of local authority rates' which 
had been 'brought about by grant allocations' (and ultimately second homes) tapped 
into an emotive and highly charged local issue. Jobs were once again addressed, but 
with a few new ideas - Wigley discussing 'Japanese contacts', 
'an electronics 
industrial park' and an 'economic development officer' employed by the local 
council. 161 Similar themes were also addressed in Merioneth, although agriculture 
received a more prominent billing. Here, in addition to local party newspapers, 
Plaid 
produced a pamphlet, Success to Merioneth Farmers, especially for the constituency. 
It utillsed themes that were also aired in a draft pamphlet on agriculture, 
Protect our 
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Farms, also written in 1974.162 The 'problem' of the Common Market - 'a disaster t',., )r 
Welsh farmers' - provided most of the propaganda for these pamphlets. As Plaid 
argued: 
Faced with the rapidly rising costs (especially cereal prices sanctioned for the 
benefit of the big French and English producers) our livestock, dain., and 
poultry farmers are actually unable to cover their costs, whilst home prices are 
kept down by subsidised imports fTom the EEC. 163 
Rising fanning costs in the 1973-74 period such as 'fuel - 80 per cent', 'feed 50 per 
cent', 'fertiliser 40 per cent' and 'machinery 15 per cent' also provided valuable 
propaganda in Merioneth. 164 
The content of Plaid policy statements did not vary from February to October. The 
only discernible difference in October was that Thomas and Wigley were ne", 
constituency MPs and thus had their own records to defend. Thomas compared his 
campaign to being 'hauled in front of your bosses after a six month probation 
period'. 165 Moreover, both Thomas and Wigley's record in the intervening months 
was impressive. Both quickly established themselves as effective community MPs- 
Their energetic activism placed Labour in a difficult position. When Labour was 
attentive, and found solutions to local problems, Plaid claimed the credit. When the 
government did not, the Plaid propaganda machine attacked its failures. Press reports 
of Thomas and Wigley's activism provided valuable election propaganda for the party 
in October. Thomas's 'achievements' after February had surpassed expectations. 
Eight Commons speeches, three hundred Commons questions and dealing with a 
thousand constituents' letters (on themes varying fTom farming to slilcosis, pensions, 
social security and devolution) as well as campaigns for new factories aptly fitted in 
with his campaign slogan 'On with the work'. As Y Cvmro reported, 'his record since I 
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February will help him defend the seat'. 166 The same was true of 'Wigley. who also 
received credit for an energetic approach. As Y Cymro again reported, Wlgleý had 
delivered an equal number of commons speeches, dealt with fi-,. -e thousand 
constituents' letters and dealt with another 175 problems through his local -sur, -, eries'. 
Agriculture, local rates, new factories, silicosis Nvere prominent constituencv 
concems. 
However, as the local press reported, the October election Nvas notable not onk, for the 
fact that 'there were far more green badges than red ones around', but also for the 
hostility of the campaign, 'the bitterest election fought by Labour for twenty years'. 167 
There had been 'local difficulties' in Caemarfonshire in February. Plaid had 
responded to those problems with an approach that was more common in Chicago 
than Cesarea. When the local Conservative candidate attempted to 'smear' Wigley by 
associating Plaid Cymru with Cymdeithas 'antics', he was warned by a local Plaid 
official that continuing the attacks might be detrimental to his health. They stopped. 168 
But these were minor problems compared to the hostile Wigley-Sherrington 
confrontation in October, when 'smear' campaigns were launched by both sides and 
when one political confrontation ended in a mass brawl in Caernarfon's 'square'. As 
the election results indicated, this had little impact on Plaid's reputation. In fact, one 
or two of the incidents caused amusement. For example, Emlyn Sherrington's left- 
wing reputation was irresistible to quick-witted Plaid supporters who 'adjusted' his 
posters to read 'KREmlyn Sherrington'. ' 69 Labour leaflets proclaiming that Wigley 
intended to 'sabotage' local tourism by cutting off water supplies to caravan sites. 
This backfired when Plaid demanded a bundle of the leaflets so that they could deliver 
them to villages like Rhosgadfan and Rhostryfan which suffered water shortages. 
170 
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Plaid's victories in Caemarfonshire and -Merioneth vvere the result of a long process of 
political change, stemming back to the 1960s. Plaid did not win because of one-off 
protest votes (as its continued success in the region from 1974 to the present day 
confirms). Victory was the result of a deep-rooted capacity to express the economic 
and social as well as cultural, interests of the local community. This was built up 
through unsubtle attacks which exploited changing circumstances and promised 
4national' solutions. But success was not just about Plaid popularity. Like Labour in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, its success depended on the unpopularityl or inefficiencies 
of its political opponents. The Conservative and Liberal parties (whilst contesting 
local elections on a more regular basis by the early 1970s) did not present a realistic 
challenge. Labour's domination was undermined by its lack of roots, organisation and 
credibility by the mid 1970s. 
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CONCLUSION 
I 
This thesis has been largely concerned with the decline of the Labour parvY in north- 
west Wales up to 1974. This is not, of course, the end of the story. In the 1979 general 
election Labour's share of the vote in Caemarfonshire fell to 24.8 (from 34.1 % in 
1974), and in Merioneth to 24.8 per cent (from 30.91ýo in 1974). Just four years later in 
the 1983 general election the party was no longer even a realistic challenger to Plaid 
Cymru. In Caernarfonshire Labour slumped to third place in a four-way contest, 
polling under 20 per cent of the vote. In Menoneth Labour came last (also in a four- 
way contest) polling just 15 per cent of the vote. It ýk'as a position from the which the 
party has still not fully recovered. 
By the end of the 1970s Plaid Cymru had thus consolidated its electoral position in 
the region, extending its majorities in both Caemarfonshire and Menoneth. By the 
1983 general election Plaid had gained further and established commanding electoral 
majorities in both constituencies. It was a position which the party has since 
preserved, returning substantial majorities in all subsequent elections and developing 
a strong base in local government. 
It has been argued above that these changes were more than a referendum on 
'Welshness'. The determinant of change was not simply the growth of Welsh identity. 
In 1979 - whilst Plaid Cymru was winning electors 
in Gwynedd - voters even in 
Gwynedd were rejecting devolution in the referendum on this subject. Plaid 
Cymru's 
support was not simply based on devolutionist or separatist sympathies, 
but on its 
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capacity to exploit a broader range of grievances and to offer an economic 'solution' 
wrapped up in a nationalist rhetoric. In the UK and across Europe, mo-party' 
political systems were in decline. In Wales this was reflected in the decline of the 
Labour party but also in the spectacular rejection of the Conservative party. This 
decline presented new opportunities to credible 'anti-Labour parties'. In England this 
meant the Liberals. In Wales this meant Plaid Cymru. Yet if Liberal support proved 
transient, Plaid's support was not. It was built up. Support was (gradually) 
accumulated. 
This emphasis on the erosion of Labour support may seem odd given Labour's 
success in the 1997 general election (when the party won 34 out of 40 Welsh seats) 
and its similar success in 2001. The 1997 result reflected the party's unprecedented 
popularity at UK level, and once more reflected a potent desire to end eighteen years 
of Tory rule. Yet if Labour did well on the back of this, even in Plaid Cyrnru 
heartlands, it only dented Plaid majorities in Caemarfonshire, Merioneth and other 
parts of north-west Wales. It was only when Plaid committed electoral errors - as in 
Anglesey in 2001 - that Labour regained some of its support. 
The two results are not contradictory because Labour's 'strength' across Wales in 
1997 and 2001 disguised many intrinsic weaknesses. Although the party had 
supported - and delivered - devolution in 1997, it was subsequently trounced in the 
1999 assembly elections, losing traditionally safe southern seats in the process. These 
results, like the extraordinarily low turnout in 2001 - signified a reaction -a 
disappointment - with the veracity of 'New' Labour's apparent commitment 
to 
Wales, which paralleled the disappointment shown after 1970. In north-west Wales, 
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Labour's support had been based on more than support for devolution, and Plaid's 
growth was based on more than this as well. -. Nationalism was a Ian-ua, -, e of 
discontent, used to erode Labour's base. 
This is not to deny the importance of language and culture as influences on voting. 
Nor is it to claim that voting patterns now are the same as In the past. In 'post- 
colonial' Wales, in the elections of the period since 1997, some -ý, -oters are expressing 
anti-Tory views by voting Labour in UK elections, whilst displaying 'Welsh' 
concerns by voting Plaid Cymru in National Assembly elections. ' Plaid Cymru has 
been working at combining economic and cultural appeals since the 1960s. Labour - 
sporadically buoyed up by its UK-wide appeal - has done little to re-establish its 
Welsh credibility in the 1990s. Without a full 'Welsh' appeal - without a pledge to 
tackle economic and cultural as well as constitutional issues - it has been difficult for 
Labour to fight back. The 'Welsh' Labour appeal of the 1950s and 1960s has faded. 
11 
The pattern of political developments in Wales after 1979 is important as it highlights 
several themes of this study. As Chapter One noted, Labour's support in north-west 
Wales was always based on a combination of pro-devolutionist sentiment, support for 
Labour's 'local' policies, the popularity of the party's programme at UK level and an 
appeal to local or national identities .2 These were vital and inter-related strands of 
Labour success. In the 1940s and 1950s support for Plaid Cymru had been 11m, ted by 
the party's over-emphasis on cultural and linguistic concerns and its almost complete 
lack of attention to 'serious' social and economic insecurities. This was not a stance 
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which would enable Plaid Cymru to challenge Labour in north-vvest 'Wales - or 
anywhere else. 3 
However, as Chapters Two, Three and Four demonstrated, a series of changes (both 
political and non-political) enabled Plaid Cymru's challenge to flourish. Chapter Two 
showed how changing social and economic factors, evident across the UK, created 
opportunities to challenge political attitudes in ways which gradually impacted on 
political loyalties and allegiances in north-west Wales. 4 These, combined with other 
distinctively local forceS5, provided the context in which Plaid's challenge developed. 
Nevertheless, political allegiances are not built on sand. Chapter Three showed that 
whilst Labour had been attentive to social and economic change in the 1950s, and to 
the challenges it faced at local level6, its , solutions' to those problems proved largely 
ineffective in the 1960s, not only because of economic problems, but also because of 
poorly constructed policies. Cuts in expenditure, problems with regional aid and other 
aspects of the Labour government's programme undermined the party's image - and 
unity - within Wales. 
Chapter Four identified the second component of political change. It showed how in 
the 1960s, Plaid Cymru modernised of both its organisation and policies. These 
changes provided the platform from which a challenge to Labour's dominance could 
be made. 8 However, the party's rethinking still had to be conveyed to the electorate. 
Chapter Five showed how Labour's credibility in north-west Wales was undermined 
by hostile nationalist propaganda, instigated not only by Plaid but also by an 
influential local press which had become despondent with the failure of Labour 
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policy. The chapter thus demonstrated that Welsh politics was not only a matter of 
policies and personalities, or even of the 'nati 11m ag e -s ional question', but also one of i- 
Plaid Cyrnru tapped into local fears over the survival of the Welsh culture and 
language, and over economic prospects, in order to undermine Labour's image as a 
party concerned with 'Welsh' aspirations. 9 
Chapter Six focussed on the culmination of political change. It shmved how Plaid 
Cymru's electoral success in 1974 was not the result of a 'one-off protest vote 
against either Labour or the Conservative government, but instead was the final 
component of a slow process of changing political allegiances, evident not only in 
north-west Wales but also in the rest of the UK, where other 'third parties' also 
performed well in 1974.10 
This thesis has consistently indicated that elections are a competition - and that 
success is sometimes the result of both a party's strengths and its competitor's 
weaknesses. Attention has thus been paid to the declining credibility of the Liberals 
and Conservatives as challengers to Labour - but also to Labour's inability to strike 
back against its opponents, especially after 1970. Crumbling local Labour 
organisations declining support among those who tried to 'set' local opinions and 
perhaps the lack of a credible programme for Wales, meant Labour only began to 
compete once it was too late. The nature of Labour's campaign in 1974 was not the 
cause of Labour's collapse; it reflected a much deeper malaise. Moreover, Plaid's 
capacity to combine 'traditionalism' with elements of Labour appeal meant it could 
draw support from Conservatives and Liberals. Contradictory appeals were reconciled 
by seeing Welsh home rule as a solution to all ills. 
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III 
As there is no existing account of Labour's decline in north-west Wales. this study 
has tried to engage with a broader historiographical literature. Historians and 
sociologists in Wales and elsewhere have displayed a growing concern for 'national 
identities', their 'construction' and their impact on politics. " It is often assumed that 
Plaid Cymru's growth reflected a renaissance in Welsh national identity, be, _, inning 
with the linguistic revival of the 1960s. This study contributes to such debates by 
arguing that a cautionary approach should be taken to these assumptions. As the study 
demonstrated, it was still feasible to 'feel' Welsh, support the language and vote 
Labour in 1974, as it was to oppose devolution and support Plaid Cymru in 1979. 
Plaid Cymru did not win in 1974 because it had cultivated a naturally developing 
4nationalist' community, the product of a cultural 'Welshness'. On the contrary, it 
won and then developed it -a factor which was vital in ensuring continued electoral 
success in the north-west for the remainder of the twentieth century. In the 1970s, 
much was challenged which is now accepted. In particular, issues relating to the 
language - prominent among Plaid activists but less so among voters in the 1970s - 
have since been elevated into prime features of Welsh identity. Language was not a 
major 4cause' of Plaid's support - outside a cultural elite. 
12 
This study also contributes to historical and psephological debates over the 
importance of 'national' as opposed to 'local' factors in determining or Influencing 
political choices. As several chapters of the study demonstrated, 'local' experiences 
and issues were still important in understanding political loyalties in the early 1970s. 
As Chapter Five stressed, this was particularly so when the importance of those issues 
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were explained to voters by effective political campaigning. Even in the a, -, e of 'TV 
elections', old-fashioned political approaches remained allve and proved effective. 
Politics was not suddenly 'nationalised' by the arrival of TV sets in living rooms I 
across the UK. It is possible that some regions of the UK (including north-west 
Wales) were more susceptible than others to *local' issues, not because the 'VVelsh 
were 'different', but because of the continued existence and importance of a 
distinctive local (especially the Welsh language) press. As the study noted, Plaid 
Cymru believed that its political message and appeal in 'border' constituencies ýwas 
severely restricted by a dominant 'English' local press, and by TV aerials tuned to 
'English' stations. In north-west Wales 'the media' presented a pro-Plaid face, 
undermining Labour's attempt to stress its local relevance and 'Welshness'. It is clear 
from this study that Labour's problems stemmed from the inter-action of 'local' and 
4national' (meaning UK wide and Wales-wide) policies and approaches which merged 
to determine a party's local credibility. The influence of a local Welsh elite, and the 
local press, in creating a climate of opinion should not be under-estimated. The latter 
at least provided a vehicle for a political language which provided easy solutions to 
complex problems, in a rhetoric as attentive to local concerns as Labour's had been in 
the 1950s. 
If there is little literature on Labour's decline in north-west Wales or Plaid's growth to 
'revise', there is a substantial literature on Welsh politics which this thesis augments. 
Much of that literature has focused on class, trade unionism, Labour success and the 
south, with the literature on north Wales offering a pale reflection of that agenda. This 
study shows that the history of north Wales should not be an afterthought, a 'footnote' 
to a history dominated by south Wales. Instead it should be seen as central to the 
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experience of contemporary Wales. The political history of north Wales in the 19-; 0, -, - 
1970s offers insights with a broader relevance. It shows that social class and trade 
unions are not the only valuable themes in Welsh labour history, a factor xhich is 
becoming increasingly obvious even, and perhaps especially, in south Wales now that 
the veracity of social class as a unifying 'bond' have been questioned by industrial 
decline. Thus the experience of north Wales - and the approach used in this study - 
could perhaps be applied in studying political change in other parts of Wales in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
Devolution has naturally cast a large shadow over the study of recent Welsh historv, 
creating a substantial and often very unhistorical literature. This study suggests that 
devolution is too often seen as a single issue and studied out of context. There was 
much more to Welsh politics in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s than devolution. 
Devolution was just one part of a package of policy proposals and debates which 
helped shape political change; even if it preoccupied a section of the Welsh speaking 
elite, it did not preoccupy voters. This study has thus attempted to relocate devolution 
within its contemporary world, to understand political change by considering UK, 
Welsh and local social, economic and political images, trends, themes and issues. 
Equally, it has also emphasised that local trends were part of a much wider and shared 
European experience. Doubts about the appropriate location of power were part of 
this. A cultural renaissance and belief in a Welsh identity had a role, but that role 
needs to be studied, not assumed, and set against other experiences. 
IV 
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In a field as uncultivated as the recent history of north Wales, some issues ine-vitabl", 
remained under-developed within this thesis. There has been insufficient time to fully 
evaluate the role of individuals such as Goronwy Roberts, or to compare him with 
other influential Labourites from the area, such as Cledwyn Hughes. " Neither ý, vas 
there sufficient time to compare the rise of Plaid Cymru in Caernarfonshire and 
Merioneth with the experience of neighbouring constituencies in north Wales, such as 
Anglesey (which became a Plaid Cymru seat in 1987) or Conwy (which still has 
not). 14 The way in which Plaid Cymru built up allegiances (and encountered 
problems) in north-west Wales after 1974 sadly remains virgin territory. 
In other areas, evidence was tantalising, but sparse. Evidence of -support 
for the 
Investiture of the Prince of Wales in 1969 and of opposition to devolution in 1979 
raised the issue of 'Britishness' and its appeal within Wales. Given the rejection of 
devolution by local voters in 1979, and the narrow margin in favour of devolution 
even in 1997, the question of a persistent 'British' identity in the heart of Welsh 
speaking Wales is both fascinating and compelling. Recently found opinion polls, 
privately conducted over the last thirty years for the Conservatives, may well shed 
important light on attitudes to 'Britishness' and the monarchy within Welsh speaking 
Wales. Recently opened records at the PRO may place debates over the Investiture in 
a fTesh perspective. ' 5 
Neither was there enough time to develop a full analysis of Labour's Welsh policy 
problems in the 1970-74 period. As has already been noted, preliminary evidence 
indicates that Labour became too pre-occupied with devolution after 1970, or that 
activists were so disillusioned by the failure of the Wilson governments that the 
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development of new domestic policies and a fresh approach was beyond the part, "s 
capabilities. As Chapter Six suggested. the only distinctive elements of Labour's 
Welsh manifestos in 1974 related to devolution. Other policies lacked the energy and 
originality of those offered by Labour a decade earlier. Much work remains to be done 
in understanding why this was the case. 
Indeed, much remains to be done on many areas of 'Welsh social and political history, 
especially from the early 1970s onwards. The history of the Labour party in Wales is 
not a closed book. As research for this study has demonstrated, nevv sources can still 
be uncovered which shed light on 'older' aspects of the party's history, whilst 
devolution and the challenge of Plaid Cymru, now spreading to Labour's southern 
heartland, offers fresh challenges to a new generation of Welsh political historians. 
Neither has the story of devolution been fully told. To borrow a classic devolutionist 
phrase, writing the history of devolution, like devolution itself 'is a process not an 
event'. Placing devolution, national identity and the growth of Plaid Cymru back into 
a broader context should be a significant part of that process. 
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